Compilation of the

Mosaic Pieces

(30.03.2026 4th Edition)

Experience

Understanding

Problem

Emotion Feeling Intuition

Knowing

Inner Perspective – Spirituality

World Constitution through Unity Formation

Reality and Constituted Reality

Klaus Wroblewski

The Genesis of the Question

My writings did not originate in a theoretical interest, but in an existential concern. The **Gedankenmosaik** (Mosaic of Thoughts), my original collection of reflections, began as a personal attempt to understand my own life, my relationship, and, above all, the questions that had remained unresolved. From this starting point, three guiding questions gradually emerged and came to shape my subsequent reflections:

What does my life, taken as a whole, mean?
What is the "I"—my own and that of others?
How is understanding itself possible?

Over time, the character of this work changed. What had begun as an attempt at personal clarification increasingly developed into an open-ended search for orientation. The concern was no longer solely to come to terms with what had been experienced, but also to seek a theoretical account that I myself could regard as viable. In the Gedankenmosaik, I recorded my first fundamental reflections on these questions. Since I approached philosophy as a layperson and was therefore not committed to any established school of thought, I soon discovered that almost every philosophical tradition contained ideas with which I could agree, while at the same time advancing others that conflicted with my own intuitions. Much of what I encountered I understood only in part. Nevertheless, I sought to interpret these ideas from my own perspective and, wherever this seemed meaningful, to incorporate them into my developing reflections. In this way, a distinctive line of thought gradually emerged. Ultimately, this led me to publish my reflections, since I had not encountered this particular constellation of ideas in any account known to me.

The same applies to the **Mosaiksteine** (Mosaic Pieces). Alongside the *Gedankenmosaik*, a number of theoretical lines of inquiry emerged that I pursued independently of the main text and developed as separate studies. I chose the term Mosaikstein for these individual studies. Over time, this resulted in the following Mosaic Pieces: *Experience*, *Understanding*, *Problem*, *Emotion, Feeling, Intuition*, *The Internal Perspective and Spirituality*, *Knowing*, *The Constitution of the World through Unit Formation*, and *Reality and Constituted Reality*. In the present work, these individual studies are brought together in a condensed form.

With this fourth compilation of the *Mosaic Pieces*, I intend, for the time being, to bring the written development of my reflections to a close. At present, I find in them viable and plausible answers to the questions of how understanding itself can be understood, how the other person—the "you"—can be understood, and how the "I" can be understood. What follows is a concise overview of the individual Mosaic Pieces:

Experience
Understanding
Problem
Emotion, Feeling, Intuition
The Internal Perspective and Spirituality
Knowing
The Constitution of the World through Unit Formation
Reality and Constituted Reality

The individual Mosaic Pieces are available in their complete form through the Internet Archive under the search term “Klaus Wroblewski” and on PhilPeople under my name.

Overview: The Individual Mosaic Pieces

In the **Mosaic Piece “Experience”** (study: pp. 011-110; table of contents: pp. 450-452), experience is not conceived as the mere reception of an already constituted world, but as a living process through which constituted reality first takes shape for us. This means that meaning is not simply found as something already given; rather, it emerges in lived experience. From a situation that is initially open and as yet indeterminate, relations, differences, and meanings gradually arise through which a world can first become accessible to experience.

This process is never purely conceptual. Experience is always shaped by bodily and emotional involvement. The lived body is the field within which the world appears as near or distant, pleasant or burdensome, attractive or threatening. Emotions are involved from the outset: they bring what matters into prominence, direct attention, and orient the course of experience. Constituted reality therefore does not arise independently of our bodily and affective involvement, but precisely through it.

Conceptual thought assumes its distinctive function only subsequently. It does not originally generate meaning, but takes up what has already become effective within experience. By ordering, naming, and articulating it conceptually, thought renders these formations of meaning more stable and communicable. Thought thus gives more determinate form to what initially emerged within lived experience as open and fluid.

At the same time, everything that arises in this way remains provisional. Orders of experience can change, be corrected, or appear differently under altered conditions. It is precisely in this revisability that their relation to reality becomes apparent: not through any definitive apprehension of reality, but through their openness to resistance, irritation, and renewed formation. Reality itself can never be fully grasped, yet it remains operative as both a limit and a corrective.

From this perspective, the “I” likewise does not appear as a fixed entity, but as something that takes shape only within the process of experience. It emerges through the interrelation of an individual's relation to the world and relation to itself and therefore remains open and processual. What emerges, overall, is an account of the human relation to the world in which experience constitutes the fundamental source of meaning, conceptual thought organizes that meaning, and both together give rise to a constituted reality that provides orientation for the individual without ever becoming finally determined.

In the **Mosaic Piece “Understanding”** (study: pp. 111-168; table of contents: pp. 452-455), the aim is to show that understanding cannot simply be equated with thinking. Rather, it emerges as a living process in which experience and thought interact. Its point of departure lies not in the concept, but in experience: the world never encounters us in an entirely neutral manner, but always already as meaningful—as familiar or unfamiliar, important, irritating, or in need of clarification. This already constitutes an initial form of understanding.

At the same time, it becomes apparent that understanding is not a purely intellectual process. It is bound up with embodiment, mood, and emotion. Feelings help determine what comes to the fore, what affects us, and what appears relevant in the first place. Meaning therefore does not

arise only through subsequent reflection; it already takes shape within lived experience itself. Thought subsequently takes up this already operative meaning, orders it, articulates it in concepts, and thereby renders it more stable and communicable.

Understanding thus appears as a movement between two levels: one that remains close to immediate experience and another that is conceptually organized. Neither is sufficient on its own. Without experience, thought would remain empty; without thought, experience would remain transient and difficult to articulate. Understanding occurs precisely in the mediation between the two, through which meaningful relations can emerge.

It also becomes clear that understanding is never entirely complete. It remains open to correction, to new experiences, and to other perspectives. What initially appears coherent may later become questionable. In this sense, understanding always remains provisional. The "I," too, does not appear as a fixed entity, but takes shape only within this process of experiencing, interpreting, and relating to oneself.

What emerges overall is an account of understanding as an open and dynamic process. It is grounded in experience, organized through thought, and sustained by emotion, while always remaining oriented toward something that can never be fully captured. Precisely for this reason, understanding remains an ongoing process in which world, self, and meaning are continually disclosed anew.

In the **Mosaic Piece "Problem"** (study: pp. 169-217; table of contents: pp. 455-457), the point of departure is not an already established order, but its fragility. The guiding insight is that knowing does not begin where meaning, coherence, and orientation are already secured, but where precisely this taken-for-granted order breaks down. A problem is therefore not merely a disturbance within an otherwise intact world. It designates a situation in which established orders of meaning cease to be viable and new orientation must first be formed. It is in this sense that the problem acquires a fundamental status: it is not a peripheral phenomenon, but the actual occasion for knowing.

From this perspective, constituted reality is not understood as something simply found, but as the result of an ongoing process of reorganization. Where problems arise, relations are formed anew, relevances shift, and provisional orders are stabilized. Constituted reality thus emerges through processes of meaning formation under conditions of uncertainty. In this context, knowing does not mean simply representing a structure that already exists. Rather, it means responding to problematicity, establishing relations, and gaining orientation. Yet the resulting order always remains provisional, since every solution may itself generate further problems.

The distinction between constituted reality and reality is also crucial here. Constituted reality refers to the particular order of meaning that has been formed and stabilized. Reality, by contrast, remains a limiting concept: it is neither directly accessible nor fully determinable, yet it operates as both limit and corrective. It is in relation to this limit that the impossibility of securing any order once and for all becomes apparent. Problems mark precisely those points at which existing interpretations become unstable and must be reorganized. Knowing therefore remains, in principle, open, revisable, and incomplete.

A further central claim is that neither conditionality, nor reality, nor meaning itself constitutes the actual beginning. In contrast to Buddhist approaches, the argument maintains that problematicity cannot be derived from an already existing nexus of conditions; in contrast to New Realism, it maintains that problematicity cannot be understood merely as the consequence

of inadequate access to a given reality. Against hermeneutic models, moreover, it emphasizes that meaning does not precede the problem but is first brought forth in the process of engaging with problematicity. The problem therefore precedes conditionality, reality insofar as it has already become accessible within an organized order, and any already operative horizon of meaning.

What emerges overall is an account of knowing as an open, dynamic, and never completed process. Problems are not obstacles that simply have to be eliminated before knowing can begin. Rather, they are the driving force through which meaning formation, order, and the constitution of a world are first set in motion. This *Mosaic Piece* therefore identifies the problem as the origin, limit, and driving force of knowing:

It is not despite problematicity that a relation to the world and orientation become possible, but precisely through it.

In the **Mosaic Piece "Emotion, Feeling, Intuition"** (study: pp. 218-289; table of contents: pp. 457-459), the aim is to show that affective processes are not merely accompanying phenomena of thought, but belong to the very core of human meaning formation. Constituted reality does not appear as something already complete and simply given; rather, it takes shape through the interplay of experience, understanding, and the engagement with problems. Within this process, emotion, feeling, and intuition perform a fundamental function: they provide orientation before conceptual thought begins and thereby shape, from the outset, what can emerge as significant at all.

Emotions are not understood here as mere reactions to situations whose meaning has already been established. Rather, they structure the experiential field itself by generating differences, weightings, and relevances. Through them, some things move into the foreground while others recede; some acquire urgency while others lose significance. Emotions thus constitute the affective ground structure of experience. They are not secondary additions to experience, but contribute to the very possibility of the world appearing in a particular way.

Feelings, in this context, designate the bodily experienced dimension of this emotional organization. Through them, it becomes experientially palpable how the world presents itself to an individual: as burdensome or opening, attractive or oppressive, coherent or irritating. Feelings do not render meaning evident conceptually, but bodily. At the same time, they give rise to an immediate relation to oneself, since what becomes manifest in feeling is not only the world, but also one's own affectedness. Feelings thereby contribute to the emergence of the "I" as situated and affected within its relation to the world.

Intuition appears as a condensed form of implicit understanding. It is neither irrational nor merely an uncertain "gut feeling," but a mode of orientation in which meaning grounded in experience condenses into a form capable of guiding action. Intuition does not proceed by constructing concepts step by step; rather, a relation presents itself immediately as coherent, fitting, or direction-giving. Intuition thus mediates between affectively structured experience and subsequent conceptual thought.

At the same time, this affective formation of meaning remains open and susceptible to disruption. Under conditions of problematicity, established emotional orders become unstable, relevances shift, feelings register this instability, and intuition itself must be reorganized. This shows that emotion, feeling, and intuition do not merely contribute to the formation of order; they also participate in its transformation.

Emotion, feeling, and intuition thereby make disruptions within an established order of meaning experientially accessible and contribute to the emergence of new coherence.

Overall, this yields an account of constituted reality as affectively co-constituted. Emotion differentiates, feeling renders this differentiation experientially evident, and intuition organizes it into an orienting configuration. Only on this basis can conceptual thought stabilize, order, and explicate what has already taken shape. Affective processes thus appear not as additions to understanding, but as its foundation. Without them, there would be no relevance, no bodily evidence, and no implicit orientation—and consequently no viable relation to the world.

In the **Mosaic Piece "Knowing"** (study: pp. 290-319; table of contents: pp. 459-460), knowing is not described as the mere apprehension of an already constituted reality. Rather, it is understood as a living process in which meaning, orientation, and understanding first take shape. Central to this account is the idea of recognition. Recognition here does not merely mean encountering something familiar again; it designates the moment in which experience, interpretation, and understanding come together in such a way that something is experienced as coherent, viable, and intelligible. Knowing therefore does not arise at a single point, but takes shape in the course of a process.

The internal perspective is of fundamental importance in this regard. Knowing cannot be adequately understood if it is described solely from the outside as an intellectual or functional process and thereby reduced to technically ascertainable operations. Knowing always takes place within a concrete experiential situation and is bound to perception, embodiment, mood, and already established horizons of meaning. The internal perspective is therefore not merely a personal supplement to knowing; it is the perspective within which knowing takes shape in the first place.

Thought, too, acquires a different role within this account. It does not appear as the origin of knowing, but as a subsequent form of its organization. What has already emerged as meaningful within lived experience is conceptually articulated, clarified, and stabilized in thought. Concepts and arguments make what is known available for reflection and communication, but they do not originally bring it forth. Its point of departure lies instead in the experience of fit—or, conversely, of incongruity—from which new insight can emerge.

For this reason, the concept of coherence (*Stimmigkeit*) is of particular importance. It designates the manner in which knowing proves itself within its actual enactment. Something does not become convincing merely because it is logically correct, but because experience, meaning, and understanding come together in a way that enables orientation. *Stimmigkeit* may manifest itself as clarity, coherence, or practical viability. Conversely, a lack of *Stimmigkeit* may become the point of departure for new knowledge, because it calls established relations into question and compels a reorientation.

Yet *Stimmigkeit* does not itself amount to truth. Rather, it designates a condition under which an individual can acknowledge an insight as viable and integrate it into already established formations of constituted reality. Only when such integrations continue to prove themselves, withstand objections, and can also be stabilized beyond individual contexts of understanding does what may count as true emerge. Truth therefore does not appear as a static magnitude existing outside the process of knowing, but as a validity achieved within the process of understanding and continually requiring renewed validation.

Engagement with different philosophical positions reveals the variety of ways in which knowing can be understood: as insight into order, as functional model formation, as resonance, as spiritual openness, as release from attachment, or as orientation within contexts of meaning. The approach developed here acquires its own contours precisely through its engagement with these perspectives. Epistemology thereby appears not as a fixed doctrinal system, but as an ongoing process of reconstruction and clarification.

Overall, this Mosaic Piece develops an account of knowing as an open and dynamic process. Knowledge does not consist in apprehending final truths, but in an ongoing form of orientation toward oneself and the world. It remains grounded in experience, is organized through thought, and at the same time remains open to correction and transformation. Knowing thus appears as a continuous process in which world and self are repeatedly brought into a newly coherent relation.

In the **Mosaic Piece "The Internal Perspective and Spirituality"** (study: pp. 320-353; table of contents: pp. 460-462), spirituality is not understood as privileged access to a transcendent reality, but as a form of human meaning formation. The point of departure is the insight that human beings never apprehend the world immediately. Everything that is perceived, thought, and experienced always already appears from within an internal perspective and is co-determined by interpretation, embodiment, language, and cultural formation. Our understanding of the world is therefore always perspectival and never completely objective.

Meaning does not arise from things themselves, but through the ways in which individuals organize impressions, form units, and establish relations. On this basis, a space of possibilities emerges: an open space of thought and interpretation within which alternatives, projections, and possibilities of meaning can arise. This space is not arbitrary, however, but is constrained by experience, emotional resonance, social communication, and practical validation. What proves capable of providing orientation and of remaining connectable within life can acquire viability.

Against this background, spirituality appears as a distinctive way of engaging with this space of possibilities. It does not constitute a separate world alongside everyday life, but a bodily, emotionally, and symbolically embedded practice of interpreting oneself and the world. Thinking and feeling are not opposites here; they are fundamental modes through which spiritual experience is enacted. Spirituality can therefore also manifest itself in everyday life, wherever individuals seek meaning, orientation, and inner *Stimmigkeit*.

For spiritual experiences to acquire stability and become communicable, individuals draw upon myths, symbols, and rituals. These forms stabilize meaning without thereby having to be understood as literally true. Religion, in this context, is described as an institutionalized form of such meaning formation, whereas spirituality remains more individual and open. Faith, emotion, and intuition confer personal validity upon such interpretations insofar as they allow them to be experienced as plausible, meaningful, and capable of guiding action.

Overall, what is developed here is a non-metaphysical account of spirituality. Spirituality appears as a condensed form of human meaning formation within the internal perspective: bodily grounded, emotionally sustained, symbolically mediated, and oriented toward the achievement of orientation. It is therefore not a withdrawal from the world, but a way of finding meaning within a world that is accessible to us only through interpretation.

In the **Mosaic Piece "The Constitution of the World through Unit Formation"** (study: pp. 354-418; table of contents: pp. 462-466), the central question is how a world can appear as ordered and determinate in the first place. The point of departure is the assumption that constituted reality is not simply given as something already complete, but emerges only through processes of unit formation. Something becomes an object or a meaningful relation only insofar as it is distinguished from something else and, at the same time, stabilized as a unit. The world therefore does not appear as a collection of independently given things, but as the result of operations in which differences are drawn and formed into relatively stable units. Constituted reality is thus not the point of departure, but the result of such processes of organization.

This approach makes clear that unit and difference are inseparably related. Without difference, nothing could be distinguished; without unit formation, nothing could persist as something determinate. Constituted reality emerges precisely through the interplay of these two moments: differences open possibilities of determination, while units stabilize these determinations in such a way that they become recognizable and capable of entering into further relations. Units are never final; they must be continually reproduced and remain, in principle, open to transformation.

Against this background, the distinction between reality and constituted reality is also reformulated. Reality remains a possible point of reference, but one that is not directly accessible. Constituted reality, by contrast, is the form in which the world appears within processes of unit formation. It is neither simply given nor arbitrarily constructed, but emerges within a field of tension between possibility, limitation, and stabilization. The classical question of being is thereby displaced by the question of how order comes about in the first place.

Understanding and problematicity can likewise be conceived as moments within unit formation. Understanding stabilizes units and enables relations to appear as meaningful and familiar. A problem, by contrast, marks the point at which such units become unstable. It reveals that existing orders are not necessary and thereby opens the possibility of new formations of units. Constituted reality thus emerges through the continuing interplay of stabilization and irritation.

The engagement with different philosophical positions reveals different forms of such unit formation. Whereas Kant, for example, places stable structures of order in the foreground, Nietzsche emphasizes the perspectival and mutable formation of units, Einstein model-based and testable constructions, and Spinoza an encompassing unity that is already given. These approaches are not merely compared with one another; they are interpreted as different ways of structuring constituted reality through the formation of units.

Within a systems-theoretical approach, this perspective is developed further: systems generate constituted reality by drawing distinctions and stabilizing units. Truth no longer appears as a simple correspondence with a pregiven reality, but as *Stimmigkeit* within such organized relations. What emerges overall is a dynamic conception of the world: constituted reality is the result of ongoing unit formation, remains fundamentally open, and changes through processes of differentiation, stabilization, and renewed reorganization.

In the **Mosaic Piece "Reality and Constituted Reality"** (study: pp. 419-448; table of contents: pp. 466-468), the preceding reflections developed in the other Mosaic Pieces are brought together within a common perspective. The central question is under what conditions a world can appear to us as meaningful, ordered, and intelligible at all. The guiding answer is that the world is not simply present as an already completed order, but is brought forth through processes of meaning formation. The distinction between reality and constituted reality is

decisive here: reality designates the limiting concept of that which precedes our formations of constituted reality without ever being fully captured by them, whereas constituted reality designates the organized context within which the world appears to us, is experienced, interpreted, and ordered.

Reality, understood in this sense, does not designate a second domain concealed behind constituted reality whose intrinsic nature could itself become the object of determinate claims. Rather, it marks the epistemological limit of every formation of constituted reality. Constituted reality can arise only from effects that are received and organized within individual processes of understanding; how reality is constituted independently of these processes of organization remains inaccessible to knowing.

According to this account, constituted reality does not arise through mere representation, but through operative processes in which differences are registered, weighted, ordered, and integrated into stable relations. Experience constitutes the point of departure because it is within experience that the world initially appears as a dynamic field of differences. Whatever is encountered never appears neutrally, but is always already accentuated or diminished, familiar or irritating, in a particular way. Constituted reality is therefore not a completed given, but a provisionally stabilized order of meaning that arises within the process of experience and remains open to transformation.

This openness, however, must not be confused with arbitrariness. Formations of constituted reality remain continuously exposed to effects that do not necessarily fit into already established orders. It is precisely in the possibility of confirmation, irritation, and correction that the epistemological significance of the concept of reality becomes apparent.

Understanding carries this initial formation of meaning further by organizing differences and bringing them into a more determinate order. The account distinguishes here between an **analog dimension of experience**, structured bodily and in gradations, and a **digital structure of thought**, operating conceptually and through discrete distinctions. Understanding mediates between the two. It translates the fluid and prereflective richness of experience into more stable conceptual forms, although this translation can never occur without loss.

Constituted reality thus appears as an organized context of meaning emerging from this mediation. Reality itself, however, is never exhausted by such a context. Whatever becomes determinate within constituted reality is already the result of distinction, weighting, and unit formation. Reality, by contrast, designates the horizon that can never be fully determined and to which these formations of constituted reality nevertheless remain related.

This position acquires particular force in the concept of the problem. A situation becomes problematic where differences cannot readily be integrated into existing orders. The problem therefore does not merely mark a gap in knowledge; it marks a limit of stabilization itself. It reveals that every order remains incomplete and that constituted reality can persist only as a response to what resists integration—a response that remains open to revision.

It is precisely here that the function of the concept of reality becomes especially clear. Reality does not simply designate what we do not yet know but might eventually come to know. Such an interpretation would reduce reality to a constituted reality that is merely unknown for the

time being. The limiting concept goes further: it designates the principled impossibility of moving from within a constituted reality that has itself arisen through unit formations to a determination of reality that would be independent of those very formations.

Reality is therefore not a second world behind constituted reality. It is the limiting concept for that to which every formation of constituted reality remains related without ever being able to determine it fully as it is in itself.

The Mosaic Pieces on emotion, feeling, and intuition deepen this architecture by showing that constituted reality is already structured bodily and affectively prior to any conceptual ordering. Emotions mark relevance, feelings give perspectival form to relations with the world, and intuition integrates complex relations preconceptually into a provisional whole. Constituted reality is therefore emotionally and situationally shaped from the outset.

Within this context, the "I" likewise appears not as a fixed substance, but as a unit that is processually formed within these processes of resonance and stabilization. Here, too, the distinction from reality remains decisive: the fact that constituted reality is individually organized does not imply that nothing exists independently of this organization. It implies only that the individual cannot occupy an epistemological standpoint from which it could determine what that which exists independently of its formation of constituted reality is like in itself.

In the Mosaic Piece "Knowing", this perspective is given a more explicitly epistemological formulation. Knowing does not occur through access to reality itself, but as a reflexive process within constituted reality. Knowledge arises where experience, meaning, and understanding come together in a viable way. Truth is therefore understood neither as an immediately ascertainable correspondence with reality nor as mere internal coherence, but as the robust stability of an order that proves itself under the pressure of irritation and problematicity.

Reality performs an indispensable regulative function in this process. Without the assumption of a point of reference that is not exhausted by our formations of constituted reality, irritation, resistance, and correction could ultimately be described only as internal modifications of already established orders of meaning. The concept of reality, by contrast, maintains that formations of constituted reality do not constitute their own ultimate standard. They can fail, be corrected, or be abandoned because that to which they refer is not exhausted by their respective order.

The decisive systematic consolidation is achieved in the **Theory of Unit Formation**. It constitutes the meta-level of the entire account. Unity is not presupposed; rather, units arise through the selective stabilization of differences. Something appears as determinate only when it is distinguished from something else and, at the same time, held together as identical. Constituted reality is therefore not an inventory of already completed things, but an organized configuration of such stabilized units.

Reality, by contrast, designates that which is never fully exhausted by any of these unit formations. It is therefore neither itself a unit nor the sum of all units that remain as yet unknown. If reality were conceived as a determinate whole, it would already have become a unit within a formation of constituted reality. For precisely this reason, within the Theory of Unit Formation, reality can be determined only as a **limiting concept**: it designates the necessary openness of every unit formation toward that which is not fully determined by it.

From this perspective, it also becomes possible to determine what it means to understand understanding itself. Understanding is itself a process of unit formation. It does not simply represent a world that already exists in determinate form, but organizes differences in such a way that a world can appear as a meaningful nexus. Knowing examines these units with regard to their viability, while reflection, in turn, directs itself toward the conditions of this entire process.

It thus becomes apparent that neither the individual nor the world can be regarded as a completed point of departure. Both emerge only within processes of unit formation. The limit of this reflexive self-reconstruction is, once again, reality. The Theory of Unit Formation can investigate its own organizational context, but it cannot leave that context in order to compare its formation of constituted reality with a reality determined independently of every unit formation.

Taken as a whole, this Mosaic Piece develops a **systemically and transcendentally oriented theory of the constitution of reality**. It avoids naïve realism because constituted reality is not understood as the immediate representation of an independently given world. At the same time, it does not lapse into relativism or subjectivism, because orders of constituted reality remain subject to the pressures of validation, irritation, and problematicity.

It is precisely for this reason that the limiting concept of reality is indispensable. On the one hand, it designates the limit of every possible claim to knowledge; on the other, it designates the openness upon which every formation of constituted reality remains dependent. Reality is not the unknown counterpart of constituted reality that might one day become fully knowable. Rather, it designates the horizon that, in principle, can never be exhausted by constituted reality and to which every formation of constituted reality nevertheless remains related. From the perspective of the Theory of Unit Formation, therefore, no positive claim can be made about the ontological constitution of reality itself; what can be experienced are only effects that are interpreted and organized within formations of constituted reality.

The guiding distinction thus remains clear:

Constituted reality is the operative nexus of meaning and world within which we live, experience, and know.

Reality is the limiting concept for that to which every formation of constituted reality remains related without ever being able to transform it completely into unit formations. It thereby limits every absolute claim to knowledge while simultaneously keeping constituted reality open to irritation, correction, and renewed formation.

Whatever we can determine already belongs to constituted reality; reality designates the limit of determinability itself.

Mosaic Piece: Experience



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[1] A detailed outline is provided on pp. 450-452.

1. Subject Matter, Aim, and Method of the Study

(Experience as the Point of Departure for the Distinction between Reality and Constituted Reality)

1.1 Subject Matter of the Study

The subject matter of this study is the analysis of experience as a fundamental structure of the human relation to the world and of human understanding. Experience is conceived neither as a mere aggregate of sensory stimuli nor as a subsequent personal interpretation, but as an active, energetic process through which a world first comes to appear as meaningful.

The central question is how meaning emerges from a prestructural openness of lived experience, what role emotional and bodily processes play in this emergence, and how experience relates to conceptual thought. Experience is thereby understood as the primary level of meaning formation, logically and phenomenologically prior to conceptual reflection.

The study rejects representational models of perception as well as reactive models of emotion. Experience does not appear as a representation of a pregiven reality, but as an operative process through which constituted reality is formed: differences are organized, under conditions of bodily and affective structuring, into provisionally stabilized orders of meaning.

These structures are neither objectively guaranteed nor personally arbitrary. Rather, they emerge relationally through the interplay of bodily resonance, emotional structuring, and symbolic processing.

1.2 Aim of the Study

(Clarifying Experience, Emotion, and Conceptual Thought within the Horizon of the Reality–Constituted Reality Distinction)

The aim of this study is to provide a systematic clarification of experience as a fundamental structure of the human relation to the world. Experience is examined not as a phenomenon secondary to thought or understanding, but as a primary, energetic process through which a world first emerges as meaningful.

The study pursues several interrelated objectives.

First, experience is to be conceptually specified as an autonomous mode of meaning formation. Experience is understood as an analog process, structured bodily and emotionally, in which meaning emerges operatively and becomes stabilized in the course of its enactment without thereby being available for arbitrary construction.

Second, emotions are to be understood as constitutive structures of experience. They are conceived neither as accompanying states nor as subsequent evaluations, but as energetic processes through which relevance is marked, attention is directed, and experiential relations are organized.

Third, the relation between experience and conceptual thought is to be determined in such a way that thought does not appear as the origin of meaning, but as a subsequent mode of

stabilizing, abstracting, and communicatively fixing what has already become meaningful within experience.

The overarching aim is to determine experience as a constitutive condition of the possibility of orientation, a relation to the world, and understanding. At the same time, the study advances the thesis that the human understanding of the world does not take place in a single uniform mode, but in two structurally distinct yet interrelated modes. Understanding is not thereby denied; rather, it is conceived as a derivative, reflexive order of conceptual thought grounded in a prior experiential order.

1.3 Method of the Study

(Phenomenological-Reconstructive Analysis of the Operative Constitution of Meaning)

The study follows a phenomenological-reconstructive approach. It is neither empirically experimental nor purely speculative, but reconstructs the structures of lived experience from the internal perspective as they manifest themselves in the enactment of experience.

Central to this approach is the phenomenological description of typical experiential relations. Everyday examples do not serve to illustrate empirical findings, but to explicate phenomenal structures. This procedure is supplemented by process-philosophical reflections on the dynamics of experience and emotion, as well as by systems-theoretical considerations concerning meaning, self-reference, and operational closure.

Reductionist models are deliberately avoided, whether they reduce experience to neural processes or equate conceptual constructions with lived experience itself. The investigation instead places the distinction between immediate lived experience and its description through conceptual thought at the center of the analysis.

2. Experience between Chaos and Order

(Prestructure and the Initial Constitution of Constituted Reality)

2.1 Experience as a Non-Representational Relation to the World

(Constituted Reality as an Operatively Formed Order in a Limiting Relation to Reality)

The point of departure for the following reflections is the thesis that human experience cannot be understood as a representation of an objectively given world. Experience is not a passive registration of stimuli, but an active, structuring process in which stimuli are received as effective factors, weighted, and organized into meaningful relations. The world therefore does not immediately appear to the individual as an already constituted reality; it acquires its form only through the process of experience.

The relation to reality does not manifest itself as an immediate correspondence between experience and a “world in itself.” Rather, reality becomes apparent through the consequences of experience-based interpretations. Effects make assumptions testable in action: they may prove viable, compel correction, or manifest themselves as resistance. In this way, it becomes apparent that formations of constituted reality are not arbitrary, without thereby implying that reality itself could be determined completely or conclusively.

The world therefore does not confront the individual as an already ordered totality. What appears initially is instead a **prestructural openness of lived experience**: an excess of impressions and possibilities within which no stable meanings have yet been formed. This openness designates an initial condition in which the world has not yet been transformed into fixed forms of meaning and therefore does not yet exist as a consolidated constituted reality.

It is precisely at this point that the assumption of a **transcendental-operative dimension of experience** becomes relevant. Meaning and objecthood are not simply found as already given, but are brought forth in the enactment of lived experience. This bringing-forth is neither arbitrary nor capable of completion; it remains subject to a limiting relation to reality.

Reality is not the content of experience, but the limit at which the orders of meaning formed through experience encounter constraints, become susceptible to irritation, and remain open to correction, without reality itself ever becoming available as a completed totality.

In what follows, this openness will be referred to as chaos.

Chaos does not mean mere disorder. Rather, it designates the absence of stable structures of meaning: not a condition "behind" the world, but the as-yet unconsolidated mode in which the world appears within lived experience insofar as the constitutive operations through which meanings, relations, and relevances emerge have not yet crystallized into a provisional order.

Chaos is thus the name for the limit of determinacy within experience itself.

At this point it becomes apparent that experience does not represent an already ordered world, but first brings forth what can count as ordered and meaningful—without this bringing-forth ever being capable of claiming to constitute a final apprehension.

Experience is the process through which provisional order emerges from this openness.

This order is not inherent in the world "in itself," insofar as the world is not presupposed here as an already fully structured objectivity. Rather, it emerges through meaning-constituting operations of lived experience. Experience is creative, not in the sense of arbitrary positing, but as an enactment that selects, condenses, and structures by transforming stimuli into meaningful relations and thereby first making an experiential relation to the world possible.

The orders that emerge in this way claim to be related to constituted reality; this claim, however, is not secured by representational fidelity, but by the operative stabilization of meaning under conditions that experience itself participates in bringing forth.

The resulting order remains dependent upon the situational, bodily, and emotional conditions within which the respective operations of lived experience take place and within which relevances, accentuations, and trajectories of meaning emerge. Experience thus proves to be a process in which a world is formed anew in each instance without ever being capable of being transformed into a final totality.

Reality remains the limiting horizon within which experience forms, tests, shifts, and revises its orders—precisely because experience does not represent the world as something already "complete," but discloses it in the course of its own enactment.

2.2 Order as the Result of Energetic Meaning Formation

(The Affective and Bodily Constitution of Constituted Reality)

If experience cannot be understood as a representation of an already given world, the question arises as to how order can emerge at all from the prestructural openness of lived experience. This order is not already present and subsequently merely recognized; it takes shape within the enactment of experience itself.

What affects, touches, attracts, or repels an individual, what oppresses or relieves them, does not remain merely one impression among others, but acquires a particular weight within lived experience. The experiential field already begins to become differentiated at this point. Not everything emerges with the same intensity, not everything acquires the same proximity, and not everything becomes significant in the same way. Order therefore does not arise only through a subsequent determination, but already in the manner in which experience unfolds.

The description of this process is not merely explanatory, but required by the subject matter itself. Only through the description of lived experience does it become apparent that experience never consists in a uniform juxtaposition of given impressions. Rather, it manifests itself as a dynamic process of accentuations, tensions, and shifts. Something presses itself forward while something else recedes; some things gain emphasis while others lose weight; some bind attention while others slip away. Description does not disclose a mere supplement to the theory, but the very context within which it becomes apparent how provisional order emerges from openness.

Precisely because experience does not represent the world but discloses it in its enactment, its structure must be descriptively brought to light. Yet the experienced order is not immediately given within conceptual thought. It becomes linguistically accessible only through a reflexive description that takes up the individual's field of affectedness and relevance without being able to transform it completely into a systematic order of thought.

The order of experience is therefore initially accessible only within the respective enactment of individual lived experience—in sensations, bodily affectedness, and the emotional accentuations of the concrete moment. Description does not belong to this original process of disclosure; rather, it constitutes a subsequent reflexive act of thought that takes up this order and explicates it linguistically.

The differentiation of the experiential field in this manner is inseparably bound up with embodiment. The lived body is not merely the bearer of an already constituted relation to the world, but the medium within which the world can first appear as near or distant, inhibiting or enabling, burdensome or relieving. Tension and release, attraction and aversion, susceptibility to being affected and resistance are enacted within bodily experience.

That something is experienced as oppressive, unpleasant, agreeable, sustaining, or threatening is therefore not added retrospectively, but arises from the manner in which the lived body is affected by the world. The order of experience is consequently inseparable from embodiment; it takes shape within the bodily situatedness of lived experience.

The role of emotions also belongs within this context. Emotions are neither mere concomitants of an already ordered relation to the world nor subsequent evaluations of what has already been determined. Rather, they participate in the very emergence of relevances within the experiential

field. They mark what receives attention, what emerges as significant, what becomes condensed, and what recedes.

Situations therefore do not first appear as factually given and only subsequently acquire an emotional coloring. Rather, from the outset they present themselves as attractive or repellent, familiar or unfamiliar, urgent or indifferent. It is precisely here that the participation of emotions in the constitution of constituted reality becomes apparent. They do not yet establish a fixed conceptual order, but they differentiate the experiential field by producing weightings and enabling orientation.

In this context, we can speak of **energetic meaning formation**.

Here, "energetic" does not designate a physical magnitude, but the dynamic through which experience unfolds in tensions, intensities, condensations, and transitions.

Stimuli are not simply received; they are experienced in terms of their respective significance. They stand out, interrelate, become condensed, or lose weight. Order thus emerges not from neutral registration, but from a dynamic process of bodily affectedness and emotional accentuation. What appears as real takes shape within a dynamic in which embodiment and emotion are not secondary, but constitute fundamental conditions for any articulated relation to emerge at all from the excess of possible impressions.

This order is neither arbitrary nor final. It is not arbitrary because bodily affectedness and emotional accentuation are not freely at our disposal.

The individual does not arbitrarily determine what affects, oppresses, relieves, or unsettles them. It is precisely here that the formation of constituted reality reveals itself to be bound to conditions that do not simply arise from within that formation itself.

At the same time, this order is not final. Bodily states change, emotional weightings shift, and new situations generate different relevances. What has just occupied the foreground may recede; what appeared insignificant may suddenly acquire force. Constituted reality must therefore not be understood as a rigid configuration, but as a provisional order that is continually formed anew in the enactment of lived experience.

Order as the result of energetic meaning formation therefore means:
Constituted reality is not constituted independently of embodiment and emotion, but in the enactment of lived experience sustained by affectedness, relevance, tension, and condensation.

Reality remains the limiting horizon against which these orders prove themselves, encounter irritation, and undergo transformation.

Constituted reality is therefore neither mere reproduction nor free positing, but the provisionally stabilized order of the relation to the world brought forth within the bodily-affective enactment of experience.

2.3 Experience as Gestalt Formation and Event

(Temporary Units with a Claim to Constituted Reality)

Experience does not manifest itself as a mere succession of individual sensory data, but as a nexus of Gestalten. An experience does not appear as the addition of isolated stimuli, but as a meaningfully condensed event in which perception, emotion, and bodily orientation are interwoven.

What manifests itself in experience therefore does not occur as a collection of disconnected particulars, but in Gestalten that form a coherent nexus and emerge as provisional units.

These units, however, are not permanently fixed. They arise in the enactment of experience as temporary condensations through which the world appears in a particular way. As such, they carry a **claim to constituted reality**: they are not merely states, but modes in which the world becomes real for the experiencing individual.

This claim to constituted reality must not, however, be understood as correspondence with an objectively completed inventory of what exists.

What appears as a Gestalt is not a copy of an independently existing reality, but the manner in which the world comes to appearance within the process of experience. Experience therefore does not represent constituted reality as a representation of reality, but discloses the world through an operative enactment.

In this context, reality does not function as something immediately available and given, but as a limiting horizon that orients and constrains the enactment of experience. Gestalten therefore carry a claim to constituted reality without this claim ever being capable of fulfillment through a final correspondence with reality.

The Gestalt character of experience is not a subsequent order externally imposed upon lived experience. It takes shape within the process of experience itself. Gestalten designate operative units that arise when differences of perception, affect, and orientation enter into a provisional relation and become relationally stabilized.

Experience brings about condensations, selective movements, and relational formations through which a unit emerges from prestructural openness and appears as a nexus of meaning. This unit is neither substantial nor final. It is a temporary order of the experiential field that forms within the enactment of lived experience and acquires its constituted reality only within that enactment.

Experience forms temporary units with a claim to constituted reality.

These units are “temporary” because they do not exist as permanent structures, but emerge from the ongoing course of experience, become stabilized, and can change again. They are “units” because a multiplicity is condensed within them into a nexus that appears in lived experience as a Gestalt. And they carry a “claim to constituted reality” because they are not merely individual states without relation to the world, but modes in which the world becomes real for the experiencing individual.

This claim, however, remains bound to the provisional character of the Gestalt. It does not amount to a claim to final truth in the sense of complete apprehension, but designates a mode in which the world appears that has proved viable and sustainable within the process of experience.

Reality remains operative here as a limiting concept insofar as the formation and stabilization of such units are not arbitrary.

Gestalten can remain viable, prove themselves, become irritated, disintegrate, or be transformed into other Gestalten. It is precisely this that shows that experience does not sovereignly posit its own orders. The temporary units within which the world appears are subject to conditions that the process of experience does not fully control. Their claim to constituted reality therefore proves itself not through identity with an ultimately accessible reality, but through the manner in which Gestalten persist within the experiential field, undergo transformation, or break down in the face of resistance.

In this sense, experience is not only Gestalt formation but also **event**. As event, it is essentially processual and temporal in structure. It does not occur as an isolated point, but unfolds as a movement encompassing beginning, course, and conclusion. Meaning does not arise in isolated moments, but through their interrelation within temporal unfolding.

A Gestalt, therefore, is not simply there. It takes shape, acquires contours, persists for a time, and may subsequently dissolve or pass over into another Gestalt. Its unity is therefore not static but event-like: it rests upon a temporal condensation of meaning.

This, too, must be understood within the horizon of reality as a limiting concept.

Reality does not appear as a timelessly available given, but as that to which experience remains related in its temporal unfolding without ever being able to apprehend it in its totality.

The relation of the Gestalt to constituted reality is therefore not static but event-like. It manifests itself in the way meaning becomes stabilized over time, proves viable or breaks down in the face of resistance, and may develop into new condensations as lived experience continues.

Order consequently appears here not as a rigid structure, but as a momentary Gestalt. This Gestalt may change, dissolve, or pass over into other Gestalten. Experience thus remains open to transformation and renewed formation without losing its continuity.

This openness is connected to the energetic-affective foundation of experience.

Gestalten are condensations of perceptual, bodily, and emotional differences that become stabilized as operative units without ever becoming closed or final.

It is precisely because experience does not proceed neutrally, but unfolds through relevances, tensions, and accentuations, that Gestalten can arise; and precisely because their formation remains subject to a limiting relation to reality, their units remain provisional and open to revision.

The continuity of experience therefore does not consist in final fixation, but in the ongoing course of its operations, in transitions, irritations, and reorganizations. In this way, the world comes to appearance anew in each instance without experience ever being capable of exhausting itself in a final apprehension of reality.

Experience as Gestalt formation and event therefore means:

Constituted reality appears in temporary units that are formed within the temporal, bodily-affective enactment of experience, carry a claim to constituted reality, and precisely through their provisional character refer to reality as a limiting horizon.

2.4 The Provisional Character of Experienced Order

(The Openness of Constituted Reality to Revision in Its Limiting Relation to Reality)

The order that emerges within experience makes no claim to absolute validity. It is not given as a final structure, but remains bound to the affective, bodily, and situational conditions of its emergence. Order therefore always appears as provisional.

This provisional character must be understood within the horizon of reality as a limiting concept and as an expression of the manner in which experience establishes a relation to constituted reality in the first place. Reality is not given as an available totality that experience could represent conclusively. Rather, it functions as a limiting horizon in relation to which orders immanent to experience can orient themselves, prove viable, encounter irritation, and undergo revision, without reality itself ever being exhausted by these orders. Provisionality thus marks the limit of stabilization within the process of experience itself.

The same event may be experienced differently under different conditions. Changes in emotional attunement, attention, or situational context may result in the formation of different nexuses of meaning. Experience therefore remains open to reorientation.

From a transcendental-operative perspective, this means that the meaning-constituting operations through which Gestalten and orders arise cannot be conceived independently of the concrete conditions under which lived experience is enacted.

Rather, they are situated within these conditions of enactment. What is brought into prominence as a Gestalt, what appears relevant, and how relations are stabilized depend upon energetic-affective patterns of activity, bodily orientation, and situational conditions.

The openness of experienced order to revision therefore does not imply arbitrariness. Rather, it designates the possibility that different orders may arise within the horizon of the same relation to constituted reality, each of which may prove viable or fail in the face of new experience.

Provisionality is therefore a constitutive property of experienced order.

Precisely because experience does not produce its orders as final determinations, it remains capable of adaptation, learning, and transformation. Provisionality is therefore not merely a limitation, but at the same time an operative condition of the very capacity for experience.

Experience stabilizes meaning not as a final state, but as a temporary order within an ongoing process that remains open to shifts, irritations, and renewed formations. In its limiting relation to reality, this also means that modification cannot be understood merely as an internal change of states. Rather, it constitutes a readjustment of the relation to constituted reality.

Experience modifies its orders because reality as a limiting horizon cannot be exhausted by any final structure. Instead, it opens the possibility of correction, reformation, and reorientation within the enactment itself.

Understanding, in this context, does not appear as a conclusion but as an ongoing process. Experience generates orientation without providing ultimate certainty. Meaning remains revisable and open to further differentiation. This processual character of understanding corresponds to the event-like structure of experience. Meaning arises within the temporal nexus of beginning, course, and conclusion and may be transformed as experience continues. Openness to revision therefore designates the internal form of experience's relation to constituted reality.

Because experience does not derive its order from a conclusively accessible reality, but brings it forth in its enactment while remaining in a limiting relation to reality, every orientation remains provisional, every order of meaning remains open to revision, and every understanding remains open to further differentiation.

At the same time, it becomes clear that the provisional character of experienced order does not undermine its claim to constituted reality. Precisely because constituted reality is not given as a rigid counterpart but is disclosed within orders immanent to experience, this claim must remain open to revision. A relation to constituted reality is therefore realized not through possession of a completed whole, but through the capacity to form nexuses of meaning, test them against resistance, and correct them under altered conditions.

The provisional character of experienced order thus designates the openness of constituted reality to revision in its limiting relation to reality.

Experience brings forth orders that may be viable without being final; it generates orientation without guaranteeing closure; and it preserves its relation to constituted reality precisely by allowing its formations of meaning to remain open to correction, transformation, and reorientation. This openness reveals the distinctive structure of the experience-based constitution of constituted reality.

2.5 Experience as a Self-Referential Process

(Relation to the World and Self-Enactment in Open Meaning Formation)

Experience relates not only to effects arising from the world,
but at the same time to its own enactment.

It unfolds as a self-referential process in which not only is something experienced, but experiencing itself is co-enacted. Experiencing does not stand outside what occurs; it is part of the event itself and is operative within it.

The relation of experience to constituted reality must therefore not be understood as an external relation between an internal representation and an external reality, but as an operative interrelation of relation to the world and self-enactment.

Reality is not a fully accessible external domain that could be determined independently of the experiential process. Rather, it is the limiting horizon toward which the experiential process remains oriented while simultaneously carrying with it and participating in the formation of the conditions of its own enactment.

This self-relatedness is not a subsequent act of reflection, but a structure of lived experience that shapes the experiential process from the outset. It belongs to the very manner in which

experience forms order. In stabilizing provisional orders of meaning out of the prestructural openness of lived experience, experience does not operate from a neutral distance, but as a process that carries itself along in its own enactment.

The operations of selection, condensation, and structuring are therefore not merely directed toward something; they also involve the respective possibilities, limitations, and modes of their own enactment as operative within lived experience itself. In this sense, self-referentiality designates a transcendental-operative condition of experience.

Experience is always also the co-enactment of itself.

If experience does not represent the world but discloses it in its enactment, if order is formed bodily and affectively, and if Gestalten and orders of meaning constitute only provisional units with a claim to constituted reality, then experience cannot be understood as a merely receptive occurrence. Rather, it is an enactment that carries with it its own perspectival character, its formations of relevance, and its formations of order. Relation to the world and self-enactment therefore cannot be separated from one another.

Experience is always also the manner in which an experiencing process relates to its own respective order without having to make this relation an explicit theme.

Within the enactment of experience, an implicit perspective is always operative from which perception, emotion, and action are organized.

This perspective need not itself become the object of reflection; rather, it forms the background against which nexuses of meaning emerge.

Experience is therefore always perspectivally structured and bound to particular modes of experiencing and acting that are actualized in its enactment.

This perspectival structure is not primarily conceptual in character, but operates through patterns of activity, resonances, concentrations of attention, and bodily orientations.

What comes to the fore, what recedes, what acquires weight, and what loses significance therefore cannot be separated from the perspective within which experience unfolds.

The claim of experience to constituted reality consequently does not arise from a perspective-neutral standpoint, but **from a concrete internal perspective** within which the world appears in Gestalten.

Reality remains the limiting horizon insofar as the perspectivally formed nexuses of meaning are related to constituted reality without thereby rendering reality itself accessible or exhausting it in any final determination.

The self-referentiality of experience, however, does not imply closure against the world. Experience is not closed in upon itself, but structurally open to irritation, transformation, and new formations of meaning. Precisely because it relates to itself in its own enactment, it remains capable of responding to what affects it, disrupts it, or compels it to move in new directions.

Experience takes up existing patterns of activity, varies them in response to new demands, and can transform them under the influence of irritation. This openness is intertwined with its

limiting relation to reality. Irritations are not merely internal disturbances; within the experiential process, they mark the limits of the order that has been stabilized at a given time. They reveal that operatively formed Gestalten and orders of meaning are not self-contained, but must prove themselves in a relation to constituted reality that cannot be completely controlled and that may therefore compel or enable transitions, transformations, and new formations.

Relation to the world and self-enactment thus stand in an intrinsic relation. Experience relates to the world not from a neutral external standpoint, but from within an enactment that carries its own conditions with it. At the same time, this self-relation does not occur independently of the world, but only through engagement with what appears, offers resistance, or generates new relevances.

Self-referentiality must therefore not be understood as a retreat into inwardness, but as a structure of open meaning formation.

Experience connects with itself without closing itself off within itself. Precisely by carrying forward its own patterns of experiencing, ordering, and responding, it remains capable of modifying and transforming them in its engagement with new situations.

Experience is therefore neither arbitrary nor completely determined. It is shaped by bodily resonances, emotional patterns, biographical experience, and cultural contexts without being reducible to them. The self-referential openness of the experiential process contains the possibility of transformation, redetermination, and the formation of new nexuses of meaning.

In transcendental-operative terms, this means:

Experience does not simply reproduce existing patterns, but works with them as conditions of enactment that are actualized, modified, and, where necessary, transformed within the event of experience.

Precisely because experience acquires its relation to constituted reality only in enactment and under conditions of provisionality, it can connect with itself, reorient itself in response to irritation, and thereby bring forth new orders and Gestalten that are themselves once again provisional.

The self-referential structure of experience is therefore not an addition to its relation to the world, but its internal condition. The world becomes experienceable only insofar as experience co-enacts itself in its own enactment; and experience can co-enact itself only insofar as it remains related to the world.

The subtitle of this section can therefore be stated more precisely:

Experience is relation to the world and self-enactment within open meaning formation.

It does not form meaning from a closed position, but within a process that co-enacts itself, remains oriented toward constituted reality, and precisely for this reason remains open to correction, transformation, and renewed formation. Reality appears here not as a conclusively accessible totality, but as the limiting horizon in relation to which the openness of this meaning formation is oriented and proves itself.

It follows that:

Experience is a self-referential process because it not only discloses the world but also co-enacts itself in this disclosure. Its formation of meaning remains open because it is exhausted neither by existing patterns nor by any final determination of reality. Relation to the world and self-enactment are interwoven within the experiential process in such a way that constituted reality appears in provisional, perspectivally formed, and revisable orders.

It is precisely here that the distinctive structure of the experience-based constitution of constituted reality becomes apparent.

2.6 Experience as a Limiting Horizon and Reality as a Limiting Concept

(Explicit Clarification of the Guiding Distinction between Experience, Constituted Reality, and Reality)

Experience is not the sum of individual perceptions, memories, or conceptual operations. Rather, it designates the nexus within which anything can emerge as given, meaningful, and real in the first place.

Experience is therefore neither merely inward lived experience nor the subsequent processing of impressions, but the fundamental structure within which appearance, meaning, and constituted reality are brought into relation with one another.

What is real is not situated beyond all experience; rather, it manifests itself in the corrigibility and incompleteness of experience and in its relation to something that becomes manifest through its effects without thereby already being grasped in its own determinacy.

This resistance is at the same time the positive condition for experience to possess any content at all. Without it, every distinction between appearance and constituted reality, truth and error, or adequate and inadequate determination would collapse.

Reality as a limiting concept therefore designates the relation of experience to something real that manifests itself without ever being exhausted by any determinate mode of appearance.

This can be illustrated by the example of the symbol. A symbol is not merely the bearer of a fixed meaning. Its meaning becomes accessible only through concrete interpretations without being identical with them. Its meaning is disclosed in interpretation without becoming identical with any single interpretation. It is precisely here that we can see how something may be given without being exhausted by the manner in which it is given.

Experience as a limiting horizon thus designates the open nexus within which constituted reality appears without ever being completely exhausted by the manner of its appearance. Reality as a limiting concept designates the excess of what is real over every particular mode in which it is given.

There is no external relation between the two. Experience is not related to something absolutely separate from it. Rather, experience is itself the mode in which constituted reality appears in finite determinacy.

Experience is therefore not a representation of reality, but the presentation of constituted reality.

It does not reproduce what is real in the form of a copy, but brings it to appearance in a determinate, finite, and perspectival Gestalt.

The limiting horizon of experience designates the productive structure in which determinacy and openness are intertwined. Because experience is limited, it remains dynamic; because it is perspectival, it remains corrigible; because it never possesses the whole immediately, it remains open to further disclosure. Correspondingly, reality as a limiting concept does not designate ignorance, but the insight that what is real precedes every finite determination.

Knowledge is therefore neither the mere representation of a completed domain of objects nor the free production of a world from autonomous forms. Rather, it is the progressive determination of something real as it becomes accessible within the nexus of experience. Within this nexus, the classical poles of subject and object are not primordial givens, but subsequent differentiations within a more comprehensive process through which constituted reality is disclosed. Experience is the enactment of this disclosure. Reality designates the inexhaustibility of that which attains determinacy within it.

The following conclusions can therefore be drawn:

- **Experience is the limiting horizon because it situates everything that is given within an open nexus of possible further determinations.**
- **Reality is the limiting concept because it is never completely exhausted by any of these determinations, but sustains, limits, and exceeds them.**
- **What is real is not separate from experience, yet neither is it completely exhausted by the particular Gestalt in which it is experienced.**

Experience and reality therefore stand in a relation of intrinsic interdependence: within experience, constituted reality appears in a finite Gestalt, while reality indicates that each of these Gestalten points beyond itself to more than it itself contains.

3. Experience, Conceptual Thought, and Units

(Operative Unit Formation between Enactment and Symbolic Stabilization)

3.1 Experiential Units as Elementary Enactments of Meaning

(Prereflective Units in the Formation of Constituted Reality)

It follows from the tension between openness and order that experience does not remain undifferentiated. It differentiates itself into units that can be experienced as coherent enactments of meaning.

These experiential units do not arise through conceptual abstraction, but are formed within the affective and bodily enactment of experience.

They can be understood as patterns of activity—as emotionally and bodily mediated modes of enactment in which perception, attention, affectedness, and orientation condense into provisional units. Within the horizon of reality as a limiting concept, this differentiation must

not be understood as the decomposition of an already given inventory of the world, but as a transcendental-operative articulation of access to the world.

Experience forms units within which the world can appear in a determinate way in the first place. These units arise under the limiting orientation toward reality, which remains operative as a relation to constituted reality without itself becoming available as a conclusively determinable totality.

Experiential units are not isolated elements.

They are temporally extended nexuses in which perception, emotion, and bodily orientation are interwoven.

An experience therefore does not appear as the sum of individual stimuli, but as a condensed unit of meaning. What is experienced does not emerge in atomized components, but in wholes, Gestalten, or nexuses of meaning that constitute a unit within the enactment itself.

This unitary character is not the result of a subsequent synthesis. Rather, it designates the manner in which experience unfolds from the outset. Experience stabilizes relations, resonances, and transitions in such a way that a Gestalt emerges as a unit.

Experiential units are therefore elementary enactments of meaning. They designate the most elementary units through which constituted reality becomes articulated within lived experience.

Experiential units arise from bodily-affective patterns of activity and appear within lived experience as Gestalten or meaningfully coherent situations. Emotions function as structuring moments within these enactments by marking relevances and focusing attention.

Experiential units are prereflective units in the formation of constituted reality.

They are prereflective because they structure lived experience before becoming the object of conceptual thematization or reflection. They open possibilities of orientation and action without linguistic or conceptual means already having to be available.

Experience is therefore not first articulated at the point at which judgments are made or concepts are formed. Its articulation already begins within the elementary enactment of lived experience itself. Within this enactment, affective-bodily patterns of activity mark relevances, focus attention, and open possible directions of action.

The formation of constituted reality thus does not begin only with subsequent interpretation, but already within the prereflective organization of the experiential field. This prereflective organization, however, must not be understood as an arbitrary positing. Within the horizon of reality as a limiting concept, experiential units carry a claim to constituted reality without being understood as representations of an objectively fixed reality.

Their status is not that of representational correspondence, but that of operative units that must prove themselves in the continuing course of experience. Experiential units remain viable for as long as they provide orientation; they may be irritated, transformed, or dissolved when new demands, resistances, or shifts arise within the experiential field.

It is precisely here that their relation to constituted reality proves not to be secured through conceptual correspondence. Rather, it consists in the formation of provisional nexuses of meaning that remain viable within lived experience and can change under altered conditions.

The transcendental-operative dimension of experience becomes particularly apparent in these units. Orientation is not primarily the result of explicit judgments, but arises within the enactment of experience itself.

Experiential units are the elementary forms within which orientation takes shape.

They emerge from the ongoing formation of nexuses of relevance through which the experiential field becomes articulated. These nexuses of relevance are temporally, bodily, and affectively situated. They are grounded in resonances, concentrations of attention, and emotional weightings through which the experiential field is structured in a determinate way.

Constituted reality therefore does not appear as a completed inventory that merely has to be received. Rather, it manifests itself within the elementary enactments of meaning through which experience brings the world to appearance in a particular way.

Experiential units are consequently not fixed entities. They emerge, change, and may dissolve again. Their unity does not consist in permanent stability, but in the coherence of their respective enactment.

Experience appears here as a dynamic order of meaning that remains bound to its affective, bodily, and situational conditions. This provisional character follows directly from the preceding reflections. Like Gestalten, experiential units are temporary moments of stabilization within an ongoing experiential event. Their unity is not closed, but remains open to transitions into other units.

Precisely because reality becomes operative within orders of meaning immanent to experience only in the form of effects, resistances, or irritations, every experiential unit remains revisable, every order susceptible to irritation, and every stabilization open to transformation and reorganization.

Experience is thus articulated into elementary enactments of meaning in which the world repeatedly comes to appearance in a particular way, without this ever bringing the relation to constituted reality to a final conclusion.

Experiential units are prereflective units in the formation of constituted reality because, prior to any explicit thematization, they already form the nexuses within which something emerges as meaningful, coherent, and real.

They show that experience does not first acquire its order through thought, but already within the enactment of lived experience itself. It is precisely here that its fundamental function in the constitution of constituted reality lies.

3.2 Experiential Units as Units of Activity

(Bodily-Affective Enactments as Bearers of Meaning)

Within experience, the world does not appear as a completed internal representation, but within the enactment of an active relation to the world that is at the same time something that happens to the individual. Experiential units are therefore not merely structures of what is "there," but temporally extended processes in which perception, feeling, bodily orientation, and understanding interweave and must prove themselves in practical enactment. In this sense, lived experience always involves activity—not in the sense of arbitrary production, but as an ongoing process of orientation in which meaning is formed, stabilized, irritated, and, where necessary, revised.

What is decisive is that this activity is subject to feedback. Whether an interpretation remains viable becomes apparent in whether action succeeds, expectations are disappointed, resistance occurs, or situations develop differently from what was anticipated. It is precisely in such disruptions that experience reveals itself not merely as a perspectival projection, but as something that must remain oriented toward a limiting horizon against which its interpretations remain corrigible.

For reality as a limiting concept, this means:

The relation to the world is not primarily representational. Experience does not produce an internal image of the world that would subsequently have to be compared with an external reality. Rather, the relation to the world is operative.

Reality becomes effective as a limiting horizon toward which the enactment of experience remains oriented and against which interpretations may fail.

Reality therefore does not appear as a determinable object, but as the limiting horizon against which orders immanent to experience must prove themselves, become irritated, and undergo correction.

It manifests itself in the fact that interpretations are not arbitrary, but remain bound to conditions that become effective within the experiential process itself as irritation, resistance, or unexpected change.

Experiential units are the elementary forms of this process. Within them, meaning takes shape in enactment. Relevances are established, relations are recognized, and meanings are condensed, so that the world appears in a particular way without thereby becoming definitively determined.

The provisional character of this perspective belongs to the structure of experience itself. Constituted reality emerges through the success and failure of actions, through the occurrence of resistance, and through situations that confirm or correct expectations. Experiential units therefore remain, in principle, open to revision.

This makes clear that:

Experiential units are units of activity in which meaning becomes stabilized as a bodily-affective enactment.

Embodiment provides the fundamental grounding of these units. Perceiving, feeling, and orienting oneself do not occur independently of the body, but as forms of bodily participation

in the world. Experiential units integrate this participation into coherent enactments in which attention is directed, tensions are generated, and possibilities for action are opened.

From this perspective, embodiment does not appear as a mere accompanying condition, but as the locus at which meaning becomes operatively stabilized—as directed attention, as a configuration of tensions, and as bodily orientation within the experiential field.

At the same time, the connection with the theory of emotion, which will be developed systematically in Chapter 7, becomes apparent.

Emotions constitute the internal dynamic core of such units of activity. They function as energetic patterns through which experience acquires intensity, direction, and weight. Emotions do not mechanically determine what occurs; rather, they structure what can become effective within the experiential field in the first place.

Emotions therefore function as operative structures of relevance within units of activity.

They mark what binds attention, what emerges as significant, and how perception, orientation, and action become organized. In this sense, emotions are not mere concomitants of experience, but structuring moments of its enactment.

Within units of activity, emotions operate as the qualitative structure of what occurs. They focus attention, give direction to lived experience, and impart a particular dynamic to its enactment. In this way, energetic patterns of activity emerge within which experience acquires its Gestalt.

This perspective corresponds to the account developed in Chapter 7, according to which emotions can be understood as energetic patterns of activity that mark relevances, weight perception, and enable orientation. Units of experiential activity can therefore be described as concrete enactments of such affective-bodily dynamics. They constitute the elementary contexts within which emotions perform their structuring function in the formation of constituted reality.

What emerges within lived experience thus depends, on the one hand, on the energetic patterns of activity operative within the respective enactment and, on the other, on how these patterns prove themselves or become subject to irritation as experience proceeds.

Reality enters into play here as a limiting horizon—in the form of irritations, resistances, or pressures toward reorientation that become effective within the experiential field and may call existing orders into question.

Experiential units as units of activity are therefore never static. They remain in motion because they continually adjust to what occurs within the experiential process.

As the situation, the respective mood, and the further course of lived experience change, perception, attention, and meaning change with them. Their unity therefore does not lie in permanent stability, but in the fact that experience repeatedly organizes itself into a coherent nexus of meaning and, in doing so, reorganizes itself.

This dynamic character is closely consistent with the preceding reflections on Gestalt formation and the provisionality of experienced order. Experiential units appear as temporary

condensations within an event-like nexus; they can form, transform, and dissolve again without disrupting the internal continuity of experience.

Understood in transcendental-operative terms, their unity therefore lies not in a stable inventory, but in the enactment of organization itself—in the ongoing stabilization and reorganization of relations, resonances, and Gestalten. This reorganization, however, is not an arbitrary process of self-variation. It occurs as a dynamic relation to constituted reality. Experience reorganizes itself because constituted reality is not given as a conclusively available structure but, in its limiting relation to reality, always remains open to irritation, revision, and renewed formation.

Units of activity are therefore the elementary forms within which this dynamic relation to constituted reality is enacted. Within them, bodily orientation, emotional relevance formation, and situational possibilities for action combine into provisionally stabilized enactments of meaning that enable orientation without guaranteeing a final order.

It is precisely within this open dynamic that the fundamental role of affective-bodily patterns of activity in the constitution of constituted reality becomes apparent.

3.3 Conceptual Thought as a Level of Symbolic Stabilization

(Conceptual Fixation of Operatively Formed Constituted Reality)

Conceptual thought operates on a different level from experience. Whereas experiential units occur within situational enactment and remain bound to affective, bodily, and situational conditions, conceptual thought is directed toward stabilization, abstraction, and symbolic order.

Within the horizon of reality as a limiting concept, this difference must not be understood as a separation between lived experience and an objective world, but as a difference between two modes of relating to constituted reality.

Experience enacts constituted reality operatively and eventfully in provisional Gestalten and units of activity. Conceptual thought takes up these enactments and stabilizes them symbolically. In this way, a second level of meaningful order emerges in which what has come to prominence within the experiential process is conceptually fixed, rendered comparable, and made available beyond the individual enactment.

Reality remains the limiting horizon here as well. It is neither immediately given as a completed objectivity nor to be understood as a mere product of conceptual thought. Rather, it functions as a limiting reference toward which both orders immanent to experience and their symbolic fixations remain oriented.

Conceptual thought forms units that can be detached from the immediate experiential context. These conceptual units arise through naming, classification, and conceptual fixation. They make nexuses of meaning available independently of the particular enactment and enable comparison, repetition, and transfer.

A specific symbolic operation thereby becomes apparent:

What has emerged within experience as a temporally extended, affective-bodily condensation is transformed into a form capable of persisting beyond the individual enactment.

Under the conditions established by reality as a limiting concept, this means that conceptual thought does not represent reality, but transforms the relation to constituted reality.

It generates symbolic stabilizations that can function as regulative points of reference within subsequent experiences.

These symbolic units, however, possess no absolute status. Their claim to validity remains bound to experiential processes within which they may prove viable, become subject to irritation, or undergo revision. The limiting structure of reality becomes apparent in the fact that symbolic stabilization, too, cannot provide any final fixation of what is real.

Conceptual thought thus functions as a level of symbolic stabilization upon which operatively formed constituted reality is conceptually fixed.

This fixation is not an immediate continuation of the experiential process, but a transformation of its structure. In the transition to conceptual order, the dynamic Gestalt of lived experience is selectively retained. Certain aspects are brought into prominence, while others recede.

Conceptual thought therefore orders what has already emerged as meaningful within experience.

This selectivity follows from the very structure of the relation between experience and conceptual thought. Experience forms meaning within affective-bodily enactments in which relevances are marked and Gestalten condensed. Conceptual thought can therefore begin only with what has already emerged within this prereflective order. More precisely, in transcendental-operative terms:

The operations of conceptual thought are secondary stabilizations that draw upon prior operations of experience.

Conceptual thought is therefore not the origin of meaning. Rather, it constitutes a level upon which meaning is retained, explicated, and transformed into symbolic forms that open new possibilities of connection.

From this perspective, the relation between experience and conceptual thought can be determined more precisely. Experience forms meaning in the mode of enactment. It generates provisional orders by condensing perception, emotion, and bodily orientation into units of activity. Conceptual thought transforms these orders into symbolic units by selectively detaching particular aspects from their situational enactment, fixing them conceptually, and making them available beyond the individual experiential context.

Experiential units and conceptual units therefore differ not merely in their degree of abstraction, but in their structural function within the formation of constituted reality.

Experiential units are units of enactment:
They arise within the living process of experience and stabilize meaning in the form of situational, affective-bodily patterns of activity.

Conceptual units are units of stabilization:
They symbolically retain particular nexuses of meaning and make them available independently of the concrete course of experience.

This makes clear that conceptual thought does not replace experience. Rather, it operates on a different level of the same formation of constituted reality.

Experience remains the primary mode of meaning formation because it is within experience that relevances, Gestalten, and units of activity first emerge. Conceptual thought does not simply take over these structures; rather, it selectively transforms them by detaching particular aspects from the enactment immanent to experience, fixing them conceptually, and translating them into symbolic forms that enable orientation, comparison, and communication beyond the individual experiential context.

The strength of conceptual thought therefore lies not in the generation of meaning, but in its stabilization and mediation. Concepts, classifications, and symbolic orders make it possible to retain and communicate nexuses of meaning beyond individual situations. At the same time, they remain dependent upon the order immanent to experience from which they emerge.

Within the horizon of reality as a limiting concept, this also means that symbolic stabilization cannot conclusively secure experience's relation to constituted reality. Concepts and categories do not determine reality itself; rather, they stabilize orders of meaning immanent to experience within constituted reality. They are forms of orientation within a constituted reality that is operatively formed in the experiential process.

Symbolic units may prove viable; they may become subject to irritation; they may be differentiated or revised. In this way, coherence with the provisional character of experienced order is preserved. Conceptual thought provides a form of transformation through which experience symbolically stabilizes its provisional orders without abolishing the open and revisable character of its relation to constituted reality.

3.4 Conceptual Units as Units of State

(Abstract and Communicable Forms of Stabilized Meaningful Order)

Conceptual units can be described as units of state.

They retain particular states of meaning and make them available independently of the respective course of experience. Their ordering function lies precisely in this fixation. Within the horizon of reality as a limiting concept, this means:

Conceptual thought produces symbolic states that do not bring experience's relation to constituted reality to closure through representation, but transform it into a form that can be made available.

Reality does not appear here as a completely given objectivity that could be represented by such states. It remains the limiting horizon toward which the validity of symbolically fixed states of meaning is oriented and against which their viability may prove itself, become subject to irritation, or reveal a need for revision as experience proceeds.

Concepts, categories, and rules stabilize experience by isolating and retaining recurring patterns. This stabilization is necessary if orientation is to extend beyond the individual moment and complex relations are to become manageable.

What is decisive, however, is that this stabilization is not the origin of order. Rather, it presupposes that an order has already been formed within the experiential process.

The extraction of recurring patterns presupposes a prior order immanent to experience that has been operatively formed in affective, bodily, and situational terms.

Expressed in transcendental-operative terms:

Conceptual thought operates as a secondary instance of stabilization. It transforms provisional Gestalten and experiential units into symbolic forms that permit comparison, repetition, and transfer.

Within the horizon of reality as a limiting concept, this level, too, remains related to constituted reality. Its relation to constituted reality, however, does not consist in representing what is real, but in a regulative fixation that renders this relation manageable without bringing it to closure.

As units of state, conceptual units are comparatively enduring. They retain their form even when the concrete experiential context changes or is no longer present. It is precisely this durability that fundamentally distinguishes them from the experiential units described above.

Experiential units are units of activity.
They arise within the situational enactment of lived experience, integrate perception, emotion, and bodily orientation, and stabilize meaning in the form of dynamic patterns of activity.

Conceptual units, by contrast, are units of state.
They symbolically retain particular states of meaning and make them available independently of concrete enactment.

The difference between these two forms of unit formation can therefore be stated more precisely:

Units of activity stabilize meaning in the mode of enactment.
Units of state stabilize meaning in the mode of symbolic fixation.

This difference does not, however, imply competition between the two forms, but rather functional complementarity. Whereas units of activity organize meaning within the situational occurrence of lived experience, units of state make possible its stabilization across particular situations.

This stabilization, however, entails a structural reduction.

The situational, affective, and bodily dynamics of experience cannot be fully preserved in symbolic forms. Conceptual fixation selectively retains what has emerged as relevant within enactment, while other aspects recede.

This reduction is a necessary consequence of its function.

By fixing states of meaning, conceptual thought selectively retains what has acquired significance within the experiential process. In this way, symbolic structures emerge that enable orientation beyond individual situations.

Within the horizon of reality as a limiting concept, a further limit becomes apparent here:

Symbolic stabilization can neither determine nor exhaust reality. Rather, it provides conceptual forms of access that remain dependent upon the event-like order of experience within which constituted reality first appears in Gestalten and units of activity.

Conceptual units therefore stand in a structural relation of tension to experience.

They secure availability and overview, but in doing so move away from the immediacy of lived experience. Their significance remains bound to the order immanent to experience from which they emerge and upon which they continue to depend. Whereas experience, as energetic meaning formation, Gestalt formation, and event-like enactment, repeatedly brings forth and keeps open new orders, conceptual thought transforms these orders into symbolically stabilized units of state that enable orientation beyond the individual moment.

This stabilization does not abolish the provisional character of experienced order. Rather, it translates that provisionality into symbolic forms that may prove viable, become subject to irritation, and undergo revision as experience continues.

Reality as a limiting concept therefore remains operative at the level of units of state as well.

It limits every claim of symbolic fixation to final validity while at the same time indicating that symbolically stabilized states of meaning can acquire their viability only within the continuing experiential process.

The systematic distinction between units of activity and units of state can therefore be stated conclusively as follows:

Units of activity are the elementary enactments through which constituted reality is formed.

Units of state are symbolic stabilizations of these enactments.

Both forms of unit formation belong to the structure of human meaning formation. Units of activity disclose meaning within the enactment of experience; units of state stabilize this meaning in symbolic form and make it available beyond individual situations.

It is precisely through the interplay of these two levels that constituted reality becomes stabilized as an operatively formed order of meaning, without this stabilization ever being understood as a final determination of reality.

3.5 Tension and Complementarity between Experience and Conceptual Thought

(Analog Enactment and Digital Stabilization of Constituted Reality)

Experience and conceptual thought are not different manifestations of one and the same process, but different modes of meaning formation. Experience unfolds in the mode of immediacy, resonance, and situatedness—that is, within the concrete presence of a here and now. Conceptual thought, by contrast, operates in the mode of distance, abstraction, and stabilization. The two modes follow distinct logics and cannot be reduced to one another.

Within the horizon of reality as a limiting concept, this difference appears as a difference between two modes of relating to constituted reality. Experience brings the world to appearance operatively and eventfully by forming provisional orders, Gestalten, and experiential units out of prestructural openness. Conceptual thought transforms these orders into symbolic stabilizations that become available beyond the particular enactment. Reality does not appear here as a completed external domain that is either experienced or thought, but as a limiting horizon that orients and constrains both modes without integrating them into a single representational mechanism.

This difference, however, does not imply competition. Experience and conceptual thought instead stand in a complementary relation.

Experience opens nexuses of meaning by forming significance within enactment. Conceptual thought does not simply take over these nexuses, but selectively transforms them by detaching particular aspects from the enactment immanent to experience, fixing them conceptually, and translating them into symbolic forms that enable orientation, comparison, and communication beyond the individual experiential context.

Without experience, conceptual thought would remain empty. Without conceptual thought, experience would remain bound to enactment and could not be stabilized beyond the moment.

More precisely, in transcendental-operative terms:

Original meaning formation occurs within the affective-bodily, energetic, and situational operations of experience, in which relevance is established, Gestalten are condensed, and patterns of activity are stabilized as experiential units. Conceptual thought, by contrast, constitutes a level of secondary operations that fix, explicate, and render communicable these provisional orders of meaning as conceptual units and units of state.

Under the assumption of reality as a limiting concept, this complementary relation preserves the open character of the relation to constituted reality. Symbolic stabilization can render experience's claim to constituted reality manageable without conclusively securing it. Meaning formation immanent to experience can disclose constituted reality in an event-like manner without making it available as a fixed totality.

The tension between the two modes is therefore structural. It can be overcome neither by reducing experience to conceptual order nor by dissolving thought into lived experience. This structural tension corresponds to the distinction developed above between units of enactment and units of state, as well as to the provisional character of experienced order.

Experience remains bound to the here and now of its bodily-affective conditions, whereas conceptual thought gains durability precisely through distancing and abstraction, while thereby selectively reducing the dynamics of lived experience.

It is precisely here that the distinction indicated in the subtitle can be formulated more exactly:

Experience enacts constituted reality in an analog, continuous form of lived experience in which meanings emerge fluidly, shift, and change over the course of enactment. Conceptual thought, by contrast, stabilizes these processes in a digital form by transforming meaning into discrete, symbolically fixable units that can be named, classified, and repeated.

The distinction between analog and digital is not intended as a technical analogy, but as a structural distinction between modalities of meaning.

The analog enactment of experience is continuous, transitional, and related to intensities, resonances, and shifts in relevance. It does not stabilize meaning in fixed states, but in provisional Gestalten and units of activity.

The digital stabilization of conceptual thought, by contrast, operates discretely. It does not divide experience itself into discrete components; rather, it selectively fixes particular aspects of its enactment in distinguishable symbolic forms. In this way, it makes meaning repeatable, comparable, and communicatively connectable.

The complementarity of the two levels thereby becomes clearer: conceptual thought can digitally stabilize only what experience has previously brought forth in analog form; experience, in turn, can preserve its orders beyond their particular enactment only insofar as conceptual thought transforms them into symbolic units.

Under the conditions established by reality as a limiting concept, the irreducibility of this tension is also evident in the fact that reality itself is not available as a complete inventory. Neither can conceptual thought fix reality, nor can experience possess it in pure immediacy. Both modes remain limited in their relation to constituted reality and, at the same time, dependent upon one another.

Meaning therefore does not arise on either of the two levels alone, but through the interplay of their different functions.

Experience generates provisional order by bringing forth operative condensations where stable structures of meaning are absent. Conceptual thought stabilizes these condensations in symbolic forms that enable comparison, repetition, and transfer. From this perspective, meaning remains at once event-like and capable of fixation, without fixation being able to abolish its event-like character.

Reality as a limiting concept functions as the common horizon of this interplay. On the one hand, the relation to constituted reality is realized as living, situational, and resonant meaning formation; on the other, it is rendered manageable through symbolic stabilization. Both forms remain susceptible to irritation, correction, and further differentiation as experience proceeds.

From this perspective, understanding appears as a dynamic process unfolding between experience and conceptual thought. It does not consist in abolishing their difference, but in their productive interrelation. The unity of understanding is therefore not a homogeneous unity, but an **operative unity**. It consists in the fact that Gestalt formations immanent to experience and symbolic stabilizations mutually sustain, correct, and carry one another forward.

With regard to reality as a limiting concept, the final implication is this: understanding achieves orientation without providing ultimate certainty, because both experience and conceptual thought remain bound to a reality that operates as a limiting horizon, preventing any final closure of meaning while simultaneously opening the possibility of productive reorientation, revision, and further differentiation.

3.6 Provisional Conclusion

(Unit Formation as the Mediation of Experience, Conceptual Thought, and the Relation to Constituted Reality)

The preceding reflections have shown that human meaning formation takes place on two structurally distinct yet interrelated levels. Experience constitutes the primary mode in which meaning arises in enactment. It is affective, bodily, and situational in structure and organizes itself into prereflective experiential units.

Under the conditions established by reality as a limiting concept, this primary mode can be understood as a transcendental-operative access to the world. Experience is not representational; rather, within its enactment it forms provisional orders, Gestalten, and units in which the world comes to appearance in a particular way, without this mode of appearance being capable of being understood as a determination of reality itself.

Conceptual thought, by contrast, constitutes a secondary mode of meaningful order. It stabilizes, abstracts, and fixes what has already emerged as significant within experience. Conceptual units enable distance, comparison, and communicative mediation without themselves being the origin of meaning.

This symbolic stabilization must be understood as a transformation of the order immanent to experience. Conceptual thought makes states of meaning available as units of state, retains recurring patterns, and enables orientation beyond the individual moment. In doing so, it necessarily and selectively reduces the situational, affective, and bodily dynamics of experience.

Under the conditions established by reality as a limiting concept, this level, too, remains related to constituted reality. Its relation to constituted reality does not, however, consist in determining reality itself, but in the symbolic stabilization of orders of meaning within constituted reality.

Experiential units and conceptual units must therefore not be conceived in isolation from one another. They stand in an ongoing reciprocal relation in which experience-based meaning formation and conceptual stabilization mutually influence one another.

This relation is characterized by tension, but it is productive.

Experience opens nexuses of meaning as event-like, energetic-affective condensations and Gestalten. Conceptual thought selectively takes up these structures, stabilizes them symbolically, and makes them available beyond their situational enactment. These symbolic stabilizations, in turn, feed back into the experiential process by directing attention, enabling comparison, and opening new possibilities of connection for further experience.

The unity of meaning formation therefore does not arise through the abolition of the difference between experience and conceptual thought, but through the interplay of their distinct functions.

Experience forms meaning in the mode of analog enactment. Meanings emerge within the continuous process of lived experience, in which perception, emotion, and bodily orientation are condensed into units of activity.

Conceptual thought stabilizes meaning in the mode of digital symbolization. It selectively transforms particular aspects of this enactment into discrete, symbolically fixed units that can be named, classified, and repeated.

Meaning formation thus appears simultaneously as event-like enactment and symbolic stabilization.

The possibility of this dual structure rests on the continuing interdependence of the two levels. Experience opens meaning within situational enactment; conceptual thought stabilizes this meaning in forms that enable orientation beyond the particular moment.

Unit formation therefore proves to be the mediating process between experience-based meaning formation and conceptual stabilization.

This mediation concerns exclusively the level of constituted reality as an operatively structured order of meaning.

Reality remains distinct from it. It functions as a **transcendental limiting horizon** marking the fundamental openness and non-totalizability of every order of meaning.

The guiding distinction can therefore be stated more precisely once again:

Constituted reality designates the provisionally stabilized orders of meaning formed within experience and conceptual thought, in which the world appears and becomes manageable.

Reality, by contrast, is not another order within this mediation. It is the limiting concept that marks the limit of every order.

Reality is the horizon toward which formations of meaning remain oriented, at which irritations and resistances become operative as limits of experienced and symbolically stabilized order, and which prevents any order of meaning from presenting itself as a final totality.

The perspective developed in this chapter can therefore be described as a three-level structure of the formation of constituted reality:

1. **At the level of experience, meaning is formed operatively in enactment.**
2. **At the level of conceptual thought, these orders of meaning are symbolically stabilized.**
3. **Through the mediation of these two levels, a dynamic nexus of understanding emerges in which experience and conceptual order reciprocally feed back into one another.**

Reality remains the limiting horizon toward which this shared process of meaning formation is oriented without itself being exhausted by any of its forms.

4. Experiential Order and Symbolic Order

(Relational Constitution of Meaning between Experiential Order and Symbolic Order)

4.1 Understanding as a Relational Process

(Meaning Formation through Relations)

The preceding chapters have shown that meaning arises neither from isolated impressions nor from individual conceptual units. Understanding is not a discrete act, but a relational process. It emerges where experiential units and conceptual units enter into relation and mutually determine one another. Under the conditions established by reality as a limiting concept, this determination must be understood as a transcendental-operative coordination:

Understanding realizes a relation to constituted reality not by representing an already completed reality, but by operatively stabilizing meaning within a relational configuration that takes shape in enactment and remains open to revision because reality, as a limiting horizon, is never absorbed into this stabilization.

Experience does not appear as a sequence of mutually independent moments, but as a nexus. A lived experience acquires meaning in relation to other lived experiences, a perception within the context of a situation, and a thought within a configuration of further thoughts. Stable orders of meaning therefore do not arise from isolated elements, but from the operative interconnection of differentiated markings. The formation of Gestalten and units developed above can thus be specified relationally:

Whatever emerges as a Gestalt or experiential unit acquires its meaning not from itself, but from the relations within which it is stabilized in the experiential process.

Under the conditions established by reality as a limiting concept, this also means that such stabilization cannot count as a final determination. Relations are operative condensations within constituted reality understood as an order of meaning. They remain oriented toward reality as a limiting horizon without transforming it into a closed order. This relationality pervades both the analog dimension of experience and the digital stabilization of thought within the same operative nexus.

Experiential units acquire their meaning through their relations to other experiential units, whereas conceptual units unfold their meaning within conceptual orders and symbolic networks.

Relations thus function as a condition of operative meaning stabilization. This preserves coherence with the distinctions developed thus far: the analog, energetic-affective, and bodily meaning formation of experience gives rise to prereflective relations and condensations, whereas conceptual thought transforms these relations into symbolic orders, fixes them, and makes them communicable. The two levels do not, however, constitute separate systems, but different modes within an ongoing operative nexus in which relations are formed, maintained, shifted, and reorganized.

Within this context, understanding designates the operative coordination of differentiated relations within a stabilizing nexus of meaning. It is a process of ordering, connecting, and

differentiating that unfolds through the interplay of experience-based meaning formation and conceptual structuring.

Understood in transcendental-operative terms, understanding is therefore not an additional instance alongside experience and conceptual thought, but the name for the manner in which their different operations are related to one another:

Experience opens provisional Gestalten, units of activity, and formations of relevance, whereas conceptual thought stabilizes them in symbolic units of state. In understanding, these operations are relationally coordinated, so that nexuses of meaning can remain both sustained by event-like enactment and symbolically available, without either level replacing the other.

In this sense, the formation of constituted reality occurs on different relational levels. Experiential units acquire their meaning through relational condensation within the experiential field; conceptual units stabilize meaning within symbolic relations; and in understanding, the two levels are coordinated with one another. Constituted reality thus appears as a relationally structured order of meaning whose stability emerges from the operative interconnection of experience and symbolic order.

This relational structure simultaneously points to two distinct modes of meaning formation. Experience forms meaning analogically as a continuous, affective-bodily enactment in which Gestalten, relations, and experiential units arise. Conceptual thought stabilizes these formations of meaning digitally by transforming them into discrete, symbolically fixable units. Understanding arises from the coordination of these two modes, so that the formation of constituted reality appears as an ongoing coupling of analog and digital meaning formation.

Understanding nevertheless remains fundamentally open. Relations can shift, emerge anew, or lose significance. Meaning is not fixed, but arises within the ongoing relational process in which experience and thought are mediated with one another. This openness follows from the structural provisionality of experienced order and the selective stabilization performed by conceptual thought. Irritations, new contexts, or altered affective attunements can reorganize relations and thereby transform understanding without disrupting the continuity of understanding as a process.

This relational structure concerns exclusively constituted reality as an operatively formed order of meaning. Reality is not relationally integrated, but remains the transcendental limiting horizon marking the non-closure of relational orders. Relations are ways in which constituted reality is operatively organized—as a network of connections, differences, and moments of stabilization that arise in enactment. Reality, by contrast, is not an element within this network, but the limiting reference that prevents any relational order from positing itself as a final totality.

It thereby becomes apparent that relationality is not merely a property of particular nexuses of meaning, but a fundamental structural principle of the constitution of constituted reality. Meaning arises from the operative coordination of different levels of meaning formation.

Understanding designates the relational nexus within which experience-based meaning formation and symbolic stabilization are brought into relation and jointly realize a relation to constituted reality.

4.2 Relations among Experiential Units

(Relational Condensation of Experience-Near Constituted Reality)

Relations among experiential units are formed within the enactment of experience itself. They are not pregiven, but arise from temporal, situational, and affective nexuses. An experiential unit therefore acquires its meaning not from itself, but from its embeddedness within a field of further experiences. Under the conditions established by reality as a limiting concept, this formation of relations must be understood as a transcendental-operative achievement:

Experience forms not only units, but simultaneously the relations within which these units appear as meaningful.

Reality must not be presupposed here as an already relationally ordered totality that experience merely encounters. Rather, it is to be understood as the limiting horizon toward which the relational condensations of experience remain oriented without ever being capable of transforming it into a closed order.

These relations are dynamic. They change with affective attunement, attention, and situational context. An event can acquire different meanings depending on the experiential nexus within which it occurs.

Meaning arises here not through fixed assignment, but through relational condensation.

This preserves coherence with the preceding determinations: like order as a whole, relational structure is grounded energetically, affectively, and bodily; it takes shape as a provisional stabilization within an ongoing nexus of events.

Under the conditions established by reality as a limiting concept, this also means that the mutability of relations is not merely contingent, but structurally connected with the provisional character of the relation to constituted reality. Because reality is never exhausted by experienced order, relational condensations remain susceptible to irritation, capable of shifting, and open to reorientation.

Relations among experiential units are therefore not rigidly fixed, but form fluid fields of meaning within which relevances can shift.

Expectations, memories, and bodily resonances participate in shaping these relations without completely determining them. This participation must be understood in transcendental-operative terms: expectations, memories, and resonances are not merely contents existing alongside relations, but operative moments of the process of relating itself. They focus attention, prepare transitions, and contribute to the condensation of Gestalten.

At the same time, the process remains open. The self-referentiality of experience—its connection with already established patterns of activity—makes variation and transformation possible, particularly where irritations mark the limits of previous condensations. Under the conditions established by reality as a limiting concept, this limit appears as a dimension of constituted reality within enactment: not as an element that could itself be relationally integrated, but as a limiting reference at which fields of meaning may become stabilized or destabilized.

Understanding at this level is immediately operative, yet only to a limited extent representable. The relational nexuses of experience cannot be adequately captured conceptually because their bodily-affective, situational, and temporally dynamic dimensions remain bound to the enactment of lived experience and can therefore enter into the operations of conceptual thought only in transformed form. Nevertheless, they constitute the foundation of every further ordering of meaning.

The determinations developed thus far also show that the formation of constituted reality arises from the interplay of different modes of organization. Experience forms meaning analogically as a continuous, affective-bodily enactment in which Gestalten, relations, and experiential units arise. Conceptual thought stabilizes these formations of meaning digitally by transforming them into discrete, symbolically fixable units. Understanding emerges through the coordination of these two modes. Constituted reality thus appears as the result of an ongoing coupling of analog and digital meaning formation, while reality, as a limiting horizon, marks the openness and limits of this order.

It thereby becomes apparent that the formation of constituted reality occurs on different relational levels. Experiential units acquire their meaning through relational condensation within the experiential field; conceptual units stabilize meaning in symbolic relations; and in understanding, the two levels are coordinated with one another.

The immediately operative understanding of experiential relations realizes a relation to constituted reality as an event-like, prereflective order of meaning that conceptual thought can transform only selectively into symbolic stabilizations. The limited representability of this order is therefore not merely a matter of epistemic incompleteness, but an expression of the structural difference between units of enactment and units of state. What is relationally condensed within experience remains, in its full experiential reality, bound to operative enactment, whereas symbolic fixations necessarily remain reductive.

It thus becomes apparent once again that relationality is not merely a property of particular nexuses of meaning, but a fundamental structural principle of the constitution of constituted reality. Experience does not form units in isolation, but always through relational condensation; conceptual thought stabilizes these relations within symbolic orders; and in understanding, the two levels are coordinated.

Constituted reality thus appears as a relationally structured order of meaning whose stability arises from the operative interconnection of experience and symbolic order.

Reality remains the transcendental limiting horizon marking the non-totalizability of every relational order and thereby grounding the principled openness of understanding at this level as well.

4.3 Relations among Conceptual Units

(Symbolic Relations as the Stabilization of Meaning)

At the level of conceptual thought, relations are formed in a different manner than at the level of experience. Conceptual units enter into conceptual, logical, and systematic relations that do not arise within situational enactment, but are formed within symbolic orders designed for relative durability. Under the conditions established by reality as a limiting concept, this designates a specific form of operative meaning stabilization:

Conceptual thought realizes a relation to constituted reality not through event-like condensation in the here and now, but through symbolic relational organization, in which states of meaning are rendered available as units of state.

Whereas the preceding section showed that experiential units acquire their meaning through relational condensation within the experiential field, meaning at the level of conceptual thought arises through a different mode of organization: not as situational enactment, but as symbolic stabilization within conceptual orders. This reveals a structural correspondence with the experiential relations described above.

What is condensed within experience as a fluid, bodily-affective field of meaning appears in conceptual thought as an explicit relation among conceptual units.

Reality remains the limiting horizon. Symbolic relations claim a relation to constituted reality without thereby making reality available as a closed and determinate totality. Their validity remains dependent upon validation, criticism, and possible revision in the continuing course of experience and thought.

Concepts do not acquire their meaning in isolation,
but through their position within a conceptual nexus.

They are distinguished, compared, hierarchically ordered, and interconnected, so that meaning arises through connectivity and coherence within a symbolic configuration. This relationality must be understood as a transformation of relations immanent to experience: what arises within experience as fluid relational condensation is transformed within conceptual thought into explicit relations that can be handled systematically.

Expressed more precisely in transcendental-operative terms:

Conceptual thought does not operate as the origin of meaning, but as the level upon which meaning that has already emerged is brought into a form capable of being stabilized through distinction, comparison, and ordering.

Under the conditions established by reality as a limiting concept, this stabilization remains provisional. Coherence within symbolic orders is not identical with a determination of reality itself, but designates a form of ordering constituted reality whose viability must prove itself in the continuing course of experience, criticism, and conceptual development.

Relations among conceptual units therefore possess greater structural stability than relations within experience. They make it possible to retain and communicate meaning beyond the particular experiential nexus.

Models, theories, and classifications are based upon such stabilized relations among conceptual units.

Their function is to fix patterns, enable comparison, and provide orientation beyond individual situations. This stability constitutes the ordering function of units of state. It creates overview, repeatability, and transferability by symbolically retaining relations of meaning.

At the same time, this form of relation remains selective. It abstracts from the situational, affective, and bodily dynamics of experience. Relations among conceptual units thereby gain

clarity and durability, but lose the immediate resonance of lived experience. This selectivity corresponds to the transformation of units of enactment into units of state described above:

Symbolic relations retain particular aspects of meaning formation immanent to experience, while others necessarily recede because the temporally dynamic and bodily-affective condensation of lived experience cannot enter into conceptual operations in the same manner.

It is precisely here, under the conditions established by reality as a limiting concept, that the limits of symbolic order become apparent. Abstraction reveals that reality cannot be absorbed into the conceptual world as a relationally integrable element; rather, as a limiting horizon, it marks the non-totalizability of every symbolic order.

Understanding at this level is explicit and open to reflection. It permits justification, criticism, and systematic development. Its viability, however, remains dependent upon a prior experiential order from which conceptual relations derive their meaning.

In transcendental-operative terms, this means:

Explicit understanding is an operative coordination within symbolic networks that stabilizes, tests, and further differentiates meaning. It nevertheless remains connected to experience-based meaning formation, because only there do relevances, Gestalten, and resistances emerge through which symbolic relations can acquire and test their viability.

If reality is understood as a limiting concept, the dual structure is thereby preserved. Constituted reality, as an operatively formed order of meaning, can be relationally organized—analogically within the dimension of experience and digitally within the symbolic orders of conceptual thought. Reality, by contrast, remains the transcendental limiting horizon that limits every stabilization and preserves the principled openness, revisability, and non-closure of understanding even at the level of conceptual thought.

4.4 Translation between Experience and Conceptual Thought

(Transformation of Analog Experiential Order into Digital Determinacy)

There is no immediate transition between the relations among experiential units and the relations among conceptual units. Rather, the connection between the two levels is accomplished through processes of translation by which experience-based nexuses of meaning are transformed into conceptual orders. This translation is not a neutral representation. It involves selection, condensation, and transformation: certain aspects of experience are brought into prominence and conceptually fixed, while others remain unarticulated or recede.

The translation of experience into thought is therefore necessarily selective.

Under the conditions established by reality as a limiting concept, this selectivity must be understood as a transcendental-operative condition of mediation.

Because experience, as a unit of enactment, is organized bodily-affectively, situationally, and temporally, whereas conceptual thought stabilizes meaning in the form of units of state, translation cannot consist in the transfer of identical contents. Rather, it takes place

as an operative transformation through which meaning is converted into a different form of availability without preserving its original processual character.

At the same time, this process of translation is indispensable. Only through it does experience become representable, communicable, and available for reflection. Concepts make it possible to gain distance from what has been experienced without completely severing themselves from its origin. Conceptual thought retains in symbolic forms what has already emerged as significant within experience and makes it available beyond the immediate moment. This distance does not imply a departure from the relation to constituted reality, but rather a different mode of stabilizing constituted reality as an operatively formed order of meaning.

Concepts create comparability, repeatability, and the possibility of criticism, yet they remain dependent upon a prior order immanent to experience that can enter into symbolic forms only selectively and in transformed form.

Translation, moreover, does not proceed in only one direction. Conceptual orders feed back into experience. They structure expectations, direct attention, and influence what can emerge as significant within the experiential field. Experience and conceptual thought therefore stand in a reciprocal relation of mediation. Experience prereflectively forms relevances, Gestalten, and experiential units; conceptual thought stabilizes these as conceptual orders; and these orders, in turn, affect the experiential process by providing possibilities of connection, opening horizons of comparison, and helping to shape the relational organization of the experiential field.

This feedback does not abolish the provisional character of experienced order, but organizes it. Concepts can stabilize expectations, yet they can equally become questionable and undergo transformation through irritations arising within experience. The reciprocal relation between stabilization and renewed formation thereby continues.

The mediation between experience and conceptual thought does not abolish their difference. Experience remains bound to enactment, whereas thought remains bound to symbolic order. Translation therefore does not designate a transition into a unified level, but the ongoing process of mediation between two different modes of meaning formation. More precisely, in transcendental-operative terms:

The unity of understanding does not consist in abolishing this difference, but in the operative nexus of their reciprocal transformations, within which meaning is both brought forth eventfully and fixed symbolically.

Reality does not function in this process as a pregiven structure that would be represented in perception, but as a limiting reference and source of impulses at which experience-based and conceptually organized processes of meaning formation are initiated. The distinction between constituted reality and reality introduced above is thereby consistently maintained. Processes of translation concern constituted reality as an operatively structured order of meaning, not reality as a limiting horizon.

Reality is not an element within relational or symbolic networks, but marks the limit at which meaning formation proves incapable of totalization. At the same time, it functions as that through which irritations, resistances, and pressures toward reorientation become possible—conditions under which both experience-based condensations and conceptual fixations may prove viable or fail.

What is perceived must therefore not be understood as a representation of real structures, but as the result of an enactment-based process of meaning formation. **Perception is operative, not representational.** It designates the manner in which experience forms provisional order out of openness, allows Gestalten and relations to emerge, and stabilizes meaning without thereby making reality itself available.

Reality remains the transcendental limiting horizon that both enables and constrains these formations of meaning: it enables them by providing the impulses through which they arise and constrains them by preventing any final fixation of meaning.

The perspective developed here therefore avoids both a reduction of meaning formation to the conceptual structures of thought and an exclusive localization of meaning within the immediate enactment of experience. Meaning instead arises through the interplay of both levels: **experience forms relational condensations within enactment, whereas conceptual thought symbolically stabilizes these formations of meaning and renders them available for reflection.**

This also contains an implicit resolution of the classical subject–object problem. Neither should the subject be conceived as a sovereign instance imposing meaning upon an already completed world of objects, nor should the object be presupposed as a fully given entity that cognition merely represents. Subject and object instead appear as secondary differentiations within a more comprehensive nexus of experience, conceptual thought, and understanding, within which constituted reality is operatively disclosed, symbolically stabilized, and relationally mediated. Reality remains the limiting horizon that prevents any one of these levels from becoming autonomous as a final totality.

4.5 Relation as the Locus of Meaning Formation

(Relation as a Fundamental Structure of the Constitution of Constituted Reality)

Meaning arises neither within isolated experiential units nor exclusively within abstract conceptual structures. Rather, it takes shape within the relations that develop among them. Relation is therefore not merely a connection between already existing meanings, but the locus at which meaning first acquires Gestalt. Under the conditions established by reality as a limiting concept, this Gestalt formation must be understood as a transcendental-operative process: meaning becomes stabilized within constituted reality as an operatively formed order of meaning, whereas reality, as a limiting horizon, marks the principled non-closure of these relational Gestalt formations.

Within experience, meaning initially appears as a nexus of resonances.

Perceptions, emotions, and bodily orientations enter into relation with one another and condense into experiential Gestalten. This formation of meaning remains, in its full structure, bound to the enactment of lived experience and is therefore only partially representable. Nevertheless, it provides immediate orientation for perception, action, and situational understanding.

This preserves coherence with the preceding analysis: resonance, affective relevance formation, and bodily orientation provide the energetic foundation within which experiential units emerge as units of enactment. Relation here designates the operative condensation through which transitions, accentuations, and Gestalten arise over the temporal course of experience.

Under the conditions established by reality as a limiting concept, this also means that such condensation must not be understood as a representation of structures inherent in reality. Rather, it designates the manner in which the world appears within lived experience—initiated and constrained by reality, without reality itself becoming available as a structuring schema.

Within thought, by contrast, meaning appears as a relational order of units.

Meanings arise here from distinctions, connections, and systematic relations. At this level, too, relation is constitutive, although in a different form from that found in experience. Conceptual units enter, as units of state, into conceptual, logical, and systematic relations designed for relative durability and enabling comparison, repetition, justification, and criticism.

This symbolic relationality constitutes a transformation of meaning formation immanent to experience. It stabilizes and abstracts what has emerged as significant within experience and organizes it into coherent orders. Under the conditions established by reality as a limiting concept, this level, too, remains related to constituted reality without making reality available as a closed totality. The stability of these relations is therefore regulative and open to revision, because their viability can prove itself only in the continuing course of experience and criticism.

Relation connects these two levels without unifying them. It makes it possible for experience-based nexuses of meaning to be taken up conceptually and, at the same time, for conceptual orders to become effective within experience. Meaning therefore arises through the mediation of both levels, not at either level alone.

More precisely, in transcendental-operative terms, relation designates the ongoing process of mediation in which units of enactment are translated into units of state and symbolic orders, in turn, feed back into the experiential process. Concepts structure expectations, direct attention, and open possibilities of connection for further experience without replacing the bodily-affective dynamics of enactment from which they emerge.

This mediation necessarily remains selective and provisional. The bodily-affective dynamics of experience cannot be transformed into symbolic order without altering their original processual character. At the same time, symbolic stabilization cannot be separated from the event-like formation of meaning from which it arises.

Understanding, from this perspective, therefore does not consist in apprehending completed contents, but is a relational occurrence within enactment. It consists in the co-enactment of relations, transitions, and differences that emerge through the interplay of experience and thought.

Under the conditions established by reality as a limiting concept, this can be stated more precisely:

Understanding realizes a relation to constituted reality as the operative coordination of relational formations of meaning that can be exhausted neither by immediate resonance nor by conceptual order alone.

Reality remains the transcendental limiting horizon that simultaneously enables and constrains this process by preserving the openness, susceptibility to irritation, and non-totalizability of every relational order of meaning without itself becoming integrated into these relations as one of their elements.

4.6 Provisional Conclusion

(Understanding as Relational Mediation under the Limiting Condition of Reality)

The preceding analyses have shown that meaning arises neither from individual experiential units nor from isolated conceptual structures. Meaning is formed relationally. It emerges within the relations that develop both within experience and within thought and that mediate between these two levels. Under the conditions established by reality as a limiting concept, this relationality must be understood as a transcendental-operative nexus: constituted reality appears as an operatively formed order of meaning within which relations stabilize meaning, whereas reality, as a limiting horizon, marks the principled openness and non-totalizability of these relational orders.

The analyses of this chapter have also revealed a differentiated structure of relational meaning formation. At the level of experience, meaning arises within enactment through the relational condensation of perceptions, emotions, and bodily orientations. Experiential units appear here as units of enactment that generate meaning within situational nexuses of resonance without being fully representable in symbolic form.

Conceptual thought stabilizes these formations of meaning within a different mode of organization. Conceptual units enter, as units of state, into symbolic relations among concepts, categories, and systematic orders. These symbolic relations enable distance, reflection, and communicative mediation, yet remain dependent upon a prior order immanent to experience from which they emerge and against which their viability must prove itself in the continuing course of experience and criticism.

An ongoing process of translation takes place between the two levels. Experience-based nexuses of meaning are selectively transformed into symbolic orders, while conceptual orders simultaneously feed back into the experiential process by structuring expectations, directing attention, and opening new possibilities of connection.

This translation does not abolish the difference between the two levels. Rather, it realizes the process of mediation within which meaning is both brought forth eventfully and stabilized symbolically.

Understanding, in this context, designates the relational coordination of these different forms of meaning formation. It does not consist in apprehending completed contents, but in the co-enactment of relations, transitions, and differences that emerge through the interplay of experience-based meaning formation and symbolic order.

It thereby becomes clear that relationality is not merely a property of particular nexuses of meaning, but a fundamental structural principle of the constitution of constituted reality. Constituted reality appears as a relationally organized order of meaning whose stability arises from the operative coordination of experience-based condensations and symbolic relations.

Reality remains distinct from this order. It is not an element within relational orders, but the transcendental limiting horizon toward which formations of meaning remain oriented and against which their principled non-closure becomes apparent. Reality limits every stabilization of meaning without itself becoming part of that stabilization.

The fundamental structure of the formation of constituted reality can therefore be described in terms of three interrelated levels:

- **At the level of experience, meaning is formed analogically within enactment as a relational condensation of perceptions, emotions, and bodily orientations.**
- **At the level of conceptual thought, these formations of meaning are digitally stabilized by being transformed into discrete symbolic relations, concepts, and systematic orders.**
- **Within understanding, the two levels are relationally mediated, so that experience-based meaning formation and symbolic stabilization reciprocally affect one another.**

Constituted reality thus appears as an operatively formed and relationally structured order of meaning. Reality remains the limiting horizon toward which this meaning formation is oriented and against which its principled openness, revisability, and non-closure become apparent.

The conceptual framework within which the subsequent analyses of analog experience, digital thought, the "I," and the formation of world can proceed has thereby been established. Experience remains the fundamental basis of all meaning formation because it is within the transcendental-operative enactment of experience that the world first comes to appearance in Gestalten, units, and relations. Every conceptual stabilization remains dependent upon this enactment and cannot replace it.

Reality, finally, marks the limiting horizon of this meaning formation. It prevents any relational order from positing itself as a final totality and thereby structurally preserves the openness of understanding as well as the possibility of further differentiation and reorientation.

5. The Analog Dimension of Experience and the Digital Stabilization of Constituted Reality

(Two Modes of Meaning Formation and Their Interplay)

5.1 Two Modes of Meaning Formation

(Analog Continuity and Digital Differentiation)

The preceding reflections have shown that the human relation to the world is not organized in a uniform manner. Experience and conceptual thought do not constitute different contents of one and the same process, but two structurally distinct modes of meaning formation. They differ not merely in degree, but in the manner in which meaning is respectively generated and organized. Reality as a limiting concept does not designate a further mode, but the transcendental limiting horizon toward which both modes of relating to constituted reality remain oriented without reality itself entering into either of them. Constituted reality accordingly emerges as an operatively formed order of meaning in different modes, whereas reality marks the principled openness and non-totalizability of every formation of meaning.

Experience unfolds as an **analog mode of meaning formation**. It is continuous, processual, and characterized by transitions. Meaning does not arise here through sharply delimited distinctions, but through Gestalten, attunements, and resonances. Experience thereby remains open to ambiguity and transformation. Meaning does not unfold punctually, but over the temporal course of lived experience.

More precisely, in transcendental-operative terms, the analog mode designates the manner in which experience forms provisional orders out of prestructural openness by affectively and bodily marking relevances, condensing resonances, and bringing forth Gestalten as events. Under the conditions established by reality as a limiting concept, this unfolding of meaning remains related to constituted reality without being representational: reality is not reproduced as an already completed structure, but operates as a limiting reference toward which event-like condensations remain oriented, at which irritations may arise, and through which the provisional character of order remains structurally grounded.

Conceptual thought, by contrast, operates in a **digital mode of meaning formation**. It works through distinctions, discrete units, and stabilized relations. Meaning arises here through delimitation, naming, and symbolic fixation. The digital mode enables overview, comparison, and communicative connectivity, but to a considerable extent detaches meaning from the immediate dynamics of experience.

This remains consistent with the previously developed transformation of units of enactment into units of state. The digital mode stabilizes nexuses of meaning that have emerged through experience as conceptual units, organizes them within conceptual networks, and makes them available beyond the immediate moment, while necessarily and selectively reducing the situational, affective, and bodily dynamics of experience. This stabilization, too, remains open to revision. Concepts and relations may prove viable, but they may equally become subject to irritation and transformation because reality does not enter symbolic order as a totalizable inventory.

The distinction between the analog and digital modes must not be understood technically, but as designating different forms of the organization of meaning.

Analog means continuous, qualitative, and process-related;
digital means discrete, differentiating, and symbolically fixating.

Both modes are necessary and functionally interrelated. This interrelation must itself be understood in transcendental-operative terms.

The analog mode provides the operative richness of meaning within which Gestalten, relations, and relevances arise in enactment. The digital mode transforms this richness into symbolic stabilizations that enable comparison, communication, and systematic development.

This functional interrelation concerns the level of constituted reality as an order of meaning; reality remains distinct from it as the limiting horizon that marks the non-closure of both modes and structurally enables their reciprocal capacity for correction.

Neither mode can replace the other.

Analog experience provides the richness of meaning from which significance emerges; digital thought organizes these meanings and makes them available beyond the immediate moment. Understanding arises through the interplay of both modes, not through their unification.

If reality is understood as a limiting concept, this means that understanding is the operative coordination of analog condensations and digital stabilizations through which constituted reality emerges as a provisional order of meaning and is continuously reorganized. Reality

remains the transcendental limiting horizon that orients and constrains this interplay by preventing any complete closure of meaning and thereby preserving the openness, revisability, and capacity for transformation of meaning formation in both modes.

The distinction between analog experience and digital stabilization thus points to a fundamental structure of human meaning formation.

The relation to constituted reality is enacted, on the one hand, within continuous, affective-bodily processes of experience and, on the other, within the discrete symbolic differentiations of thought. The two modes are not interchangeable but constitute complementary forms of the constitution of constituted reality.

5.2 The Analog Structure of Experience

(Preconceptual and Bodily-Affective Formation of Constituted Reality)

The analog formation of meaning in experience designates the manner in which meanings arise within the continuous enactment of lived experience. Experience is not a juxtaposition of isolated impressions, but an ongoing nexus of perceptions, attunements, and bodily orientations within which meaning takes shape processually. Meanings do not appear as sharply delimited units, but in Gestalten, transitions, and resonances that condense over the temporal course of lived experience.

This continuous character of experience provides the basis for what has previously been described as analog meaning formation. In this context, “analog” does not refer to a technical analogy, but to a structural property of lived experience:

Meanings arise within the flow of enactment and change with their respective situational embeddedness.

Perceptions, emotions, and bodily orientations interweave and form dynamic fields of meaning within which relevances can shift and Gestalten can emerge.

More precisely, in transcendental-operative terms, experience forms meaning by bringing forth provisional orders from prestructural openness. These orders do not arise through fixed assignments, but through relational condensation within the experiential field. Relevances, transitions, and resonances temporarily stabilize into Gestalten without this stabilization becoming permanent or final.

Under the conditions established by reality as a limiting concept, this formation of meaning remains related to constituted reality without representing reality as a structure. Reality does not appear as a pregiven order that would be reproduced in experience. Rather, it operates as a limiting reference toward which experiential orders remain oriented and at which irritations, resistances, or reorientations may occur.

The analog formation of meaning in experience is therefore fundamentally open. Meanings can shift, relations can appear anew, and previous relevances can lose their significance. This mutability is not merely an empirical property of individual experiences, but an expression of the structural openness of the experiential process itself.

The bodily-affective dimension of experience remains central here. Emotions mark relevances, direct attention, and contribute to the condensation of Gestalten. Perception, feeling, and bodily orientation jointly participate in the formation of those fields of meaning within which experiential units become stabilized.

This structure can also be determined temporally. Experience does not unfold in discrete moments, but within a continuous course in which past, present, and anticipation interweave. Memories enter into present perceptions, expectations structure attention, and new events may transform existing nexuses of meaning. Analog meaning formation therefore designates a temporally extended organization of meaning.

The continuous character of experience does not, however, imply indeterminacy. Stabilizations also arise within the analog mode. Gestalten, recognitions, and situational patterns make orientation within the experiential field possible. These stabilizations nevertheless remain bound to the enactment of lived experience and change with new experiences.

It is precisely here that the difference from the digital mode of conceptual thought becomes apparent. Whereas conceptual thought transforms meaning into discrete units and stable relations, experience stabilizes meaning within enactment itself. Analog meaning formation therefore does not designate a lesser form of order, but a different mode of organizing meaning.

This mode remains fundamental to every further form of meaning formation. The symbolic orders of conceptual thought presuppose that relevances, Gestalten, and relational condensations have already emerged within the experiential process. Without this analog formation of meaning, there would be no point of departure for conceptual stabilization.

The relation to constituted reality therefore takes place initially in the analog mode of experience. Constituted reality appears here as a continuous nexus of meanings that takes shape and changes within the enactment of lived experience. Reality remains distinct from it as the limiting horizon that marks the openness and non-closure of this meaning formation.

Analog meaning formation thus provides the operative ground upon which digital stabilization of meaning can first be built. Experience opens nexuses of meaning, whereas conceptual thought transforms them into symbolic forms. Both modes remain dependent upon one another without merging into one another.

5.3 The Digital Structure of Thought

(Discrete, Symbolic, and Conceptual Stabilization)

Whereas the analog formation of meaning in experience unfolds within the continuous enactment of lived experience, conceptual thought operates in a digital mode of meaning formation. Meaning arises here not primarily through transitions, resonances, and Gestalten, but through distinctions, delimitations, and stable symbolic units. The digital mode therefore designates the manner in which meaning is organized through differentiation, naming, and symbolic fixation.

Digital meaning formation rests upon the capacity to transform continuous nexuses of experience into discrete units. Concepts, categories, and symbolic relations stabilize particular aspects of the experiential process and make them available independently of their situational

enactment. In this way, conceptual orders arise that enable comparison, repetition, and communicative mediation.

More precisely, in transcendental-operative terms:

Conceptual thought does not generate meaning out of itself, but transforms formations of meaning immanent to experience into symbolic forms. What appears within experience as relational condensation is stabilized in thought as explicit distinctions and systematic relations among concepts.

Digital meaning formation is therefore not an autonomous source of meaning, but a mode of stabilizing and organizing nexuses of meaning that have already emerged.

Under the conditions established by reality as a limiting concept, this symbolic order, too, remains related to constituted reality without determining reality as a structure capable of final closure. Concepts and conceptual relations can organize constituted reality without apprehending reality as a totality. Their validity remains dependent upon validation, criticism, and possible revision.

The strength of the digital mode lies in its capacity for stabilization.

Concepts fix meanings, relations among concepts enable systematic connections, and symbolic orders provide an overview of complex fields of experience. Scientific models, theories, and classifications are based upon this form of digital organization of meaning.

At the same time, this stabilization remains selective. Symbolic order abstracts from the situational, affective, and bodily dynamics of experience. Digital meaning formation thereby gains clarity and durability, but loses the immediate resonance and processual character of lived experience. This reduction is not merely a limitation, but a necessary consequence of symbolic stabilization.

The structural difference from the analog mode of experience thus becomes apparent once again. Whereas experience brings forth meaning within continuous enactment, conceptual thought stabilizes meaning in discrete symbolic units. Analog meaning formation organizes meaning within the flow of lived experience; digital meaning formation organizes meaning through differentiation and symbolic fixation.

The two modes, however, do not exist independently alongside one another. Digital meaning formation presupposes that relevances, Gestalten, and relational condensations have already emerged within the experiential process.

Conceptual thought can stabilize and organize only what has already acquired meaning within the enactment of experience.

Conversely, symbolic orders feed back into experience. Concepts structure expectations, direct attention, and influence which aspects of the experiential field can emerge as significant.

Digital meaning formation is therefore not only stabilizing but also orienting.

The relation to constituted reality thus appears as an interplay of analog and digital organizations of meaning. Experience forms nexuses of meaning within enactment, whereas

conceptual thought stabilizes these nexuses in symbolic relations. Reality remains distinct from both as the limiting horizon marking the principled openness of every order of meaning.

Digital meaning formation therefore does not constitute a higher or more complete form of knowledge. Rather, it is a specific mode of organizing meaning that enables stability, comparability, and reflection without being able to replace the dynamic meaning formation of experience.

The digital mode of conceptual thought thus constitutes the symbolic dimension of the constitution of constituted reality. It stabilizes nexuses of meaning within conceptual orders that can persist beyond particular situations, while remaining dependent upon the analog meaning formation of experience from which these orders emerge.

5.4 Translation and Structural Tension

(Selectivity, Loss, and Connectivity)

The distinction developed above between analog and digital meaning formation does not describe separate domains of human knowledge, but two different modes of organizing meaning. Experience and conceptual thought do not constitute isolated systems, but stand in an ongoing reciprocal relation in which analog and digital meaning formation interact.

The two modes fulfill different functions within meaning formation. The analog mode generates richness of meaning and situational orientation; the digital mode stabilizes and structures these nexuses of meaning in symbolic form. Analog experience provides the relevances and Gestalten from which meaning emerges, whereas digital thought orders and differentiates these meanings and makes them available beyond their situational enactment.

More precisely, in transcendental-operative terms:

The unity of understanding does not consist in abolishing the difference between experience and conceptual thought, but in the operative coordination of their different functions.

Analog meaning formation brings forth nexuses of meaning within enactment; digital meaning formation transforms these nexuses into symbolic structures that can be examined, communicated, and further developed.

This coordination, however, is not a one-directional process. Digital orders of meaning feed back into experience. Concepts and symbolic structures shape expectations, direct attention, and influence which aspects of the experiential field can emerge into prominence. In this way, a dynamic nexus arises in which experience and thought reciprocally structure one another.

At the same time, the difference between the two modes remains. Analog experience remains bound to situational enactment, whereas digital meaning formation is directed toward symbolic stability. This difference is not a weakness of knowledge, but a structural condition of human meaning formation.

Under the conditions established by reality as a limiting concept, it becomes apparent that even this interplay cannot produce a final order. Constituted reality emerges as an operatively formed order of meaning through the interplay of analog and digital meaning formation. Reality

remains distinct from it as the limiting horizon that constrains every stabilization and marks the principled openness of meaning formation.

The interplay of the two modes simultaneously enables the ongoing development of meaning. Analog experience opens new nexuses of meaning, whereas digital meaning formation transforms them into more stable symbolic forms. These stabilizations may in turn be irritated by new experiences, so that existing orders can be modified or expanded.

Understanding thus appears as a dynamic process in which experience and thought complement one another reciprocally.

Constituted reality does not arise from a single instance of knowledge, but from the operative coordination of different modes of meaning formation.

The distinction between analog and digital meaning formation therefore does not describe two separate forms of knowledge, but two complementary dimensions of the same constitution of constituted reality.

Experience opens meaning within enactment; conceptual thought stabilizes meaning in symbolic structures. Understanding arises from the coordination of both modes.

Reality remains the limiting horizon toward which this meaning formation is oriented and against which its principled non-closure simultaneously becomes apparent.

5.5 The Productive Tension between the Analog and the Digital

(Viable Constituted Reality between Resonance and Concept)

The distinction between analog and digital meaning formation does not merely describe two different modes of organizing meaning; it points to a structural tension within human meaning formation. Experience and conceptual thought do not stand in a relation of succession or complete integration, but remain in a persistent difference that is constitutive of the development and stabilization of meaning.

Analog meaning formation unfolds nexuses of meaning within the continuous enactment of experience. Perceptions, emotions, and bodily orientations form fluid fields of meaning within which Gestalten, relevances, and relational condensations emerge. This form of meaning formation is open, situational, and processual. Meanings arise over the temporal course of lived experience and remain fundamentally capable of change.

By contrast, the digital mode of conceptual thought stabilizes these nexuses of meaning in discrete symbolic units and relations. Concepts, categories, and conceptual orders enable differentiation, comparison, and communicative mediation. Digital meaning formation thereby creates overview and durability, but necessarily reduces the situational and bodily-affective dynamics of experience.

The tension between the two modes follows from these different forms of meaning organization. Analog experience generates richness of meaning and situational significance, whereas digital stabilization orders and fixes these meanings. Both modes are therefore reciprocally dependent upon one another without merging into one another.

More precisely, in transcendental-operative terms:

The difference between analog experience and digital stabilization is not merely an epistemic limitation, but a structural condition of the constitution of constituted reality. Analog meaning formation opens nexuses of meaning within enactment, whereas digital meaning formation transforms them into symbolic orders that can be examined, communicated, and further developed.

This difference generates a productive tension within meaning formation. Analog experience can bring forth new nexuses of meaning that irritate or expand existing symbolic orders. Conversely, digital meaning formation can stabilize and structure experiential nexuses, thereby opening new forms of orientation.

The tension between the two modes should therefore not be understood as a deficiency, but as a driving force in the development of meaning. Meaning remains open to new formation because experience can continuously bring forth new nexuses of meaning. At the same time, meaning remains capable of stabilization because conceptual thought transforms these nexuses into symbolic orders.

Under the conditions established by reality as a limiting concept, it becomes apparent that this tension cannot be completely resolved. Constituted reality emerges as an operatively formed order of meaning through the interplay of analog and digital meaning formation. Reality remains distinct from it as the limiting horizon that constrains every stabilization and marks the principled openness of meaning formation.

The productive tension between analog experience and digital stabilization thereby secures the dynamic character of the formation of constituted reality. It prevents meaning from either being absorbed into the immediacy of lived experience or becoming completely fixed within symbolic orders.

From this perspective, understanding appears as the process through which this tension is operatively coordinated. It consists in the ongoing interplay between experience-based meaning formation and conceptual stabilization, through which constituted reality emerges as a provisional order of meaning and continues to develop.

Reality remains the transcendental limiting horizon toward which this meaning formation is oriented and against which its principled non-closure simultaneously becomes apparent.

5.6 Provisional Conclusion

(Constituted Reality as the Result of Analog–Digital Mediation)

The preceding analyses have shown that human meaning formation is organized in two different modes: the analog unfolding of meaning within experience and the digital stabilization performed by conceptual thought. These two modes do not designate different domains of objects, but different ways of organizing meaning within the formation of constituted reality.

The analog formation of meaning in experience takes place within the continuous course of lived experience. Perceptions, emotions, and bodily orientations form relational fields of meaning within which meanings emerge situationally. Experience does not organize meaning

through fixed units, but through Gestalten, transitions, and resonances that condense and change over time. Meaning arises here within enactment itself.

The digital mode of conceptual thought transforms these experience-based nexuses of meaning into discrete symbolic units. Concepts, categories, and systematic relations stabilize meaning, make it available beyond particular situations, and enable comparison, communication, and reflective examination. Digital meaning formation therefore organizes meaning through differentiation, naming, and symbolic fixation.

The two modes do not stand in a relation of succession or complete integration, but constitute complementary dimensions of the same process of meaning formation. Analog experience opens nexuses of meaning within enactment, whereas digital stabilization organizes these nexuses within symbolic orders.

At the same time, a structural tension exists between the two modes. Analog experience generates a richness of meaning that cannot be completely translated into symbolic orders. Digital stabilization reduces this richness in order to enable overview, determinacy, and communicative mediation. It is precisely from this difference that the dynamics of meaning formation arise: new experiences can irritate or expand existing symbolic orders, while conceptual structures organize and orient the experiential process.

Understanding emerges through the operative coordination of these two modes. It designates the process in which experience-based meaning formation and symbolic stabilization are brought into relation and reciprocally influence one another. Constituted reality thus appears as a relationally organized order of meaning that continuously emerges and changes through the interplay of analog and digital meaning formation.

Under the conditions established by reality as a limiting concept, this structure can be specified more precisely. Constituted reality designates the operatively formed order of meanings that develops within experience and thought. Reality, by contrast, remains distinct from this order as a transcendental limiting horizon toward which meaning formation remains oriented without reality itself entering into this order.

Reality limits every stabilization of meaning by marking the principled openness and non-closure of meaning formation. Orders of constituted reality therefore remain fundamentally open to revision and further development.

The distinction developed here between analog experience and digital stabilization thus describes a fundamental structure of the human constitution of constituted reality. Meaning arises neither exclusively within the immediate enactment of experience nor solely within the conceptual orders of thought. Rather, it emerges through the interplay of both modes.

Experience opens nexuses of meaning within continuous enactment, whereas conceptual thought transforms these nexuses into symbolic structures and stabilizes them. Understanding designates the operative mediation of these two forms of meaning formation.

The conceptual framework has thereby been established within which the subsequent analyses of self-relation, world-projection, and cultural meaning formation can be developed. The difference between the analog unfolding of meaning and digital stabilization constitutes a fundamental structural condition of the human formation of constituted reality.

Reality, finally, remains the limiting horizon that prevents either of these orders from positing itself as a final totality and thereby structurally preserves the openness, revisability, and further development of meaning formation.

The preceding analyses can thus be understood as the explication of a systematic structure of the constitution of constituted reality.

First, **experience constitutes the primary locus of the emergence of meaning**, in which meanings arise within analog, bodily-affective enactment as Gestalten, resonances, and relational condensations.

Second, **conceptual thought functions as a level of symbolic stabilization**, transforming experience-based formations of meaning into digital, conceptually fixed orders and thereby enabling comparison, reflection, and communicative mediation.

Third, **this formation of meaning is fundamentally relational in structure**, since meanings arise from the relations within which experiential units and conceptual units are coordinated with one another.

Fourth, **this relational organization manifests itself in two distinct modes of meaning formation**: an analog dimension of experience and a digital structure of thought.

Fifth, **reality remains distinct from this operatively formed order of meaning and functions as a transcendental limiting horizon**, orienting meaning formation while simultaneously marking its principled non-closure.

The constitution of constituted reality can thus be understood as a dynamic nexus in which analog experience, digital stabilization, and relational mediation interact. Constituted reality appears as an operatively formed order of meaning, whereas reality, as a limiting horizon, structurally preserves the principled openness, revisability, and non-totalizability of this order.

6. Experience, the I, and Relational Self-Constitution

(Self-Formation within Constituted Reality under the Limiting Reference to Reality)

6.1 The I as an Experiential Unit

(The Self as Prereflective Enactment)

Within experience, the I does not appear as a clearly delimited instance, nor as a center separate from experience. Rather, it manifests itself as an integral component of the experiential enactment itself. It is not a pre-given unit, but takes shape through the interplay of perception, emotion, and bodily relatedness.

Under the assumption that reality is conceived as a transcendental limiting concept, this permits a more precise determination:

The I is not the locus from which an independently given reality is represented. Rather, it is an operative Gestalt within constituted reality—that is, within the order of meaning in which the world can come to appearance in the first place.

Reality functions here as a limiting horizon that initiates and constrains the experiential process without being absorbed into it. The I therefore does not appear as a mediating instance between experience and reality.

In immediate lived experience, the I is not thematically given.

The I does not appear as an object of perception, but as the implicit perspective from which perceiving, feeling, and acting take place.

The expression "internal perspective" is only partially suitable here, since it easily suggests the idea of an inner space of consciousness. It is more precise to speak of a **perspectival structure of experience**:

Experience is always already world-related, and the I arises within this relation to the world, not as an interiority separate from it.

This perspectival character is prereflective. It is not consciously posited, but is operative within enactment. In this sense, the I can be understood as a structuring perspective that organizes perception, emotion, and action without itself becoming explicitly thematic.

Expressed in transcendental-operative terms:

The constitution of meaning is necessarily perspectival, and this perspectival character belongs to the operative structure of experience itself, not to a subsequent act of reflection.

As an experiential unit, the I is essentially dynamic. It changes with situational conditions, emotional attunements, and relational contexts. No stable core can be inferred from this. Rather, the I—analogously to other experiential units—arises as a temporary stabilization within an ongoing enactment organized through resonances, transitions, and condensations.

This processual character becomes intelligible when reality is understood as a limiting concept. Because reality is not exhausted by constituted reality as it is experienced, the I, as part of this constituted reality, likewise remains fundamentally provisional. It is always open to revision and transformation. No ultimately fixed core can therefore be derived from it.

At the same time, this experience-near Gestalt of the I is inseparably connected with a relation to the world. The I emerges through engagement with situations, things, and other people.

This relation to the world is not an external addition, but constitutive of self-formation.

The I is therefore relationally constituted from the outset: it forms itself as an operative unit within the orders of meaning that constitute constituted reality, while reality, as a limiting horizon, preserves the openness of these orders.

The I as an experiential unit can thus be understood neither as an isolated instance nor as a sovereign center. It is a processual-relational nexus that arises and changes within the enactment of experience. It is neither the primordial source of the constitution of the world nor merely the product of external structures, but an operative perspectival Gestalt within constituted reality.

This determination permits an initial systematic classification:

Self-constitution is multilayered. The I appears initially as a prereflective experiential unit, is symbolically stabilized in conceptual thought, and develops further within the relational nexus of relations to the world and to others.

6.2 The I as a Conceptual Unit

(The Self as a Symbolically Stabilized Form)

Alongside the experience-near, prereflective Gestalt of the I, a second form of self-relation emerges at the level of conceptual thought. Whereas the I remains dynamic and implicit within the enactment of experience, in thought it becomes a symbolically stabilized unit that can be named, described, and reflected upon.

This second level must not be understood as a representation of reality. Rather, it constitutes a transformation within constituted reality:

It is not reality that is represented as an "I." Rather, the operative self-enactment of experience is transformed into symbolic states that remain available beyond the particular moment. Reality continues to function as a transcendental limiting horizon marking the principled non-closure of this self-description as well.

The conceptual unit of the I arises through conceptual fixation and ordering. Lived experiences are selectively retained, temporally ordered, and integrated into larger nexuses. Memories are connected, biographical narratives are formed, and self-images are stabilized. In this way, a coherent self-understanding emerges that enables orientation across time.

Expressed more precisely in transcendental-operative terms:

Conceptual thought transforms prereflective units of experiential enactment into units of state by selectively fixing and structuring what has been experienced and stabilizing it within symbolic relations. Continuity is therefore not an original given, but the result of such operations of ordering.

As a conceptual unit, the I possesses relative stability. It persists across changing experiential situations and makes planning, the attribution of responsibility, and social reliability possible. This stability, however, is functional and rests upon abstraction: the situational, affective, and bodily dynamics of lived experience are necessarily reduced.

This confirms the previously introduced distinction between enactment and state:

Stability arises through fixation, distancing, and symbolic order—that is, through processes that bracket precisely those dimensions that operate within the experiential mode as resonance, attunement, transition, and bodily orientation.

This functional stability must therefore not be misunderstood as the expression of an "authentic" or "true" I. The conceptual unit is instead an operative order of meaning within constituted reality that enables orientation, can prove viable, but always remains open to revision.

The I as a conceptual unit is consequently not identical with the I as an experiential unit. It constitutes a secondary order that refers back to experience-based self-enactment without being

able to apprehend it completely. Its significance remains dependent upon this prior experiential order.

Expressed in transcendental-operative terms:

The self-enactment of experience constitutes the primary condition within which perspectivality, resonance, and situational self-relatedness emerge. Conceptual self-description is a secondary stabilization that symbolically fixes this enactment and renders it communicable without fully transferring its bodily-affective and temporal density.

The distinction between constituted reality and reality is therefore preserved even within self-relation:

Both the I as an experiential unit and the I as a conceptual unit belong to operatively formed constituted reality. Reality, by contrast, remains the transcendental limiting horizon marking the openness, non-totalizability, and revisability of every order of the self.

Against this background, personal identity appears not as an immutable core, but as the result of symbolic stabilization within an ongoing experiential process. It arises through the conceptual ordering of experience-based forms of self-enactment and therefore remains fundamentally open to revision and new formation.

In summary:

The I as a conceptual unit is a necessary but derivative form of self-constitution. It stabilizes constituted reality in symbolic form because the underlying enactment of experience is not reproduced within conceptual thought, but selectively interpreted, ordered, and symbolically stabilized; within the horizon of reality as a limiting concept, it therefore remains fundamentally incomplete.

6.3 The I as a Relational Unit

(Self-Formation within Relations to World and Others)

Alongside the experience-near Gestalt of the I and its symbolic stabilization in conceptual thought, a third dimension of self-constitution emerges:

The I is formed not only within the individual experiential process and through conceptual self-descriptions, but also within the relational nexus of relations to the world and to others.

More precisely:

The I does not arise as an isolated instance, but as an operative unit within relational orders of meaning in which constituted reality comes to appearance. Reality remains the transcendental limiting horizon that constrains these orders without itself becoming a constituent element within them.

Experience is always related to the world. Perceptions, emotions, and actions take place within situations structured by things, environments, and other people. The I therefore does not arise independently of these relations, but within the enactment of engaging with them. Consistent with the relational structure of the formation of constituted reality, we may say:

Self-constitution takes place within relational nexuses in which experiential units and possibilities of action are interwoven. The I is neither the origin nor an external reference point of these relations, but a Gestalt that emerges within the relational field of experience.

This relational structure becomes particularly evident within the social nexus. Self-understandings do not arise solely from internal self-observation, but through interaction with others. Recognition, attribution, communication, and shared action contribute to the formation of more stable self-images.

Expressed more precisely in transcendental-operative terms:

Symbolic self-descriptions are embedded within social relations in which meanings are shared, affirmed, or called into question. Identity therefore appears not as a purely individual construction, but as a relationally stabilized order of meaning that develops through the interplay of experience, self-interpretation, and social relatedness.

This relational Gestalt of the I likewise remains provisional.

Relations change, situations are transformed, and new experiences arise. Accordingly, self-understandings may also shift or be reorganized.

Within the horizon of reality as a limiting concept, this openness becomes structurally intelligible:

Because reality is not exhausted by the relational orders of constituted reality, the self as a relational nexus likewise remains fundamentally open to revision and incapable of final fixation.

Self-constitution can thus once again be understood as a multilayered process. The I initially appears as a prereflective experiential unit, is symbolically stabilized in conceptual thought, and subsequently develops further within the relational nexus of relations to the world and to others. These dimensions are not separate, but interwoven.

The unity of the I must therefore be understood as an operative unit within constituted reality, formed through the interplay of experience, symbolic stabilization, and relational embeddedness. Reality marks the limiting horizon of this self-formation and preserves its principled openness without itself becoming part of these relational orders.

6.4 The Relation between Experience and the I

(Self-Relation as the Mediation of Enactment and Interpretation)

The relation between experience and the I is not additive, but constitutive. Experience is always experience from the perspective of an I, and the I does not exist independently of the enactment

of experience. It is neither the cause of experience nor merely its result, but constitutes its structuring centering within enactment.

The I must not be understood here as an instance confronting an objectively given reality. Rather, it functions as an operative centering within constituted reality, understood as an order of meaning immanent to experience. Reality remains the transcendental limiting horizon that initiates and constrains the experiential process, without the I being capable of functioning as a mediating instance between experience and reality.

Within the experiential process, the I appears as an implicit reference point of meaning. Perceiving, feeling, and acting are necessarily perspectivally organized without this perspective itself having to become explicitly thematic. The I is therefore not something added to experience, but the manner in which experience is centered and organized as experience **for someone**. Every understanding of the world is consequently perspectivally organized and bound to the I-perspective operative within the experiential process.

Expressed in transcendental-operative terms:

Perspectivality is a structural condition of the experiential process itself. It operates prereflectively, organizes the formation of relevance, Gestalt formation, and possibilities of action, and constitutes the background against which nexuses of meaning can emerge in the first place.

Within the horizon of reality as a limiting concept, this centering remains provisional. It realizes a relation to constituted reality within the enactment of experience without permitting any final determination of what is meant by reality.

Emotions play a central role in this context. They bind experience to the I by marking what affects someone, what generates proximity, and what establishes distance.

Through this affective involvement, experience is enacted as one's own experience.

Their function can therefore be specified more precisely: emotions are not merely individual colorations, but operative moments of meaning formation. As dynamic patterns of activity, they mark relevance, focus attention, and give direction to lived experience without determining it conclusively.

Within the horizon of reality as a limiting concept, this means that affective involvement is a condition of the relation to constituted reality insofar as it determines what can emerge as significant within the experiential field in the first place. At the same time, it remains open to revision, because reality is not exhausted by these patterns but permits irritation and reorientation.

The relation between experience and the I is therefore essentially dynamic. As experiences change, so too do the ways in which the I experiences itself and the world. Recurring affective patterns contribute to the stabilization of relations to self and world, whereas new experiences may shift or call existing structures into question.

Stability and change can accordingly be specified as follows:

Stability arises as a temporary condensation of recurring patterns of activity, not as the expression of a fixed core. Change occurs where new relations, relevances, and Gestalten emerge within the experiential field or irritate existing orders.

This dynamic becomes intelligible within the horizon of reality as a limiting concept: not because reality is pregiven as a structuring order, but because, as a limiting horizon, it marks the non-closure of every order of self and world and thereby makes shifts, corrections, and new formations possible.

The I thus arises and changes within the ongoing experiential process. It is not an instance behind experience, but a **relational structure of centering** that is continuously re-formed through the interplay of lived experience, emotion, and orientation.

In summary:

The relation between the I and experience must be understood as a perspectivally centered enactment within which a relation to constituted reality is realized. This enactment is initiated and constrained by reality as a limiting horizon, without reality itself entering into these relations as an element. Precisely for this reason, it remains fundamentally open, revisable, and non-totalizable.

The analysis of self-constitution thus confirms:

The I is not the primordial point of departure of experience, but arises within the processes through which constituted reality itself is formed. As an experiential unit, a symbolically stabilized conceptual unit, and a relational unit, it develops through the interplay of experience, interpretation, and relation, while reality as a transcendental limiting horizon marks the openness of this process.

6.5 The I in Relation to Others

(Intersubjectivity as the Co-Constitution of Constituted Reality and Self)

The I does not develop in isolation, but arises and stabilizes itself in relations with others. Encounters with other people are not external supplementary conditions of experience, but constitutive contexts of self-formation.

Self-formation must here be understood as an operative order of meaning within constituted reality. Others do not appear merely as objects, but as relational points of reference around which experience condenses, becomes oriented, and is transformed. Reality remains the transcendental limiting horizon that marks the openness and non-totalizability of these relational orders without itself being given as a completed structure of social relations.

In experiencing others, the I appears in reflected, affirmed, or disrupted form. Recognition, rejection, resonance, and conflict feed directly back into self-enactment and shape how an individual experiences itself. These moments are not subsequent interpretations, but are operative within the enactment of the relation itself.

The role of social experience can therefore be specified more precisely:

The I does not enter into relations as an already constituted instance, but forms itself within event-like condensations of perception, emotion, and bodily orientation that acquire a specific intensity and direction in encounters with others.

Expressed in transcendental-operative terms:

Recognition, rejection, resonance, and conflict are operative moments of relevance formation and meaning formation. They modulate self-relation within enactment without this modulation being completely subject to conceptual control.

Relations structure both the experience-near Gestalt of the I and its symbolic self-interpretation. In interaction with others, expectations, roles, and self-attributions arise that shape self-understanding without determining it conclusively.

The I is therefore always socially situated. This social situatedness must not, however, be understood as external determination, but as a condition of the order of meaning within which relations to self and world can arise in the first place. Expectations and roles operate as symbolic stabilizations that feed back into experience, direct attention, and provide interpretive frameworks. At the same time, they remain bound to experience-based condensations within which they may be affirmed, disrupted, or revised.

The social dimension does not entail the dissolution of the self. The I is not absorbed into the other, but forms itself through the interplay of ownness and otherness.

Relation enables both self-attachment and self-differentiation.

This tension can be determined systematically: the self stabilizes itself within relational attachments without being exhausted by them, and it differentiates itself without becoming isolated. In this double movement, the fundamental structure of self-constitution as a relation between openness and order becomes apparent.

Expressed in transcendental-operative terms, this structure rests upon the fact that experience forms relations and conceptual thought translates them into roles, self-attributions, and narrative continuities. These stabilize the self without bringing it to closure.

The I thus proves to be a relational nexus that acquires its Gestalt in encounters, changes through social experience, and remains open to new forms of self-interpretation. In this sense, **being a self is always also being-with-others**.

In summary:

Relational self-formation belongs to constituted reality as an operatively structured order of meaning within which the I and others acquire Gestalt through resonances, affirmations, and disruptions. Reality remains distinct from this as a transcendental limiting horizon marking the principled openness of social orders of meaning.

No social interpretation, role conception, or self-description can conclusively determine self-enactment, because experience in encounters continually gives rise to new condensations, shifts, and reorientations through which selfhood is repeatedly re-formed.

6.6 Self-Understanding as a Process

(Open, Revisable, and Relational Self-Constitution)

Self-understanding is not a discrete act of self-reflection, but an ongoing process. It arises through the interplay of experience-near self-enactment and conceptual self-interpretation. The two levels stand in a reciprocal relation and continuously influence one another.

This interplay must be understood as a transcendental-operative process of mediation within constituted reality:

Self-understanding stabilizes orders of meaning concerning the self without reality, as a limiting horizon, ever being capable of integration into a conclusive self-description.

Experiences can confirm, modify, or call existing self-interpretations into question. New situations, affective disruptions, or social encounters may cause established self-images to lose their viability. Self-understanding therefore remains fundamentally open and revisable.

The status of self-images can thus be specified more precisely:

They are **conceptual units** that, as units of state, make stability possible, while their validity remains dependent upon the continuing course of experience-based meaning formation. Disruptions mark the limits of existing orders of the self and open up—or compel—new formations in which self-relation is reorganized.

Conversely, conceptual self-understanding feeds back into the experiential process. Self-images, expectations, and biographical narratives structure perception and attention and influence how new experiences are lived and interpreted.

Self-understanding is therefore not merely reflective, but operatively effective within the enactment of experience.

In light of the previously established relation between analog experience and symbolic stabilization, this can be formulated more precisely:

Conceptual self-interpretations function as horizons of expectation and interpretation that help shape formations of relevance and influence what can emerge within the experiential field in the first place. At the same time, their efficacy remains provisional, since new experiences may disrupt, shift, or transform these horizons.

The process of self-understanding is not organized linearly. It unfolds in recursive movements of experience, interpretation, and renewed experience. Stabilization and change stand in a dynamic relation. Continuity arises not through fixation, but through ongoing adaptation and reorganization.

The translation between experience-near self-enactment and conceptual self-interpretation is necessarily selective and transformative. It makes stability possible by fixing states of meaning, while simultaneously permitting change insofar as these fixations can be reorganized in light of new experiences. Continuity is therefore not the expression of an immutable core, but the result of repeated stabilization that remains open to revision.

Self-understanding thus proves to be an open, temporally structured process. It is neither completely available to itself nor capable of final closure. The I remains in motion within self-understanding and acquires its Gestalt through the ongoing interplay of experience and conceptual thought.

A clear distinction must therefore be maintained:

Self-understanding concerns constituted reality as an operatively formed order of meaning of the self, stabilized in different ways within experience and conceptual thought. Reality remains distinct from it as the transcendental limiting horizon that marks the non-totalizability of every order of the self. Neither experience-near self-enactment nor conceptual self-interpretation can determine the I conclusively, because the process of meaning formation remains fundamentally open to disruption, revision, and renewed determination within ongoing enactment.

In summary:

Self-understanding stabilizes orders of meaning concerning the self in conceptual form without ever being capable of closing them into a final self-description. Within the horizon of reality as a limiting concept, every self-interpretation remains provisional, revisable, and embedded within the ongoing process through which constituted reality is formed.

6.7 Provisional Conclusion

(The I as an Operatively Formed Unit within Constituted Reality)

The preceding analysis has shown that the I can be understood neither as a fixed substance nor as a merely conceptual construction. Rather, it proves to be a processual and relational nexus that forms itself within the enactment of experience and becomes stabilized through the interplay of self-interpretation and social relations.

Within the horizon of reality as a limiting concept, the I must be understood as an operative Gestalt within constituted reality:

It belongs to the order of meaning within which the world comes to appearance, while reality, as a transcendental limiting horizon, marks the principled openness and non-totalizability of this order.

As an experiential unit, the I appears prereflectively and dynamically. It constitutes the implicit perspective from which perception, emotion, and action are organized. This experience-near Gestalt is bodily, affective, and situationally determined and changes over the course of lived experience. Perspectival centering is not a subsequent act of reflection, but a structural condition of the enactment within which meaning arises.

At the level of conceptual thought, by contrast, a symbolically stabilized form of the I emerges. As a conceptual unit, it enables continuity, self-description, and social reliability. This stabilization rests upon the selective fixation and ordering of lived experiences and their integration into narrative nexuses. It nevertheless remains related to experience-based self-enactment and can process its bodily-affective and temporally dynamic structure only in the form of conceptual interpretation and symbolic translation.

The I is, moreover, constituted relationally. It arises within the nexus of relations to the world and to others and acquires Gestalt through the interplay of experience, emotion, social resonance, and conceptual self-interpretation. Recognition, conflict, and communication contribute to the stabilization of self-images without determining the self conclusively.

Self-constitution thus proves to be a multilayered process in which experience-near self-enactment, symbolic stabilization, and relational embeddedness interweave. None of these dimensions can be determined in isolation; their unity consists in the enactment of their interplay.

Within this structure, self-understanding takes the form of an open process mediating between stabilization and change. It unfolds through recursive movements of experience, interpretation, and renewed experience. Conceptual orders of the self feed back into the experiential process, while new experiences may confirm, shift, or call existing self-interpretations into question.

Continuity does not arise from an immutable core, but from the repeated stabilization of nexuses of meaning that remains open to revision. Change is not an external addition, but inherent in the process itself.

The I can therefore be understood as an experience-based, relationally structured, and symbolically mediated unit that neither exists independently of its relation to the world nor can be completely fixed conceptually. Experience remains the sustaining ground upon which every form of self-understanding depends.

The following conclusion can therefore be drawn:

The constituted reality of the I arises through the interplay of orders of meaning immanent to experience, their symbolic stabilization, and their relational embeddedness. No final or immutable self can be derived from this process.

Reality, by contrast, remains the transcendental limiting horizon. It constrains every possible self-description and prevents its totalization. Precisely in this way, it preserves the principled openness, revisability, and non-closure of selfhood and self-understanding.

The I is therefore not a given unit, but an operative structure arising and changing within enactment and within constituted reality, whose determinacy always remains provisional.

7. Emotions as the Affective Grounding of the Formation of Constituted Reality

(Relevance, Resonance, and Orientation Prior to Conceptual Stabilization)

7.1 Emotions as Elementary Structures of Experience

(Affective Basic Forms of Meaning Selection)

Emotions are not subsequent additions to experience, but belong to its elementary structures. Experience never unfolds in an emotionally neutral manner. Every lived experience already involves an affective order through which it is determined what receives attention, what appears significant, and how the experiential field becomes structured. Emotions therefore function not as incidental properties of experience, but as constitutive conditions of its meaningfulness.

Against the background of the distinction between reality and constituted reality developed in this study, this structure can be specified more precisely.

Affective order functions as a transcendental-operative mode of the constitution of meaning within constituted reality understood as an operatively formed order of meaning.

Reality is not represented as a pregiven structure. Rather, it remains operative as a limiting horizon at which experience-immanent meaning formation is initiated and, at the same time, constrained by its principled non-closure.

This constitution becomes apparent in the fact that experience cannot be understood as the mere registration of givens. Situations do not first appear as factually given and only subsequently receive an emotional evaluation. Rather, from the outset they appear as attractive or repellent, familiar or unfamiliar, relevant or indifferent. Affective valence is not an external addition to experience, but part of its internal relational structure. It determines how world can become experientially accessible in the first place.

Within the distinction between reality and constituted reality, this means that affective determination must not be understood as an individual addition to an already completed reality, but as an operative mode of disclosure. Within experience, world appears as a meaningfully articulated nexus, and this articulation is affectively grounded. Reality functions as a transcendental limiting horizon that marks the principled openness of this mode of appearance and prevents orders immanent to experience from being mistaken for a complete apprehension of reality.

Emotions must therefore not be understood as isolated internal states. They permeate perception, thought, and action alike. Within them, a fundamental mode of being-in-the-world is articulated through which world is not merely perceived, but experienced as meaningfully structured.

Experience is always already directed, perspectival, and weighted.

This weighting is affectively mediated. Coherence with the preceding determinations of experience is thereby preserved: experience has been characterized in the preceding chapters as a non-representational relation to the world, as energetic meaning formation, and as perspectivally centered enactment. Within this structure, emotions operate as energetic patterns

of activity that mark relevance, focus attention, and give direction to lived experience without conclusively determining the order that emerges.

Expressed in transcendental-operative terms:

Affective weighting realizes a relation to constituted reality without making reality available as a completed totality.

As elementary structures of experience, emotions operate prereflectively. They condense affective weightings and structure the experiential field before conceptual classifications, explicit evaluations, or linguistic articulations begin. Their orienting function for experience lies precisely in this prereflectivity, without emotions themselves already having to become thematically explicit.

They determine what emerges into prominence within the stream of possible impressions and what remains in the background.

More precisely:

Emotions are not subsequent commentaries upon lived experience, but operative achievements of selection and condensation through which provisional order emerges from prestructural openness.

This order must not be understood as a representation of real structures, but as a meaning structure immanent to experience that forms within enactment, can prove itself viable, can be disrupted, and remains open to revision. Reality remains the limiting horizon that prevents this order from becoming the totality of what is meant by reality.

In this way, emotions make an essential contribution to preventing experience from remaining unstructured. They enable selection from the excess of possible perceptions and thereby constitute a condition for world to appear as a meaningfully articulated nexus.

Without emotional structuring, there might be perception in the sense of mere reception of stimuli, but there would be no meaning.

Meaning is not the result of subsequent processing by conceptual thought, but arises from the primordial affective permeation of experience.

Within constituted reality, meaning arises as primary meaning formation; conceptual thought can transform it into symbolic order, but cannot produce it as its origin. Reality remains the limiting horizon marking the principled non-closure of every formation of meaning.

It follows that meaning is more primordial than conceptual thought. Emotion and experience are prior to language and conceptuality not temporally, but functionally. They provide the fundamental structure of valence and meaning within which language can first articulate meaning. Concepts stabilize, differentiate, and explicate meanings already formed within affective experience.

Within the theory developed here, this means:

The symbolic order of thought is a derivative form of transformation within constituted reality.

It transforms affectively disclosed fields of meaning into discrete, communicable units of state without being able to preserve the full richness of experience-based meaning. Reality remains the limiting horizon against which every such symbolic stabilization remains fundamentally open and revisable.

Reality thereby remains the transcendental limiting horizon that prevents conceptual explication from being misconstrued as a final closure of meaning.

Within thought, emotion often appears as a structure-forming unit. This mode of appearance, however, is itself an effect of the self-observation of the psychic system. Consciousness condenses its own operations of selection and connection into affective states and observes them as apparently unified causes of its thought. Emotion thereby appears as something that directs thoughts, fixes perspectives, and structures judgments.

Systematically considered, however, this apparent unity is a consequence of symbolic stabilization.

What operates within enactment as a dynamic relational order of affective weightings can appear within thought as a fixed and nameable moment.

Conceptual thought transforms its operations into units of state that enable overview and repeatability while simultaneously reducing their original processual character.

From a systems-theoretical perspective, this phenomenon can be specified functionally. In the sense of Niklas Luhmann, emotion does not operate as a structure in the strict sense, but as a **relation-directing condition of structure formation**. It conditions possibilities of connection within the process of meaning formation by marking relations, highlighting relevances, and stabilizing horizons of expectation. What appears within thought as a structure-forming unit is, functionally, an operation of selection that presents itself to self-observation in the form of affective condensation.

Alongside the emotional structuring of experience, further relational parameters can be identified that order and stabilize relations of meaning. One such parameter is logic.

Logic must not be understood as an emotion-free or presuppositionless instance, but as a formalized schema of selection that orders relations according to criteria of consistency, inferential coherence, and validity. Logic, too, does not operate neutrally, but through abstraction: it brackets affective weightings in order to render formal relations visible.

Whereas emotions disclose meaning through affective valence, logic operates upon nexuses of meaning that have already been disclosed. It is not an alternative form of lived experience, but a reflective form of order formation. Logic does not structure meaning prereflectively, but subsequently, by formally stabilizing already constituted fields of meaning, rendering them open to examination, and maintaining their intersubjective connectivity.

The distinction between analog experience and digital thought thereby remains coherent:

Emotion belongs to the analog dimension of experience, within which meaning is initially disclosed, whereas logic belongs to the digital order that fixes meaning in discrete distinctions and renders it examinable.

Emotion and logic therefore do not stand in opposition, but constitute different relational parameters of meaning constitution. Emotion operates primarily and prereflectively; logic secondarily and reflectively. Both condition connectivity, but according to different criteria: emotion through valence and relevance, logic through consistency and formal validity.

The analysis therefore suggests that meaning constitution should not be understood monocausally. Alongside the emotional and logical structuring of experience, further relational parameters are operative that enable orientation under conditions of incomplete determinability. In particular, belief and plausibility function as modes of the acceptance of meaning that mediate between affective disclosure and formal order.

Together with emotion and logic, they constitute an ensemble of relational parameters through which experience can first become possible as a meaningfully articulated nexus. Within the horizon of the distinction between reality and constituted reality, this ensemble structure must be understood as an expression of non-totalizability:

Because reality, as a limiting horizon, withdraws from every complete determination, different modes of accepting and stabilizing meaning are operatively necessary in order to enable connectivity without claiming final closure.

The dual determination of emotion can thus be stated precisely:

Phenomenologically, emotion appears as an elementary structure of experience; functionally and theoretically, it proves to be a condition of the possibility of structure formation. As such, emotion does not operate in the form of a self-contained unit, but as a relational and dynamic order of affective weightings.

Only within thought, which reflectively condenses its own operations of selection, does emotion appear as a structure-forming unit. This apparent unity is therefore an effect of conceptual condensation and not an expression of the original lifeworld structure of emotional experience.

The central systematic determinations of emotion can therefore be summarized as follows:

- Meaning is more primordial than conceptual thought.
- Emotion and experience are functionally prior to language and conceptuality insofar as they provide the fundamental structure of valence and meaning within which meaning can first be articulated.
- Neutrality is not an original mode of experience, but an abstraction performed by observational thought.
- Within thought, emotion appears as a structure-forming unit, although functionally it constitutes a relation-directing condition of structure formation.
- Within the horizon of the distinction between reality and constituted reality, this primordiality, functional priority, and abstraction concern the operative structure of constituted reality; reality itself remains distinct as a transcendental limiting horizon marking the non-totalizability of every emotional, logical, or other order of meaning.

7.2 Emotions as Patterns of Activity and Bearers of Energy
(Dynamic Bearers of Order Formation)

Emotions can be described as prereflective patterns of activity through which experience is set in motion and acquires a particular direction. They are not mere concomitants of lived experience, but dynamic processes that shape the enactment of experience—that is, the very moment of experiencing itself.

Against the background of the distinction between reality and constituted reality, this dynamic can be determined more precisely. Emotional patterns of activity are transcendental-operative achievements within constituted reality as an operatively formed order of meaning. They are modes in which meaning constitution occurs within enactment without reality being represented as a pregiven structure. Rather, reality remains the limiting horizon at which this formation of meaning is initiated and at which, at the same time, its principled non-closure becomes manifest.

As energetic structures, emotions modulate the intensity and tension of lived experience.

They influence how strongly something carries weight, how urgent it appears, and how much attention it receives. The concept of energy does not designate a physical quantity here, but the qualitative dynamic through which experience unfolds.

This preserves coherence with the determination of order as energetic meaning formation:

Emotions function as energetic patterns through which relevances are marked, transitions are condensed, and Gestalten can emerge.

Expressed in transcendental-operative terms:

Qualitative dynamics are not merely an accompaniment to experience, but an operative condition for provisional order to emerge from openness and for the world to come to appearance in a particular way.

This energetic dimension simultaneously performs an ordering function. Emotions concentrate activity, focus perception, and open or restrict possibilities for action. Joy can open and expand experience; fear can narrow and intensify it. In both cases, emotions structure the experiential field without completely determining its contents.

Within the distinction between reality and constituted reality, this ordering must not be understood as individual arbitrariness, but as operative selection within a relation to constituted reality that remains fundamentally provisional. Emotions establish relevances and directions, yet they do not bring meaning to final closure. Irritations, resistances, and new situations can shift or dissolve existing orders. Reality functions here as a transcendental limiting horizon marking the principled non-totalizability of emotional order and thereby structurally enabling its revisability.

Emotional patterns of activity are not static. They change over the course of experience, may intensify or diminish, or may pass into other emotional patterns. Experience thereby remains dynamic and adaptive. This preserves coherence with the event-like character of experience and

the provisionality of experienced order: emotional patterns are temporary moments of stabilization within an ongoing process in which meaning arises not punctually but over time.

Expressed in transcendental-operative terms:

The unity of experience lies in the nexus of enactment, not in a fixed structure.

Accordingly, emotional patterns must also be understood as dynamic relations that form, change, and may dissolve again over the course of lived experience.

Emotions therefore do not operate as causes of individual reactions, but as structuring forces of lived experience itself. They contribute to making experience directed, coherent, and relevant to action.

Within the horizon of the distinction between reality and constituted reality, this can finally be stated as follows:

Emotional patterns of activity are constitutive conditions of the operative order of meaning of constituted reality.

They give experience direction, weight, and connectivity without providing a final determination of meaning.

Reality remains distinct as a transcendental limiting horizon. It is neither represented nor exhausted by emotional ordering, but marks the limit at which experience-immanent orders may prove viable, become subject to irritation, and pass into new formations of meaning.

7.3 Emotions and the Formation of Relevance

(Marking What Becomes Significant within Constituted Reality)

Relevance is not an objective property of things or situations, but arises within the emotional enactment of experience. Emotions do not determine what is; rather, they structure what can emerge as significant within the experiential field. They open a space of meaning within which perception, attention, and action are oriented.

Against the background of the distinction between reality and constituted reality developed in this study, this structure can be determined more precisely:

Relevance does not arise through the representation of a pregiven reality, but through affective-bodily meaning formation within constituted reality as an operatively formed order of meaning. Emotional markings of relevance realize a relation to constituted reality, while reality, as a limiting horizon, marks the principled non-closure of such orders of relevance.

This formation of relevance occurs prior to conceptual reflection. Emotions mark what is important and unimportant, near and distant, urgent and indifferent, without these distinctions already having to be made explicit. Experience thereby becomes selective and directed. This remains coherent with the preceding determinations of experience. Markings of relevance are operative selections that focus attention, generate tension, and open possibilities for action

before conceptual thought can transform these selective operations into discrete concepts and rules.

Systematically formulated:

Relevance is a condition of the possibility of meaningful order as such. Only through affective markings of relevance can the excess of possible impressions become an articulated experiential field.

The formation of emotional relevance is at the same time situation-dependent. The same given can acquire different meanings within different emotional contexts. Fear, curiosity, or trust do not alter the object itself, but the manner in which it is experienced. Relevance is therefore not a fixed property of things, but a relational occurrence.

Within the distinction between reality and constituted reality, this means:

Variation in relevance is not an expression of individual arbitrariness, but of the operative provisionality of experienced order.

The world appears as meaningfully articulated because emotional patterns of activity condense relations and establish emphases. These emphases may, however, shift as situations, attunements, and bodily orientations change.

Reality remains operative as a limiting horizon insofar as formations of relevance can prove viable or become subject to irritation in the continuing course of experience. Reality itself, however, does not appear as a fixed schema of relevance and therefore cannot be completely transformed into an operative order of meaning.

Through the emotional formation of relevance, experience acquires structure. It prevents the experiential field from remaining in uniform indeterminacy and makes orientation possible within the excess of possible impressions. Emotions thus contribute essentially to rendering experience capable of guiding action.

This preserves the connection with the determination of experiential units as units of activity. The formation of relevance is not merely an intellectual sorting of information, but a bodily-affective concentration of activity through which perception is focused, tension is organized, and possibilities for action are opened or constrained.

Expressed more precisely in transcendental-operative terms:

Relevance is the operative condition for experience to take place at all as a coherent and directed access to the world.

The formation of relevance nevertheless remains fundamentally provisional. It may shift or dissolve as emotional constellations change. Experience therefore remains open to reorganization precisely because its structures of relevance are not definitively fixed.

Within the horizon of the distinction between reality and constituted reality, this can finally be formulated as follows:

The provisionality of emotional relevance is a structural expression of the limiting status of reality. Because it is not reality itself but only its interpreted efficacy that enters into the experience-immanent order of meaning, emotional determinations of relevance remain revisable, susceptible to irritation, and capable of being formed anew. They stabilize orientation within constituted reality without totalizing it and thereby enable transformation, redetermination, and the formation of new nexuses of meaning within the continuing experiential process.

7.4 Emotions as Relational Events

(Affective Mediation of Self, World, and Other)

Emotions are not self-contained inner processes. They arise within the relation between the individual and the world and must therefore be understood as relational events. In them, bodily resonance, situational givens, and biographical formations intertwine to form an experiential nexus. Against the background of the distinction between reality and constituted reality developed in this study, this interrelation can be determined more precisely.

Emotions are transcendental-operative enactments within constituted reality as an operatively formed order of meaning.

Within them, relations of meaning are formed and stabilized without reality being represented as a completed structure. Rather, reality remains the limiting horizon at which these relational formations of meaning are initiated and at which their principled non-closure becomes apparent.

An emotional experience therefore does not merely disclose an inner state. Rather, it discloses a particular way in which the world appears. Fear allows the world to emerge as threatening, trust as sustaining, and curiosity as a field of possibilities. Emotions are therefore not merely reactions to the world; they contribute to constituting the world in a particular Gestalt. This remains coherent with the preceding determination of experience as a non-representational access to the world and as Gestalt formation.

The world does not appear as a completely ordered totality, but as a respectively condensed Gestalt within the enactment of experience. Emotional events are central operations within this process of condensation.

Within the distinction between reality and constituted reality, this means:

The respective Gestalt of the world is related to constituted reality, but must not be understood as a representation of real structures. It is the result of an enactment-based process of meaning formation initiated and constrained by reality without being structurally predetermined by it.

This relational structure simultaneously means that emotions are neither purely internal nor purely objective. They belong neither exclusively to the experiencing individual nor solely to the external situation. Rather, they arise in the moment in which a relation is established between the experiencing individual and the experiential field and continue to structure the further enactment of that relation.

Expressed more precisely in transcendental-operative terms:

Emotions are operative relational achievements through which relevances are marked, proximity and distance are organized, and possibilities of connection are conditioned. They are therefore not merely contents of experience, but conditions of its relational stabilization of meaning.

Emotions thereby alter not only the sense of self but also the relation to the world. They shape how proximity and distance are experienced, how openly or narrowly experience unfolds, and which possibilities for action emerge. This preserves the connection with the determination of experiential units as units of activity. Emotions concentrate activity, focus attention, generate tension, and open or constrain possibilities for action without completely determining experiential content.

Within the distinction between reality and constituted reality, these determinations must be understood as provisional orders within constituted reality. They can shift, become subject to irritation, or be formed anew in the continuing course of experience because reality, as a limiting horizon, prevents any final closure of meaning.

As relational events, emotions are also essentially temporal in structure. They arise, unfold, and change over the course of experience. Their meaning therefore lies not in a static state, but in the process of their emergence and subsiding.

This preserves coherence with the event-like character of experience:

Meaning arises from the nexus of temporal unfolding, not from isolated moments.

Expressed in transcendental-operative terms, this means that emotional meaning is **meaning-in-enactment**. It arises through the dynamic condensation and transformation of relations through which the world appears in a particular way.

Within the horizon of the distinction between reality and constituted reality, this can finally be summarized as follows:

As relational events, emotions constitute constituted reality as a provisional order of meaning within the enactment of experience. Reality remains distinct as a transcendental limiting horizon marking the openness, revisability, and non-totalizability of emotional Gestalten of the world.

7.5 Temporality and Processuality of Emotions

(Temporal Gestalten of Affective Meaning Formation)

Emotions are essentially temporal in structure. They initially exist as possibilities within the affective-dispositional structure of the experiencing individual, the open meaningfulness of the situation, and the temporal incompleteness of the experiential process itself. Emotions therefore do not occur merely at discrete points in time, but unfold over the course of experience. They arise, condense, change, and eventually subside.

This temporal dynamic is not an accidental property of emotions, but a constitutive component of their structure. Against the background of the distinction between reality and constituted reality developed in this study, this temporality can be understood as a transcendental-operative structure of meaning formation.

Emotions are modes through which constituted reality, as an operatively formed order of meaning, is temporally organized.

Reality remains the limiting horizon marking the principled incompleteness of this enactment and constraining every final fixation of emotional trajectories of meaning.

Their transformative force lies precisely in this temporal dynamic. Emotions not only change over the course of their own unfolding; in temporal enactment they also modify the meaning of the situation, the orientation of the experiencing individual, and the structure of subsequent lived experience. This preserves coherence with the determination of experience as event and Gestalt formation. Meaning does not arise in isolated moments, but within the nexus of beginning, unfolding, and subsiding. Emotional processes are central operations within this temporal unfolding of meaning.

Expressed more precisely in transcendental-operative terms:

Emotional dynamics are not merely an accompaniment to lived experience, but an operative modulation of the experiential order itself.

In their course, relevances shift, perspectives change, and possibilities for action are restructured.

Within temporal enactment, emotions connect individual moments of experience into coherent Gestalten. They create continuity by relating what has been experienced and by forming expectations. At the same time, these Gestalten remain mutable. They can reorganize, acquire new interpretations, or dissolve over the course of experience. Emotions thereby contribute to preventing experience from disintegrating into isolated moments and instead allow it to be lived as a coherent yet open process.

Within the distinction between reality and constituted reality, however, this continuity must not be understood as a final stabilization. Rather, it is an operative stabilization within constituted reality. Because it is not reality itself but only its interpreted efficacy—in the form of irritations, resistances, or differences that cannot be completely integrated—that enters into the experience-immanent order of meaning, the Gestalt-forming continuity of emotional processes also remains fundamentally open to revision.

Emotional temporality is therefore not a linear succession of isolated states, but a dynamic processual structure. Emotions connect past, present, and future by activating memories, evaluating present situations, and structuring expectations of future developments. The temporal structure of emotional experience thereby becomes apparent: emotions are not merely reactions to present situations, but organize experiential processes within an extended temporal horizon.

Expressed in transcendental-operative terms:

Emotional temporality is a structure of the formation of constituted reality itself. It enables experiences to be integrated, orientation to be stabilized, and future possibilities for action to be anticipatively structured.

Within the horizon of the distinction between reality and constituted reality, this can finally be stated as follows:

Emotional processes organize constituted reality as a temporally unfolding order of meaning. Reality remains the transcendental limiting horizon that prevents this order from being understood as a final totality and structurally secures the openness, mutability, and revisability of emotional meaning formation.

7.6 Emotions between Prereflectivity and Thematization

(The Transition from Lived Affectivity to Conceptual Articulation)

Emotions operate within the enactment of experience before they are linguistically articulated or conceptually determined. They structure perception, attention, and orientation without themselves already becoming thematic. In this way, they form the background within which experience can acquire Gestalt in the first place. Against the background of the distinction between reality and constituted reality developed in this study, this background can be understood as a transcendental-operative horizon of meaning. Emotions open and articulate constituted reality as an operatively formed order of meaning, while reality, as a transcendental limiting horizon, marks the principled non-closure of this affective Gestalt formation.

This efficacy does not, however, imply that emotions are hidden. They are immediately present insofar as they permeate and shape lived experience. They manifest themselves bodily as tension, posture, or readiness and thereby influence the further formation of experience. Their structure is not confined to an inner domain, but unfolds within the relation between the experiencing individual and the experiential field.

This preserves coherence with the preceding determinations of emotions as patterns of activity, bearers of energy, and relational events. Emotions are bodily grounded and energetically structured modes of enactment that establish relevances within relational processes, organize proximity and distance, and open or constrain possibilities for action.

Within the distinction between reality and constituted reality, this means that these bodily-relational enactments constitute the world in a particular way without representing reality as a completed structure. Rather, reality remains the limiting reference at which such enactments are initiated and through which their provisional character is structurally grounded.

When emotions are linguistically articulated, their mode changes. What has been lived is transformed into general concepts that are no longer bound to a particular experience. Words such as *fear* or *joy* function as symbolic forms through which emotional experience can be ordered, stabilized, and communicated. These linguistic forms, however, are not unambiguously fixed but remain open to different interpretations.

Expressed more precisely in transcendental-operative terms:

With linguistic articulation, the transformation of units of enactment into units of state begins. Conceptual thought stabilizes affectively disclosed nexuses of meaning in discrete symbols that enable comparison and communication, while necessarily and selectively reducing the situational, bodily, and temporally dynamic density of enactment.

The thematization of emotions therefore entails both a gain and a loss. It enables distance, communication, and reflective engagement; at the same time, it moves away from the immediacy of lived enactment. What previously operated as a dynamic affective order now

appears as a nameable state, an object of self-interpretation, or an attribution within communication.

This preserves coherence with the distinction between analog experience and digital thought. Emotions initially belong to the analog, continuous enactment of experience; their conceptual articulation transforms them into the digital order of discrete distinctions. This transformation is necessary if emotional experience is to be linguistically explicated and rendered socially connectable, yet it always remains selective and can reproduce the original richness of meaning only in interpreted form.

A fundamental tension within emotional experience becomes apparent here at the same time: emotions belong immediately to lived experience without already being fully transparent within that immediacy. They are lived forms of relation to the world that become explicit objects of thought only through subsequent thematization.

There is therefore no rupture between prereflectivity and conceptual articulation, but a transition:

Thought explicates what is already operative within affective enactment without being able, through this explication, to conceptually apprehend its original processuality in full.

Within the horizon of the distinction between reality and constituted reality, this can finally be stated as follows:

The linguistic and conceptual thematization of emotions belongs to the symbolic stabilization of constituted reality. Reality itself does not enter into conceptual order; rather, within the experience-immanent order of meaning, only its interpreted efficacy appears in the form of irritation, resistance, or differences that cannot be completely integrated. Precisely for this reason, emotions articulated in language remain revisable, open to interpretation, and dependent upon further experience.

7.7 Provisional Conclusion

(Emotion as a Fundamental Condition of the Constitution of Constituted Reality)

The preceding analyses have shown that emotions are not merely concomitant phenomena of lived experience, but belong to the fundamental conditions of the formation of constituted reality. They operate prereflectively, structure relevance, concentrate activity, organize relational forms of world-relatedness, and shape the temporal Gestalt of experience. In this respect, they perform a constitutive function in the formation of constituted reality.

Emotions do not disclose experience only retrospectively; rather, they participate in its elementary structure. They shape what emerges within the experiential field, what acquires significance, and the manner in which the world can appear as an articulated nexus. They therefore constitute a fundamental condition for experience to be orienting, relevant to action, and meaningfully structured at all.

Against the background of the distinction between reality and constituted reality developed in this study, this function can be determined more precisely. Emotions do not constitute reality; they operate within constituted reality as an operatively formed order of meaning. They

structure experience-immanent nexuses of meaning without representing reality as a pregiven structure. Reality remains the transcendental limiting horizon at which these affective orders are initiated and at which their principled non-closure becomes apparent.

The constitutive achievement of emotions is evident in their interweaving of different dimensions of experience. They mark relevances, condense perception, organize proximity and distance, structure temporal trajectories, and form the prereflective background from which conceptual and linguistic thematizations emerge.

Emotions are therefore not individual contents within experience, but fundamental forms of its organization.

This order nevertheless remains fundamentally provisional. Because reality itself does not enter into the experience-immanent order of meaning, but only its interpreted efficacy appears in the form of irritation, resistance, or differences that cannot be completely integrated, emotionally constituted orders of constituted reality likewise remain revisable, susceptible to irritation, and capable of being formed anew.

The provisional conclusion is therefore:

As prereflective, relational, temporally structured, and energetically effective processes, emotions constitute a fundamental condition of the constitution of constituted reality. They enable meaning formation without bringing it to final closure and thereby ground the openness within which constituted reality appears as an orientable yet always revisable nexus.

8. The I as an Operative Effect of Experience-Based Self-Reference

The I as the Result of an Open, Bodily-Affective Process

Whereas Chapter 6 developed the I primarily in terms of its structural dimensions—as an experiential unit, a conceptual unit, and a relational unit—Chapter 8 shifts the emphasis to the genesis and mode of enactment of the I. The question is no longer primarily in which layers or orders the I can be determined, but how it forms itself within the experiential process. The analysis of its structure thus gives way to an examination of its character as enactment: the I now appears not primarily as an articulated unit within constituted reality, but as an **operative effect of experience-based self-reference**.

Accordingly, the I is not first and foremost an object of knowledge or self-reflection, but an experiential process that enacts itself. It does not appear as a fixed center behind lived experience, but as a processual unit that forms, continues, and changes over the temporal course of experience.

8.1 The I as Processual Enactment

(The I as Event, Not Substance)

The I is not primarily an object of knowledge or self-reflection, but an experiential process that enacts itself. It does not appear as a fixed center behind lived experience, but as a processual unit that forms, continues, and changes over the temporal course of experience.

Within the horizon of reality as a limiting concept, this can be specified more precisely:

The I belongs to constituted reality as an operatively formed order of meaning and must not be understood as an instance confronting an objectively given reality.

Reality remains the transcendental limiting horizon that initiates and constrains the experiential process without the I becoming available as a completed substance or as a conclusively determinable center.

In immediate lived experience, the I is not thematically given. It does not emerge as an object, but constitutes the implicit perspective from which perception, emotion, and action are organized. This perspective is not consciously posited but is operative within the enactment of experience.

The determination of experience as a self-referential process can thereby be developed further:

Within lived experience, not only does something occur; the experiencing itself is co-enacted.

Within this co-enactment, an implicit perspectival structure is operative that sustains meaning formation, the formation of relevance, and orientation without itself being given as an object.

Expressed in transcendental-operative terms:

Perspectivality is a structural condition of the experiential process and therefore also a structural condition of the I as processual enactment.

As processual enactment, the I is not stable in the sense of possessing an unchanging core. It changes with situations, affective attunements, and relational contexts. The I acquires its particular Gestalt within the concrete nexus of experience and remains open to transformation.

Its processuality can therefore be specified as follows:

The I is a temporary stabilization within an ongoing enactment in which Gestalten can emerge, change, and pass into one another without the overall nexus necessarily disintegrating.

Within the horizon of reality as a limiting concept, this openness becomes structurally intelligible:

Because reality is not exhausted by the experience-immanent order of meaning, the Gestalt of the I, as a nexus of meaning, likewise remains in principle non-totalizable and open to revision.

This processuality does not, however, imply arbitrariness. Recurring emotional patterns, bodily dispositions, and biographical condensations lend a certain continuity to self-enactment. This continuity is not the expression of a fixed substance, but the result of an ongoing experiential nexus.

Expressed more precisely in transcendental-operative terms:

Continuity is an operative achievement of meaning stabilization within enactment, not a property of an immutable core.

The I thus proves to be an experience-based structure that can be conceived neither independently of its relation to the world nor independently of temporality. **Being an I is not a state but an event that continuously takes shape anew within the enactment of experience.**

In conclusion:

The I is a processual, perspectivally centered structure of meaning within constituted reality that forms and changes through bodily-affective and relational enactments. Reality remains the transcendental limiting horizon marking the principled openness and non-closure of this self-enactment and thereby structurally preserving the possibility of transformation, redetermination, and further differentiation.

8.2 Self-Reference as a Structure of Experience

(Experience as the Co-Enactment of the Self)

Experience is not only related to something in the world; it is simultaneously related to itself. It unfolds as a self-referential process in which not only is something experienced, but the experiencing itself is co-enacted. To perceive therefore means not merely to perceive something, but simultaneously to be present within that perceiving.

This self-reference is neither subsequent reflection nor a retrospective consideration of one's own lived experience. Rather, it is an immanent structure of enactment itself. It belongs to the very manner in which experience occurs.

Within the horizon of reality as a limiting concept, this can be specified more precisely:

The relation of experience to constituted reality is an operative enactment that carries its own enactment along with it and cannot be understood as a representational relation to a pregiven reality. Reality remains the transcendental limiting horizon marking the openness and non-totalizability of every experience-immanent order of meaning within which self-reference operates.

Within the enactment of experience, there is therefore always an implicit relation to one's own experiencing. Perceiving, feeling, and acting are not anonymous, but occur within a perspective experienced as one's own. This sense of belonging requires no explicit thematization.

The function of self-reference can therefore be determined more precisely:

Self-reference is the manner in which experience is perspectivally centered and in which meaning formation appears as one's own structure of enactment.

Expressed in transcendental-operative terms:

This belonging is not an additional attribution, but a condition of the possibility of the formation of relevance, weighting, and orientation that arise prereflectively within bodily-affective enactment.

Self-reference also grounds the continuity of experience over time. Experiences connect with one another because they are anchored within an ongoing self-relation. The unity of lived experience therefore does not arise through the external linking of individual moments, but from the processual self-relatedness of the experiential course.

The temporal structure of experience can accordingly be specified:

Meaning arises from the nexus within enactment, and this nexus is not additive but organized through ongoing self-reference.

Within the horizon of reality as a limiting concept, this means:

The unity of experience is an operative stabilization within constituted reality, not a representation of a given reality. It remains provisional because reality, as a limiting horizon, cannot be integrated into this unity, and irritations can therefore lead to shifts in the orders of self and world.

Self-reference does not imply closure against the world. On the contrary, precisely because experience relates to itself, it remains open to irritation, transformation, and new formations of meaning.

Self-reference is therefore not fixation, but a condition of connectivity and transformation.

Experience connects with already established patterns of activity, varies them in response to new demands, and can transform them under the influence of irritations. Self-reference is the operative condition under which such continuation and transformation become possible.

Within the horizon of reality as a limiting concept, this flexibility is structurally grounded:

Because reality does not enter into the experience-immanent order of meaning, every stabilization remains open to revision, new formation, and restructuring.

From this perspective, the I does not appear as an additional element of experience, but as a dimension of its enactment. It is the manner in which experience carries itself along and thereby becomes experienceable as a coherent process.

In conclusion:

The I is not an instance behind experience, but the transcendental-operative form in which experience carries itself along within constituted reality as an order of meaning. Reality remains distinct from it as the limiting horizon that marks the principled non-totalizability of this order of self and world and thereby structurally preserves its openness to irritation, transformation, and new formations of meaning.

8.3 Embodiment and I-Experience

(The Body as the Medium of Self-Relation)

The I as experience is inseparably connected with embodiment.

The lived body does not confront the I as an object, but constitutes the medium within which experience takes place. Through it, the I is situated, directed, and affectively attuned.

This means that embodiment is not merely an empirical endowment, but a **transcendental-operative condition of meaning constitution within constituted reality as an operatively formed order of meaning**. The world does not appear as a pregiven reality that is represented, but as an experience-immanent structure of meaning mediated through the lived body and oriented toward the limiting horizon of reality without ever integrating that horizon into experience.

Bodily sensations, postures, and movements structure the manner in which the I experiences itself in the world. States such as fatigue, tension, or lightness do not affect only the body, but alter the entire mode of experience: the I appears more constricted or more expansive, burdened or open. Embodiment therefore shapes not merely isolated moments, but the overall nexus of self-enactment.

Bodily states are not mere concomitant phenomena, but modulate the intensity, direction, and weight of lived experience and thereby the operative stabilization of meaning.

The manner in which world and self come to appearance is co-determined by embodiment because formations of relevance, resonances, and possibilities for action are organized within bodily enactment.

This bodily dimension operates prereflectively. Within lived experience, the body is not thematically apprehended as an object, but constitutes the background against which experience occurs. Only under certain conditions can it explicitly emerge into prominence. Even then, however, it remains part of the experiential process and does not become an external object.

The relation between prereflectivity and thematization can therefore be specified as follows:

Bodily enactment sustains experience before it can be conceptually apprehended; subsequent thematization transforms it into symbolic forms without abolishing its sustaining function within enactment.

Within the horizon of reality as a limiting concept, this means:

Bodily prereflectivity belongs to the operative structure of constituted reality, whereas reality, as a limiting horizon, constrains every conclusive conceptual determination of this structure of enactment.

Embodiment is at the same time relationally constituted. The lived body is always already related to the world. It responds to situations, spaces, and other people. Through this bodily resonance, orientation arises before conceptual interpretation begins.

The I is therefore always bodily embedded in the world. Orientation arises through resonances and through orders of proximity and distance sustained bodily and affectively.

The lived body is thus the medium of relational constitution within which relations of meaning are prereflectively stabilized and within which the world can emerge as a meaningfully articulated nexus.

Within the horizon of reality as a limiting concept, this embeddedness is related to constituted reality without being representational:

It constitutes constituted reality as an order of meaning, whereas reality, as a limiting horizon, marks the openness, susceptibility to irritation, and non-totalizability of this bodily mediated order.

In conclusion:

The I as experience is an embodied enactment. Being a self cannot be separated from embodiment, but takes place as a bodily situated mode of being-in-the-world.

The I is therefore a processual, perspectivally centered structure of meaning within constituted reality that is mediated bodily and affectively and formed relationally. Reality remains the transcendental limiting horizon that initiates and constrains this meaning formation and thereby structurally preserves its principled openness to transformation, reorientation, and new formation.

8.4 Affective Attachment and the Sense of Self

(The Emotional Grounding of Personal Unity)

Emotions bind experience to the I. Through them, it becomes experienceable what affects someone, what creates proximity, and what establishes distance. Affective attachment does not designate an additional relation to experience, but the manner in which experience is lived as one's own experience.

Systematically considered, this reveals a condition of the relation to constituted reality:

Meaning and relevance do not emerge neutrally, but in an affectively centered form. This centering belongs to the operative structure of constituted reality, whereas reality does not enter into this order but marks its openness and non-totalizability.

Within this affective attachment, a **sense of self** takes shape. The sense of self is neither an explicit self-assessment nor a conceptual judgment about oneself, but the fundamental way in which a person relates to themselves within the enactment of experience. It shapes how open, secure, tense, or vulnerable the I appears within lived experience.

This preserves coherence with the determination of the I as an experiential unit and with the prereflective character of emotional structures:

The sense of self is a prereflective, bodily-affectively sustained basic attunement of self-enactment that helps shape perception, orientation, and readiness for action without itself already being conceptually thematized.

Conceptually, this can be specified as follows:

The affective centering of the experiential process is concretized as a sense of self.

The sense of self does not arise at a single moment, but develops over the temporal course of experience. Recurring emotional patterns lend self-enactment a particular basic attunement. This attunement is not rigid but can change through new experiences, while nevertheless continuing to provide orientation and structure.

This preserves coherence with the temporality and processuality of emotions:

Emotional patterns connect moments of experience, generate expectations and aftereffects, and create continuity that nevertheless remains open to restructuring.

The continuity of the sense of self can accordingly be understood as an operative stabilization within an ongoing nexus of experience, rather than as the result of a fixed substance. The revisability of this stabilization follows from the fact that it takes place within constituted reality and cannot be transformed into a finally closed order.

Affective attachment does not operate in isolation, but relationally. It arises in engagement with situations, things, and other people. Recognition, reliability, or rejection feed back into the sense of self and shape how a person experiences themselves. This preserves coherence with the social and relational formation of the I:

Being a self is being-with-others, and resonance, conflict, affirmation, and irritation modulate self-enactment within the enactment of relation.

Affective attachment can therefore be understood as a relational achievement in which proximity and distance, security and vulnerability, as well as openness and withdrawal are organized as modes of relation to self and world.

The I thus constitutes itself not only through self-reference and embodiment, but also through affective attachments.

From this perspective, being a self is affectively grounded throughout. The sense of self constitutes a central dimension of the experience-based enactment of the I.

The following conclusion can therefore be drawn:

The sense of self belongs to constituted reality as an operatively formed order of meaning of the self within which experience becomes possible as one's own experience. Reality remains distinct from it as the limiting horizon that constrains every final determination of this affective order of the self.

Neither the sense of self nor its conceptual thematization can conclusively determine self-enactment, because affective attachments remain relationally and temporally structured and open to revision over the continuing course of experience, thereby preserving the possibility of transformation, reorientation, and renewed self-determination.

8.5 The I as an Open Structure

(Revisability and the Non-Closure of Selfhood)

The I as experience is not a closed unit. It remains open to new experiences, irritations, and transformations. This openness is not an external addition but a constitutive feature of self-enactment.

Systematically, this can be determined as follows:

The I belongs to constituted reality as an experience-immanent structure of meaning that forms within enactment and cannot be transformed into a finally closed order. Reality does not appear as a determinable element within this order, but marks its limit and thereby its principled non-closure.

It follows from this openness that new situations, encounters, or events can not only confirm existing self-relations but also call them into question and transform them. Experiences can stabilize familiar modes of being a self, but can equally interrupt or shift them. The I is therefore not secured by a fixed core but remains fundamentally capable of change.

Self-relations must accordingly be understood as temporary moments of stabilization within an ongoing enactment that can be reorganized under conditions of irritation. Changes then appear not as external disturbances of an already completed identity, but as reorganizations within the operative formation of meaning through which the I respectively stabilizes itself as Gestalt and perspective.

This openness, however, must not be equated with a lack of stability. Precisely because the I stabilizes itself within enactment, it possesses a certain continuity arising from recurring nexuses of experience, basic emotional patterns, and bodily dispositions.

This continuity is itself dynamic: it emerges through repetition and stabilization within the process, not from a fixed identity. Recurring patterns stabilize formations of relevance, resonances, and the sense of self without rigidly determining them.

Continuity must therefore be understood as an operative achievement of self-reference and of connectivity with already established patterns of activity. It designates a mode of stabilization within openness, not the abolition of openness.

It is precisely this connection between openness and continuity that makes learning and development possible. The I can respond to new demands and revise existing self-interpretations because its stabilization is never final. Without this openness, self-understanding would become rigid and experience would lose its capacity for further connection.

Self-understanding therefore develops through recursive movements of experience, interpretation, and renewed experience. Its dynamics depend upon the possibility of adapting symbolic orders of the self to new experience-based condensations. Such adaptation remains possible because no order of the self can be transformed into a final form. Every stabilization remains open to revision because it takes place within constituted reality and cannot be closed into a totality.

The I thus appears as an open structure mediating between stabilization and transformation. It is neither arbitrarily malleable nor conclusively fixed. Being a self unfolds as an ongoing process that remains dependent upon experience and repeatedly acquires new Gestalt within it.

This also preserves the previously established tension between experience-near enactment and conceptual stabilization: the I stabilizes itself both as an experience-near Gestalt and as a conceptual self-interpretation, without either level replacing the other.

Openness is the condition under which stabilization does not become final fixation but can persist as a provisional order.

This openness, however, is not uniform. Over the course of life, it can change and, under certain conditions, become more restricted. With increasing experience, sedimented self-interpretations, and stabilized emotional patterns, the self gains continuity and reliability, but at the same time also becomes more selective. Openness is then directed less toward unlimited novelty than toward the modification, differentiation, or even defense of already established self-relations.

Such a narrowing does not, however, entail a loss of self-enactment, but rather a changed form of its organization. This change, too, must be understood as a reorganization within constituted reality: stabilization becomes more prominent, while new experiences are integrated more selectively. Nevertheless, the structure remains open, since irritations, new situations, and unexpected encounters can once again shift existing selectivities. The principled openness of self-enactment therefore remains operative, albeit in historically varying forms.

8.6 Provisional Conclusion

(The I as an Operative Effect within Constituted Reality)

The preceding analysis has shown that the I cannot be understood as a fixed instance or a pregiven identity. Rather, it proves to be an experience-based, processual enactment that forms and changes over the temporal course of lived experience. This simultaneously confirms the shift undertaken in this chapter in relation to Chapter 6:

The I must be understood not only as an articulated unit within constituted reality, but as an operative effect of those enactments through which constituted reality first emerges as an order of meaning.

The I therefore itself belongs to operatively formed constituted reality and must not be understood as a center confronting an objectively pregiven reality. Reality remains distinct from it as a transcendental limiting horizon marking the principled non-closure of this self-enactment and thereby structurally grounding the openness and revisability of every order of the self.

From this perspective, the results of the individual analyses can now be brought together. As experience, the I appears prereflectively, bodily situated, and affectively bound. It is the implicit perspective from which perception, emotion, and action are organized. This perspective is not thematically available, yet it does not constitute the unity of lived experience retrospectively, but within enactment itself.

The unity of lived experience therefore arises not additively, but from the continuous self-accompaniment of the experiential process, which is bodily mediated and affectively weighted. Perspectivality, embodiment, and affectivity are thus conditions under which world can appear at all as a meaningfully articulated nexus and under which experience coheres as I-experience, without this unity ever being fully captured conceptually.

Precisely because the I arises in this way not in isolation but within the enactment of experience, self-reference, embodiment, and affective attachment do not operate alongside one another but interweave. They make it possible for experience to be lived as a coherent process and for a sense of self to emerge that provides orientation without being conceptually fixed.

It follows at the same time that the I can never be understood independently of world and others. Encounters, recognition, rejection, resonance, and conflict feed back into self-enactment and shape the sense of self and self-interpretation without determining them conclusively. The relational orders of the self that emerge in this process belong to constituted reality as an order of meaning; reality is not integrated into them but remains the limiting horizon at which their openness, susceptibility to irritation, and capacity for transformation become apparent.

From this interweaving there finally also follows the openness of the I. Being a self remains capable of change without becoming arbitrary. Continuity arises from recurring nexuses of experience, emotional patterns, and bodily dispositions, not from a fixed core. It is precisely here that repetition and stabilization prove capable of sustaining self-enactment without bringing it to closure.

New experiences can confirm, shift, or transform existing self-relations because the stability of the I itself exists only as an operative achievement within the process. Openness is therefore

not the opposite of continuity, but the condition under which continuity remains possible as a provisional order.

The provisional conclusion can thus be stated more sharply:

The I is an experience-centered structure that can neither be understood independently of its relation to the world nor be fully apprehended conceptually.

Experience remains the sustaining ground upon which every form of self-understanding and identity formation depends. Self-understanding and identity formation accordingly appear as forms of symbolic stabilization within constituted reality that remain related back to prereflective, bodily-affective self-enactment and cannot replace it.

Reality remains the transcendental limiting horizon that prevents every totalization of the self and thereby marks the principled non-closure, revisability, and openness of the experience-based structure of the I within which being a self continuously acquires Gestalt.

9. Understanding as the Mediation of the Analog and the Digital

(Integrating Resonance and Form-Giving in the Process of Meaning Constitution)

9.1 Understanding as a Double Movement

From Experience to Thought and from Thought Back to Experience

Understanding does not primarily take place in conceptual thought, but initially in immediate lived experience. It is the prereflective enactment of experience in which meaning is already operative before it is conceptually apprehended. Conceptual thought presupposes this **experiential understanding**; it explicates, orders, and stabilizes meaning that it does not itself originate.

Understanding therefore does not arise in a transition from experience to the intellect, but within the tension between prereflective experiential understanding and its conceptual articulation. This double movement is strictly confined to the level of constituted reality: understanding operates entirely within the operatively generated order of meaning in which world appears. Reality, by contrast, is not part of this operation but the limiting horizon that cannot be operationally integrated and that marks the non-totalizability of every production of meaning.

Experience opens meaning by making world accessible affectively, bodily, and situationally. Within experience, meanings emerge without already being conceptually fixed. Thought takes up these meanings and orders them by abstracting, stabilizing, and rendering them symbolically available. Both movements are necessary, but they follow different logics.

This distinction remains consistent with the guiding differentiation of this study:

Constituted reality is not a representation of an objectively pregiven reality, but arises as an analogically grounded and digitally stabilized order of meaning; reality remains epistemically unavailable as a limiting concept and is not "understood," but posited as a differential pole that limits the operative order without itself appearing as an order.

This double movement is neither a temporally linear process nor an alternation between two modes of equal status. Experience and thought instead interpenetrate recursively. Experience constitutes the primary enactment of understanding by prereflectively opening meaning. Thought presupposes this experiential understanding and, as a reflective instance, feeds back into it by forming expectations, directing attention, and stabilizing or modifying patterns of interpretation.

Understanding does not arise *between* experience and thought, but within experiential enactment itself, which is continuously modified by conceptual reflection. The feedback of thought must not be understood as an abolition of the genesis of experience, but as recursive mediation: digital stabilization can connect only with what has already been differentiated as relevant and affectively weighted in the analog mode; at the same time, digital order shapes subsequent experiential selection through horizons of expectation and conditions of connectivity.

The tension between experience and thought cannot be abolished. Experience can neither be completely transformed into concepts nor can thought dispense with the experience-based richness of meaning. Understanding is therefore not a state but an ongoing process unfolding within the tension between the two modes.

Within the horizon of reality as a limiting concept, this irreducibility must be understood not merely psychologically but in transcendental-operative terms: every digital stabilization is selective and generates a structural remainder. This non-totalizability is not a defect, but a constitutive limit of operative meaning formation.

What appears as resistance, irritation, or effect is not a causally describable influence of a "reality in itself," but an **internal attribution of difference** that marks operative instability and thereby drives stabilization, under the pressure of ordering, toward the modification or transformation of orders of constituted reality.

From this perspective, understanding appears as a dynamic order. It acquires Gestalt through the interplay of experience-near meaning formation and conceptual structuring without being reducible to either level. The double movement of experience and thought thus constitutes the fundamental pattern of human understanding.

At the same time, this fundamental movement remains strictly situated within constituted reality: understanding organizes and stabilizes relations of meaning within the operative order of world. Reality is integrated neither analogically nor digitally; rather, it functions as a transcendental limiting horizon that prevents any stabilized order from misconstruing itself as a conclusive totality and thereby structurally secures the principled openness and revisability of understanding.

9.2 Experience as Resonance

(The Analog Opening of Meaning)

Experience takes place in the mode of resonance.

It is not the mere reception of external givens, but a responsive relation to the world. Resonance designates the manner in which experience responds to what appears and, in doing so, is itself set in motion. Experience is therefore not passive, but relational and dynamic.

Within the horizon of reality as a limiting concept, this means:

Resonance is not a representation of an objectively pregiven reality, but the operative enactment in which constituted reality first arises as meaningful appearance—while reality remains operative in the background as a non-operationalizable limiting horizon without itself appearing as an order.

In resonance, meaning is not fixed but opened. Something affects, irritates, or attracts without already being conceptually determined. This affective encounter is not purely individual, but relational. It arises through the interplay of situational givens, bodily disposition, and the emotional attunement of the experiencing individual.

Resonance therefore designates not an inner state, but a situational relational event in which world and self are brought into relation. Accordingly, resonance does not mean "harmonious consonance," but a **bodily-affective structure of response to operative difference within which constituted reality emerges as structured appearance.**

This structure can be illustrated by a situation in which a person enters a previously unknown place. Even before individual elements are consciously identified or conceptually classified, a

particular atmosphere emerges. The space appears inviting or repellent, familiar or unfamiliar, calming or tense. This effect is not the result of conscious evaluation, but the expression of an immediate process of response. Experience responds to what appears by itself undergoing change.

Within the horizon of reality as a limiting concept, however, this "effect" must not be understood as the causally describable influence of a reality "in itself," but as an **operative attribution of difference within the formation of constituted reality**: appearance is differentially structured, affectively marked, and perspectivally bound from the outset.

Within this situation, meaning is not explicated but intimated. Certain aspects of the space come to the fore, while others remain in the background. Attention is directed without its object already having been explicitly determined. At the same time, bodily orientation changes: movement slows down or accelerates, distance is sought or proximity permitted. These changes are not subsequent effects but part of resonant experience itself. The analog dimension of understanding thereby becomes apparent: gradation, modulation of intensity, and atmospheric structure open meaning prior to any conceptual fixation.

Resonance is neither purely internal nor objectively explicable. It arises through the interplay of the particular situation, the bodily disposition of the experiencing individual, and their emotional attunement. Meaning does not appear here as a fixed semantic content, but as a possibility that intimates itself within the enactment of experience. Only in a further step can this prereflective resonance be conceptually apprehended, interpreted, or evaluated. This subsequent ordering constitutes **digital stabilization**: concepts transform continuous differences into distinguishable units and make explicit judgments possible without being able to fully capture the resonant enactment from which they arise.

Resonance is therefore not an additional dimension of experience, but its fundamental mode. Within resonance, what can acquire meaning becomes manifest without that meaning already having been explicated. Resonance directs attention, modifies bodily orientation, and opens possibilities for action before reflective decisions begin. Experience thus takes place as a responsive event in which meaning is not manufactured from outside the experiential process, but continuously brought forth and transformed within the enactment of the relation to the world.

Within the horizon of the guiding distinction, the decisive point remains: **constituted reality is the structured appearance that emerges within resonant enactment; reality remains the epistemically unavailable background that becomes operative as resistance or impulse without itself appearing as an order.**

This resonant structure is processual. Resonance may intensify, diminish, or break off. It may remain stable or pass into new forms of resonance. Experience thereby remains dynamic and open to change. This openness is not arbitrariness, but **contingency under operative conditions**: orders of constituted reality arise through selective stabilization, while reality, as a limiting horizon, prevents the totalization of such stabilization.

As a resonant process, experience is not completely available to deliberate control. It eludes complete conceptual fixation and mastery. Yet precisely therein lies its productive force. Resonance enables meaning without conclusively fixing it and thus forms the basis of every further form of understanding. This productivity remains consistent with the transcendental self-limitation of the present approach: understanding operates entirely within constituted

reality; reality is not integrated into it but functions as a differential pole that renders visible the non-closure of every operative order.

Symbols and abstract forms of meaning assume a distinctive role in this context. They make it possible to articulate resonant contents of meaning without conceptually exhausting them. They preserve the openness of experience by condensing meaning without determining it unambiguously. As mediating forms, symbols and abstract forms of meaning stand between immediate resonance and conceptual determination. They thereby permit meaning to be communicated, stabilized, and jointly referred to without abolishing its living ambiguity.

Within the horizon of reality as a limiting concept, this means that such condensations, too, remain operations within constituted reality understood as an order of meaning, whereas reality functions as the limiting marker of the principled non-totalizability of every form of articulation, whether symbolic or conceptual.

9.3 Thought as Form-Giving

(Digital Stabilization and the Explication of Meaning)

Thought operates in the mode of **form-giving**. It takes up the nexuses of meaning opened within experience and transforms them into conceptual orders. In doing so, it generates clarity, distance, and stability. Thought fixes what has already emerged as significant and become structurally articulated within the resonant enactment of experience.

Within the horizon of reality as a limiting concept, this means:

Thought operates within constituted reality as an operatively stabilized order of meaning; it is a form of digital stabilization of what has already been differentiated analogically—that is, bodily, affectively, and resonantly. Reality is not conceptually apprehended in this process but remains the horizon that cannot be operationally integrated and whose function consists in marking the non-totalizability of operative meaning formation.

This form-giving is necessarily selective. Thought brings certain aspects into prominence, separates them from their situational nexus, and places them within relational structures. Concepts, categories, and rules arise through these operations of differentiation and coordination. Meaning thereby becomes conceptually determinable and comparable.

This selectivity must not be understood as a subsequent falsification, but as a structural moment of digital operation:

Concepts transform continuous differences into identifiable units; the digital dimension operates through discrete determination and symbolic stabilization and presupposes the analog field within which differences are gradually marked as significant.

Form-giving simultaneously entails reduction. The qualitative density of experience, its transitions, attunements, and bodily resonances, cannot be fully captured in conceptual forms. What is gained is overview and communicative availability. What is lost is not merely the immediacy of lived experience, but also its personal availability as bodily-affectively present experience.

This reduction is not accidental but follows from the logic of digital stabilization as a reduction of complexity. Digital order is selective: it brings certain differences into prominence while allowing others to remain in the background in order to make stable connectivity possible.

This reduction is a condition of the productive capacity of thought. Only through form-giving do planning, argumentation, and systematic reflection become possible. Thought makes it possible to move beyond individual experiential situations, establish connections, and gain orientation. Yet this orientation remains bound to the experience from which it emerged and cannot generate its meaning independently of that experience.

The systematic architecture therefore remains consistent: **constituted reality arises through the interplay of analog differentiation and digital stabilization; thought is a "subsequent ordering" that stabilizes meaning already formed without itself constituting the origin of that meaning.**

Thought as form-giving therefore remains functionally related to experience. It does not generate meaning from within itself, but orders and stabilizes what has already been opened within experience. Understanding arises through the interplay of resonant experience and conceptual form-giving, not through either movement in isolation.

This interplay must be understood strictly as an operation within constituted reality:

Understanding is not an additional instance standing above experience, but the structural explication of what is already operative within the experiential process; reality remains a formal limiting marker—"no more than a boundary sign, but also no less"—insofar as it secures the non-closure of every stabilization and the continuing pressure toward its problematization.

9.4 The Space of Possibilities within the Tension between Experience and Thought

(Openness, Selection, and Connectivity)

The tension between experience and thought opens a space of possibilities. This space does not arise through detachment from experience or through the independence of thought, but from the interplay of both modes. Possibilities arise wherever meaning opened within experience can be taken up, varied, and further developed through the distancing and ordering operations of thought.

This space of possibilities must not be understood as an ontological reservoir, but as a formal structure of the formation of constituted reality: constituted reality arises as selective actualization within a field of possible options of meaning.

Experience binds us to what is respectively given. It is situated, affectively shaped, and bound to concrete contexts. Thought, by contrast, enables distance. It allows the individual to detach itself from immediate lived experience, move beyond existing nexuses, consider alternatives, and project possible developments.

The space of possibilities arises precisely where this distancing capacity of thought becomes operative without losing its relation to the experiential formation of meaning. Analog

differentiation gradually opens relevance and significance; digital stabilization transforms these differences into conceptually available units and relations.

This space of possibilities is not unlimited. It is neither a field of arbitrary options nor an empty realm of possibility. Rather, it remains bound both to experience-based structures of relevance and to the conceptual orders within which thought operates. Possibilities are therefore always **situated possibilities** that emerge within nexuses of meaning that are given but not completely determined.

Orders of constituted reality are contingent without being arbitrary; they arise through selective stabilization under operative conditions.

Within the tension between experience and thought, existing nexuses of meaning can be confirmed, modified, or called into question; at the same time, new relations of meaning may emerge. Experience brings new perspectives into play, while thought examines, orders, and reflects upon them. The space of possibilities is therefore not an abstract reservoir of possibilities, but a dynamic field within which relations of meaning can change, be reconfigured, or become stabilized.

Expressed more precisely in transcendental-operative terms: possibilities are logically prior to actuality, yet constituted reality is not the totality of all possibilities but their selective realization within enactment:

possibility → selection → actualization.

In this context, understanding functions not merely as a form of cognition but as practical orientation within an open field of possibilities. It enables the individual to relate to world, others, and itself and to shape these relations. The space of possibilities arises not despite the tension between experience and thought, but through it; as an ongoingly structured yet fundamentally open nexus of meaning.

Reality remains the horizon that cannot be operationally integrated, the source of irritation, and the marker of non-closure. It prevents totalization, generates pressure toward problematization, and thereby secures the openness of constituted reality without itself entering the space of possibilities as a positively determinable structure.

9.5 Legitimation and Meaning

(Validity within Operatively Formed Constituted Reality)

Understanding is not merely an enactment of relation to meaning; it simultaneously raises the question of its legitimation. The issue is not only that something is understood, but why one particular interpretation can count as meaningful while another cannot. This is the question of the viability of operative orders of meaning within constituted reality: legitimation is a form of stabilization that must prove itself within the enactment of understanding without ever becoming a totalizing correspondence with reality.

This legitimation can be derived neither from experience alone nor from thought alone. Experience provides **evidence in the sense of immediate plausibility**. It reveals what proves viable, what appears coherent, and what generates resonance. Thought, by contrast, provides **justification in the sense of coherence, connectivity, and argumentative intelligibility**.

The double movement of understanding is thereby preserved: the prereflective opening of meaning through resonance and evidence, and reflective form-giving through coherence and justification, remain structurally distinct while being related to one another.

Meaning arises where these two dimensions enter into relation. An interpretation that proves viable experientially but cannot be conceptually mediated remains isolated. A conceptually coherent interpretation that lacks experience-based resonance remains empty. Legitimate understanding therefore requires the mediation of experience-based evidence and conceptual order.

This mediation must be understood as **operative translation**: resonant fields of meaning are selectively transformed into symbolic forms, while symbolic orders feed back into experience by helping to shape expectations, attention, and patterns of interpretation. Legitimation is therefore not a "verification against reality," but the recursive stabilization of meaning through the interplay of both modes within constituted reality.

This mediation is not a one-time act. Legitimation remains an open process that can change with new experiences and new conceptual insights. Meaning is never secured once and for all, but proves itself within the ongoing enactment of understanding.

The central consequence of reality as a limiting concept is thereby preserved: **every stabilization remains fundamentally revisable because it can exist only as an operative order within constituted reality.**

Irritations and instabilities do not mark the causal intervention of a "reality in itself," but rather **system-internal attributions of difference** that generate pressure toward revision and thereby motivate the further development of the order of meaning.

Understanding is therefore legitimized neither purely from within nor in a purely objective manner. It is grounded in a tension between experience and thought in which meaning is not definitively fixed, but continually developed anew.

Legitimation takes place within constituted reality as an operatively structured order of meaning, as a balance between resonant evidence (plausibility/viability) and conceptual justification (coherence/connectivity).

Reality remains distinct from this as a transcendental limiting horizon that marks the non-totalizability of every legitimation and thereby structurally preserves the principled openness of meaning, its dependence upon ongoing validation, and its revisability.

9.6 Provisional Conclusion

(Understanding as Mediation between Experiential Reality and Concept)

The analysis has shown that understanding cannot be conceived as a unitary process. Rather, it takes place within the tension between two different modes of meaning formation.

Within the horizon of reality as a limiting concept, this tension must be understood strictly as an operative difference within constituted reality: understanding organizes meaning within the

formed order of meaning, while reality remains distinct from it as a transcendental limiting horizon marking the non-totalizability of every order of meaning.

Experience opens meaning through resonance, contextual embeddedness, and affective weighting. Thought gives form to this meaning through conceptual ordering, abstraction, and stabilization. The double movement is thereby preserved: resonance prereflectively opens significance as possibility and direction; form-giving transforms this opening into symbolically available orders. Both movements are functionally related to one another but follow different logics.

This tension cannot be dissolved. Experience can neither be completely transformed into conceptual forms nor can thought remain viable without experience-based richness of meaning. Understanding does not arise on either level alone, but through the continuing interplay between them. Every conceptual stabilization remains selective and leaves a remainder of the density of enactment unintegrated; conversely, every resonant opening remains only partially communicable and reflectively accessible without symbolic form-giving.

The double movement of experience and thought opens a space of orientation and freedom. Experience binds the individual to what is given, whereas thought enables distance and reflection. Within this mediation, existing nexuses of meaning can be confirmed, modified, or newly conceived.

This space of possibilities is not unlimited, but remains bound to experience-based structures of relevance and to the symbolic orders within which thought operates. Possibilities are therefore **situated possibilities within nexuses of meaning that are given but not completely determined.**

The legitimation of meaning likewise proves to be processual. It is grounded neither in mere immediacy nor in purely conceptual coherence, but in their reciprocal relation. Meaning proves itself within the enactment of understanding and remains open to revision.

Legitimation is not an ultimate validation against a "reality in itself," but an operative stabilization within constituted reality that is continuously modified under the influence of irritations, new experiences, and new conceptual insights.

Understanding thereby proves to be a dynamic, relational process. It is neither a fixed entity nor a final state, but a continuing movement between experience-based meaning formation and conceptual order. **Experience remains the sustaining ground upon which every form of understanding depends.**

Understanding operates within constituted reality as an order of meaning, while reality, as a transcendental limiting horizon, structurally marks the principled openness, revisability, and non-closure of this process.

10. Horizon Formation and the Constitution of Reality through Understanding

(World- and Self-Projection under the Transcendental Limitation of Reality)

10.1 Understanding as a Horizon-Forming Process

(Meaning as the Opening of a Field of Possible Determinations)

Understanding does not take place through the isolated apprehension of individual states of affairs, but always against the background of a horizon of meaning. This horizon designates the domain of what is implicitly co-intended, expectable, and possible, within which experience and thought can generate meaning. Within the horizon of reality as a limiting concept, this horizon of meaning must be understood as the **horizonal openness of constituted reality**:

Constituted reality is not given, but arises as an operatively stabilized order of meaning that remains perspectivally bound, affectively structured, and at the same time horizonal in its openness.

Horizons are not explicitly given. They form within the enactment of experience and exert a structuring influence upon what can be perceived, understood, and thematized. Experience opens horizons by allowing meanings to be experienced not in isolation, but within the context of a broader field of meaning.

Experience is the primary locus in which world appears and difference is marked as significant; these markings stabilize into fields of meaning within which individual contents can first emerge as "this" rather than "that."

Understanding is therefore always more than the apprehension of an individual content. It is a process of orientation within an open space of meaning. Whatever is understood always points beyond itself toward further possibilities, connections, and continuations.

World initially appears as a field of possibilities; understanding means forming units from this field, fixing relations, and establishing nexuses without these units being ontologically pregiven.

Reference to possibility is therefore not an addition to understanding, but one of its structural forms.

Horizons are not static. They change with new experiences, altered emotional attunements, and new conceptual orders. Understanding is thus a dynamic process that not only presupposes horizons but continually shifts and expands them.

This dynamic follows from the recursive mediation between the analog dimension of experience and the digital structure of thought: analog markings of relevance and intensity open fields of meaning; digital stabilization fixes particular relations; and these fixations feed back into experience by shaping expectations, directing attention, and prestructuring perception—thereby contributing to shifts in experiential horizons.

The horizon of understanding does not constitute a fixed framework but an open structure. It limits what can be understood at any given time without fixing that limitation once and for all. Precisely this openness makes learning, irritation, and reorientation possible.

The openness of the horizon is not merely a matter of psychological flexibility, but an expression of the **non-totalizability of operative meaning formation**. Irritation marks the non-integrability of certain differences within existing orders; it does not point ontologically toward a reality "in itself," but functionally toward operative instability—and precisely thereby makes shifts of horizon, revision, and new formation possible.

10.2 World as the Result of Understanding

Constituted Reality as a Horizontally Organized Nexus of Meaning

From this perspective, world is not simply given but is the result of an ongoing process of understanding. It does not appear as a neutral totality of things, but as a meaningfully articulated nexus that enables orientation.

World is the structured appearance that arises within the enactment of meaning formation, whereas reality does not become available within this nexus as a given totality.

This world arises through the interplay of experience and thought. Emotional relevance, bodily resonance, and conceptual order interact and allow world to emerge in a particular way. World is therefore not an image of an objectively pregiven reality, but a projection that forms within the enactment of understanding.

Experience opens meaning analogically, affectively, and bodily; thought forms and stabilizes meaning digitally and symbolically; the "world-projection" is the respective operative configuration of these two movements.

Reality does not function here as a prestructuring template, but as a transcendental limiting horizon at which processes of meaning formation are initiated and at which their non-closure becomes manifest.

The world-projection is not arbitrary. It rests upon recurring structures of experience and stabilized conceptual orders. Nevertheless, it remains perspectivally and situationally bound. Different experiences and interpretive nexuses can lead to different world-projections without these necessarily being mutually incompatible.

Orders of world are selectively stabilized orders of meaning bound to patterns of relevance, expectations, and symbolic networks. They can vary without collapsing into mere arbitrariness because they remain operatively bound to conditions of connectivity, plausibility, and coherence.

From this perspective, world possesses no final closure. It remains open to expansion, correction, and revision. New experiences can irritate, shift, or reconfigure existing world-projections. World thus appears as a dynamic nexus that continually acquires new Gestalt within the process of understanding.

Within the horizon of reality as a limiting concept, this openness is not merely empirical change but structural non-totalizability:

Irritation is not a causally describable intervention of a "reality in itself," but a system-internal attribution of difference that marks operative instability and thereby drives the modification and new formation of orders of meaning.

World is therefore neither purely internal nor purely objective. It arises within a relational process in which experience and thought are brought into relation with one another. Understanding designates the process through which world is disclosed as a meaningful nexus. Wholeness must not be understood here as a presupposed totality, but as the structuring interrelation of nexus, context, and space of possibilities.

Wholeness is an operative form of the organization of constituted reality, not the assertion of a conclusive reality.

Reality remains distinct as a transcendental limiting horizon and marks the principled openness of the world-projection by limiting every totalization of the operatively formed order of world and thereby structurally enabling revision, correction, and expansion.

10.3 World-Projection and Self-Projection

(The Co-Constitution of World and I)

The projection of a world is inseparably connected with the projection of the self.

How world appears depends upon how the I locates itself within it. At the same time, the respective world-projection shapes how the I understands itself.

World-projection and self-projection therefore do not stand in an external relation, but constitute two sides of the same process of understanding. Within the horizon of reality as a limiting concept, this unity must be understood as an operative interrelation within constituted reality: world and I are not two pregiven entities that subsequently enter into relation, but arise through reciprocal meaning formation as a relationally structured order, while reality, as a transcendental limiting horizon, marks the non-totalizability of this order.

Basic emotional patterns, recurring experiences, and bodily orientations structure this nexus. Someone who experiences world as open and viable projects themselves differently from someone for whom world appears primarily threatening or opaque. These differences are not merely personal attitudes, but expressions of different experience-based world-projections.

This remains consistent with the previously developed role of emotions in the formation of relevance and as relational events: emotional patterns modulate what emerges as significant, how proximity and distance are experienced, and which possibilities appear attainable. Within this affective weighting, world- and self-projection are formed simultaneously.

Self-projection is not freely available. It arises within the enactment of experience and through engagement with given situations, social relations, and cultural orders. The I does not project itself independently of world, but in engagement with it.

The determination of the I as processual enactment and as socially and relationally situated is thereby preserved: being a self is not a substance, but an operative nexus that stabilizes and changes through bodily-affective and situational enactments as well as through social resonances.

Within the horizon of reality as a limiting concept, this means:

Self-projection is a formation of constituted reality, not the free positing of an identity independently of the order of experience.

At the same time, world-projection is not independent of self-projection. Expectations, self-images, and biographical narratives influence what is perceived as significant and how new experiences are integrated. World and self are therefore interwoven within a reciprocal process of projection.

The recursive mediation between experience and thought is thereby preserved: symbolic orders—expectations, narratives, and self-images—are forms of digital stabilization that feed back into experience, direct attention, and provide patterns of interpretation, while new experiences can confirm, irritate, or revise these orders. World-projection and self-projection are thus not separate productions, but two sides of the same movement of translation and feedback.

From this perspective, understanding proves to be an existential process. It concerns not merely individual states of affairs, but the manner in which someone understands both themselves and world as a whole. World-projection and self-projection are expressions of the same experience-based process of meaning formation.

Understanding is existential—in the sense of the lived enactment of world and self—because it forms constituted reality as a meaningfully articulated nexus simultaneously for world and self, without ever being capable of becoming a conclusive entity or a final totality.

Reality remains the transcendental limiting horizon that structurally marks the openness, revisability, and non-closure of these processes of projection and thereby prevents either world-projection or self-projection from presenting itself as a final apprehension of reality.

10.4 Openness and Limitation of Horizons

The Non-Totalizability of Constituted Reality in Its Limiting Relation to Reality

Horizons open possibilities of understanding while simultaneously limiting them. Every horizon determines what can appear meaningful within a particular space of experience and interpretation and excludes other possibilities without completely negating them.

If reality functions as a limiting concept, this horizonal character belongs to the structure of constituted reality itself: constituted reality is relationally constituted, affectively structured, perspectivally bound, and horizonal in its openness.

This limitation is not an external barrier, but an internal structure of understanding. A horizon makes orientation possible by selecting and structuring relevances. Without limitation, experience would remain unordered. Openness and limitation therefore belong inseparably together.

This structure must be understood operatively:

Meaning formation arises through the selection and stabilization of differentiated possibilities; limitation is the condition of connectivity because only limitation establishes stable points of connection.

New experiences can expand, shift, or irritate horizons. Unexpected events, altered emotional attunements, or new conceptual perspectives can call existing frameworks of meaning into question. Understanding thereby remains capable of learning and transformation.

Irritation is not a causally describable intervention of a "reality in itself," but a structural form of systemic boundary experience:

Boundary experience marks, within an existing order of constituted reality, what can and cannot be integrated, thereby determining what remains connectable and generating pressure toward revision and transformation.

Horizons can, however, also narrow. Rigid patterns of interpretation, fixed self-images, or inflexible conceptual orders can restrict the openness of understanding. Experience then loses flexibility and connectivity. Such narrowing does not necessarily constitute an "end" of meaning formation, but rather a changed form of its organization: stabilization becomes more prominent than openness, selection becomes more restrictive, and alternatives become less connectable.

Horizonal openness therefore does not mean arbitrariness. It designates the possibility of reorganizing meaning without abandoning the necessity of orientation. Understanding always moves between openness and limitation and derives its stability and dynamism precisely from this tension. This contingency must be understood as **"without arbitrariness"**: orders are comparable, prove themselves to different degrees, and remain subject to pressure from irritation and problematization.

Within the context of openness and limitation, spirituality can also be described as a specific form of horizon expansion. Spirituality does not designate a separate domain of content or a distinctive form of knowledge, but a mode of understanding in which existing horizons of meaning are relativized, transcended, or reframed. It directs attention not primarily toward individual states of affairs, but toward the nexus within which experience, self, and world are related to one another, without positing this nexus as a closed totality.

No additional level of reality is thereby introduced: **reality remains a transcendental limiting concept; constituted reality remains the only domain of meaning, experience, and knowledge.**

As a horizon-opening practice or orientation, spirituality can extend the scope of understanding by loosening familiar patterns of interpretation and allowing alternative perspectives on meaning, nexus, and significance. It makes it possible to interpret experiences not exclusively from functional, instrumental, or conceptually fixed perspectives, but to embed them within more comprehensive nexuses of meaning.

In this way, spirituality can open new spaces of resonance in which experience is lived as meaningful without already being unambiguously determined. Systematically, spirituality must therefore be understood as a particular form of the **actualization of meaning within the space of possibilities—not as access to a transcendent reality.**

Spirituality must not, however, be equated with unlimited openness. It, too, operates within a given horizon and depends upon symbolic forms, narratives, and practices that provide orientation and stabilize meaning.

Spiritual horizons can likewise narrow, for example when they become dogmatically fixed or immune to irritation. In such cases, they lose their horizon-expanding function and instead constrain understanding. Spirituality is therefore not an unassailable private truth, but remains situated within relational orders and subject to difference and pressure toward problematization.

Under favorable conditions, however, spirituality contributes to expanding horizons and keeping them open. It can help relativize entrenched frameworks of interpretation, readjust relations to self and world, and keep understanding receptive to dimensions of experience that resist purely conceptual apprehension.

Spirituality thus appears not as the opposite of rational understanding, but as a way of widening its horizon without abandoning the necessity of orientation and structure. The decisive point remains:

Spirituality does not experience reality as an object, but rather the limit of constituted reality—the limited character of every actualized order of meaning and a sensitivity to what cannot be integrated within the space of possibilities.

10.5 Truth within the Horizon

(Truth as Validation within Open Constituted Reality)

From the perspective developed here, truth must not be understood as timeless correspondence with a world-independent reality. Rather, it manifests itself as the validation of meaning within a particular horizon of understanding. An interpretation is true insofar as it proves viable in experience, provides orientation, and sustains itself within the enactment of action.

Understood in this way, truth is not a relation of representation to reality "in itself," but an **operative form of validity within constituted reality as a formed order of meaning**.

Reality remains the transcendental limiting horizon and functions not as a positively available criterion, but as a marker of the non-totalizability of every fixation of truth.

This conception of truth is neither purely personal nor arbitrary. Truth claims are bound to experience-based evidence and conceptual coherence. An interpretation must prove plausible in lived experience while remaining conceptually intelligible and connectable. Truth arises through the interplay of both dimensions.

The previously developed structure of the legitimation of meaning is thereby preserved: evidence as resonant viability and coherence as conceptual justifiability are distinct but mutually related modes of the stabilization of meaning.

Because horizons are mutable, truth likewise cannot be fixed once and for all. New experiences can call existing truths into question or extend them. New conceptual orders can likewise disclose different aspects of experience. Truth is therefore not a static state but a processual nexus.

Processuality is consequently not merely empirical mutability, but a structural consequence of the horizonal character of constituted reality: orders of meaning are operatively stabilized yet remain in principle open to revision because no stabilization can become a totality.

This processuality does not, however, entail relativism. Truths can be assessed in terms of their viability. They prove themselves insofar as they provide orientation, enable action, and integrate experience. Truth validates itself within the enactment of understanding. At the same time, this means that validation is not arbitrary, but bound to conditions of connectivity.

Boundary experience marks, within an existing order of constituted reality, what can and cannot be integrated, thereby determining what remains connectable and generating pressure toward revision and transformation. Within this dynamic, truth is not "suspended," but continually examined and reshaped.

Truth, from this perspective, is always horizonal in structure and contextually bound. It is bound to the respective conditions of understanding without being exhausted by them. Precisely this relation to experience and horizon makes truth dynamic and open to transformation.

Truth belongs to constituted reality as an operative order of meaning and remains, in its validity, bound to experiential resonance, conceptual coherence, and practical validation.

Reality, as a transcendental limiting horizon, prevents a horizon-bound truth from misconstruing itself as a conclusive apprehension of an absolute reality.

10.6 Provisional Conclusion

(Horizon Formation as the Highest Explication of the Constitution of Constituted Reality)

The preceding considerations have shown that understanding essentially takes place as a horizonal process. It does not occur through the apprehension of isolated contents, but within the nexus of an open space of meaning in which experience and thought can form meaning. This space of meaning must be understood as an operative structure of constituted reality:

Horizonal structure belongs to the manner in which constituted reality arises as an order of meaning, while reality, as a transcendental limiting horizon, marks the non-totalizability of this order.

Horizons structure what can appear meaningful without fixing this structure once and for all. They open possibilities of understanding while simultaneously limiting them. This limitation is a condition of orientation. Openness and limitation therefore prove to be inseparably connected.

Limitation is not a restriction of connectivity, but the operative condition under which integrable relations of meaning can be distinguished from non-integrable ones and orientation can arise at all.

From this perspective, world does not appear as a pregiven totality, but as the result of an ongoing process of understanding. It arises through the interplay of experience-based meaning formation and conceptual order. World-projection and self-projection are reciprocally related and together constitute the framework of understanding.

If reality is a limiting concept, this framework remains anchored within constituted reality.

World- and self-projections are operative orders of meaning that form, stabilize, and change within enactment without ever becoming a conclusive totality.

Truth manifests itself as the validation of meaning within a horizon. It is neither absolute nor arbitrary, but bound to experience, coherence, and viability. Truth therefore remains processual and open to revision without relinquishing its claim to provide orientation.

That is:

Truth belongs to constituted reality as an operative order of meaning and remains, in its validity, bound to experiential resonance, conceptual coherence, and practical validation; reality, as a transcendental limiting horizon, prevents horizon-bound truth from misconstruing itself as a conclusive apprehension of what is meant by reality.

Understanding thus proves, in its entirety, to be a world-projecting process. It opens horizons within which world and self acquire Gestalt. Experience remains the sustaining ground from which horizons emerge and to which every conceptual order remains related.

Understanding operates entirely within constituted reality as an order of meaning, while reality remains the limiting marker that structurally secures the non-closure, revisability, and openness of this projection of world and self.

11. Reconnecting the Reality–Constituted Reality Distinction

Synthesis of the Argument and Systematic Positioning of the Present Mosaic Stone

The preceding analyses have shown that the formation of constituted reality can be reduced neither to immediate experience nor to conceptual order alone. Rather, constituted reality arises through the interplay of bodily-affective experience, symbolic stabilization, and relational mediation. Within this structure, what appears as the self likewise takes shape: as the enactment of experience, as symbolically stabilized self-interpretation, and as a relational Gestalt within the nexus of world and social relations.

The aim of the following chapter is to bring these interrelations together systematically within the horizon of the distinction between reality and constituted reality and to trace them back to their common ground.

11.1 Experience as the Locus of the Constitution of Constituted Reality

(A Summative Determination of the Concept of Experience)

Throughout the analysis, experience has emerged as the primary locus of the formation of constituted reality. It is neither passive registration nor an already constituted inner perspective, but an operative, bodily-affective enactment within which world first appears as meaningfully articulated.

Experience is not one domain alongside others, but the nexus within which something can emerge as given, significant, and real. Within experience, world is not received but disclosed. This disclosure is not the act of a presupposed subject, but an occurrence in which determinacy emerges from prestructural openness.

The distinction between subject and object is not presupposed by this structure. It arises only within the experiential process itself as a derivative differentiation. Experience precedes this distinction. It is the enactment within which perspective, relevance, and order take shape without already being fixed as separate poles.

Constituted reality therefore does not appear as a pregiven inventory, but as the result of operative meaning formation. This meaning formation takes place through bodily-affective processes in which relevances are marked, differences weighted, and nexuses stabilized. Emotions function as structuring moments through which the experiential field becomes articulated and orientation becomes possible.

The intellect, by contrast, does not appear as the origin of meaning, but as a derivative instance that symbolically fixes and stabilizes nexuses formed within enactment.

Experience, in this sense, is neither subjective nor objective. It is the field within which such a distinction first becomes possible. What appears as inside or outside, as I or world, is not presupposed but is the result of differentiations immanent to experience.

At the same time, experience is not a closed domain. It unfolds as an open, self-referential process in which relation to world and self-enactment are inseparably interwoven. The orders arising within it are neither arbitrary nor final. They are bound to bodily, affective, and situational conditions while remaining open to revision.

Experience is therefore the locus of the constitution of constituted reality because, within it, bodily-affective and relational operations generate nexuses of meaning from prestructural openness that appear as constituted reality without ever being exhausted in a conclusive determination.

11.2 Reality as a Transcendental Limiting Concept
(Limit, Corrective, and Non-Totalizability)

If constituted reality is understood as the result of meaning formation immanent to experience, the question necessarily arises as to that to which these formations of meaning remain related without being exhausted by it. This relation cannot itself be fully realized within constituted reality. It points toward what will here be designated as reality.

Reality is neither one object among others nor a domain alongside experience. Nor is it to be understood as a hidden layer behind appearance. Rather, reality designates the limiting relation inherent in every formation of constituted reality. It is that to which experience necessarily remains related without this relation ever being exhausted in a conclusive determination or incorporated into a closed order.

The concept of reality thereby acquires a transcendental meaning. It designates no additional entity, but the limit at which determination necessarily points beyond itself.

Reality is not a content of experience, but the condition of its limitedness.

This limiting function becomes apparent in the structure of every experience-based order. What appears as constituted reality is perspectivally, situationally, and selectively determined. Every determination brings something into prominence while leaving something else undetermined. Within this structure, constituted reality points beyond itself without this reference ever coming to rest in a conclusive order.

At the same time, reality becomes effective within the experiential process. It does not manifest itself as positive content, but in the form of resistance, irritation, and the need for correction. Wherever expectations fail, interpretations lose their viability, or actions produce unexpected consequences, the limit of experience-immanent order becomes apparent. Reality appears here not as an object, but as a **limit of availability**.

This limit is not merely negative. It also functions as a corrective. Precisely because orders of constituted reality are not closed in upon themselves, they remain open to revision, transformation, and reorientation. The possibility of correction is not a subsequent addition but is inherent in the very structure of limitation.

Reality is therefore neither to be conceived independently of experience nor identified with it. It is not an outside in the sense of a separate domain, but the **excess of the real over every mode of its appearance**. Constituted reality appears only within the nexus of experience without being exhausted by it.

It follows that reality is in principle non-totalizable. Every order of constituted reality remains provisional, every stabilization revisable, and every determination open to further

determination. This non-closure is not a limitation in the sense of a deficiency, but a condition of the possibility of experience itself.

The distinction between constituted reality and reality can thus be stated precisely:

Constituted reality designates the provisionally stabilized orders of meaning formed within the experiential process. Reality designates the limiting relation of these orders—that to which they remain related without ever being able to transform it into a conclusive determination.

11.3 Understanding as an Operative Process of the Formation of Constituted Reality

(Synthesis of Experience, Emotion, Intellect, and Horizon Formation)

Understanding is to be conceived neither as a representation of a pregiven world nor as a subsequent reflection upon something already given. It designates the operative nexus within which constituted reality forms, stabilizes, and transforms itself in the enactment of experience. Understanding is not an additional act alongside experience, but the manner in which meaning formation immanent to experience organizes itself.

The point of departure of this process is experience. Within it, Gestalten, relevances, and units of orientation arise in the mode of bodily-affective enactment. Constituted reality appears here as a provisional order that is not posited but brought forth within enactment. Emotions structure this order by marking relevance, directing attention, and giving direction to the experiential process.

The intellect takes up these prereflective orders and transforms them into symbolic stabilizations. It fixes, abstracts, and orders what has emerged within the enactment of experience without being able to detach itself from that enactment. Understanding thus takes place as a mediating movement between analog experience and digital stabilization.

This mediation is inseparably connected with horizon formation. Understanding takes place within a nexus of expectations, pre-understandings, and possibilities that determine what can appear and how it acquires meaning. Horizons form and shift within the enactment of understanding itself.

Understanding is therefore essentially relational. It takes place within the nexus of world, embodiment, language, and social embeddedness. Constituted reality does not arise in isolation, but within mediated relations.

Across all these dimensions, understanding remains related to reality. This relation takes the form of an **orientation toward a limit**. Reality becomes effective where formations of meaning encounter their limits, stabilizations become questionable, and reorientation begins.

Understanding is therefore an open process. It stabilizes meaning without bringing it to closure, generates order without totalizing it, and remains oriented toward revision because it is related to a reality that cannot be incorporated into a conclusive determination.

11.4 Conclusion

(Experience as the Presentation of Constituted Reality under the Limitation of Reality)

The preceding considerations have shown that constituted reality can be understood neither as immediately given nor as the mere result of conceptual positing. Rather, it takes shape within the enactment of experience, in which relevances are marked, Gestalten formed, nexuses stabilized, and horizons opened. Experience thereby proves to be the nexus within which world can appear as meaningfully articulated in the first place.

This formation of constituted reality does not take place independently of embodiment, emotion, and intellect. Bodily-affective involvement structures the experiential field, while the intellect symbolically fixes and stabilizes the orders that have arisen within enactment. Understanding designates the operative mediation of these dimensions.

At the same time, this order remains related to reality without ever being able to incorporate reality into a conclusive determination. Reality is the limiting relation toward which formations of constituted reality orient themselves, against which they prove themselves, by which they are irritated, and in relation to which they are corrected.

Experience is therefore not a representation of reality, but a presentation of constituted reality under the conditions of finite, perspectival, and revision-open meaning formation.

Within experience, constituted reality appears as a provisional order of meaning. Reality designates the limiting relation of this order: not as an object at its disposal, but as that toward which it orients itself, against which it proves itself, by which it is irritated, and in relation to which it is corrected. **Understanding is the enactment of this mediation.**

Mosaic Piece: Understanding



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1. Object, Aim, and Method of the Study

(Understanding within the Horizon of the Constitution of Constituted Reality and the Limit of Reality)

1.1 Understanding as a Dual-Mode Process of the Formation of Constituted Reality

(Understanding between Experience-Based Meaning Formation and Symbolic Stabilization)

The object of this study is understanding as a fundamental enactment of the human relation to constituted reality. Understanding is not conceived as an isolated achievement of the intellect, but as a structurally two-stage process in which two distinct modes of the constitution of meaning and constituted reality are related to one another: the mode of experience-based meaning formation and the mode of symbolic stabilization through thought.

These two modes are not to be understood as two ontologically separate worlds. Rather, they designate two different ways in which constituted reality emerges for human beings, becomes articulated, stabilized, and reflected upon.

The first mode is that of **experience**. Within it, meaning is formed bodily, affectively, situationally, and prereflectively.

The second mode is that of **thought or the intellect**. Within it, meaning that is already operative is transformed into discrete, relational, and symbolically available forms.

From this perspective, experience is not to be understood as a representation of an objectively given reality. It is the primary occurrence within which constituted reality is first brought forth as a meaningful order. This order is neither constructed with complete freedom nor grounded in objective representations. It arises relationally through the interplay of bodily resonance, emotional structuring, and situational condensation.

Thought, by contrast, is not the origin of meaning, but a derivative form of its stabilization, abstraction, explication, and communicative fixation. The intellect renders meaning distinguishable, comparable, and systematically connectable. It transforms the continuity of lived experience into discrete units, concepts, relations, and models.

Understanding is identical neither with experience nor with thought. It is the operative process of mediation between these two modes. Within understanding, experience-based meaning is taken up, symbolically ordered, conceptually stabilized, and at the same time related back to experience. Understanding is therefore neither a purely internal act nor merely a capacity of the individual, but a relational process within which constituted reality, self-relation, and relation to world emerge together.

Reality does not appear in this context as an immediately available object. It is not simply what is already there and must subsequently be represented correctly. Rather, reality functions as a **limiting relation or limiting horizon** against which experience- and thought-based orders of constituted reality can prove themselves, become subject to irritation, and be corrected. It is precisely this that makes intelligible why understanding necessarily remains open, selective, and revisable.

Reality is understood here as a transcendental limiting concept.

The study thereby opposes three reductions.

First, it rejects representational models that understand experience as a mirroring of a completed world.
Second, it rejects intellect-centered models that derive meaning exclusively from conceptual order.
Third, it rejects positions that dissolve experience entirely into symbolization.

In their place, the study advances the thesis that understanding can be adequately reconstructed only if it is conceived as the mediation of two irreducible yet mutually related modes of the formation of constituted reality.

1.2 Aim of the Study: Reconstructing the Structure of Understanding

(Clarifying Experience, Thought, and Understanding within the Horizon of the Reality–Constituted Reality Distinction)

The aim of the study is to reconstruct understanding systematically within the horizon of the distinction between constituted reality and reality. It does not begin from an isolated theory of the intellect, but from the insight that the human relation to constituted reality occurs in at least two distinct yet interwoven modes: experience-based meaning formation and symbolic stabilization through thought.

First, experience-based meaning formation is to be precisely determined as the primary mode of the constitution of constituted reality. Experience is understood as an analog, bodily-affective, and self-referential process in which meaning is not represented but brought forth within enactment. In this mode, understanding has not yet been conceptually elaborated, but is already operative as implicit coherence, orientation, and the formation of relevance.

Second, the symbolic ordering form of thought is to be developed. Thought is not understood as a continuation of experience by other means, but as a transformation of meaning that has emerged through experience into discrete, relational, and conceptually explicit forms. Concepts, systems, and models thereby appear as necessary but secondary stabilizations of constituted reality.

Third, the study aims to reconstruct understanding itself as a distinct process of mediation between experience and thought. Understanding does not consist in abolishing the difference between the two modes, but in their productive interrelation. It mediates between analog meaning formation and digital stabilization without reducing either mode to the other. **This constitutes the central systematic point of the investigation.**

The overarching aim is to develop a theoretical framework within which meaning, the I, constituted reality, and truth do not appear as presupposed givens, but as the results of open, relational, and revisable processes. Within this framework, constituted reality is not merely the counterpart of a knowing instance, but the order of the relation to world formed and stabilized within the enactment of experience and thought. Reality remains the limiting horizon that constrains and irritates this order and prevents its total closure. Understanding is conceived as an operative, relational process within a transcendental limiting relation to reality.

The study therefore does not pursue a theory of ultimate justification. Rather, it seeks to show that understanding necessarily remains selective, perspectival, and corrigible without thereby collapsing into arbitrariness. It is precisely this structure of openness, provisionality, and nevertheless viable relation to constituted reality that forms the object of the investigation.

1.3 Method of the Study: A Phenomenological-Reconstructive Analysis of Understanding

(Describing the Operative Constitution of Meaning between Experience and Thought)

Methodologically, the study follows a phenomenological-reconstructive approach. It is neither empirical-experimental nor purely speculative. Its concern is neither the measurement of external data nor the mere construction of abstract systems, but the reconstruction of those fundamental structures through which experience, thought, and understanding manifest themselves in enactment.

The point of departure is the description of experience-near enactments. The question is how relevances, Gestalten, tensions, orientations, and nexuses of meaning emerge within lived experience. Such descriptions serve not merely as illustrations, but as explications of those structures that precede every subsequent conceptual stabilization. In doing so, the first-person perspective of lived experience is taken seriously without being absolutized.

This approach is supplemented by process-philosophical considerations. These make visible that experience and understanding must not be conceived as static states, but as temporal, dynamic, and event-like processes. Meaning does not arise in punctual acts, but through temporal unfolding, condensation, transition, and transformation.

In addition, systems-theoretical perspectives on self-reference, stabilization, and relational order are employed. They help clarify how relatively stable structures can emerge from open processes without ever assuming the character of final totalities. In this way, it becomes intelligible that thought, with its concepts, models, and systems, is indispensable for the ordering of constituted reality while itself remaining dependent upon antecedent experiential processes.

Reductionist models are deliberately avoided. Experience is neither reduced to neuronal processes nor is understanding dissolved entirely into logical or conceptual operations. Nor is it claimed that constituted reality can be completely apprehended within the enactment of experience. Rather, the study maintains that the formation of constituted reality becomes intelligible only through the interplay of experience-based meaning formation and symbolic stabilization, and that reality, as a limiting relation, resists every totalization of these processes.

The method of the study is therefore directed not toward closure, but toward structural clarification. It asks about the conditions, forms, and limits of understanding. It does not reconstruct a completed system, but an open nexus of processes within which constituted reality is only ever provisionally stabilized.

2. Understanding Begins with Experience

(On the Primacy of Implicit Meaning Formation over Explicit Interpretation)

2.1 The Presumed Relation between Understanding and Experience

(Why Understanding Cannot Be Conceived without Experience)

If understanding is not to be reduced to conceptual operations of the intellect, the question necessarily arises as to its relation to experience. The guiding hypothesis of this investigation is that understanding does not begin only where concepts are formed, judgments made, or relations explicitly reflected upon. Rather, understanding is assumed to be operative already at a prior level: in the manner in which experience itself gives rise to meaning, relevance, and orientation.

This hypothesis follows from a fundamental insight into the structure of the human relation to the world. Human beings do not encounter situations as neutral registrars who first receive raw data and only subsequently assign meaning to them. Rather, world appears meaningful from the outset: something imposes itself, something appears familiar or unfamiliar, threatening, important, indifferent, or relieving. Within this immediate meaningfulness, a form of understanding is already operative.

Understanding is therefore not to be conceived exclusively as a subsequent interpretation of something previously not understood. Rather, it is already operative within the experiential process itself. Experience is not merely the material of understanding, but its primary mode of enactment. Within experience, differences are not merely registered but weighted; impressions are not merely received but structured; situations are not merely lived through but apprehended in their significance.

It follows that conceptual understanding cannot be the origin of all meaning formation. If thought is to explicate, order, and stabilize anything at all, there must already be a nexus of meaning to which it can relate. This nexus is not to be found within thought itself, but within experience.

Experience is therefore not a derivative phenomenon of understanding, but its condition of possibility.

The guiding thesis of this chapter is accordingly:

Understanding does not begin with the concept, but already within experience.

Experience is the primary enactment of implicit understanding; conceptual understanding is the secondary explication and stabilization of meaning that is already operative.

2.2 Experience as the Primary Mode of Implicit Understanding

(Meaning Formation Prior to Concept and Judgment)

Experience is not merely the reception of data subsequently processed by thought. It is itself already an enactment of meaning formation. Within experience, relevances are formed,

Gestalten brought into prominence, differences weighted, and nexuses constituted. In this sense, experience can be understood as the primary mode of implicit understanding.

“Implicit” here does not mean unclear or deficient, but **preconceptual**. The understanding that takes place within experience has not yet been translated into concepts, fixed in judgments, or systematically explicated. Nevertheless, it is operative. Without this implicit understanding, no explicit understanding could begin, since it would lack any point of reference.

Experience thus occupies an intermediate domain. It is neither mere sensation nor already conceptual thought. It is a form of the enactment of meaning in which significance emerges without yet being conceptually determined. Precisely therein lies its systematic importance for a theory of understanding.

Understanding is therefore not first a product of reflection. It is already operative within the enactment of experience. Thought enters into relation with this implicit understanding by explicating, stabilizing, and transforming it into a symbolically manageable form. Yet thought does not generate this meaning from within itself.

Only against this background does it become meaningful to determine the structure of experience itself more precisely.

2.3 Experience as a Non-Representational Access to the World

(Constituted Reality as an Operatively Formed Order within a Limiting Relation to Reality)

If experience is understood as the primary mode of implicit understanding, it cannot be conceived as the mere representation of an independently given reality. Experience is not a mirror of a completed world, but an active enactment within which constituted reality first emerges as a meaningfully structured order.

The point of departure of experience is not an already ordered constituted reality, but a **prestructural openness of lived experience**. Within this openness, there is an excess of impressions, possibilities, and affections in which no stable meanings have yet formed. This situation may be described as chaos—not in the sense of an ontological disorder, but as the absence of consolidated structures of meaning.

Experience is the process through which a provisional order emerges from this openness. This order is neither simply found nor merely imposed retrospectively. It forms within the enactment of lived experience itself. Meaning arises through selection, condensation, and relational structuring.

Experience is therefore fundamentally non-representational. It does not reproduce an external reality, but constitutes constituted reality as an experienceable order of the relation to world. This constituted reality is neither freely invented nor objectively given. It arises through the interplay of bodily resonance, emotional structuring, and situational embeddedness.

Reality, in this context, is not what experience represents. Nor is it an object concealed behind experience. Rather, reality functions as a **limiting relation**: as that against which experience-based orders of constituted reality prove themselves, at which they may fail, and through which they remain corrigible.

Reality is therefore not a content of experience, but its limit.

2.4 Order as the Result of Energetic Meaning Formation

(The Affective and Bodily Constitution of Constituted Reality)

The order that forms within experience does not arise only through conceptual classification. Rather, it is already constituted within the enactment of lived experience itself, as a process of bodily-affective meaning formation.

Experience is not a neutral juxtaposition of isolated impressions, but an occurrence structured by intensities, tensions, and weightings. Some elements come to the fore while others remain in the background; some bind attention while others lose relevance. The experiential field begins to acquire structure already through these differentiations.

In this context, the lived body possesses constitutive significance. It is not merely the bearer of a relation to world, but the medium within which world can appear as near or distant, burdensome or relieving, attractive or repellent. The order of experience therefore cannot be separated from the bodily constitution of lived experience.

Emotions must be understood in close connection with this bodily dimension. They are not subsequent evaluations of an already ordered relation to world, but themselves constitute fundamental structures of meaning formation. By marking relevances, concentrating attention, and assigning weight to particular aspects of the experiential field, they contribute essentially to the internal articulation of experience.

Experience can therefore be described as an **energetic process**—not in a physical sense, but as a dynamic of condensation, tension, and transition. Within this dynamic, constituted reality appears not as an unordered given, but as an articulated nexus.

The order that arises in this way is neither arbitrary nor final. It is not arbitrary because it remains bound to bodily and affective conditions; it is not final because these conditions are themselves mutable. The order of experience must therefore be understood as a processual, situationally bound, and open occurrence of structuration.

Constituted reality is therefore always a provisional order of lived experience.

2.5 Experience as Gestalt Formation and Event

(Temporary Units with a Claim to Constituted Reality)

Experience does not appear as a sequence of isolated impressions, but as a nexus of Gestalten within which perception, emotion, and orientation combine to form meaningful wholes. These Gestalten are not permanently fixed, but arise within the enactment of experience as temporary condensations with a claim to constituted reality: they are ways in which world becomes real within lived experience without being understood as representations of an objective reality.

As modes of appearance of constituted reality, they are simultaneously temporal in structure: they arise, intensify, and subside. Meaning does not result from individual moments, but from

their interrelation. Constituted reality thus appears not as a static structure, but as a temporally formed and open order within which Gestalten can change, dissolve, or pass into others.

2.6 The Provisionality of Experienced Order

(The Revisability of Constituted Reality within Its Limiting Relation to Reality)

The order of experience possesses no claim to absolute validity. It always remains bound to the conditions of its emergence and is therefore fundamentally provisional.

This provisionality is a fundamental structure of the relation to constituted reality. Because reality is not given as a completely available totality, no experience-based order can be final.

Experience therefore remains open to revision. New situations, altered perspectives, or affective shifts can lead to the formation of different nexuses of meaning.

This openness to revision does not, however, entail arbitrariness. Orders of constituted reality must prove themselves. They may remain viable, fail, or be corrected. Reality manifests itself precisely in this possibility of irritation and resistance.

Understanding is therefore not a completed state, but an ongoing process.
Constituted reality remains open because it is not identical with reality.

2.7 Experience as a Self-Referential Process

Relation to World and Self-Enactment within Open Meaning Formation

Experience is not only related to world, but simultaneously to its own enactment. Within it, not only is something experienced; experiencing itself is co-enacted. This self-referentiality is not reflective self-observation, but an implicit structure of lived experience, which always takes place from a particular perspective.

This perspective is not subsequently added to experience, but determines lived experience itself. It is not arbitrary, but shaped by bodily dispositions, emotional patterns, and biographical experiences, while nevertheless remaining open to change.

Experience is therefore a process within which relation to world and self-enactment are inseparably interwoven. It is neither purely objective nor purely subjective, but a relational enactment.

This self-referentiality does not imply closure. Rather, experience remains open to irritation and new formations. Precisely therein its relation to reality becomes apparent: as the limit at which existing orders can be called into question and transformed.

2.8 Experience, Constituted Reality, and Reality

(Explicit Clarification of the Guiding Distinction within the Horizon of Understanding)

The preceding considerations lead to a fundamental conceptual distinction that is decisive for the further analysis of understanding: the distinction between **experience, constituted reality, and reality**.

Experience designates the enactment within which meaning arises. It is the process of meaning formation itself. Constituted reality designates the provisionally stabilized orders formed within this process. It is the manner in which world appears to us.

Reality, finally, is neither experience nor constituted reality. It is neither an object nor an order. It is the limiting concept that marks the non-closure of every formation of constituted reality. Reality manifests itself where orders of constituted reality encounter their limits: in resistance, irritation, and the necessity of correction. It is not available, but effective only indirectly.

The result of this chapter can therefore be summarized as follows:

Understanding is already operative within experience.
Experience is the primary mode of implicit meaning formation.
Constituted reality is the order formed within this process.
Reality is the limiting horizon that keeps every such order open.

3. Understanding Has a Dual Structure (Implicit / Explicit)

(Units of Enactment, Symbolic Stabilization, and the Structure of Explicit Understanding)

3.1 Experiential Units as the Basis of Implicit Understanding

(Enactments of Meaning as Prereflective Structures of Orientation)

If understanding is already operative within experience, the question arises as to the form in which this implicit understanding is structured. Experience does not appear as an undifferentiated stream, but differentiates itself within enactment into coherent nexuses of meaning that may be described as **experiential units**.

These units are not to be understood as discrete objects or sharply delimited elements. Rather, they are temporally extended, bodily-affectively structured enactments within which perception, emotion, and orientation are interwoven.

The unity of experience is grounded not in the identity of an object,
but in the internal coherence of lived experience itself.

These experiential units are of fundamental importance for understanding. Within them, understanding is already operative, though not as explicit knowledge, but as lived coherence of meaning. **A situation is experienced as coherent before it is conceptually analyzed.** Orientation is possible before it can be justified.

Experiential units are therefore not merely the material of a later understanding, but its first realization. Within them, understanding manifests itself as an implicit enactment that already organizes meaning without transforming it into concepts.

3.2 Experiential Units as Units of Activity in Understanding

(Understanding as Bodily-Affective Enactment)

Experiential units are not merely structures of lived experience, but enactments of activity. Experience is not a passive reception of impressions, but an active process of engagement with world.

This activity is bodily grounded. Perceiving, feeling, and orienting oneself are not separate processes, but interwoven modes in which understanding is enacted. The implicit understanding of experience is therefore not theoretical in nature, but practical, situational, and action-related.

In this mode, understanding manifests itself as the capacity to orient oneself within a situation without having conceptually comprehended it in full. One knows how one can act before one can explain why. This form of understanding is not deficient, but fundamental.

Experiential units are therefore **units of activity of understanding**. Within them, world is not merely experienced, but is already understood in a particular way within lived experience. This understanding is bodily, affectively, and situationally bound.

3.3 Thought as the Symbolic Stabilization of Understanding

(Explicit Order, Concept, and Reflection)

If understanding is already operative within experience, the question arises as to the function of thought. Thought is not the origin of understanding, but a derivative form of its stabilization and explication.

Within thought, the implicit understanding of experience is transformed into a symbolic order. What was previously lived as a situational nexus is now conceptually apprehended, differentiated, compared, and placed into relations. Thought transforms the continuity of lived experience into discrete units.

This transformation is necessary because it stabilizes understanding and makes it communicable. Only through conceptual order does it become possible to reflect upon experiences, compare them, and speak about them. Thought thereby expands the scope of understanding.

At the same time, thought remains related to experience. It does not generate original meaning, but draws upon nexuses of meaning that are already operative. Without experience, thought would have no object.

Thought must therefore be understood as the **symbolic stabilization of understanding**. It makes explicit what is implicitly operative within experience.

3.4 Conceptual Units as Forms of Explicit Understanding

(Discreteness, Abstraction, and Relational Order)

Within thought, units arise that differ fundamentally from experiential units. Whereas experiential units are continuous, fluid, and situationally bound, conceptual units are discrete, stable, and abstract.

Conceptual units make it possible to retain meaning independently of the concrete situation. They isolate particular aspects, order them, and place them in relation to other concepts. In this way, a symbolic order arises within which understanding can be systematically organized.

This form of understanding is explicit. It enables justification, criticism, and comparison. It provides the basis for scientific, theoretical, and argumentative processes.

Yet this explication comes at a price. In conceptual fixation, the experiential nexus is not preserved in its original mode of givenness, but transformed into a different form of articulation. What appears within lived experience as a coherent Gestalt is differentiated within the concept into individual aspects.

Conceptual understanding is therefore necessarily selective. It stabilizes meaning, but at the same time reduces it. Precisely for this reason, it cannot replace experience but remains dependent upon it.

3.5 Difference and Interrelation between Experience and Thought in Understanding

(Two Modes of a Unified Process)

Experience and thought are not two separate domains, but two distinct modes in which understanding is enacted.

In the experiential mode, understanding appears as an implicit, bodily-affective enactment. In the mode of thought, it appears as an explicit, symbolically stabilized order. Both modes are irreducible, yet related to one another.

The difference between them is not the difference between ignorance and knowledge, but between two forms of understanding:

- **implicit, situational understanding**
- **explicit, conceptual understanding**

These two forms stand in a relation of reciprocal dependence. Without experience, thought would have no meaningful content. Without thought, experience could not be stabilized, reflected upon, and extended.

Understanding is therefore not located in either mode alone. Rather, it arises through their interrelation. It is the process within which implicit meaning formation and explicit order interweave.

3.6 Provisional Conclusion: The Dual Structure of Understanding

(Implicit Meaning Formation and Explicit Stabilization)

The result of this chapter can be summarized in one fundamental thesis:

Understanding has a dual structure.

It takes place

- **as implicit meaning formation within experience**
- **and as explicit stabilization within thought.**

Both forms are necessary and irreducible to one another. Understanding is neither merely experience nor merely thought. It is the nexus within which both modes are mediated with one another.

Experience provides the foundation of understanding by generating meaning. Thought stabilizes this understanding by conceptually explicating it. Understanding itself is the process that connects the two.

A decisive premise for the further course of the investigation has thereby been established. Understanding can no longer be conceived as an isolated achievement of the intellect. It must be understood as a complex, dual-mode process within which meaning formation and symbolic order reciprocally condition one another.

4. Understanding as a Relational Process

(Meaning Formation as a Nexus of Relations between Experience and Thought)

4.1 Understanding as a Relational Event

Why Understanding Does Not Arise in Isolated Units

The preceding considerations have shown that understanding can be located neither exclusively in thought nor exclusively in experience. It is neither a purely conceptual act nor mere lived experience. Rather, understanding arises from the interrelation of both modes.

This raises a further question:

If understanding cannot be reduced to either mode, where does it actually take place?

The answer is:

Understanding takes place not in isolated units, but in relations.

Experiential units taken by themselves do not yet constitute understanding in the explicit sense. Nor do isolated concepts already amount to understanding. Only when relations are established between them—between experiences, between concepts, and especially between experience and concept—does a nexus arise that can be described as understanding.

Understanding is therefore not a punctual event, but a relational process. It consists in the formation, maintenance, and transformation of relations between different moments of meaning.

These relations are not external to meaning. They constitute meaning itself.

Something is understood not by being present in isolation,
but by appearing within a nexus.

4.2 Relations within Experience

(Implicit Connections of Meaning and Relevance)

Already at the level of experience, understanding proves to be relationally structured. Experiential units are not isolated units but stand in manifold relations to one another.

A situation is not experienced as a collection of individual impressions, but as a coherent nexus of meaning. Individual aspects refer to one another, reinforce one another, contradict one another, or alter their significance in relation to others.

These relational structures are implicit. They are not explicitly thematized, but realized within the enactment of experience itself. A sound is experienced as threatening because it stands in relation to other experiences. A situation appears familiar because it connects with previous experience.

Understanding here does not consist in consciously establishing relations, but in their immediate efficacy.

Experience is a relational nexus within which meanings arise through their interconnections.

These implicit relations are dynamic. They change with the situation, with attention, and with emotional attunement. At this level, too, understanding is therefore not a static state but a dynamic nexus of relations.

4.3 Relations within Thought

(Conceptual Relations and Systematic Order)

Within thought, the relational structure of understanding is transformed into another form. Whereas relations within experience are implicit and situational, within thought they become explicit and systematic.

Concepts do not stand by themselves. They acquire their meaning through their relations to other concepts. A concept is intelligible only within the context of a network of distinctions, classifications, and relations.

Thought therefore consists not only in the formation of concepts, but above all in the ordering of relations between them. It structures meaning by making relations explicit:

- similarities and differences
- cause and effect
- part and whole
- means and end

Within this relational order, understanding acquires a new quality. It becomes explicit, justifiable, and examinable. Nexuses can be represented, analyzed, and criticized.

Yet this form of understanding, too, remains relational. An isolated concept is meaningless. Meaning arises only within the nexus of a conceptual network.

4.4 Relations between Experience and Thought

(Translation, Transformation, and Connectivity)

The central form of understanding, however, lies neither solely within experience nor solely within thought, but in the relation between the two.
Here, understanding takes place as a process of translation. Experiences are transformed into concepts, and concepts are related back to experiences.
This translation, however, is not a simple transfer. It is transformative and selective:

- **Not everything that is experienced can be conceptually apprehended.**
- **No concept captures experience in its entirety.**

Nevertheless, this relation is necessary. Without it, experience would remain mute and thought empty.

Understanding therefore consists essentially in establishing **connectivity between experience and concept**. It involves bringing what is lived into a form that can be conceptually apprehended without thereby completely losing its relation to experience.

This relation is characterized by tension. Experience is continuous, multilayered, and situational. Thought is discrete, ordering, and abstracting. Understanding mediates between these different structures.

Its distinctive achievement lies precisely in this mediation.

4.5 Relation as the Locus of Understanding

(Meaning Arises within the Nexus, Not within the Elements)

The preceding considerations yield a fundamental insight:

The proper locus of understanding is neither the individual experience nor the individual concept, but the relation between them.

Meaning does not arise in isolated elements, but within a nexus. An experience becomes intelligible when it stands in relation to other experiences. A concept becomes intelligible when it is embedded within a network of concepts. And understanding in the comprehensive sense arises where experience and concept are brought into relation.

Understanding is therefore not the possession of knowledge, but an **enactment of relations**.

This insight also changes the conception of truth and knowledge. Truth can no longer be understood merely as a property of isolated propositions, but as the validation of nexuses. Knowledge is not the apprehension of isolated facts, but the formation of viable relations.

Understanding is thus essentially relational because meaning itself is relational.

4.6 Provisional Conclusion: Understanding as Relationally Mediated Meaning Formation

(The Nexus of Implicit and Explicit Relations)

The result of this chapter can be summarized in the following thesis:

Understanding is a relational process.

It arises

- **within the implicit relations of experience,**
- **within the explicit relations of thought,**
- **and, above all, within the mediation between the two.**

Understanding cannot be reduced to a single level or form. It is the nexus within which different kinds of relations overlap, complement one another, and undergo transformation.

It thereby becomes clear that understanding cannot be conceived as an isolated capacity or merely as a mental state. It is a process enacted within a nexus of relations.

5. Analog Experience and Digital Stabilization in Understanding

(Two Modes of Meaning Organization as the Fundamental Structure of the Mosaic Stone "Understanding")

5.1 Two Modes of Meaning Organization in Understanding

Why Understanding Mediates between Continuity and Discreteness

The preceding considerations have shown that understanding is reducible neither to experience nor to thought alone, but takes place through their interrelation. The question therefore arises as to how these two modes differ structurally and why their difference is necessary for understanding.

The guiding thesis of this chapter is:

Understanding mediates between two fundamentally different forms of meaning organization:

- **analog, continuous meaning formation within experience**
- **digital, discrete meaning organization within thought**

This difference is neither merely technical nor accidental. It concerns the manner in which meaning itself is formed, structured, and stabilized.

Experience organizes meaning as a fluid nexus. Meanings pass into one another, change gradually, and remain bound to concrete situations. Thought, by contrast, organizes meaning through differentiation. It separates, fixes, and forms discrete units.

Understanding is therefore necessarily a process of mediation between continuity and discreteness. It must transform what is fluid into stable forms without losing it entirely and relate what has been fixed back to the nexus of lived experience.

5.2 The Analog Structure of Experience in Understanding

(Continuity, Transition, and Situational Meaning Formation)

In the experiential mode, meaning appears as continuous. Meanings are not sharply separated from one another, but pass into one another. Perception, emotion, and orientation form a coherent process.

This continuity manifests itself in several dimensions:

- transitions are fluid rather than discrete,
- meanings are graduated rather than unequivocally delimited,
- relevances shift gradually.

A sound may appear slightly threatening or intensely threatening; a situation may be more or less familiar. Such differences are not binary, but gradual.

For understanding, this means:

Experience provides a nexus of meaning that is rich, multilayered, and open. It enables orientation without drawing rigid boundaries.

This implicit understanding is powerful precisely because it is not reduced to fixed units. It can apprehend complex situations without completely decomposing them.

Yet this strength is simultaneously a limitation. The continuity of experience makes it difficult to fix meaning unambiguously, communicate it, and organize it systematically.

5.3 The Digital Structure of Thought in Understanding

(Differentiation, Fixation, and Conceptual Order)

Within thought, meaning is transformed into a different form. The continuous nexuses of experience are differentiated into discrete units.

This digital structure manifests itself in fundamental operations:

- **Differentiation:** something is either A or not-A.
- **Fixation:** meanings are stabilized and determined.
- **Relation:** concepts are systematically related to one another.

Concepts separate what flows into one another within experience. They establish clear boundaries where there were previously fluid transitions.

For understanding, this means:

Thought enables a form of clarity that is not given within experience. It makes it possible to retain, compare, and justify meanings.

Yet this structure, too, has its limit. Discrete order does not merely reduce the richness of experience; it transforms it. Through abstraction, interpretation, and translation, it brings forth a different quality. It not only simplifies but changes the character of what it apprehends, while leaving certain aspects unaccounted for.

Conceptual understanding is more precise, but selective.

5.4 Understanding as Translation between the Analog and the Digital

(Transformation Rather than Representation)

The relation between experience and thought can be understood as a process of translation. Yet this translation is not the simple transfer of a content from one form into another.

Understanding transforms meaning:

- it transforms continuous nexuses into discrete structures,
- it reduces complexity in order to gain stability,
- it creates connectivity at the cost of completeness.

Not everything that is experienced can be conceptually apprehended. And what is conceptually apprehended is never identical with experience itself.

Understanding is therefore not representation, but **transformation**. It generates new structures of meaning that remain related to experience without being identical with it.

At the same time, the movement also proceeds in the opposite direction. Concepts influence experience. They direct attention, structure perception, and alter what can appear as relevant in the first place.

Understanding is thus a reciprocal process of transformation between analog and digital forms of meaning organization.

5.5 The Productive Tension within Understanding

(Why Understanding Can Be Neither Entirely Analog nor Entirely Digital)

The difference between analog experience and digital thought cannot be dissolved. It does not represent a provisional incompleteness, but a structural condition of understanding.

If understanding were purely analog, it would lack stability. Meaning might be rich, but it could not be unambiguously fixed or communicated.

If understanding were purely digital, it would lack connection to experience. It might be formally clear, but would remain empty of content or detached from lived experience.

Thought may be digital in large part; **understanding is not**. Understanding depends upon a relation to experience that precedes every conceptual fixation and at the same time exceeds it. Understanding therefore depends upon the tension between both modes.

This tension is not a problem to be solved, but a condition to be made productive.

Within this tension arise:

- the possibility of **orientation through experience**
- and the possibility of **clarity through thought**.

Understanding is the process that holds both together.

When the relation to experience is mediated through logic and conceptually fixed, understanding is transformed: it gains clarity and determinacy, but loses the open, situationally bound character of experience.

The nexus is no longer lived, but constructed as a relation within a system.

Logical fixation does not replace the relation to experience;
rather, it domesticates it: it renders it manageable, but also poorer.

5.6 Provisional Conclusion: The Dual Structure of Meaning Organization in Understanding

(Analog Experience and Digital Stabilization as an Irreducible Difference)

The result of this chapter can be summarized in one central thesis:

Understanding rests upon the mediation of two distinct forms of meaning organization:

- **analog, continuous meaning formation within experience**
- **digital, discrete stabilization within thought.**

These two forms cannot be reduced to one another, yet they depend upon one another. Understanding is the process that mediates between them.

It thereby becomes clear that understanding cannot be conceived as a unitary act. It is a complex process that integrates different structures.

6. The I in the Enactment of Understanding

(Self-Enactment, Self-Reference, and the Unity of the Process of Understanding)

6.1 The I as the Enactment of Implicit Understanding

(The Self as the Lived Perspective of Experience)

If understanding is already operative within experience, the question arises as to how the I participates in this process. The I cannot simply be presupposed as a fully constituted instance that has experiences and subsequently understands them. Rather, it must be clarified whether and how the I itself emerges within the enactment of understanding.

In the experiential mode, the I does not appear as a clearly determinable object among other objects. It does not confront lived experience, but is embedded within the enactment of experience itself as an implicit perspectival structure. Everything that is experienced necessarily appears from a particular perspective; yet this perspective is not given as an independent component of experience, but constitutes itself within the enactment of lived experience.

The I is therefore not an object of experience, but a structural condition of experience. It functions as a pole from which experience is organized without itself becoming thematic.

In this sense, the I is not something that is experienced, but that through which something can appear as experienced in the first place.

This implicit self-givenness of experience can be understood as the prereflective dimension of lived experience. Only in the act of reflection does the I become an explicit object to which properties can then be attributed. This objectification, however, is secondary: it presupposes an original enactment in which the I is operative not as an object but as a perspective.

The determination of the I thereby shifts fundamentally. It is not to be understood as an entity within the world, but as a structure of enactment that first makes any relation to world possible. The I is not one being among beings, but the condition of the possibility of appearance as such.

For understanding, this means:

The I is initially not that which understands,
but the manner in which understanding takes place.

6.2 The I as the Unity of Explicit Understanding

(The Self as Conceptual and Symbolic Stabilization)

Within thought, the form in which the I appears changes.

What is operative in the experiential mode as an implicit perspective now becomes an object of reflection.

The I is conceptually apprehended, named, and integrated into a symbolic order. It appears as a unit that possesses properties, remembers, plans, and describes itself.

This form of the I is not immediately given, but the result of a process of stabilization.

For understanding, this means:

Within thought, the I becomes a point of reference that organizes understanding. It makes it possible to attribute experiences, justify actions, and understand oneself as identical through time.

Yet this form of the I is not identical with the implicit I of experience. It is a construction based upon experience that simultaneously structures and simplifies it.

The explicit I is therefore not the origin of understanding, but a product of its symbolic order.

6.3 Self-Reference as a Structure of Understanding

(How Understanding Relates to Itself)

Understanding is related not only to world, but also to itself. Every act of understanding implicitly contains a relation to the fact that understanding is taking place. This self-reference is not an additional act of reflection, but a fundamental structure of understanding: whoever understands also knows, in a certain sense, that they understand—even when this knowledge is not explicitly thematized.

A simple mathematical relation provides an instructive example. If someone recognizes that **2 + 3 = 5**, this understanding takes place immediately. No additional verification is required; rather, it manifests itself in the fact that the correctness of the proposition is grasped and that one can operate with it. Implicit in this insight is the fact that understanding has occurred. Whoever grasps that 2 + 3 = 5 simultaneously knows—without having to reflect upon it separately—that they understand it.

The example suggests that understanding should be conceived as a structure that is not only directed toward an object but simultaneously possesses a prereflective self-relation. This self-relation is not additive but constitutive: it belongs to the enactment of understanding itself and makes understanding determinable as understanding. Without this immanent self-reference, neither the evidence of mathematical insight nor its immediate connectivity could be adequately explained.

In the experiential mode, this self-reference manifests itself as implicit perspectivality; in the mode of thought, as explicit self-reflection. In both cases, however, it is part of understanding itself.

The I is the locus of this self-reference. It does not stand over against understanding, but designates the structure within which understanding can relate to itself. It thereby becomes clear that the I is not merely an object of understanding, but a condition of its possibility.

6.4 The I in Relation to Others

Understanding as a Social and Shared Process

Understanding is not only an individual process. It always also takes place in relation to others. Language, communication, and social interaction are fundamental conditions under which understanding can unfold.

The I is therefore not isolated. It emerges and stabilizes itself in interaction with others. Concepts, meanings, and interpretations are not individually invented, but form part of shared symbolic orders.

For understanding, this means:

The I is always already embedded within a network of relations. Understanding is therefore not merely an internal process, but a socially mediated nexus.

Others are not merely objects of understanding, but co-participants in the formation of meaning. They contribute to stabilizing, correcting, and further developing meanings.

The I is therefore not merely a point at which understanding occurs, but a node within a relational configuration of processes of understanding.

6.5 Self-Understanding as the Mediation of Experience and Thought

(The I as the Locus of Integration of Both Modes)

The I is the locus at which the two modes of understanding—experience and thought—are brought into relation with one another.

In the experiential mode, the I is operative as an implicit perspective. In the mode of thought, it is thematized as an explicit unit. Self-understanding arises where these two forms are mediated with one another.

Self-understanding means:

- interpreting one's own experience,
- understanding one's own actions,
- conceptually apprehending one's own identity.

Yet self-understanding always remains incomplete. Conceptual determination can never fully capture the richness of experience. At the same time, experience remains indeterminate without conceptual order.

The I is therefore not a stable core, but a process.
It emerges within the enactment of understanding and changes with it.

6.6 Provisional Conclusion: The I as a Node of Understanding

(Unity without Closure)

The result of this chapter can be summarized in one central insight:

The I is not a presupposed instance,
but a node within the process of understanding.

It is

- **an implicit perspective in the experiential mode,**

- **an explicit unit in the mode of thought,**
- **and, within understanding, the mediation of both.**

The I is therefore neither completely given nor completely constructed. It emerges within the enactment of understanding and remains fundamentally open and mutable.

This openness is a consequence of the structure of understanding itself. Because understanding is a process, the I, too, remains processual.

7. Emotions in the Enactment of Understanding

(The Affective Structuring of Meaning and Relevance within the Process of Understanding)

7.1 Emotions as an Implicit Structure of Understanding

(Why Understanding Is Impossible without Relevance)

If understanding cannot be conceived as a purely conceptual act, the question arises as to what determines what is understood in the first place. Understanding is not a neutral access to world, but a selectively structured process. Not everything that is given is taken into account to the same degree. This selectivity points to a fundamental structure:

Understanding is always already determined by relevance.

In this context, emotions are not to be understood merely as experience-bound feeling states, but as forms of **affective relevance formation**. Emotions structure the experiential field by bringing into prominence what is significant and allowing what appears irrelevant to recede into the background. They therefore function not primarily as contents of understanding, but as conditions of its orientation.

As such, emotions belong to the experiential mode. They operate prereflectively and determine what enters the horizon of understanding in the first place. The mode of thought takes up what has already been affectively structured and transforms it into an explicit, conceptual form. Understanding thus takes place through the interplay of both modes: it depends upon an antecedent affective structure without being reducible to it.

This nexus can be specified more precisely by introducing the concept of **units of activity**. Units of activity are elementary enactments of understanding within which a particular aspect of world is disclosed, differentiated, or placed into relation.

Understanding does not take place as a single, unitary act, but as a dynamic sequence of such units, which build upon and reciprocally modify one another.

At the micro-level, units of activity concern concrete operations close to perception, such as apprehending an expression, distinguishing meanings, or establishing a connection. The understanding of a mathematical expression such as **2 + 3 = 5**, for example, can be differentiated into several units of activity: apprehending the symbols, following the operation, and grasping the correctness of the result.

At the macro-level, units of activity form more comprehensive nexuses of understanding, such as grasping an argument, interpreting a text, or orienting oneself within a situation. Here, individual units do not appear in isolation but as parts of a coherent course held together by thematic continuity and directedness toward a goal.

The micro- and macro-levels do not designate separate domains, but two analytical perspectives upon the same process of understanding: the level of its elementary enactments and the level of their overarching organization.

Emotions operate on both levels. At the micro-level, they guide the selection and weighting of individual units of activity: they determine which distinctions are drawn and which aspects are

pursued further. At the macro-level, they structure the overall course of understanding by establishing thematic emphases and stabilizing particular directions.

Affective relevance thus functions as an ordering principle of the process of understanding.

It determines which units of activity are initiated, continued, or discontinued. Units of activity therefore remain under an implicit affective guidance that determines not only their dynamics but the organization of understanding as a whole.

Emotions belong to the conditions of the possibility of understanding.

They determine what understanding is directed toward before understanding becomes explicit.

Understanding must therefore be conceived from the outset as an affectively structured process that unfolds through a sequence of units of activity and is organized through their interplay at both the micro- and macro-levels.

7.2 Emotions as a Differentiating Achievement within Understanding

(How Significance Is Brought into Prominence and Weighted)

Emotions do not operate only selectively, but also differentiatingly. They structure the experiential field by bringing differences into prominence and assigning weight to them.

A situation does not simply appear as given, but as:

- **threatening or harmless,**
- **relevant or unimportant,**
- **familiar or unfamiliar.**

These differentiations are not the result of subsequent reflection. They are already operative within the enactment of experience.

For understanding, this means:

Before something is conceptually differentiated, it has already been affectively differentiated. Emotions provide a prestructuring upon which thought builds.

Without this differentiating achievement, the experiential field would remain indeterminate. Understanding would have no point of departure.

Emotions are therefore a fundamental form of implicit understanding.

7.3 Emotions and the Formation of Nexuses of Meaning

(Affective Coherence as a Basis of Understanding)

Understanding does not consist merely in recognizing individual aspects, but in apprehending nexuses. A situation is experienced as meaningful when its elements fit together in a particular way.

Emotions contribute essentially to this formation of coherence. They connect different aspects of the experiential field into a meaningful nexus. A situation may be experienced as coherent, contradictory, tense, or harmonious. These qualities are not purely conceptual but affectively mediated.

This relation can be further specified with reference to the distinction between the micro- and macro-levels of understanding. At the micro-level, emotions contribute to connecting individual units of activity by establishing lines of connectivity between impressions, distinctions, and emerging meanings. At the macro-level, they enable overarching nexuses of meaning to emerge from sequences of such units of activity. Emotions thus structure not only the selection of individual enactments but also their integration into coherent Gestalten of understanding.

For understanding, this means:

Emotions contribute to the emergence of coherent meaning from individual impressions. They are not only selective and differentiating, but also integrative.

Understanding is therefore not only a process of differentiation but also one of integration—and emotions play a central role in both movements.

7.4 Emotions in Relation to Thought

(The Transformation of Affective Relevance into Conceptual Order)

Within thought, the form in which emotions operate changes. The affective structures of experience are not abolished but transformed into another form.

Thought can name emotions, reflect upon them, and place them within conceptual nexuses. It can, for example, distinguish between fear, uncertainty, joy, and expectation. In this way, affective structure is made explicit.

Yet this explication changes the original nexus. What appears within lived experience as immediate involvement becomes an object of reflection within thought.

For understanding, this means:

Thought makes the affective foundations of understanding explicit, but does not replace them. It transforms emotions into a form accessible to reflection.

At the same time, emotions remain operative.

Conceptual understanding, too, is not free of affective influences. They continue to shape which concepts are selected, which relations are emphasized, and which interpretations appear plausible.

Understanding therefore remains affectively co-structured even within thought.

7.5 Emotions and the Limiting Relation to Reality

(Irritation, Resistance, and Correction within Understanding)

Emotions play a role not only in the structuring of constituted reality but also in its correction. Understanding is not a closed process but remains dependent upon the possibility of examining, unsettling, and redefining existing nexuses of meaning.

When established nexuses of understanding cease to prove viable, this frequently becomes apparent first not at the conceptual level, but in the form of affective irritation.

Experiences of uncertainty, incongruity, tension, or disquiet indicate that the existing order of constituted reality is losing its coherence.

Such irritations are not merely incidental feeling states, but indications that existing structures of understanding are no longer sufficient to apprehend a situation adequately.

In this context, the function of reality as a limiting concept becomes apparent.

Reality does not appear as a fully determinable object but manifests itself indirectly—for example, in resistance, disruption, or the irritation of expectations.

It is not known immediately but experienced through the limits of existing orders of meaning. Emotions are precisely the medium within which these boundary experiences initially become operative. They mark the difference between what is expected and what actually appears, thereby signaling that existing nexuses of understanding are no longer sufficient to organize the given situation meaningfully.

These affective irritations can also be described within the framework of units of activity.

At the micro-level, they interrupt existing enactments by calling familiar possibilities of connection into question and compelling a reassessment of individual aspects.

At the macro-level, they destabilize larger nexuses of meaning by unsettling their coherence and suggesting alternative interpretations.

Here, emotions operate not only selectively or integratively, but **transformatively**: they initiate processes of restructuring within which new connections and new orders of understanding can emerge.

For understanding, this means that emotions participate not only in the formation of meaning but equally in its revision. They function as indicators of the limits of existing orders while simultaneously opening a space for their transformation. Through them, it becomes apparent that understanding can fail and, precisely for this reason, must remain open to correction.

Understanding thus proves to be not only a process directed toward coherence, but equally one dependent upon irritation.

In this sense, emotions are not merely accompanying phenomena of disruption, but conditions of its perceptibility and processing. They make it experientially apparent that constituted reality cannot be completely absorbed into existing forms of understanding. Precisely herein lies their limiting relation to reality: emotions indicate where understanding reaches its limits while simultaneously opening the possibility of engaging productively with those limits.

Irritation must therefore be understood as a productive moment in which the openness, corrigibility, and further development of understanding become manifest.

7.6 Provisional Conclusion: Emotions as a Fundamental Structure of Understanding

(Relevance, Differentiation, and the Dynamics of the Process of Understanding)

The result of this chapter can be summarized in one central thesis:

Emotions are a fundamental structure of understanding.

They are

- **the basis of relevance,**
- **the medium of differentiation,**
- **a factor in the formation of coherence,**
- **and a driving force of transformation.**

Understanding is therefore not merely an intellectual process, but an affectively structured one.

This makes clear that understanding is neither neutral nor completely controllable. It is embedded within a dynamic shaped by affective structures.

8. Conceptual Stabilization in Understanding

(Explicit Form of Meaning, Order, and the Limitation of Understanding)

8.1 Concepts as Forms of Explicit Understanding

(Why Understanding Assumes Conceptual Form)

The preceding considerations have shown that understanding does not begin in thought, but in experience as implicit meaning formation. Yet understanding does not remain at this implicit level. It tends toward explication, determination, and communicability.

This movement leads to the formation of concepts.

Concepts are not incidental tools, but necessary forms in which understanding becomes stabilized. What is understood is retained in the concept, rendered distinguishable, and made available.

Within thought, understanding therefore assumes conceptual form. Only through concepts does it become possible

- to speak about something,
- to clarify nexuses,
- and to examine understanding.

Concepts are thus not the origin of understanding, but **understanding that has acquired form**.

8.2 Conceptual Differentiation as a Structural Achievement of Understanding

(Difference, Delimitation, and Determinacy)

Concepts arise through differentiation. Something is determined as this and not that. This difference constitutes the fundamental structure of conceptual understanding.

Whereas experience is continuous, the concept operates through clear delimitations. It separates what passes into one another within lived experience. Determinacy thereby arises.

For understanding, this means:

Conceptual understanding is a process of differentiation.

It clarifies by distinguishing.

This clarification is necessary because it provides orientation. Without distinctions, systematic understanding would be impossible. At the same time, every distinction is a reduction. It brings certain aspects into prominence while leaving others unconsidered.

Conceptual understanding is therefore precise, but selective.

8.3 Concepts as Relational Units in Understanding

(Meaning Arises within a Network of Concepts)

A concept never stands by itself. Its meaning arises from its relations to other concepts.

Concepts form a network of relations:

- oppositions,
- similarities,
- hierarchies,
- functional relations.

Within this network, the systematic order of understanding emerges.

For understanding, this means:

An individual concept does not yet make understanding possible.
Understanding arises only within the nexus of concepts.

Conceptual understanding is therefore essentially relational. It consists in the capacity to establish relations among concepts. This relational structure connects with the insight developed in Chapter 4:

Understanding is a nexus of relations.
Concepts are the stabilized form of these relations.

8.4 Stabilization and Its Limit

(Why Concepts Both Enable and Limit Understanding)

Concepts stabilize understanding by retaining meaning. They make meanings repeatable and transferable.

Yet precisely this stabilization has a limit.

What is fixed in a concept loses the mobility and multidimensionality of experience. The richness of implicit understanding is brought into a determinate form—and thereby simultaneously restricted.

For understanding, this means:

Concepts make clarity possible, but they reduce complexity.

This reduction is unavoidable. Without it, communication would be impossible. Yet reduction must not be mistaken for completeness.

Conceptual understanding therefore always falls short of experience. It is a necessary but limited form of apprehending meaning.

8.5 Concepts and Their Reconnection to Experience

(Understanding as a Movement between Explication and Return)

If conceptual understanding is not to become empty, it must remain connected to experience.

Concepts do not derive their meaning from themselves, but from the nexus from which they emerged. If this nexus is lost, concepts become formal and devoid of content.

Understanding is therefore not merely explication, but also reconnection:

- concepts must remain connected to experience,
- they must prove themselves within lived experience,
- they must remain corrigible.

This reconnection is not a one-time movement, but an ongoing process. Understanding moves back and forth between experience and concept.

It is precisely within this movement that understanding remains alive.

8.6 Concepts and the Limiting Relation to Reality

(Why Conceptual Understanding Cannot Be Brought to Closure)

Concepts can structure constituted reality, but they cannot completely apprehend reality.

Every conceptual order remains provisional. It can be called into question, expanded, or corrected through new experiences.

This openness points toward the limit of understanding. Reality cannot be completely translated into concepts. It manifests itself indirectly; for example, in contradictions, irritations, or the failure of interpretations.

For understanding, this means:

Conceptual systems are necessary, but never final.
Understanding can stabilize itself, but it cannot bring itself to closure.

Understanding therefore remains an open process.

8.7 Provisional Conclusion: Concepts as a Necessary but Limited Form of Understanding

(Stabilization, Order, and Openness)

The result of this chapter can be summarized in one central thesis:

Concepts constitute the form in which understanding becomes explicitly stabilized.

They generate clarity, make communication possible, and establish systematic order. At the same time, this achievement entails a limit, insofar as concepts reduce the richness of experience to determinable and communicable structures.

Understanding is therefore not completed within the concept, but remains dependent upon its reconnection to experience and open to correction. It thus proves to be a process that moves within the tension between implicit meaning formation and conceptual stabilization.

9. The I as a Dual Structure in Understanding

(Implicit Self-Enactment and Explicit Self-Construction as the Unity of Understanding)

9.1 The I as a Problem of Understanding

(Why the I Cannot Be Presupposed)

The preceding course of the investigation has shown that understanding cannot be conceived as the achievement of an already constituted instance. Rather, the question arises whether the I itself first emerges within the enactment of understanding.

The everyday conception assumes that an I exists that has experiences, thinks, and understands. Yet this conception presupposes precisely what first needs to be explained.

If understanding is a process that takes place within experience, thought, and the relations between them, then it is appropriate to conceive the I not as the origin of this process, but as one of its results.

The I thus itself becomes a problem of understanding:

- How does the unity that understands emerge?
- How can understanding relate to itself?
- And how does this unity stabilize itself over time?

These questions lead to the thesis of this chapter:

The I is not a given substance, but a structure that forms within understanding.

9.2 The Implicit I of Experience

The Self as the Lived Perspective of Understanding

Within the experiential mode, the I does not appear as an object. It is neither an object of perception nor of conceptual determination. Instead, it manifests itself as the implicit perspective of all lived experience: everything that is experienced is experienced from a particular perspective, yet this perspective is not subsequently added to experience but coincides with the enactment of lived experience itself. In this sense, the I is neither thematized nor unequivocally delimited nor conceptually fixed, without thereby being inoperative.

For understanding, it follows that within the experiential mode the I is not that toward which understanding is directed, but designates the manner in which understanding takes place. It must be conceived as **self-enactment rather than as an object**. This implicit I proves to be continuous, bodily-affectively embedded, and situationally bound. Its unity lies not in a stable identity, but in the ongoing movement of lived experience itself.

9.3 The Explicit I of Thought

(The Self as a Conceptual Construction in Understanding)

Within thought, the form of the I changes fundamentally. What remained operative within the experiential mode as the implicit perspective of lived experience now emerges as an object. The I is named, described, delimited, and stabilized in conceptual form. It appears as a unit possessing particular properties, as an instance of decision-making, and as something capable of relating to itself.

This explicit I, however, must not be equated with the implicit I of experience, but, like every other concept, must be understood as a construction. It arises within the medium of conceptual order and symbolic stabilization.

For understanding, this means that the I now acquires the function of a point of reference from which processes of understanding are organized. Yet precisely herein lies its derivative character: the explicit I is discrete rather than continuous, stabilized rather than fluid, and explicit rather than implicit.

It therefore does not constitute the origin of understanding, but a form in which understanding describes itself.

9.4 The Tension between the Implicit and Explicit I

(Why the I Cannot Be Exhausted in Either Form)

The implicit and explicit I designate two forms of self-relation that cannot be made fully congruent. The implicit I is immediate, situationally bound, and never completely determinable; the explicit I, by contrast, appears as a stabilized, conceptually articulated, and abstracted form.

From this difference arises a constitutive tension: the explicit I can never fully capture the richness of experience-based self-enactment, while the implicit I resists definitive conceptual fixation.

For understanding, this means that the I cannot be conclusively determined. It eludes every final fixation. Precisely therein lies a structural characteristic of understanding itself.

9.5 The I as Mediation within Understanding

(Integrating Experience and Thought)

The I is not merely differentiated into an implicit and an explicit form, but must essentially be conceived as mediation. It designates the nexus within which experience-bound, implicit understanding and conceptually ordered, explicit understanding reciprocally relate to one another.

Self-understanding accordingly takes place as a process in which experiences are transformed into concepts while concepts are simultaneously related back to experience.

The I must therefore be conceived not as a static core, but as a dynamic process of mediation. It emerges through the continuing interplay between lived experience and interpretation, between continuity and stabilization, and between implicit and explicit forms of understanding.

The I is therefore not something that precedes understanding, but something that forms only within the enactment of understanding.

9.6 The I and the Limiting Relation to Reality

(Why Self-Understanding Is Never Complete)

If understanding is open and capable of revision, this necessarily applies to the I as well. The explicit I can never fully apprehend itself because it remains dependent upon an experiential nexus that can never be completely accommodated within conceptual determination.

Here, once again, the limiting relation to reality becomes apparent:

The I encounters resistance, is interrupted by irritations, and remains dependent upon continuing correction.

Self-understanding must therefore be conceived not as a completed state, but as an ongoing process. The I is not identical with itself in the sense of a fixed substance; rather, it is a mutable structure that repeatedly forms anew within the enactment of understanding.

9.7 Provisional Conclusion: The I as a Processual Dual Structure of Understanding

(Unity without Identity in the Strict Sense)

The result of this chapter can be summarized in one central thesis:

The I is a dual structure within understanding.

It is

- as implicit I, the perspective of experience,
- as explicit I, the construction of thought,
- and, as mediation, the unity of the process of understanding.

The I is therefore

- not given,
- not completely constructible,
- and not conclusively determinable.

It is a process that takes place within understanding.

This makes clear:

The I is not the origin of understanding, but one of its central results.

10. Understanding as a Process of Limitation and Mediation

(The Operative Core of the Mosaic Stone "Understanding")

10.1 Understanding as a Process in Its Own Right

(Why Understanding Cannot Be Reduced to Experience or Thought)

The preceding course of the investigation has shown that understanding is exhausted neither in experience nor in thought. It is identical neither with implicit meaning formation nor with conceptual explication. The question therefore arises whether understanding must be conceived as a process in its own right.

The answer is unequivocal: **yes**.

Understanding is not merely the sum of experience and thought, but the process of their mediation. It relates the two to one another without being exhausted in either mode.

This is central to the conception of the present mosaic stone. Understanding is neither a subordinate nor a derivative function, but a structural achievement in its own right. It is the process within which meaning is brought forth, stabilized, and transformed.

10.2 Understanding as Mediation between the Implicit and the Explicit

(The Transformation of Meaning between Experience and Concept)

Understanding must be conceived as a mediating movement between implicit and explicit enactments of meaning. It takes place between experience-bound, implicit understanding and the conceptually ordered, explicit understanding of thought.

This is not a simple transfer, but a process of transformation: when experience is transformed into concepts, meaning gains explicitness but simultaneously undergoes reduction. Conversely, when concepts are related back to experience, meaning becomes concretized but is thereby also changed.

Understanding thus proves to be a dynamic mediation that continually moves between experience and concept. Within this enactment, meaning arises neither as something purely lived nor as something purely thought, but within the transformation that brings the two into relation.

10.3 Understanding as a Boundary Process

(Relation to Reality as an Irreducible Limit)

Understanding does not take place in isolation, but remains related to something that is never fully disclosed to it. Within the framework of the present study, this relation is designated as **reality**.

Reality is not to be determined as an ordinary object of understanding. It is neither completely knowable nor exhaustively capturable in concepts, but marks an irreducible limit.

This limit becomes apparent in irritations, contradictions, and the failure of interpretations. Understanding repeatedly encounters moments that cannot be completely integrated into existing orders of constituted reality. Precisely therein it becomes apparent that such orders can never be definitively closed.

Understanding must therefore be conceived as a boundary process: it remains related to reality without ever being able to apprehend it completely. This openness is not a deficiency, but a structural condition of the possibility of understanding itself.

10.4 Understanding as the Formation of Nexuses

(Meaning as Relational Enactment)

Understanding does not take place through the mere apprehension of isolated elements, but through the formation of nexuses. An event is understood when it can be situated within a temporal, causal, or meaningful nexus. Such nexuses, however, do not simply precede understanding; they are constituted and, at the same time, constructively brought forth within its enactment.

Understanding must therefore be conceived as a relational process: it establishes connections, relates moments to one another, and integrates them into nexuses of meaning. In this way, structures of orientation emerge, yet they are never definitively closed. They remain open to expansion, transformation, and dissolution.

Understanding thus manifests itself as an ongoing process of nexus formation.

10.5 Understanding as an Open Process

(Provisionality, Revision, and the Development of Meaning)

Understanding is never complete. Every interpretation remains provisional because new experiences arise, new perspectives open up, and existing orders of relations are called into question. From this follows the fundamental revisability of understanding.

This openness is a structural consequence of its enactment. Because reality never becomes completely available to understanding, understanding itself can never attain a final status.

Rather, understanding unfolds through processes of irritation, correction, and expansion. It is an event that continually changes within its own enactment and derives its productivity precisely from this capacity for transformation.

10.6 Understanding as Self-Relation

(Reflexivity and Self-Transformation)

Understanding is directed not only toward world, but also toward itself. Human beings can not only understand something; they can also make their own understanding an object of reflection. They are capable of questioning their interpretations, altering their perspectives, and extending the scope of their understanding.

This reflexivity constitutes a central characteristic of understanding. Understanding is therefore not merely a process of disclosure, but simultaneously a process of self-transformation.

The I is the locus at which this self-relation takes place. Within it, understanding becomes reflexive without ever attaining complete closure. For the self-relation of understanding, too, remains dependent upon new experiences and new interpretations through which it continually corrects and further develops itself.

10.7 Provisional Conclusion: Understanding as an Open Process of Mediation and Limitation

(The Central Concept of the Mosaic Stone "Understanding")

The result of this chapter can be summarized in one central determination:

Understanding is an open process of mediation and limiting relation.

It is

- mediation between experience and thought,
- the formation of nexuses,
- a relation to reality as limit,
- and a self-reflective process.

Understanding is therefore

- not static,
- not completely determinable,
- and not capable of final closure.

It is an ongoing process within which meaning arises, changes, and continually reorganizes itself.

The central concept of the mosaic stone has thereby been determined.

11. Understanding, Horizon, and Truth

(Orientation, Validation, and Openness within the Process of Understanding)

11.1 Understanding as a Horizon-Bound Process

(Why Understanding Is Never Presuppositionless)

Understanding does not take place in a vacuum. It is always already embedded within a nexus that determines what can be understood in the first place.

This nexus may be described as a horizon.

A horizon is not an object, but a condition of the possibility of meaning.

It encompasses

- pre-understandings,
- expectations,
- implicit patterns of interpretation,
- linguistic and cultural structures.

Everything that is understood appears within such a horizon.

For understanding, this means:

Understanding is never presuppositionless, but always takes place within already existing nexuses of meaning and under conditions that determine what can be understood in the first place.

These conditions remain related to a limiting relation: to reality as that which eludes understanding while simultaneously limiting and orienting it.

Three levels are thereby connected:

1. **presuppositions — nexuses of meaning,**
2. **structural conditions of understanding,**
3. **the limiting relation to reality.**

This prestructure is a necessary condition. Without a horizon, there would be neither orientation nor any possibility of apprehending something as meaningful at all.

11.2 The Horizon as a Structure of Implicit Understanding

(Pre-Understanding as a Condition of Meaning Formation)

The horizon is not initially given explicitly, but operates as an implicit structure of experience. Within it, what can appear as relevant, what can count as intelligible, and what can be perceived at all are already prestructured. The horizon thus structures implicit understanding prior to every act of reflection.

At the same time, it must not be conceived as a rigid system, but as a mobile nexus that changes within the enactment of understanding itself.

For understanding, it follows that it is always shaped by a pre-understanding.

This pre-understanding is neither fully available nor entirely controllable, but forms the background against which meaning formation first becomes possible.

This must not be confused with reality, because pre-understanding designates a structure of understanding, whereas reality refers precisely to that which cannot be fully integrated into this structure or exhaustively apprehended conceptually.

11.3 Explicit Horizon Formation in Thought

(Reflection, Critique, and the Expansion of Understanding)

Within thought, the horizon can be partially explicated. Human beings can reflect upon their own presuppositions:

- they can clarify their concepts,
- question their assumptions,
- and broaden their perspectives.

Such reflection alters the horizon.

Understanding is therefore not only conditioned, but also transformable. The horizon is not something fixed and given, but a developing nexus. For understanding, this means:

Understanding is a process within which its own conditions can themselves change.

This capacity for reflection is a central condition of learning, critique, and knowledge.

11.4 Truth within the Horizon of Understanding

(Validation Rather than Final Correspondence)

If understanding is always horizonal while simultaneously taking place within a limiting relation to reality, the question of truth necessarily arises. On the one hand, understanding is always shaped by pre-understandings, perspectives, and existing nexuses of meaning and is therefore never presuppositionless. On the other hand, it remains related to something that cannot be completely absorbed into these horizons. The problem of truth arises precisely from this tension: understanding is neither simply relative nor does it possess immediate access to an objectively given reality.

Under these conditions, truth cannot be understood as complete correspondence with an objectively given and conclusively determinable reality. Such a conception would presuppose that reality were completely accessible to understanding and could be apprehended conceptually in an unequivocal manner. Yet this is contradicted precisely by the insight that understanding always takes place within horizons while simultaneously remaining related to an irreducible limit.

Truth must therefore be determined differently within the horizon of understanding. It manifests itself as **validation**. An interpretation proves true when it remains viable, provides orientation, and proves itself in engagement with experience. Truth thus designates not a final possession, but a mode of successful enactment within understanding.

This validation is not a one-time act, but a process. Truths may become stabilized, yet they remain in principle open to examination, revision, and correction.

For understanding, this means that truth is not to be conceived as a fixed property of propositions or interpretations, but as a function within the process of understanding itself. It marks the manner in which understanding proves itself under the conditions of its horizon-boundedness and its limiting relation to reality.

Truth is therefore not the attainment of final correspondence, but the provisional validation of understanding within the horizon of its possibilities and at the limit of its reach.

11.5 Truth and the Limiting Relation to Reality

(Why Truth Must Remain Open)

Whereas the preceding section determined truth as a function within horizonal understanding, the question now comes to the fore as to why such truth must necessarily remain incomplete. The reason lies in the limiting relation to reality. Understanding takes place within orders of constituted reality, yet it is not exhausted by them because it remains related to something that resists their complete integration. Reality thus marks the limit of every order of understanding.

Truths therefore cannot be final. For if there were no possibility of error, no resistance, and no limit at which interpretations could fail or require correction, the concept of truth itself would lose its meaning. Truth is meaningful only where understanding must prove itself against something that does not arise entirely from its own presuppositions.

Reality therefore functions as an **unavailable criterion of understanding**. It makes truth possible while simultaneously withdrawing it from any final guarantee. Truth must therefore remain provisional: it can prove itself within understanding without ever being conclusively secured.

Openness is consequently a condition for truth to be meaningful at all:

- without the possibility of error, there would be no truth,
- without resistance, no correction,
- without a limit, no orientation.

Reality therefore functions as a criterion without itself becoming completely available.

For understanding, this means:

Truth is always provisional.
It can prove itself, but it cannot be conclusively secured.

11.6 Understanding as Movement within the Horizon

(Transformation of Meaning and Expansion of Perspectives)

Understanding is not to be conceived as a fixed system of meaning, but as an open process of nexus formation and transformation. The horizon is neither merely a background nor a rigid boundary, but the mobile nexus within which relevances, possibilities of interpretation, and perspectives take shape.

Because this nexus is not closed, understanding itself remains fundamentally transformable. New experiences can unsettle and expand the horizon; new concepts can disclose different orders of visibility and articulability; and previous interpretations can lose their claim to validity. Understanding is therefore essentially a process of **horizon transformation**.

This movement, however, is not arbitrary. It remains bound to experience, because only through relation to experience can it become apparent whether interpretations remain viable or encounter their limits. It remains bound to conceptual order, because meaning can be explicated, communicated, and further developed only in stabilized forms. And it remains bound to the limiting relation to reality, because understanding is not exhausted by its own horizons but repeatedly encounters something that resists complete integration into them. Precisely for this reason, understanding remains in motion.

Its dynamics therefore consist neither in mere mutability nor in mere stability, but in the tension between both. Understanding must be stable enough to provide orientation and open enough to respond to irritation, correction, and new perspectives.

In this sense, understanding is to be conceived as **movement within the horizon**: as the ongoing transformation of meaning and expansion of the perspectives under which world, self, and constituted reality can become intelligible.

This movement is therefore not arbitrary. It remains bound to:

- experience,
- conceptual order,
- and the limiting relation to reality.

11.7 Provisional Conclusion: Truth as Validated Understanding within an Open Horizon

(Orientation without Final Certainty)

The result of this chapter can be summarized in one central thesis:

Understanding is horizonal, and truth is a form of its validation.

Truth is

- not absolute correspondence,
- but viable orientation
- within an open and mutable horizon.

Understanding therefore remains

- **conditioned,**
- **open,**
- **and corrigible.**

This makes clear:

Truth is not the completion of understanding, but a moment within its process.

12. Understanding as the Open Mediation of Experience and Thought

(Overall Structure, Unity, and Openness of the Process of Understanding)

12.1 Understanding as an Integrative Overall Process

Bringing Together the Determinations Developed Thus Far

The preceding chapters have developed different aspects of understanding:

- understanding as implicit meaning formation within experience,
- understanding as explicit order within thought,
- understanding as a relational nexus,
- understanding as affectively structured,
- understanding as horizon-bound,
- understanding as a boundary process in relation to reality.

These determinations must not remain juxtaposed. They point toward a common structure.

Understanding is not one subprocess among others, but the nexus within which all these moments are mediated with one another.

It is therefore appropriate to determine understanding as an **integrative overall process**:

- as a process of meaning formation,
- of the ordering of meaning,
- and of the transformation of meaning.

Understanding is the process in which these dimensions converge.

12.2 The Dual Structure of Understanding as a Unified Nexus

(The Implicit and Explicit Dimensions as a Unity)

One of the central insights of this study is that understanding has a dual structure: it takes place implicitly within experience and explicitly within thought. These two dimensions, however, must not be conceived as separate domains. Rather, they form a unity because neither of them can produce understanding on its own.

Experience is never merely raw givenness, but is already meaningfully structured; thought, in turn, can begin only from what has in some way already been prefigured within experience. Implicit understanding thus discloses a prereflective nexus of meaning, whereas explicit understanding transforms this nexus into conceptual forms, renders it distinguishable, stabilizes it, and makes it accessible to communication.

Yet precisely here it becomes apparent that their unity must not be confused with the abolition of their difference. Implicit understanding remains bound to the openness, situationality, and ambiguity of experience. Explicit understanding, by contrast, depends upon conceptual articulation and therefore necessarily introduces moments of selection, ordering, and reduction.

Concepts make meaning retainable, but never exhaust it. Conversely, experience remains meaning-bearing without being fully translatable into conceptual determinations.

Understanding is therefore identical with neither the implicit nor the explicit pole. Nor does it consist in merging the two into an undifferentiated unity. Rather, it consists in their **mediation**. Understanding takes place precisely insofar as experience-bound meaning is transformed into conceptual determinations and these determinations are, in turn, continually related back to experience.

Its distinctive structure therefore lies in a movement that relates both dimensions to one another without dissolving the tension between them.

12.3 Understanding as Movement between Modes

(The Dynamics of Experience and Concept)

Understanding is to be conceived not as a state, but as a movement. It takes place between experience and concept—that is, between the implicit enactment of meaning in lived experience and its explicit conceptual articulation.

This movement is neither external nor accidental, but structurally necessary. For experience alone, even though it is already meaningfully structured, initially remains incomplete and indeterminate in its meaning. It requires conceptual explication in order to become distinguishable, retainable, and communicable. Conversely, concepts without reconnection to experience remain empty insofar as they lose their relation to meaning and detach themselves from that to which they originally responded.

Understanding therefore necessarily takes place in a continual movement from experience to concept and from concept back to experience. In the transition to the concept, experienced meaning is explicated, ordered, and stabilized; in the return to experience, conceptual determinations are examined, concretized, and, where necessary, corrected. Understanding is thus completed neither in mere lived experience nor in pure thought, but consists precisely in the mediation of both modes.

It must also be taken into account that implicit understanding is itself not presuppositionless. It rests upon a more fundamental form of **experiential orientation** that enables living systems to orient themselves within their environment and respond to it. This fundamental orientation is a condition of understanding, but is not identical with it. For implicit understanding is not merely functional adaptation; it is already meaningfully structured and shaped by a horizon within which something appears as relevant and significant.

The movement of understanding therefore begins from an already oriented experiential basis, yet goes beyond it by conceptually explicating and reflecting upon the meaning implicit in experience. Within this interplay, new meanings, new nexuses, and new perspectives emerge.

Neither experience nor concept remains unchanged in this process. Experience becomes visible differently in the light of conceptual order, while concepts may shift, become differentiated, or dissolve under the impact of new experiences.

Understanding thus proves to be a **dynamic process of the development of meaning**. Its structure lies in the continual movement between implicit and explicit understanding, which rests upon a fundamental experiential orientation without being reducible to it. Within this movement, meaning not only takes shape but continually changes.

12.4 The Unity of Understanding without Closure

(Why Understanding Does Not Form a Totality)

Understanding forms a unity without ever becoming a closed whole. Its unity consists not in completeness, but in the continual mediation of its moments. There is no point at which understanding is finally fulfilled, because every order within which meaning is stabilized remains fundamentally provisional.

New experiences can irritate, correct, or exceed existing interpretations; new concepts can disclose different nexuses and thereby transform the horizon of understanding.

This openness is not a deficiency, but follows from the structure of understanding itself. Because understanding remains related to reality as an irreducible limit, it can never be completely absorbed into its own orders of meaning and interpretation. Reality resists every final integration and thereby prevents understanding from becoming closed.

Whatever becomes stabilized within understanding therefore remains fundamentally open to revision. The unity of understanding is consequently not to be conceived as a closed totality, but as an **open unity**: as an ongoing nexus of stabilization, correction, and renewed meaning formation.

The unity of understanding is therefore an open unity.

12.5 Understanding as a Process of Self-Transformation

(How Understanding Changes Itself)

Understanding changes not only that toward which it is directed, but also its own conditions and modes of enactment. Wherever new nexuses emerge, it is not simply the same object that is now seen more clearly; rather, the very manner of understanding changes as well.

With new formations of nexus, concepts, perspectives, and orders of relevance shift. What previously appeared plausible may become questionable, while what initially remained unavailable may enter into a new horizon of meaning. Understanding is therefore not only directed toward something, but also acts back upon itself.

Here its reflexivity becomes apparent. Understanding is not merely a process of disclosure, but also a process of self-transformation. By ordering, explicating, and transforming meaning, it simultaneously changes the horizons within which further understanding becomes possible.

New insights are therefore not merely added externally to an already existing understanding, but intervene in its structure. Understanding develops by shifting its own presuppositions and transforming its own forms of meaning formation.

This becomes particularly evident in self-understanding. Where the I relates to itself within understanding, it does not remain unchanged by what it comes to understand. Rather, the I changes in the process of self-understanding, and with this change the structure of understanding itself is transformed.

Self-understanding is therefore not merely the apprehension of an already fixed identity, but an enactment within which the understanding instance itself is co-formed and transformed.

Understanding is therefore not only knowledge, but also transformation. It does not merely disclose meaning, but simultaneously transforms the perspectives, concepts, and self-relations from which understanding proceeds.

In this sense, understanding is to be conceived as a **process of self-transformation**: as an occurrence that not only brings forth meaning, but changes itself in the very process of doing so.

12.6 Understanding in Its Limiting Relation to Reality

(Openness as a Structural Condition)

The openness of understanding is grounded in its limiting relation to reality. Understanding remains related to something that is not exhausted by its own orders of constituted reality. Reality is therefore not fully available, but manifests itself only indirectly: in resistance to familiar interpretations, in irritations of existing nexuses of meaning, and in the corrections that understanding finds itself compelled to undertake.

Precisely here it becomes apparent that no final identity can be established between understanding and constituted reality.

This enduring difference keeps the process of understanding open. It does not mean that understanding fails, but that understanding is, by its very nature, incomplete.

Understanding is therefore not only mediation, but also the experience of its own limit. It encounters an other that it cannot completely integrate and derives its internal dynamism precisely from this encounter.

Its dynamics thus arise not despite its limitation, but **because of it**.

12.7 Understanding as an Open, Dynamic Unity

(Integration without Closure)

The result of this chapter can be summarized in one overarching thesis:

Understanding is an open, dynamic unity.

It is

- the integration of experience and thought,
- movement between the implicit and the explicit,
- a relational nexus,

- affectively structured,
- horizon-bound,
- and limited by reality.

Understanding is therefore

- not static,
- not completely determinable,
- and not capable of final closure.

It is an ongoing process of meaning formation and transformation.

Understanding takes place as a movement between experience and concept, within the horizon of its presuppositions and in a limiting relation to reality; it is therefore an open process of meaning formation that can neither be brought to closure nor conclusively secured.

13. On the Self-Narrowing of Linear, Causal, and Axiomatic-Logical Models

(The Limits of Reductionist Forms of Order and the Necessity of an Open Concept of Understanding)

The preceding chapters have developed understanding as an open, relational, and dual-mode process. It has been shown that understanding is exhausted neither in experience nor in thought, but takes place through their mediation; that it is horizon-bound, affectively co-structured, and oriented toward a limiting relation to reality; and that it proves to be a dynamic, revision-open process of meaning formation and self-transformation. These determinations, however, do not merely describe positively how understanding is to be conceived. They simultaneously imply a critical perspective: they reveal that certain models of thought and knowledge established in philosophy and science capture the structural character of understanding only inadequately.

For this reason, it is systematically necessary to turn the insights developed thus far explicitly toward those models that claim to translate understanding into unequivocally determined and fully comprehensible orders. The critique does not proceed externally, but immanently: it assesses linear, causal, and axiomatic-logical models against the structural characteristics of understanding developed in the preceding analysis. Only on this basis can it be shown that, although these models perform indispensable functions for particular purposes, they lead to a **self-narrowing of understanding** as soon as they claim to encompass the process of understanding as a whole.

This concluding chapter therefore performs a dual function. It brings together the results of the preceding investigation by making their consequences explicit, while simultaneously clarifying their scope by determining the limits of reductionist forms of order. In this way, it becomes apparent that the concept of understanding developed here is not merely an alternative description, but arises from the insight that understanding resists complete reduction to linear, causal, or formal-logical models.

The following critique is therefore directed not against these models as such, but against their **claim to totality**. It shows that the very clarity and formalizability that constitute their strength simultaneously mark their limit: where understanding comes into view as an open, relational, and reality-related process, reductionist models prove necessary, but not sufficient.

13.1 Point of Departure of the Critique

(Why Classical Models Fail to Capture Understanding Adequately)

The preceding investigation has determined understanding as an open, relational, and dual-mode process. It has been shown that understanding is exhausted neither in mere lived experience nor in pure thought, but takes place through the mediation of both modes. In doing so, it is structured not only intellectually, but also affectively, horizonally, and through a limiting relation to reality that cannot be fully incorporated into conceptual orders. Understanding thus proves to be a dynamic process of meaning formation characterized by openness, revisability, and self-transformation.

Against this background, the question necessarily arises as to the extent to which classical models of thought and knowledge can do justice to this conception. Many such models—

especially linear, causal, and axiomatic-logical approaches—seek to translate complex processes into clearly structured, unequivocally determined, and formally controllable orders. They aim at unambiguity, the greatest possible determinability, predictability, and freedom from contradiction. Within their respective domains of application, these aims are not merely legitimate but indispensable.

Yet these models achieve their clarity at the price of systematic reduction. In order to make unequivocal and formally controllable structures possible, they necessarily abstract from those dimensions that cannot readily be explicated or formalized. These include, in particular, the affective structure of understanding, its implicit contents of meaning, and its embeddedness within concrete contexts of experience. Within such models, emotions appear either as disruptive influences or are methodologically excluded; experience, likewise, is reduced to what can be represented in unequivocally determinable data or variables.

Precisely here, however, lies a decisive limitation. If understanding is essentially affectively co-structured, if it takes place within implicit nexuses of meaning, and if it always remains bound to concrete experience, then their systematic exclusion results in a truncation of the very phenomenon under investigation. What such models capture is not understanding in its lived structure, but an already abstracted, purified, and reduced form of it. Their clarity therefore rests not upon a complete apprehension of understanding, but upon the methodological exclusion of essential dimensions.

This becomes problematic when such models are generalized beyond their legitimate domains of application and claim to determine understanding as a whole. For the structural moments developed above—relationality, horizon-boundedness, affective co-structuring, implicit excesses of meaning, and the limiting relation to reality—cannot be translated without loss into unequivocally determined, linear, or formally closed orders.

The following critique is therefore directed not against these models as such, but against their claim to totality. Its aim is to show that their effectiveness rests upon a reduction that becomes a narrowing whenever it is presented as a comprehensive determination of understanding.

13.2 Linear Models of Understanding

(Sequential Order and Its Limits)

Linear models assume that processes are organized in an unequivocal, stepwise sequence: a state or event A leads to B, B to C, and so forth. This form of ordering is particularly successful where processes are clearly structured, stable, and reproducible. It makes it possible to represent processes transparently, analyze them, and decompose them into controllable sequences. In technical, algorithmic, and certain scientific contexts, it therefore constitutes an indispensable instrument.

Such models, however, rest upon a fundamental presupposition: they assume that the relevant processes can be decomposed into discrete, successive steps and that the relations among those steps can be unequivocally determined. To make this possible, they must exclude those moments that cannot readily be translated into such a sequence. These include, in particular, feedback processes, ambiguities, context-dependent shifts, and affective and implicit dimensions of lived experience. Linear order achieves its clarity precisely by systematically reducing or excluding these nonlinear moments.

Understanding, however, cannot be structured in this way. It does not follow a strictly linear sequence, but unfolds within a web of retrospective references, anticipations, and restructurings. New experiences can alter earlier interpretations, while newly formed concepts can retrospectively reorganize the structure of experience. Understanding is therefore not merely a progression, but also a returning, reconnecting, and reinterpreting. It exhibits circular, recursive, and condensational structures that cannot be reduced to a simple succession of steps.

Moreover, understanding is essentially co-structured by implicit and affective moments that resist linear sequencing. Relevance does not arise only at the end of a process, but is already shaped in advance by pre-understandings, affective attunements, and situational embeddedness. What appears as the next "step" is therefore not independent of context or of the perspective from which understanding takes place. Linear models consequently underestimate the role of context, the significance of implicit nexuses of meaning, and the affective structuring of understanding.

Their limitation becomes apparent precisely here. They capture understanding only insofar as it has already been translated into an ordered, explicit, and sequential form. The lived dynamics of understanding—its feedback processes, leaps, restructurings, and contextual dependence—largely elude them. Linear models therefore do not represent the structure of understanding itself, but an abstracted and simplified representation of certain aspects of it.

For an account of understanding, this means that linear models are useful instruments for analyzing particular processes, but are not suited to apprehending the process of understanding in its entirety. Their strength lies in order; their limit lies in reduction. They render understanding comprehensible, but only at the price of truncating its nonlinear, relational, and open structure.

Linear models explain sequences. Understanding, however, takes place not in sequences, but within a dynamic web of relations.

13.3 Causal Models of Understanding

(Deterministic Explanation and Its Limits)

Causal models aim to explain phenomena through unequivocally determinable relations of cause and effect. An event is understood by tracing it back to antecedent conditions that make its occurrence necessary or at least probable. This form of explanation is extraordinarily successful, particularly in the natural sciences, because it enables processes to be analyzed, predicted, and reproduced under controlled conditions. Causal models thereby establish a form of order grounded in intelligibility, regularity, and intersubjective testability.

Such models, however, presuppose that the relevant nexuses can be translated into unequivocal, directed dependencies. To ensure this, they abstract from all those moments that cannot be represented in clear relations of cause and effect. In particular, they exclude the perspectival character of understanding, its contextual embeddedness, and its implicit and affective dimensions. Within such models, meaning either appears as secondary or is reduced to functional effects. The focus thereby shifts from meaning to explanation, from interpretation to determination.

Understanding, however, cannot be completely apprehended in this way. It is not merely a reaction to causes, but a process of interpretation. The meaning of an event does not arise solely from the conditions of its occurrence, but from the nexus within which it is understood. The same state of affairs may therefore be interpreted differently under identical causal conditions, while different interpretations may emerge from comparable situations. Understanding is thus not determined by causes, but structured through nexuses of meaning that are themselves perspectivally, historically, and situationally shaped.

Moreover, understanding is essentially co-determined by implicit and affective moments that cannot be translated into causal relations. Relevance, significance, and weighting do not arise as mere effects of causes, but are bound to pre-understandings, expectations, and affective attunements. These dimensions influence what appears to require explanation in the first place and which nexuses are perceived as meaningful. Causal models presuppose these selective and evaluative moments without themselves being able to capture them.

Precisely here lies their structural limitation. They capture understanding only insofar as it has already been translated into an explicable form. The actual process of meaning formation—the selection of relevances, the formation of nexuses, and the interpretation of events—eludes them. Causal models reduce understanding to explanation and thereby fail to capture its interpretative character.

For an account of understanding, this means that causal models are indispensable for explaining particular aspects of constituted reality, but are not suited to determining understanding as a whole. Their strength lies in clarifying conditions and dependencies; their limit lies in their inability to ground the meaningfulness of these nexuses from within themselves.

Understanding is therefore not causal in the strict sense, but takes place within a web of meanings that exceeds mere relations of cause and effect.

13.4 Axiomatic-Logical Models of Understanding

(Formal Order and Its Self-Limitation)

Axiomatic-logical models aim at the construction of fully formalized and contradiction-free systems of order. They assume that a domain can be completely structured through clearly defined basic concepts, explicit axioms, and relations derivable from them. Their ideal is an order in which every nexus is explicitly determined, every proposition unambiguously definable, and every inference logically compelling. This form of systematization reaches its highest degree of development in mathematics and formal logic, where it enables extraordinary precision, clarity, and reliability.

The effectiveness of these models, however, rests upon specific presuppositions. They assume that concepts can be unequivocally determined, that their relations can be fully explicated, and that meaning can be completely translated into formal structures. To fulfill these conditions, they must abstract from all those dimensions that cannot be unambiguously defined or fully explicated. These include, in particular, implicit contents of meaning, context-dependent shifts in meaning, affective co-determinations, and the horizonal embeddedness of understanding within pre-existing nexuses of meaning.

Understanding, however, cannot be completely formalized in this way. It remains essentially related to implicit experience, which cannot be exhaustively translated into conceptual determinations. Concepts stabilize and differentiate meaning, but they do not exhaust it. Every conceptual determination presupposes a background that is not fully explicit and against which it first becomes intelligible. This background resists complete formalization because it cannot itself be fully thematized without generating new implicit presuppositions.

Moreover, understanding is shaped not only by conceptual structures, but also by affective and situational moments. What appears relevant, how something is weighted, and which nexuses are regarded as meaningful cannot be derived from formal relations alone. Axiomatic-logical models therefore presuppose precisely those dimensions from which they simultaneously abstract. Their clarity rests upon excluding from view the conditions of their own success.

Precisely here their self-limitation becomes apparent. They are capable of ordering and logically developing already explicitly determined structures of meaning with great precision, but they do not apprehend the process in which meaning arises in the first place. The lived structure of understanding—its implicit presuppositions, its affective permeation, its contextual embeddedness, and its openness toward reality—eludes them. Axiomatic-logical models therefore do not apprehend understanding as a process, but only a formalized segment of it.

For an account of understanding, this means that such models play an indispensable role in the explication, clarification, and systematic ordering of concepts, but are not suited to determining the structure of understanding itself. Their strength lies in formal precision; their limit lies in the fact that they apprehend meaning only where it has already been explicated. Understanding, by contrast, extends beyond such explicitness because it always remains related to implicit nexuses that cannot be completely formalized.

13.5 The Common Structure of Reduction

(Unambiguity, Determination, and Closure)

Despite their differences, linear, causal, and axiomatic-logical models exhibit a common structural tendency. They seek to translate complex nexuses into unequivocally determined, controllable, and closable orders. Their common ideal is a form of knowledge in which ambiguity is reduced, processes are unequivocally determined, and nexuses can be fully explicated. This tendency manifests itself in an orientation toward **unambiguity rather than ambiguity, determination rather than openness, and closure rather than processuality**.

The effectiveness of these models rests precisely upon this orientation. By simplifying complex phenomena, isolating them, and translating them into clear structures, they make precise analysis, reliable explanation, and systematic ordering possible. Their strength lies in reducing indeterminacy and rendering nexuses controllable. Within their respective domains of application—for example, technical, scientific, or formal-logical contexts—they are therefore indispensable.

Yet this strength is simultaneously their limit. Reduction to unequivocal, determined, and formally closed structures presupposes the exclusion of those dimensions that resist such ordering. These include, in particular, the ambiguity of experience, the contextual dependence of meaning, the affective structuring of relevance, and the implicit presuppositions underlying

every act of understanding. The limiting relation to reality is likewise neutralized insofar as reality appears only as a fully apprehensible object within a system.

Precisely thereby a systematic narrowing occurs. Understanding is reduced to what can be explicated, determined, or formally ordered. Its dynamic, relational, and open structure is not thereby abolished, but displaced from view. Such models therefore apprehend not understanding as such, but only an abstracted form in which its indeterminacies have already been eliminated. What remains is a reduced representation that creates clarity but no longer reflects upon the conditions of its own emergence.

The common structure of this reduction thus consists in translating understanding into a form that negates its own openness. Unambiguity replaces ambiguity, determination replaces interpretative latitude, and closure replaces the ongoing process of meaning formation. Understanding as a lived enactment is thereby replaced by a model that represents its dynamic structure only inadequately.

For an account of understanding, this means that the models in question perform necessary ordering functions, but only under the condition of a reduction that transforms their object. Their clarity rests not upon a complete apprehension of understanding, but upon its methodological restriction. Understanding therefore resists complete reduction to such models not accidentally, but structurally.

13.6 The Counterposition: Understanding as an Open, Relational Event
(Why Reduction Is Necessary and Yet Insufficient)

The critique does not mean that linear, causal, or logical models are fundamentally false. They are necessary for a form of clarity based upon unambiguity and explicit determinability, and they make it possible to analyze nexuses insofar as these have already been translated into distinguishable units. Precisely for this reason, they are indispensable within particular domains.

Yet these models are not sufficient. Understanding exceeds them because it is not exhausted in isolated units, but is relationally constituted; because it does not proceed in a strictly linear manner, but circularly and recursively; because it is not exhausted in purely causal determinations, but possesses an essentially interpretative character; and because it must be conceived not as a closed order, but as an open process.

Understanding therefore cannot be completely formalized without losing precisely those structural moments that constitute its distinctive character.

13.7 The Necessity of a Non-Reductionist Concept of Understanding
(Openness as a Condition of Meaning and Its Linguistic Mediation)

The preceding analysis has shown that linear, causal, and axiomatic-logical models perform indispensable ordering functions, yet remain subject to a structural limitation. They achieve their clarity by reducing understanding to unequivocally determinable, explicitly formulable, and formally controllable nexuses. Precisely therein, however, lies their limit: they apprehend understanding only insofar as it has already been translated into a stabilized and abstracted

form. The implicit, affective, context-bound, and reality-related dimensions of understanding necessarily remain excluded.

From this follows the necessity of a non-reductionist concept of understanding. Such a concept is required because understanding cannot be conceived as a special case of formal ordering or causal explanation, but constitutes a distinctive form of meaning formation. Its openness is a condition of its possibility. For understanding stands in a limiting relation to reality, which cannot be completely integrated into existing orders of constituted reality. Precisely this non-closure keeps understanding in motion: it enables correction, revision, and the emergence of new nexuses of meaning.

This openness, however, presents a particular challenge because understanding necessarily depends upon language. Every theoretical determination, including the present one, must articulate itself linguistically and therefore rely upon conceptual fixations. It might therefore appear that the claim to an open concept of understanding contradicts the necessity of linguistic explication. Yet language itself proves to be part of the very structure described here.

Language is not an external means that subsequently fixes understanding, but the medium in which understanding explicates, stabilizes, and communicates itself. At the same time, understanding is not exhausted by this explication. Every linguistic determination brings meaning into a particular form, renders it distinguishable and accessible, yet simultaneously reduces it and remains related to an implicit excess of meaning. Language is therefore not the limit of understanding, but the locus at which its tension becomes articulated: between implicit meaning and explicit form, between what can be said and what is not completely exhausted in what is said.

A non-reductionist concept of understanding therefore does not require the abandonment of conceptual clarity, but a reflective use of language. It acknowledges that every explication is selective and that every theoretical order rests upon presuppositions it cannot completely incorporate. Precisely therein lies not a weakness, but a condition of meaning. For only an understanding that acknowledges its own provisionality remains open to new experiences, correction, and further development.

The consequence is a theory of understanding that does not conceive itself as a final system, but as part of the process it describes. It too remains embedded within the movement between implicit meaning and explicit determination, within the horizon of its presuppositions, and within a limiting relation to reality. Its validity therefore lies not in final certainty, but in its capacity for validation, revision, and continuation.

The preceding considerations yield not only a particular concept of understanding, but also a methodological consequence. If understanding is to be conceived as an open, relational, and non-closable process, then the method by which it is investigated cannot be determined independently of this structure. A method that claims to apprehend understanding must itself take into account the conditions under which understanding takes place.

The approach adopted here is therefore not to be understood as an external instrument applied to a given object, but as a mode of disclosure oriented toward the object itself. It deliberately renounces the claim to complete formalization or final determination and instead follows the movement of understanding: it develops concepts through continual reference back to experience, clarifies nexuses by moving through different perspectives, and remains open to revision and further development.

In this sense, the method adopted in this study is itself part of the process of understanding. It moves between implicit presuppositions and explicit elaboration, between stabilization and the preservation of openness, between conceptual clarification and the recognition of what cannot be completely explicated. Its aim is therefore not to translate understanding into a closed system, but to render visible its distinctive structure.

Precisely therein lies its intended adequacy. A reductionist method would indeed gain clarity, but only at the price of excluding essential structural moments of understanding. The method adopted here takes this structure seriously by reflecting upon its own provisionality and by treating its results not as final determinations, but as steps within an ongoing process of the disclosure of meaning.

14. Understanding as an Open Structure of the Human Relation to the World

The present investigation has reconstructed understanding not as an isolated capacity, but as a fundamental structure of the human relation to the world.

Understanding does not begin with the concept. It is already operative within experience insofar as experience generates meaning, structures relevances, and makes orientation possible. Thought enters into this implicit meaning formation by explicating and stabilizing it and by transforming it into a symbolic order. Understanding itself is the process within which these two modes are brought into relation.

It has thereby become apparent that understanding can be described neither linearly nor causally nor in completely formal terms. It takes place relationally, circularly, and processually. It is affectively structured, horizon-bound, and always related to a nexus that points beyond what is presently given.

The distinction between constituted reality and reality provides the decisive framework:

Constituted reality is the order of meaning formed within understanding. Reality, by contrast, eludes every complete apprehension and remains operative as a limiting relation. It manifests itself not as an available object, but in irritation, resistance, and the necessity of correction.

Precisely this limiting relation prevents understanding from stabilizing itself within closed systems. Every conceptual order remains provisional. Every interpretation is revisable. Understanding is therefore necessarily open.

This openness is the condition of its possibility. Only an understanding that is not closed can change, expand, and respond to new experiences.

The result of the study can therefore be condensed into the following formulation:

Understanding is not the apprehension of a completed world, but the open process within which constituted reality arises, changes, and remains oriented through its limiting relation to reality.

As a mosaic stone, this text lays no claim to a final theory. It understands itself as a contribution to a perspective in which understanding is not reduced, but taken seriously in its multidimensionality—as a dynamic, relational, and never fully closable process.

Mosaic Piece: Problem



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[3] A detailed outline is provided on pp. 455-457.

Introduction

(The Problem as the Epistemic Point of Departure of the Constitution of Constituted Reality)

The present study begins with a fundamental shift in the epistemic point of departure. Whereas a large part of the epistemological and hermeneutic tradition assumes that world primarily appears to human beings as meaningfully structured constituted reality, the thesis advanced here is that knowledge begins not with meaning, but with its instability.

The point of departure is therefore not an already existing nexus of meaning, but the **problem**. The problem designates those situations in which existing orders of meaning no longer sustain themselves, orientation becomes questionable, and new structuring operations become necessary. The problem thus appears not as a secondary disturbance within an ordered world, but as a constitutive moment of the formation of constituted reality itself.

The aim of the study is to reconstruct the concept of the problem systematically in such a way that its central function within the constitution of constituted reality becomes visible. The problem is understood neither as an objectively given state of affairs nor as a merely individual deficiency. Rather, it is determined as an operative structure in which the limit of meaning formation becomes manifest. From this perspective, the problem functions as the origin, limit, and driving force of processes of knowledge.

The fundamental theoretical assumption of the study consists in a distinction between **reality and constituted reality**. Constituted reality designates the order of meaning brought forth and stabilized within the enactment of experience and understanding. Reality, by contrast, is not understood as an independent domain of objects, but as a **transcendental limiting concept** that limits this meaning formation without itself being operationally accessible. This distinction prevents both a naïve representational theory of knowledge and an ontologization of structures of meaning.

Against this background, experience is determined as the genetic mode of meaning formation. Within it, relevances, Gestalten, and nexuses of meaning emerge that are not to be understood as representations of a given world, but as operative productions. Understanding, by contrast, is conceived as the structural organization of this meaning formation. It transforms implicit, experience-based meaning into conceptual, relational, and stabilizable forms. Constituted reality arises through the interplay of these two modes as a provisionally stabilized order.

Within this nexus, the problem occupies a central position. It marks those points at which the translation of experience into stable order fails, at which nexuses of meaning become unstable, and at which new structuring operations become necessary. The problem is therefore neither a mere deficit nor an external disruptive factor, but the operative manifestation of the limit of meaning formation within constituted reality.

From this determination follows a fundamental reassessment of knowledge. Knowledge is not to be understood as the representation of an independently given reality, but as a process of engaging with problematicity. It consists in the production of order under conditions of structural instability and therefore remains, in principle, provisional and open to revision.

The study follows a phenomenological-reconstructive approach. Its aim is not to establish a closed system, but to explicate those structures within which experience, understanding, and the engagement with problems manifest themselves in enactment. In doing so, systematic

connections are established with transcendental epistemology and hermeneutics while simultaneously moving critically beyond them. Whereas hermeneutics assumes the primacy of meaning and the Buddhist approach determines conditionedness as the primary structure, the present investigation takes the problem as its irreducible point of departure.

The guiding thesis of the study can be condensed into the following formulation:

Constituted reality arises as an operatively stabilized order of meaning through the interplay of experience and understanding, yet remains in principle non-closable through its limiting relation to reality and is continually compelled by the problem to reorganize itself.

From this perspective, it becomes clear that the problem does not stand at the margins of processes of knowledge, but at their center. It is not that which must be overcome in order to arrive at knowledge, but that which makes knowledge necessary in the first place.

1. Object, Aim, and Method of the Study

(The Problem as the Epistemic Point of Departure and Boundary Structure of the Constitution of Constituted Reality)

1.1 Object of the Study

The object of this study is the systematic determination of the problem within the horizon of the distinction between reality and constituted reality. The problem is understood neither as a contingent disturbance within an already constituted order nor as a merely individually experienced deficiency. Rather, it is to be conceived as a structural moment of the constitution of constituted reality itself. It designates those constellations in which processes of meaning formation encounter a limit at which their previous form of stabilization becomes precarious, insufficient, or no longer capable of further connection.

This fundamentally shifts the perspective on the problem. It appears not as the negation of order, but as a constitutive condition of its possibility. The problem does not designate the collapse of meaning as such, but the operative manifestation of that limit at which orders of meaning lose their self-evidence and become dependent upon reorganization.

Within the context of the mosaic stones already developed, this relation can be specified more precisely: constituted reality is to be understood as an operatively stabilized order of meaning, experience as the genetic process of meaning formation, and understanding as the structural organization of these processes. Within this nexus, the problem designates the manifestation of a boundary situation in which the operative stabilization of meaning can no longer continue unquestioned. It marks the point at which the distinction between reality and constituted reality is not abolished, but becomes manifest in its productive tension: as a compulsion toward the new formation, reformation, or transformation of meaning.

1.2 Axiomatic Positing of the Problem

(The Problem as a Non-Reducible Point of Departure under Conditions of Epistemic Unavailability)

The concept of the problem is not derived from other categories in this study, but is **posited axiomatically**. This is necessary because every justification would already have to rely upon distinctions and operative forms of meaning that themselves first emerge within the enactment of meaning formation. From a systems-theoretical perspective, the problem can therefore not be understood as a state of affairs occurring within systems, but as a structural condition antecedent to the constitution of meaning or constitutively intertwined with it. It can neither be derived from knowledge nor obtained from experience in the sense of already stabilized orders of meaning, and it resists final conceptual fixation.

The positing of the problem proceeds from the insight that meaning formation requires a beginning that cannot itself, in turn, arise from meaning. Within this context, the problem assumes the function of a minimal form of indeterminacy that compels systems to form connecting operations. It designates that situation in which connectivity is not given, but precisely thereby becomes acute as a problem of selection.

Thus, the problem functions as a **transcendental point of departure of a distinctive kind**: not as a condition of the possibility of knowledge, but as a condition of the necessity of meaning operations as such. It marks the situation in which systems are compelled to reduce complexity without being able to rely upon already secured structures.

In this sense, the problem is not a deficit of order, but the operative condition of its emergence.

It designates the minimal structure within which orientation becomes necessary without already being given. The problem is therefore the form of an indeterminacy that cannot be suspended but must be dealt with. It thereby expresses that operative compulsion toward selection from which meaning formation first emerges. In this sense, the problem becomes a transcendental point of departure that is to be understood not as a condition of knowledge in the classical sense, but as a condition of its necessity. It designates not the formal possibility of knowledge, but the antecedent problematic situation on account of which knowledge, order, and stabilization become necessary in the first place.

1.3 Aim of the Study

(Reconstruction of the Problem as a Constitutive Driving Force of Meaning, Understanding, and Constituted Reality)

The aim of the study is to reconstruct the concept of the problem systematically in such a way that its central function for the constitution of constituted reality becomes visible. Three interconnected aims are pursued. First, the problem is to be determined as a category in its own right that can be reduced neither to ignorance nor to mere disturbance. It designates not a deficit, but a structural moment of meaning formation itself.

Second, the problem is to be clarified within the horizon of the distinction between reality and constituted reality. Reality is here conceived as a limiting concept that limits meaning formation without itself being operationally available. The problem designates the manner in which this limiting relation becomes operatively manifest within constituted reality.

Third, the problem is to be determined in its function for experience and understanding. Within experience, it manifests itself as irritation and a shift in relevance; within understanding, as the limit of conceptual stabilization. In this way, the problem becomes determinable as a constitutive moment of the formation of constituted reality.

1.4 Method of the Study

(Phenomenological-Reconstructive Analysis of Problem-Related Meaning Formation)

The study follows a phenomenological-reconstructive approach. Its point of departure is not the presupposition of objective problem structures, but the analysis of their mode of appearance within the enactment of experience and understanding. The question is how problems emerge within lived experience, how they destabilize existing structures of meaning, and in what manner they compel the formation of new orders.

Methodologically, this means describing enactments close to experience, reconstructing processes of meaning formation, and systematically analyzing the dynamics of stabilization and irritation. Problems are explicitly not determined as properties of reality, nor are they accorded

the status of ontologically independent objects. Instead, it is shown that problems are to be understood as operative phenomena of difference within constituted reality.

1.5 Systematic Classification

(The Problem within the Nexus of the Mosaic Stones)

The mosaic stone “Problem” is embedded within an overarching system. It can be structured as follows:

- **Reality** functions as a limiting concept and is not itself operationally accessible.
- **Experience** takes place as genetic meaning formation.
- **Understanding** structurally organizes this meaning formation.
- **Constituted reality** designates the stabilized order that emerges from it.
- **The problem** marks the boundary phenomenon within these nexuses.

The problem occupies a distinctive position within this structure:
it marks those points at which the structure becomes unstable and must be reorganized.

1.6 Guiding Thesis of the Study

(The Problem as Origin, Limit, and Driving Force of the Formation of Constituted Reality)

The guiding thesis of the study is:

The problem is the operative manifestation of the limit of meaning formation within constituted reality and thereby the origin, limit, and driving force of its constitution.

The problem designates those situations in which

- existing orders of meaning become unstable,
- new orders become necessary,
- orientation must be produced.

The problem is therefore not eliminable, but constitutive.

2. The Problem as an Epistemic Beginning

(The Problem as the Origin of Operative Meaning Formation under Conditions of Epistemic Unavailability)

2.1 Axiomatic Positing of the Problem

(The Problem as a Non-Reducible Point of Departure of Knowledge)

The point of departure of this investigation consists in positing the problem as the epistemic beginning. This positing does not proceed by way of derivation, but from methodological necessity. Every justification would already depend upon stable structures of meaning whose genesis, however, itself begins only in the engagement with problematicity. The problem can therefore neither be further reduced nor derived from other concepts; at the same time, it resists complete conceptual fixation.

As a minimal point of departure, it marks that threshold at which it first becomes apparent that meaning is not given, but must be produced.

The problem is therefore

- not further reducible,
- not derivable from other concepts,
- not completely conceptually determinable.

The problem thus functions as an axiom in the methodological sense: not as a true proposition about the world, but as a necessary point of departure of the analysis.

2.2 Problem Instead of Given Order

(Shifting the Epistemic Beginning from Meaning to Instability)

Traditional epistemological approaches generally begin with already existing orders, whether in the form of horizons of meaning, concepts, or structures of knowledge. The approach advanced here, by contrast, shifts the point of departure of the analysis. It begins not with order itself, but with its absence, instability, or questionable character.

The problem designates precisely that situation in which orientation becomes necessary without already being given. In this sense, knowledge begins not with meaning, but with its questionable character. The problem thus marks the point at which constituted reality first comes into view as an order that must be produced.

2.3 The Problem as a Central Category

(The Problem as the Primary Manifestation of Non-Integration)

The problem is not to be conceived as a derivative category, but as a central structural moment within the constitution of constituted reality. It designates those constellations in which existing orders of meaning lose their integrative capacity, new differences emerge, and connectivity becomes precarious. In this respect, the problem is to be understood neither as an object nor as an isolated event, and equally not as a psychological state.

Rather, it must be conceived as a **structural form of non-integration within meaning formation**. As such, it represents the primary manifestation of instability within constituted reality.

2.4 Structural Characteristics of Problems

(Efficacy, Unavailability, and Provisionality)

Problems can be characterized by three fundamental properties:

1. **Efficacy:** Problems are not merely theoretical constructions, but emerge as real demands for orientation within the process of experience. They require engagement.
2. **Unavailability:** Problems cannot be completely controlled or anticipated. They arise from the dynamics of experience and elude complete planning.
3. **Provisionality:** Problems can be addressed, but never definitively resolved. Every solution generates new problems of connectivity.

These characteristics show that problems are structural components of the formation of constituted reality, not disturbances of it.

2.5 Knowledge as a Response to Problematicity

(Knowledge as the Processing of Irritation and Instability)

If the problem constitutes the epistemic beginning, a fundamental redefinition of knowledge follows. Knowledge then begins neither with the representation of reality nor with the discovery of truth, but with the processing of instability, the organization of differences, and the production of connectivity. It is therefore not to be understood as the subsequent apprehension of an already ordered world, but as an operative enactment that responds to problematicity and generates order from it.

Knowledge is, in this sense, the **operative response to problematicity**. It stabilizes nexuses of meaning without ever being able definitively to abolish their openness and need for revision.

2.6 Constituted Reality as the Result of Problem-Related Order

(Constituted Reality as the Subsequent Stabilization of Meaning)

Constituted reality is not to be presupposed as given, but forms in the engagement with problems. It arises through the stabilization of relevances, the formation of nexuses, and the establishment of orders. Constituted reality is, in this sense, the result of problem-related stabilization of meaning.

It is neither objectively pregiven nor arbitrarily posited, but constitutes itself within the process of engaging with problematicity.

Its order is therefore owed not to immediate givenness, but to the operative stabilization of meaning under conditions of structural instability.

2.7 Causality as a Functional Form of Order

(Causality as a Secondary Instrument of Problem Processing)

A central form of stabilization is causality. It is understood here not as a property of reality, but as a form of order within the formation of constituted reality that structures experience and enables orientation. Causality arises in the context of problem processing by fixing nexuses, stabilizing expectations, and enabling actions to be organized in relation to regular connections.

In this respect, causality is not a structure of reality, but a **functional ordering achievement of the formation of constituted reality**. It designates a form of meaning stabilization through which connectivity can be produced and secured under conditions of problematicity.

2.8 Provisional Conclusion: The Problem as an Epistemic Beginning

(The Problem as the Origin of Meaning, Knowledge, and the Formation of Constituted Reality)

The analysis of this chapter leads to a clear determination:

- The problem is not secondary, but primary.
- It is not disturbance, but structure.
- It is not deficit, but condition.

The guiding formulation is:

The problem is the epistemic beginning because it marks the instability of meaning from which experience, understanding, and constituted reality first bring forth their order.

The problem is therefore not something that disappears in the course of knowledge, but rather:

that which makes knowledge necessary in the first place.

3. Causality, Method, and Epistemic Demarcation

(Methodical Ordering of Constituted Reality under Conditions of Structural Problematicity)

3.1 Causality as a Means of Orientation

(Causal Order as a Pragmatic Structure for the Stabilization of Meaning)

Following the determination of the problem as the epistemic point of departure, the question arises as to how orientation is possible at all under conditions of structural instability. One central form of such orientation is causality. It makes it possible to connect events, stabilize expectations, and render actions plannable. By reducing openness to regular relations, it transforms experience into a form that ensures connectivity and operative security.

Causality is therefore not a property of reality, but a functional structure of the formation of constituted reality. It does not arise independently of the problem, but as an ordering achievement within the context of its processing. Its function consists in transforming instability into manageable nexuses and thereby stabilizing constituted reality.

3.2 Kantian Frame of Reference and Thinking in Terms of Limits

(Causality as a Category of Order, Not as a Property of Reality)

The determination of causality advanced here stands in systematic proximity to Kant's transcendental epistemology. There, too, causality is not regarded as a property of things in themselves, but as a category through which experience is structured and transformed into the form of ordered nexuses. In this sense, causality functions as a condition of the possibility of ordered experience.

The present approach, however, shifts this thought systematically. Whereas Kant reconstructs the conditions of the possibility of experience, the present investigation begins with the problem—that is, with the structural instability from which such conditions first become necessary. The focus therefore lies not primarily upon the conditions of the possibility of experience, but upon the **necessity of its production under conditions of problematicity**.

Causality thus remains a form of order, but appears not as a presupposed structure, but as a result of problem processing. It is a form of meaning stabilization through which ordered experience, stability of expectation, and connectivity first become possible under conditions of instability.

3.3 The Axiom as a Methodological Limit

(The Axiom as the Termination Point of Further Justification)

From the axiomatic positing of the problem (cf. Chapter 2.1), a methodological consequence of fundamental importance follows. Every theory requires a point at which justification reaches its limit. The axiom designates this point. In the present context, this point is the problem. It cannot be further justified because every justification would already have to draw upon order, meaning, and stabilization—the very phenomena whose emergence is only to be explained here.

The problem is therefore the methodological termination point of further justification. Its axiomatic positing is not arbitrary, but systematically necessary, because every further justification would inevitably presuppose what first emerges from the processing of problems. As an axiom, the problem thus marks not only the limit of justification, but at the same time the point of departure of the analysis.

3.4 Demarcation from an Ontological Concept of Causality

Causality as a Structure of Constituted Reality, Not of Reality

A central epistemological clarification concerns the status of causality. In traditional conceptions, it frequently appears as a property of the world itself, whether as a real cause-and-effect structure or as an objectively existing nexus. This assumption is rejected here. Within the framework of the distinction between reality and constituted reality, reality is not operationally accessible and eludes conceptual determination.

If this is the case, causality cannot be understood as a structure of reality. Rather, it must be assigned to constituted reality and thus belongs within the nexus of meaning formation and meaning stabilization. Causality is therefore not a property of the world, but a structure through which constituted reality is ordered, expectations are stabilized, and nexuses are organized with regard to connectivity.

3.5 Method as Operative Order

(Method as the Systematic Stabilization of Experience)

Method designates the manner in which meaning formation is deliberately stabilized under conditions of instability. It encompasses

- the formation of distinctions through which differences are first marked,
- the construction of relations through which these differences are transformed into nexuses,
- the fixation of meanings that enables stability of expectation,
- and the production of connectivity through which further operations can connect.

In this sense, method is not to be understood as an external technique applied to an already constituted reality. Rather, it is to be conceived as an immanent structure of the formation of constituted reality itself. For constituted reality does not arise independently of the procedures through which meaning is stabilized, but in the enactment of precisely these procedures.

The necessity of method arises from the problematicity of meaning formation. Where existing orders lose their stability, differences emerge, and connectivity is no longer guaranteed, a compulsion toward selection and the reorganization of meaning arises. Method designates the structured form of this reorganization. It is the response to the indeterminacy that becomes visible in the problem and, at the same time, the medium in which this indeterminacy is transformed into forms that can be processed and stabilized.

Method is therefore not merely an instrument, but a condition of the possibility of knowledge in the operative sense. It does not ground knowledge from outside, but provides those procedures through which ordered nexuses of meaning can first arise under conditions of

problematicity. In this sense, method itself must be understood as a moment of the constitution of constituted reality.

3.6 Openness to Revision of Forms of Order

(The Provisionality of All Methodological Stabilization)

Because constituted reality arises only in a limiting relation to reality, all orders produced within it remain structurally provisional. This applies in particular to causal attributions, methodological models, and theoretical systems. They possess no final validity, but can only prove themselves, be corrected, or be replaced by other formations of order.

Their validity therefore rests not upon ultimate truth, but upon stability under conditions of continuing irritation and change. What matters is not their definitive securing, but their capacity to maintain connectivity and order under conditions of problematicity.

3.7 Method as the Processing of Problematicity

(Method as the Transformation of Instability into Order)

The function of method can thus be determined more precisely. It consists not in the definitive resolution of problems, but in their systematic processing. This takes place through the structuring of experience, the stabilization of meaning, and the production of orientation. Method is therefore to be conceived as the form in which problematicity is transformed into provisional, operatively connectable order.

Problems do not disappear in this process, but change their form. Methodological processing does not abolish problematicity, but transforms it into structures that enable further operations and thereby stabilize constituted reality.

3.8 Provisional Conclusion: Limit and Order

(Method within the Horizon of Structural Non-Closure)

The analysis of this chapter leads to the following determinations:

- Causality is a form of order of constituted reality.
- Causality is not a property of reality.
- Method arises from problematicity.
- Order remains open to revision.
- The problem marks the limit of all stabilization.

The guiding formulation is:

Method is the operative production of order under conditions of structural problematicity and transcendental limitation.

4. Problem, Conditionedness, and Reality – A Contrastive Clarification of the Problem Approach

(Problematicity, Conditionedness, and Reality as Alternative Epistemic Starting Figures)
On the Systematic Comparison with Buddhism and New Realism.

The analysis thus far has determined the concept of the problem as an epistemic point of departure and systematically developed its function for meaning formation, the constitution of constituted reality, and knowledge. Yet this does not sufficiently clarify how this approach is to be situated in relation to other systematic models of access to world and knowledge. The following two chapters therefore serve to sharpen the theory of the problem developed here through contrast. Their aim is not reconstruction, but a systematic comparison of different initial figures of philosophical theory formation.

At the center stands the question of what is respectively determined as the epistemic point of departure. The approach developed here begins with the problem as that situation in which meaning cannot be presupposed but must first be formed. Other approaches, by contrast, proceed from already existing structures within which problematicity appears only as a derivative phenomenon. To bring the distinctive character and scope of the problem approach into sharper relief, two such countermodels will be examined below: first, the Buddhist approach, which determines conditionedness as the primary nexus; and second, New Realism, which presupposes reality as an accessible structure.

The comparison with Buddhism and New Realism fulfills a dual function. On the one hand, it is intended to show that the problem approach does not merely constitute a variant of already familiar structural theories, but rests upon an epistemic decision of its own. On the other hand, it is intended to demonstrate that neither conditionedness nor reality can function as presuppositionless points of departure without already presupposing order. Precisely thereby, the systematic position of the problem as an irreducible beginning can be determined more precisely.

Against this background, the contrastive analysis begins with Buddhism. It can serve as an exemplary case of an approach that proceeds not from the instability of meaning, but from a presupposed nexus of appearances. From there, the investigation proceeds to New Realism in order to examine the same question once again in a contemporary philosophical context and further sharpen the scope of the insights gained.

4.1 Buddhism as a Contrast Model

(Conditionedness as the Primary Access – Systematic Classification)

Within Buddhism, conditionedness assumes the role of a fundamental epistemic and ontological guiding figure. It designates the nexus within which appearances become intelligible exclusively as reciprocally dependent and relationally determined. Knowledge therefore aims not primarily at isolated objects, but at insight into those structures of conditions through which appearances are brought forth in the first place.

This means that the Buddhist approach begins from an already presupposed nexus. Appearances are regarded from the outset as structured, and the task of knowledge consists in rendering this

structure transparent. The point of departure thus lies not in the instability of meaning, but in the assumption of pervasive conditionedness.

In its conceptual elaboration, the Buddhist doctrine of conditionedness initially belongs to constituted reality insofar as it represents a form of stabilized order of meaning. At the same time, however, it systematically points toward a nexus underlying appearances without itself being operationally accessible. Within the conceptual framework developed here, the Buddhist notion of conditionedness can therefore be reconstructed as referring to a nexus closer to what this study designates as reality, insofar as reality is understood as a nexus that conditions appearances without itself being available in the form of constituted reality.

The Buddhist approach thus occupies a dual position: it formulates conditionedness as part of constituted reality, while substantively pointing toward a nexus that, within the conceptual framework employed here, is structurally attributable to reality. Knowledge, in this context, consists in insight into these structures of conditions.

Precisely here lies the systematic contrast with the theory of the problem developed in this study. Whereas the Buddhist approach proceeds from an already presupposed nexus of conditions underlying appearances, the present approach begins with the problem as a situation in which no such nexus is yet given. The point of departure here is not insight into conditionedness, but the experience of instability in which meaning is not already present but must first be formed.

This systematic difference makes it necessary to refine the earlier formulation according to which conditionedness was characterized as a fundamental structure of constituted reality. This is not to be understood as a systematic attribution made by the present approach itself, but as a reconstructive classification of the Buddhist concept of conditionedness within the distinction between reality and constituted reality developed here.

Within this theoretical framework, the Buddhist doctrine of conditionedness can therefore be understood as belonging, in its conceptually elaborated form, to constituted reality, while substantively referring to a nexus that is more appropriately associated with reality.

4.2 Conditionedness as Structure – Revision of the Initial Assumption

(Conditionedness between Constituted Reality and Reality)

In the preceding account, conditionedness was characterized as a fundamental structure of constituted reality. Within the distinction between reality and constituted reality developed in this study, this determination requires refinement. The decisive point is that, in the Buddhist context, conditionedness cannot simply be understood as an operative structure in the sense of constituted reality, but rather as a nexus toward which the doctrine is directed.

In Buddhist thought, constituted reality appears as a network of conditions in which nothing exists independently, but everything is relationally determined. Nexuses are thereby constitutive of what appears. This account may suggest that conditionedness should be understood as a fundamental structure of constituted reality. Such a reading, however, remains insufficient unless a distinction is drawn between the conceptual form of the account and that toward which it is directed.

Discourse about conditionedness initially designates a particular mode of organizing meaning and, as such, belongs to constituted reality. At the same time, however, it points toward a nexus that conditions appearances without itself being present in the form of constituted reality. Within the conceptual framework developed here, this nexus can be situated closer to what is designated as reality, insofar as reality is understood as a limiting nexus that conditions appearances while remaining operationally inaccessible.

Conditionedness is therefore not to be determined immediately as a structure of constituted reality, but as the conceptual formulation of a nexus that structures constituted reality without being exhausted by it. The appearance of a stable point of departure thus results not from an already given order of constituted reality, but from the assumption of a pervasive nexus of conditions toward which knowledge is directed.

Precisely here, once again, the difference from the theory of the problem developed in this study becomes apparent. Whereas the Buddhist approach proceeds from such a nexus and directs knowledge toward insight into it, the present approach does not begin with an already presupposed nexus, but with the instability of meaning. Constituted reality appears here not as a network of conditions, but as the result of processes of meaning stabilization within which nexuses are first brought forth.

The revision of the initial assumption therefore leads to a more precise systematic classification of conditionedness within the Buddhist context:

Conditionedness is not to be understood as a fundamental structure of constituted reality, but as a conceptual order referring to a nexus that, within the distinction developed here, is to be situated closer to reality, whereas constituted reality itself is to be understood as an operatively generated order of meaning.

4.3 The Problem as a Derivative Phenomenon in the Buddhist Context

(The Problem as an Effect of Nexuses of Conditions)

Within the Buddhist approach, the problem does not occupy a fundamental but a derivative position. It is not determined as the point of departure of the analysis, but understood as the effect of particular constellations of conditions. What appears as a problem therefore points not toward an original instability of meaning, but toward insufficient insight into the nexuses of conditions through which appearances are brought forth.

Within the Buddhist context, problems arise from misinterpretations, insufficient insight, or ignorance concerning the nexuses of conditions within which appearances are brought forth. They are not primary, but secondary: expressions of a perspective that fails to recognize the relationality of appearances or apprehends it only inadequately. The problem thereby points back toward conditions whose interrelation has not been adequately grasped.

From the perspective of the distinction between reality and constituted reality developed in this study, this determination can be reconstructed as follows: within the Buddhist approach, problematicity does not appear as an irreducible structure, but as a phenomenon within constituted reality that can, in principle, be clarified through deeper insight into the underlying nexuses of conditions. Problematicity therefore possesses no independent systematic status, but

is resolvable through reference to the nexus toward which the doctrine of conditionedness is directed.

Precisely here, once again, lies the difference from the theory of the problem developed in this study. Whereas the Buddhist approach explains the problem in terms of conditionedness and refers it back to that conditionedness, the present approach determines the problem as the epistemic point of departure. Problematicity is understood here not as a derivative appearance, but as that situation in which meaning is unstable, differences emerge, and connectivity must first be produced.

The different determination of the problem thus marks a fundamental shift in analytical perspective:

Within the Buddhist approach, problematicity becomes explicable through reference back to nexuses of conditions; within the approach developed here, by contrast, it functions as an irreducible initial structure from which such nexuses themselves first emerge.

This difference can be illustrated by an example. Consider a situation in which an unexpected event occurs—for instance, the sudden failure of a course of action or the absence of an anticipated response. In everyday experience, this initially appears as a problem: the situation becomes unintelligible, expectations are disrupted, and connectivity is interrupted.

Within the Buddhist context, such a problematic constellation would be analyzed by asking which conditions led to the event. The apparently isolated problem is understood as the effect of a complex nexus of conditions. The irritation therefore arises not from an original problematicity, but from insufficient insight into the relationality of the underlying processes. Knowledge consists in disclosing these nexuses of conditions and understanding the event as necessarily arising from them. The problem thereby loses its original status and appears as the result of a perspectival restriction.

Within the approach developed here, the same situation presents itself differently. The unexpected event does not primarily mark a lack of knowledge concerning conditions, but a situation in which existing orders of meaning lose their viability. The problem consists precisely in the fact that no stable nexus is available that would render the event immediately intelligible. Only in the process of problem processing are possible nexuses constructed, expectations reorganized, and new possibilities of connection established.

The difference therefore lies not in the object, but in the analytical perspective: whereas the Buddhist approach explains the problem by referring it back to nexuses of conditions, the approach developed here understands the problem as the point of departure from which such nexuses are first formed.

The problem is here not an effect, but the origin of meaning formation.

4.4 Knowledge as the Transformation of Conditions

Resolution of Problematicity through Insight into Conditionedness

Within the Buddhist approach, knowledge has a clearly defined function. It consists not primarily in the construction of nexuses of meaning, but in insight into the structures of conditions through which appearances are brought forth. Knowledge aims to render these nexuses transparent in their relationality and thereby dissolve the apparent independence of individual phenomena.

In this context, problematicity appears as an effect of insufficient insight. Problems are based not upon an original instability of meaning, but upon a perspectival narrowing in which nexuses of conditions are not adequately apprehended. Knowledge therefore has the function of correcting this narrowing by disclosing the relationality of appearances and making their embeddedness within more comprehensive structures of conditions visible.

Knowledge is, in this sense, directed toward transformation. It changes not merely individual interpretations, but the entire nexus within which appearances are understood. By recognizing the conditions of a phenomenon, what previously appeared as a problem loses its isolated character and becomes intelligible as part of a more comprehensive nexus. Problematicity can thereby be reduced, relativized, or, ideally, overcome.

Within the distinction between reality and constituted reality developed here, this determination can be reconstructed as follows: in the Buddhist approach, knowledge is directed toward a nexus underlying appearances that is to be situated closer to reality. The transformation of problematicity thus takes place through a deepened insight into this nexus.

Precisely here, once again, the difference from the theory of the problem developed in this study becomes apparent. Whereas the Buddhist approach understands knowledge as insight into already existing nexuses of conditions and regards problematicity as in principle surmountable through such insight, the present approach conceives knowledge as an operative response to problematicity. Knowledge here consists not in uncovering an underlying nexus, but in producing nexus under conditions of instability.

The transformation of problematicity in this approach does not take place through its abolition, but through its processing.

Problems do not disappear; rather, they change their form as new orders of meaning are formed, stabilized, and once again exposed to the possibility of further irritation. Knowledge is therefore directed not toward overcoming problematicity, but toward its continuing processing.

4.5 Reversal of the Analytical Direction

(Problematicity as Epistemic Beginning Instead of Conditionedness)

The approach developed here begins at a fundamentally different point from the Buddhist approach. Whereas the latter proceeds from an already presupposed nexus of conditions and directs knowledge toward insight into it, the present theory of the problem begins not with nexus, but with its absence. Its point of departure is the problem as that situation in which existing orders of meaning lose their stability, differences emerge, and connectivity is no longer guaranteed.

The problem thus designates not a disturbance within an already given order, but the situation prior to stable order. It marks the instability of meaning itself and the resulting necessity of orientation, without a viable nexus already being available. In this sense, the problem functions as the epistemic beginning: not as the result of an analysis, but as its presupposition.

From this shift follows a reversal of the analytical direction. Whereas in the Buddhist approach problems are derived from nexuses of conditions and referred back to them, in the approach developed here nexuses of conditions themselves are determined as results of problem processing. Conditions are accordingly not antecedent structures, but forms of order brought forth in the process of meaning stabilization.

Within the distinction between reality and constituted reality developed here, this means that conditionedness is not to be understood as a structuring nexus of reality, but as an order of relations generated within constituted reality. It thus belongs to those forms of meaning stabilization through which connectivity is produced under conditions of problematicity.

Precisely herein lies the systematic significance of the approach: the point of departure of knowledge is not insight into conditionedness, but the processing of problematicity. Nexus is not presupposed, but emerges. Knowledge is therefore directed not toward uncovering an already existing structure, but toward producing order under conditions of structural instability.

This reversal simultaneously shifts the status of the problem fundamentally. It is no longer to be understood as a derivative phenomenon, but as an irreducible initial structure from which meaning formation, order, and constituted reality first constitute themselves.

4.6 The Sharpest Contrast: The Core Point

(Problem and Conditionedness as Incompatible Initial Figures)

The difference between the Buddhist approach and the theory of the problem developed here can now be determined in its systematic sharpness. It concerns not individual concepts or partial aspects, but the epistemic point of departure of the respective theory.

Within the Buddhist approach, conditionedness functions as the fundamental structure. Appearances are regarded as relationally determined throughout, and knowledge is directed toward insight into these nexuses of conditions. Problematicity appears in this context as a derivative phenomenon attributable to insufficient insight into the structure of conditionedness. Its status is therefore secondary, and it is in principle transformable through knowledge.

By contrast, the approach developed here begins with the problem as the epistemic beginning. Problematicity designates the situation in which no stable nexus is available and meaning cannot be presupposed. It is not an effect, but an initial structure. Conditions appear in this context not as antecedent givens, but as results of processes of meaning stabilization.

The difference can therefore be formulated precisely: **whereas the Buddhist approach begins with an already existing nexus and derives problematicity from it, the theory of the problem begins with the absence of such a nexus and determines conditionedness as its subsequent construction.**

Applied to the distinction between reality and constituted reality developed here, this difference also becomes apparent in the respective location of structure. The Buddhist approach is directed toward a nexus that is to be situated closer to reality, whereas the present approach focuses upon the operative constitution of constituted reality and determines structure as a result of problem processing.

Two epistemic fundamental decisions thus confront one another that cannot readily be reconciled. The Buddhist approach begins with nexus and aims at insight into it; the theory of the problem begins with its absence and aims at its production. The former understands order as given and to be known, the latter as something to be produced and stabilized.

The comparison makes clear that problem and conditionedness do not represent two variants of the same point of departure, but different and mutually incompatible initial figures.

4.7 Reality, Constituted Reality, and Conditionedness

(The Dual Location of Conditionedness within the Conceptual Framework)

A further central difference between the Buddhist approach and the theory of the problem developed here concerns the status of conditionedness in relation to reality and constituted reality. The preceding comparison has shown that the Buddhist concept of conditionedness cannot be transferred directly into the conceptual framework developed here without first determining its systematic position more precisely.

Within the distinction introduced in this study, reality designates a limiting concept that eludes operative accessibility, whereas constituted reality is to be understood as the operatively generated and stabilized order of meaning. Against this background, the question arises as to how conditionedness is to be located within this conceptual framework, insofar as it constitutes a central epistemic and ontological guiding figure within Buddhism.

The answer can be given only reconstructively. In the Buddhist approach, conditionedness must initially be understood as a conceptually elaborated doctrine and therefore belongs to constituted reality, since it represents a particular form of stabilized order of meaning. At the same time, however, it points toward a nexus underlying appearances without itself being available in the form of constituted reality. Within the conceptual framework developed here, this nexus can therefore be situated closer to reality, insofar as reality is understood as a limiting nexus that conditions appearances while remaining operationally inaccessible.

Conditionedness thus occupies a dual position within the Buddhist approach. As a doctrine, it belongs to constituted reality; in terms of its systematic content, however, it points toward a nexus that, within the conceptual framework employed here, is more appropriately assigned to reality. This dual location is not to be understood as a claim made by Buddhism itself, but as the result of reconstructing it under the conditions of the distinction developed here.

Precisely here, once again, lies an essential difference from the theory of the problem. The present approach presupposes no structuring reality toward which knowledge would be directed through insight. Rather, it begins with operative instability within constituted reality and determines orders not as expressions of an antecedent nexus, but as results of problem processing. Conditionedness is, in this context, not a fundamental structure of reality but—if it

is employed at all within the present approach—an order of relations generated within constituted reality.

The systematic location of conditionedness thus once again makes visible the difference between the two approaches. Whereas the Buddhist approach presupposes a nexus that, within the framework of this study, is to be situated closer to reality, the theory of the problem determines constituted reality as the operative enactment of meaning stabilization and dispenses with the assumption of such an antecedent structural nexus.

4.8 The Limit of Reduction to Conditionedness

(The Irreducibility of Problematicity)

The preceding comparison has shown that the Buddhist approach refers problematicity back to nexuses of conditions and thereby determines it as, in principle, explicable. This determination, however, presupposes that a nexus is available to which problematicity can be referred back. It is precisely at this point that the theory of the problem developed here introduces a critical shift.

Within the present approach, problematicity cannot be completely reduced to conditions. Such a reduction would presuppose that a stable order were already available within which conditions could be identified and related to one another. Yet this is precisely not the case in the problem. Rather, the problem designates that situation in which such an order is not yet given and in which the conditions themselves must first be brought forth in the process of meaning formation.

Within the distinction between reality and constituted reality developed here, this means that conditions cannot be understood as antecedent structures of reality, but as orders generated within constituted reality. A reduction of problematicity to conditions would therefore imply that these orders already exist, although they actually first emerge within the enactment of problem processing.

Problematicity thus proves irreducible. It cannot be completely explained by reference back to nexuses of conditions, because such nexuses themselves depend upon processes of meaning stabilization that are first initiated by the problem. The problem therefore precedes every order and cannot be derived from it.

This irreducibility simultaneously marks a limit of explanatory procedures. Wherever problematicity arises, complete explanation in the sense of reduction to already given nexuses is not yet possible. Rather, the problem designates the point at which explanation begins, not the point at which it is completed.

Here, once again, lies the difference from the Buddhist approach. Whereas the latter assumes that problematicity can in principle be dissolved through insight into nexuses of conditions, the present approach determines the problem as a structure that resists such complete dissolution. Problem processing does not lead to the elimination of problematicity, but to its transformation into new forms of order that themselves remain open to renewed problematization.

The limit of reduction to conditionedness thus makes clear that problematicity cannot be understood as a derivative phenomenon, but as a fundamental structure that precedes every order and constitutes the condition of its possibility.

4.9 Epistemic Consequences

(Two Models of Knowledge and World-Relation)

The comparison developed thus far yields fundamental epistemic consequences that extend beyond a mere difference between individual concepts. The Buddhist approach and the theory of the problem developed here lead to different determinations of knowledge, world-relation, and the function of order.

Within the Buddhist approach, knowledge is primarily directed toward insight into nexuses of conditions. Appearances are regarded as relationally determined, and knowledge consists in apprehending this relationality in its structure. Problematicity appears in this context as an effect of insufficient insight and is, in principle, dissolvable through a deepened knowledge of conditions. World is thereby understood as structured, and knowledge aims at penetrating this nexus.

By contrast, within the theory of the problem developed here, knowledge receives a different determination. It is directed not toward insight into an already existing nexus, but toward the processing of problematicity. Its point of departure is not a given order, but the instability of meaning in which nexuses must first be produced. Knowledge thus consists in the operative production of order under conditions of uncertainty and absent connectivity.

Within the distinction between reality and constituted reality developed here, this difference can be further specified. Whereas the Buddhist approach is directed toward a nexus that is to be situated closer to reality and insight into which makes knowledge possible, the present approach determines knowledge as a process of meaning stabilization taking place within constituted reality. Reality functions here not as an accessible structural nexus, but as a limiting concept marking the limits of meaning formation.

Two different models of knowledge thereby emerge. Within the Buddhist approach, knowledge is directed toward uncovering a structural nexus underlying appearances. Within the present approach, knowledge is to be understood as an operative practice that produces order under conditions of problematicity without ever being able to bring that order to final closure.

This difference simultaneously concerns the status of order. In the Buddhist context, order appears as something already implicit in the structure of conditionedness and capable of being disclosed through knowledge. In the present approach, by contrast, order is not presupposed, but is the result of processes of problem processing that themselves always remain provisional.

The epistemic consequences of this difference can therefore be condensed into a precise contrast:

Whereas the Buddhist approach determines knowledge as insight into nexus, the theory of the problem conceives knowledge as the production of nexus. In the one case, order is known; in the other, it is generated. In the one case, nexus is presupposed; in the other, it emerges.

4.10 Provisional Conclusion: Problem before Conditionedness

(The Primacy of Problematicity over Order)

The preceding analysis has shown that the Buddhist approach and the theory of the problem developed here differ not merely in individual determinations, but rest upon different epistemic initial figures. Whereas Buddhism determines conditionedness as the fundamental nexus from which appearances and problematicity can be derived, the present approach begins with the problem itself.

Within the Buddhist context, conditionedness appears as the structuring nexus that determines appearances and insight into which makes knowledge possible. Problematicity is understood within this framework as an effect of insufficient insight and is, in principle, explicable through reference back to nexuses of conditions. Knowledge accordingly aims at penetrating this nexus and transforming the conditions from which problems arise.

By contrast, the theory of the problem developed here determines the problem as an irreducible initial structure. Problematicity designates the situation in which no stable nexus is available and meaning cannot be presupposed. It is not derivable from conditionedness, but constitutes the presupposition for nexuses to be determined and stabilized as such in the first place.

Within the distinction between reality and constituted reality developed here, conditionedness as a conceptual order belongs to constituted reality, whereas the nexus toward which it is directed in the Buddhist approach is to be situated closer to reality. The present approach, by contrast, dispenses with the assumption of such an antecedent structural nexus and determines constituted reality as the result of operative processes of meaning stabilization.

A clear systematic consequence thereby emerges: **conditionedness is not the point of departure, but is itself a form of order. Order, in turn, is the result of meaning formation, and meaning formation arises from the processing of problematicity. The problem is therefore not derivable from conditionedness, but is its presupposition.**

Problematicity thus proves to be a non-reducible structure. It designates the point at which meaning is not given but must be formed, and at the same time marks the limit of every explanation that relies upon already presupposed nexuses. As such, it functions as the epistemic beginning from which constituted reality, order, and knowledge can first be determined.

5. Problem and Reality

Systematic Comparison with New Realism
(Problematicity and Object Realism as Alternative Epistemic Starting Figures)

The comparison with the Buddhist approach has shown that the decisive difference lies not in individual concepts or doctrines, but in the determination of the epistemic beginning. Whereas Buddhism proceeds from a presupposed nexus and refers problematicity back to conditionedness, the theory of the problem developed here begins with the problem as an irreducible initial structure. This insight can now be examined in a second, differently situated systematic context.

With New Realism, attention now turns to a contemporary philosophical position that takes not conditionedness but reality as its primary point of departure. The difference previously established can thereby be sharpened in a modified form, and the systematic independence of the problem approach can be specified further. If the Buddhist approach already refers problematicity back to a presupposed nexus, the question now arises whether the same applies to a position that explicitly appeals to reality and objectivity.

5.1 New Realism as a Contrast Model

(Reality as the Primary Access – Systematic Classification)

New Realism, particularly as developed by Markus Gabriel, represents a systematically elaborated alternative to the theory of the problem developed here. Its point of departure lies not in the instability of meaning, but in the assumption that reality is given in the form of a plurality of domains of objects that exist independently of individual construction.

At the center stands the thesis that the world does not exist as a unified whole, but is to be understood as a plurality of fields of sense within which particular objects appear. Reality is accordingly not a comprehensive nexus, but the totality of what is the case within these fields of sense. Knowledge correspondingly aims at apprehending these objects in their respective field-membership.

New Realism thus begins from an already structured reality. Appearances are regarded not as results of meaning formation, but as really given within particular contexts. Knowledge therefore consists not primarily in the production of nexus, but in apprehending what is the case.

Within the conceptual framework developed here, this position can be reconstructed as determining reality as an accessible structural nexus. Constituted reality, by contrast, does not appear as an independent category of operative meaning formation, but as the domain in which objects appear and are described.

Precisely here lies the systematic contrast with the theory of the problem developed here. Whereas New Realism proceeds from an accessible reality, the present approach begins with the problem as that situation in which neither a stable nexus nor a determinate reality is available. As in the comparison with the Buddhist approach, it thereby becomes apparent that the difference lies not primarily in individual ontological assumptions, but in the determination of the epistemic point of departure.

5.2 Reality as Structure – Revision of the Initial Assumption

(Reality between Givenness and Limiting Concept)

In New Realism, reality is presupposed as given. It consists in the existence of objects within particular fields of sense that exist independently of individual construction and are, in principle, accessible. Structure, in this context, is not the result but the presupposition of knowledge.

Within the distinction between reality and constituted reality developed here, this assumption requires specification. Reality, in the present approach, is not an accessible domain of objects, but a limiting concept that eludes operative determination. It designates not a given structure, but the limit of what can be determined at all within constituted reality.

The assumption of a structured reality can therefore, within this conceptual framework, be reconstructed as a theoretical positing. As a conceptual determination, it belongs to constituted reality, yet it is directed toward a nexus that cannot, within this framework, be understood as operationally accessible.

Precisely here a fundamental difference becomes apparent: **whereas New Realism determines reality as structured givenness, the present approach understands reality as a limiting concept and relocates structure into the domain of constituted reality, which is conceived as the result of meaning stabilization.**

5.3 The Problem as a Derivative Category in New Realism

(The Problem as an Effect of Insufficient Knowledge)

Within New Realism, the problem receives not a fundamental but a derivative position. Problems arise where objects are not correctly apprehended or are incorrectly classified. They are expressions of a deficit in access to reality, not expressions of an original instability of meaning.

Problematicity thus points toward gaps in knowledge or misdeterminations within already existing structures. It is not primary but secondary: an effect of an insufficient description of what is the case.

Within the horizon of the theory of the problem developed here, the difference once again becomes apparent. Whereas New Realism refers the problem back to deficits in access to reality, the present approach determines the problem as the epistemic point of departure. Problematicity is understood here not as a consequence of insufficient knowledge, but as that situation from which knowledge first becomes necessary at all.

5.4 Knowledge as Access to Reality

(Apprehension Rather than Production of Structure)

Within New Realism, knowledge is determined as access to reality. It consists in correctly identifying and describing objects within their respective fields of sense. Knowledge is thus primarily descriptive: it determines what is the case rather than first producing nexus.

Problematicity appears in this context as a provisional state that can be overcome through improved knowledge. The task of knowledge is to correct this state by adequately apprehending reality in its structure.

By contrast, the present approach yields a different determination. Knowledge is not directed toward uncovering an already existing nexus, but toward processing problematicity. It consists in the production of nexus under conditions of instability. Knowledge is therefore not primarily descriptive but operative.

5.5 Reversal of the Analytical Direction

(Problematicity rather than Reality as the Epistemic Beginning)

The approach developed here begins at a fundamentally different point from New Realism. Whereas the latter proceeds from a given reality and directs knowledge toward its apprehension, the present approach begins with the problem as that situation in which it is unclear what is the case.

The problem designates the situation prior to stable determination. It marks the instability of meaning and the necessity of first producing nexus at all. Reality appears in this context not as a given structure, but as a limiting concept that eludes operative determination.

The direction of analysis is thereby reversed: **problems do not arise from an already given reality; rather, reality first becomes determinable within the process of problem processing. Nexus is not presupposed, but is a result.**

5.6 The Sharpest Contrast

(Reality and Problem as Incompatible Starting Figures)

The difference between New Realism and the theory of the problem developed here can now be determined in its systematic sharpness. It concerns not merely different descriptions of the same state of affairs, but the epistemic point of departure of the respective theory.

Within New Realism, reality functions as the point of departure. The world is structured, and knowledge consists in apprehending this structure. Objects appear as really given within particular fields of sense, and problems are deficits within this access. Their status is therefore secondary, and they are, in principle, surmountable through improved knowledge.

By contrast, the present approach begins with the problem as the epistemic beginning. Meaning is initially unstable, and nexus must first be produced. Reality is not an accessible domain, but a limiting concept marking the boundary of what can be determined within constituted reality. Problems are therefore not deficits within an already given access, but initial conditions of meaning formation.

The difference can thus be formulated precisely:

Whereas New Realism begins with what is,
the present approach begins with the indeterminacy of what is.

Whereas reality is presupposed there, the theory of the problem begins with precisely that situation in which such a determination is not yet available.

Applied to the distinction between reality and constituted reality developed here, this difference also becomes apparent in the respective location of structure. New Realism determines structure as a property of an accessible reality, whereas the present approach conceives structure as a result of problem processing within constituted reality.

Two epistemic fundamental decisions thus once again confront one another that cannot readily be reconciled. New Realism begins with reality and aims at its adequate description; the theory of the problem begins with instability and aims at the production of nexus. The former understands order as given and to be known, the latter as something to be produced and stabilized.

The comparison makes clear that reality and problem do not designate two variants of the same point of departure, but different and mutually incompatible initial figures.

5.7 Reality, Constituted Reality, and Object

(On the Systematic Location of Reality within the Conceptual Framework)

A further difference concerns the determination of reality and constituted reality. Within New Realism, reality is determined as accessible, and objects appear as independently existing. Knowledge is directed toward these objects insofar as they are given within their respective fields of sense and can be described.

Within the present approach, by contrast, reality remains a limiting concept, whereas constituted reality is determined as an operatively generated order of meaning. Objects do not appear independently of this order, but within the forms of stabilization through which constituted reality is first brought forth.

Within the distinction developed here, the difference can therefore be formulated precisely: whereas New Realism understands reality as the domain of accessible objectivity, the theory of the problem determines constituted reality as the enactment of meaning stabilization and reality as the limit of this enactment. Objects are accordingly not the point of departure, but the result of particular ordering achievements within constituted reality.

Precisely herein lies, once again, the difference between the two approaches. New Realism presupposes objectivity and reality as structurally given; the present approach, by contrast, understands objectivity as a form of determinacy brought forth within constituted reality. Reality functions here not as an accessible stock of objects, but as a limiting concept marking the provisionality of every determination.

The systematic location of reality and object thus makes visible once more that New Realism remains related to an already structured order, whereas the theory of the problem allows structure to emerge only from processes of problem processing.

5.8 The Limit of Reduction to Reality

(The Irreducibility of Problematicity)

The comparison thus far has shown that New Realism refers problematicity back to deficits in access to an already given reality. This determination, however, presupposes that reality is available as a sufficiently determinate structure to which problems can be referred back. It is precisely at this point that the theory of the problem developed here introduces a critical shift.

Within the present approach, problematicity cannot be completely reduced to reality. Such a reduction would presuppose that what is the case had already been determined and that reality were available as an ordered horizon of reference. Yet precisely this is not the case in the problem. Rather, the problem designates that situation in which such a determination is not yet given and in which what can count as reality or object must first be brought forth.

Within the distinction between reality and constituted reality developed here, this means that reality cannot be understood as an antecedent structure from which problematicity would be derived. Rather, reality remains a limiting concept, whereas the determination of what counts as actual and objective is first generated within constituted reality.

Problematicity thus proves irreducible here as well. It cannot be completely explained by reference back to an already given reality, because such a reality can itself be determined only under conditions of meaning stabilization. The problem therefore precedes every unequivocal determination and cannot be derived from it.

This irreducibility simultaneously marks the limit of realist attempts at reduction. Wherever problematicity arises, a complete explanation by reference to what is the case is not yet possible, because precisely what is the case, and in what manner, remains unclear. The problem therefore designates not a mere deficiency of description, but the point at which description first begins.

Here, once again, lies the difference from New Realism. Whereas the latter assumes that problems can, in principle, be resolved through a more adequate determination of reality, the present approach determines the problem as a structure that resists such complete dissolution. Problem processing does not lead to the elimination of problematicity, but to its transformation into new forms of order that themselves remain open to renewed problematization.

The limit of reduction to reality thus makes clear that problematicity cannot be understood as a derivative phenomenon, but as a fundamental structure that precedes every determination and constitutes the condition of its possibility.

5.9 Epistemic Consequences

(Two Models of Knowledge and World-Access)

The comparison yields fundamental epistemic consequences extending beyond a mere difference between individual concepts. New Realism and the theory of the problem developed here lead to different determinations of knowledge, world-relation, and the function of order.

Within New Realism, knowledge is primarily directed toward the description of a given reality. Objects are regarded as accessible within particular fields of sense, and knowledge consists in correctly identifying and determining these objects. Problematicity appears in this context as an effect of insufficient knowledge and is, in principle, surmountable through improved description or more precise differentiation. World is thus understood as structured, and knowledge aims at apprehending this structure.

By contrast, within the theory of the problem developed here, knowledge receives a different determination. It is directed not toward describing an already given reality, but toward processing problematicity. Its point of departure is not a presupposed order, but the instability of meaning within which determinations must first be brought forth. Knowledge therefore consists in the operative production of order under conditions of uncertainty and absent determinacy.

Within the distinction between reality and constituted reality developed here, this difference can be specified further. Whereas New Realism understands reality as an accessible structural nexus and determines knowledge as its description, the present approach conceives knowledge as a process of meaning stabilization taking place within constituted reality. Reality functions here not as an available structure, but as a limiting concept marking the provisionality of every determination.

Two different models of knowledge thereby emerge. Within New Realism, knowledge is directed toward uncovering what is the case. Within the present approach, knowledge is to be understood as an operative practice that produces nexus under conditions of problematicity without ever being able to bring that nexus to final closure.

This difference simultaneously concerns the status of order.

Within New Realism, order appears as something already implicit in the structure of reality and capable of being disclosed through knowledge. Within the present approach, by contrast, order is not presupposed, but is the result of processes of problem processing that themselves always remain provisional.

The epistemic consequences of this difference can therefore be summarized succinctly:

Whereas New Realism determines knowledge as the description of a given reality, the theory of the problem conceives knowledge as the production of order under conditions of problematicity. In the one case, reality is presupposed; in the other, it remains a limiting concept. In the one case, order is known; in the other, it is generated.

5.10 Provisional Conclusion: Problem before Reality

(The Primacy of Problematicity)

The preceding analysis has shown that New Realism and the theory of the problem developed here differ not merely in individual determinations, but rest upon different epistemic starting figures. Whereas New Realism determines reality as a given structural nexus from which objectivity and problematicity can be derived, the present approach begins with the problem itself.

Within New Realism, reality appears as an accessible structure within which objects can be determined and whose description makes knowledge possible. Problematicity is understood within this framework as an effect of insufficient determination and is, in principle, resolvable through more precise knowledge. Knowledge accordingly aims at the adequate description of what is the case.

By contrast, the theory of the problem developed here determines the problem as an irreducible initial structure. Problematicity designates the situation in which it has not yet been established what is the case and in which reality is precisely not available as a given nexus. It is not derivable from reality, but constitutes the presupposition for reality to become determinable in any way at all.

Within the distinction between reality and constituted reality developed here, it becomes apparent that New Realism conceives reality as an accessible structure, whereas the present approach determines reality as a limiting concept and understands constituted reality as the result of operative processes of meaning stabilization. Objectivity and order therefore appear not as points of departure, but as results of problem processing.

This confirms, in a second systematic context, the insight already gained from the comparison with the Buddhist approach: problematicity is not derivable from structure, but is its presupposition. Neither conditionedness nor reality can function as an epistemic beginning without already presupposing order. The problem, by contrast, designates the situation in which order is not yet given and must first be brought forth.

Problematicity thus proves irreducible also in relation to New Realism. It designates the point at which determination cannot be presupposed but must first be formed, while simultaneously marking the limit of every theory that proceeds from an already given reality. As such, it functions as the epistemic beginning from which constituted reality, order, and the determinability of reality can first be understood.

6. Problem, Meaning, and Hermeneutics

(Meaning Formation as the Result of Problem-Related Order)

The comparisons with Buddhism and New Realism have shown, in two different systematic contexts, that the present approach does not begin from an already given structure, but from the problem as that situation in which nexus and determinacy are precisely not yet available. Neither conditionedness nor reality can function as an epistemic beginning without already presupposing the very order whose genesis would first have to be explained. Problematicity, by contrast, proves to be a non-derivable initial structure from which meaning formation, order, and constituted reality can first be determined.

With hermeneutics, the question now shifts decisively. Unlike the approaches considered thus far, it does not primarily begin from a structure of appearances or of reality, but from meaning and understanding. It therefore operates in a field closer to the approach developed here than the previous contrast models. Precisely for this reason, engagement with hermeneutic approaches is of particular systematic significance: the issue is no longer primarily the question of reality or structure, but the status of meaning itself.

This proximity also changes the form of the comparison. Whereas Buddhism and New Realism each centered upon a presupposed nexus of the world, attention now turns to a mode of thought that understands meaning as a context-bound structure disclosed in enactment.

Hermeneutic approaches thereby share the insight that meaning cannot be understood as a property of reality, but arises in the process of understanding.

Precisely herein lies a fundamental point of connection with the approach advanced in this study.

The decisive difference, however, once again lies in the epistemic point of departure. Hermeneutic approaches generally assume that world appears within an already operative system of references of meaning and that understanding takes place within this system. The present approach begins earlier: not with meaning, but with its instability; not with the understanding of an already operative nexus of meaning, but with the problematicity from which such a nexus must first be brought forth.

The function of this chapter is therefore not merely to provide a further contrastive demarcation, but to determine precisely the relation between problem, meaning, and understanding. It is intended to show that meaning is not a presupposition but a result: not the horizon of understanding, but its provisional stabilization in dealing with problematicity. Understanding, accordingly, is not to be conceived as the interpretation of an already existing nexus of meaning, but as the operative enactment of meaning formation under conditions of structural instability.

This is precisely what distinguishes the present analysis from Chapters 4 and 5. There it was shown that neither conditionedness nor reality is viable as a point of departure. In relation to hermeneutics, the argument now proceeds one step further: meaning itself also proves not to be an original horizon, but something that must first be brought forth. The following investigation therefore serves not only demarcation, but also integration. Hermeneutic insights are adopted insofar as they concern the processuality, contextuality, and relationality of meaning; at the same time, their limits become visible wherever meaning is presupposed as an already operative nexus.

This can be illustrated by a situation of understanding in which an established nexus of meaning begins to falter. Consider, for example, the interpretation of a text whose central passage appears contradictory or cannot readily be integrated into the previous interpretative context.

From a hermeneutic perspective, this irritation would be understood as an occasion to expand or revise the existing nexus of meaning. What is initially unintelligible is thereby situated within an already presupposed system of references of meaning: understanding consists in reconstructing the passage in such a way that it can be integrated into the overall nexus. Irritation here functions as a moment within a fundamentally already given nexus whose structure can increasingly be explicated in the interpretative process.

Within the approach developed here, the same situation presents itself differently. The irritating passage appears not primarily as part of an already operative nexus of meaning, but as a rupture in which such a nexus is precisely unavailable. The problem consists in the fact that no stable interpretation is capable of further connection and that previous orders of meaning lose their viability. Understanding does not begin here within an existing nexus, but with the necessity of first bringing forth such a nexus at all. Interpretation is not the reconstruction of an implicitly existing meaning, but an operative achievement through which new relations are established, relevances are newly determined, and connectivity is first produced.

This difference can be sharpened further by shifting attention from the individual text to the level of narratives. From a hermeneutic perspective, a narrative is fundamentally treated as a coherent nexus of meaning that—even if it contains contradictory or unclear elements—is in principle oriented toward integration. The task of interpretation consists in reconstructing the individual elements in such a way that they become intelligible within a comprehensive structure of meaning. Ruptures, inconsistencies, or ambiguities appear as indications of a structure that has not yet been fully disclosed. The narrative is regarded as the bearer of a meaning that can be uncovered and systematized in the interpretative process.

Within the approach developed here, this perspective shifts fundamentally. A narrative appears not as an already given nexus of meaning, but as the result of processes of meaning stabilization that themselves arise from problematicity. The interpretation of a narrative therefore aims not primarily at reconstructing an underlying meaning, but at analyzing the operations through which meaning is first generated and stabilized. A narrative is, from this perspective, not the medium in which an already existing meaning comes to representation, but a form in which problematicity is processed. It organizes differences, establishes nexuses, and generates connectivity. It generates connectivity where instability previously prevailed. In this way, a new, narratively structured order of meaning is formed.

Precisely those elements that appear from a hermeneutic perspective as disturbances or inconsistencies acquire a different function here: they do not merely mark deficits in understanding, but point to those problem sites from which the narrative develops its ordering achievement. The interpretation of a narrative therefore does not consist in uncovering its hidden coherence, but in reconstructing how coherence is produced in the first place.

The central question is not what a narrative means, but how it generates meaning.

This also changes the status of meaning. Meaning appears neither in the text nor in the narrative as a pregiven magnitude, but as an effect of structuring achievements. It is not presupposed but produced and therefore remains fundamentally provisional and revisable. The difference from the hermeneutic perspective can thus be precisely formulated: whereas hermeneutics situates

irritations within an already operative nexus of meaning and understands interpretation as its explication, the present approach determines them as expressions of problematicity from which meaning first emerges. Interpretation, in this sense, is not uncovering, but the analysis of ordering achievements.

6.1 Hermeneutics as a Theory of Understanding Meaning

(Meaning as the Framework of Understanding)

Hermeneutics constitutes a central frame of reference for the analysis of understanding. Its point of departure is the assumption that world appears to human beings not as mere facticity, but as meaningfully structured constituted reality. Understanding means, in this context, disclosing phenomena within their nexuses of meaning and situating them within a more comprehensive horizon of meaning.

Characteristic of hermeneutic thought is the view that meaning is not understood as an objective property of things, but is disclosed only in the enactment of understanding. Understanding is context-bound, and meaning arises relationally, that is, in connection with other meanings, expectations, and interpretative nexuses. Nevertheless, the guiding assumption remains that understanding takes place within an already operative horizon of meaning. Meaning is therefore not first generated in the strict sense, but is to some extent already presupposed, even though it becomes accessible only through interpretation.

Hermeneutics thus develops a model in which constituted reality appears essentially as understandable constituted reality. Understanding is directed not toward mere facts, but toward meaning. The central thought is that world is always already disclosed in forms of meaning that are actualized, differentiated, and reconstructed in the interpretative process.

6.2 Shared Fundamental Assumptions

(Meaning as an Operative, Not Ontological Structure)

There are fundamental commonalities between hermeneutics and the present approach. Both assume that meaning is not a property of reality and that constituted reality cannot be understood as a mere representation of an independently given world. Meaning instead arises in enactment, and understanding is bound to processes of mediation, contextualization, and relational ordering.

On this point there is a fundamental compatibility. The approach developed here likewise understands meaning not ontologically, but operatively. Meaning is not a structure of reality, but a structure of the formation of constituted reality. It arises where differences are ordered, relevances stabilized, and nexuses established.

This proximity is systematically significant. Unlike the engagement with Buddhism or New Realism, the present approach does not here confront a theory that fundamentally subordinates meaning formation to a presupposed world structure. Rather, hermeneutics shares with the present approach the insight that meaning does not simply exist but arises in enactment. Precisely for this reason, the difference between the two approaches is not immediately obvious and requires precise determination.

6.3 Shifting the Epistemic Point of Departure

(Problem Rather than Meaning as the Beginning)

The decisive difference between hermeneutic approaches and the problem approach developed here lies in their point of departure. Hermeneutics presupposes that world already appears within a horizon of meaning and that understanding takes place within this horizon. Even if this horizon is not fully transparent and always requires interpretation, it nevertheless remains the condition of the possibility of understanding.

The present approach begins earlier. It begins not with meaning, but with its instability. The problem designates that situation in which no stable meaning is available, existing interpretative patterns fail, and orientation nevertheless remains necessary. Understanding begins here not within an already operative horizon of meaning, but where such a horizon has become questionable or has not yet been brought forth.

The epistemic beginning is thereby shifted. The point of departure is not the disclosure of an already existing nexus of meaning, but the experience of problematicity in which meaning must first be generated. Hermeneutics and the theory of the problem therefore differ not primarily in their description of individual processes of understanding, but in the question of whether meaning is to be posited as a presupposition or as a result.

6.4 Meaning as Result Rather than Presupposition

Meaning Formation as a Response to Problematicity

From this shift follows a fundamental redetermination of meaning. In hermeneutics, meaning appears as something that can be disclosed, reconstructed, and accessed within a horizon. Even though meaning is not objectively given, it nevertheless remains anchored in an already operative nexus that can be uncovered or differentiated through understanding.

By contrast, the present approach maintains that meaning arises only in dealing with problematicity. It is neither presupposed nor given nor accessible in the mode of uncovering. Meaning must instead be generated, stabilized, and secured in its capacity for further connection. It is therefore not a horizon, but an achievement.

This achievement necessarily remains provisional. For meaning formation takes place under conditions of continuing problematicity and therefore always remains subject to further irritation. Meaning appears in this context not as a closed space of significance, but as a temporary and operative stabilization of orientation. It is the result of problem processing and remains bound to the conditions from which it emerges.

6.5 Critique of the Implicit Ontologization of Meaning

(Meaning as a Boundary Case between Constituted Reality and Reality)

A critical point in hermeneutic approaches lies in the tendency to treat meaning as an implicitly presupposed horizon. Where meaning is conceived as an always already operative nexus, this can lead structures of meaning to assume the character of properties of the world. The boundary

between constituted reality and reality then becomes blurred, and order no longer appears as something brought forth, but as something already present.

The present approach avoids this shift through a clear conceptual distinction. Reality functions as a limiting concept that eludes operative accessibility, whereas constituted reality is to be determined as an order of meaning. Meaning therefore belongs exclusively to constituted reality. It is neither a property of reality nor the expression of an antecedent world structure, but the result of processes of ordering and stabilization.

Precisely herein lies the systematic limit of hermeneutic approaches. Insofar as they emphasize the contextuality and relationality of meaning, they are compatible with the present approach. Insofar as they treat meaning as an already operative horizon, however, they tend toward an implicit ontologization that obscures the genesis of meaning from problematicity.

6.6 Understanding as an Ordering Enactment

Understanding as the Operative Production of Meaning

Understanding is not conceived in the present approach as the interpretation of an already existing meaning, but as an active and ordering enactment. Understanding means ordering differences, stabilizing relevances, and establishing nexuses. It is not a merely receptive access to meaning, but the operative production of meaning under conditions of problematicity.

This determination shifts the emphasis of hermeneutics. Where hermeneutic thought describes understanding as the disclosure of a nexus of meaning, the present approach emphasizes the productive achievement of understanding itself. Understanding is not the path toward a meaning that would already be present, but the form in which meaning first becomes effective.

Understanding is thereby systematically tied back to problem processing. It appears where existing orders are insufficient and new nexuses must be established. Understanding is therefore not secondary to meaning, but one of the enactments in which meaning formation takes place.

6.7 The Problem as a Presupposition of Understanding

(The Problem as a Condition of the Possibility of Meaning Formation)

In hermeneutics, the problem frequently appears as an occasion for interpretation or as an interruption of an already existing nexus of meaning. It generally possesses not a fundamental but a secondary function: it motivates understanding without constituting its actual condition.

In the present approach, the problem is determined more fundamentally. It is not merely an occasion, but the condition under which understanding becomes necessary at all. Without problematicity, there would be no instability, no necessity of order, and therefore no meaning formation. The problem marks that situation in which understanding is not merely triggered, but first becomes necessary.

The relation between problem and understanding is thereby reversed. Understanding does not merely occasionally process problems; rather, problematicity grounds the necessity of understanding. Understanding is thus to be conceived not as the interpretation of an already given meaning, but as a response to its failure or instability.

6.8 Integration and Limitation of Hermeneutic Concepts

(Hermeneutics as a Theory of the Order of Meaning, Not of Its Origin)

Hermeneutic insights remain important for the present approach in essential respects. This concerns, in particular, the processual character of understanding, the context-dependence of meaning, and the relationality of significance. In all these respects, hermeneutics provides valuable descriptions of those structures within which meaning develops and becomes consolidated.

Hermeneutic concepts are limited, however, wherever a horizon of meaning is already presupposed and order appears as an existing condition of understanding. In this case, it remains unclear how meaning itself arises and why understanding becomes necessary in the first place. The question concerning the origin of meaning tends to be obscured by the assumption of an already operative horizon.

Within the approach developed here, hermeneutics can therefore be classified as a theory of the **structure of meaning**, but not as a theory of its **origin**. It describes how meaning organizes and discloses itself within particular nexuses, but does not sufficiently explain how these nexuses first arise under conditions of problematicity.

6.9 Provisional Conclusion: Problem before Meaning

(The Problem as the Origin of Constituted Reality and Understanding)

The analysis leads to a clear determination. Hermeneutic approaches begin with meaning, even if they conceive it not objectivistically but relationally and contextually. The approach developed here, by contrast, begins with the problem. The difference therefore concerns not merely different emphases within an account of understanding, but the question of what is to be posited as the primary structure of knowledge and constituted reality.

The central point is:

It is not meaning that makes understanding possible; rather, problematicity compels meaning. Meaning is not the framework of the problem, but its provisional stabilization. Understanding, correspondingly, is not the disclosure of an already operative space of significance, but an enactment in which nexus is established under conditions of instability.

This also confirms, in relation to hermeneutics, the fundamental thesis of the present study. Problematicity cannot be derived from meaning, but forms the point of departure from which meaning formation, understanding, and the constitution of constituted reality can first be determined. Precisely because hermeneutics stands closer to the present approach than the positions considered in Chapters 4 and 5, the comparison makes particularly clear what constitutes the systematic distinctiveness of the problem approach:

It begins not with meaning, but with the necessity of meaning.

7. Experience, Reality, and Limiting Concepts

(Experience as the Locus of the Formation of Constituted Reality in Its Limiting Relation to Reality)

7.1 Experience as the Primary Mode of the Formation of Constituted Reality

(Experience as the Operative Enactment of Genetic Meaning Formation)

Experience forms the point of departure of all formation of constituted reality. It is to be understood neither as a representation of a given reality nor as a mere reaction to external influences. Rather, it is an operative process of meaning formation within which constituted reality first arises.

Within experience, relevances are formed, Gestalten differentiated, and nexuses of meaning established. Experience is therefore not passively receptive, but constitutively active. Constituted reality does not appear independently of experience, but develops within its enactment. Experience is, in this respect, to be understood as the genetic origin of constituted reality: as the locus at which meaning first arises and becomes stabilized in provisional orders.

7.2 Reality as a Limiting Concept

The concept of reality is not to be understood within the framework of this study as an object of experience, but as a limiting concept. Reality is neither describable nor operationally accessible and does not itself belong to meaning formation. It eludes every immediate determination and cannot be conceived as part of constituted reality.

Its function consists rather in marking the non-closability of the formation of constituted reality. Reality functions as a transcendental-operative limitation of meaning: it prevents meaning from being completely stabilized, definitively closed, or identified with an alleged “world in itself.” In this sense, reality designates not something that can be known, but the limit of what can be determined at all within constituted reality.

7.3 Experience in Its Limiting Relation to Reality

(Irritation as Difference within Meaning Formation)

Experience always takes place under conditions of structural unavailability. This unavailability, however, is not to be understood as an immediate effect of reality. What appears within experience as resistance, irritation, or disturbance is not a direct encounter with reality, but an operative difference within constituted reality itself.

Experience is selective, structuring, and fundamentally open to revision. It organizes perception and meaning according to particular relevances, yet always remains susceptible to irritations that call existing orders into question. These irritations are not caused from outside, but arise within the enactment of meaning formation itself as differences that cannot immediately be integrated.

7.4 The Problem as a Boundary Phenomenon of Experience

(The Problem as a Marking of Non-Integration)

The problem arises within experience at the moment when meaning formation becomes unstable. This occurs when Gestalten disintegrate, relevances become unclear, and existing nexuses lose their viability. The problem is therefore neither an external event nor an isolated state, but a structural form of non-integration within meaning formation.

It manifests itself as tension within lived experience, as an interruption of meaning, and as a transitional point at which existing orders no longer suffice. In this sense, the problem is to be understood as a boundary phenomenon of experience: it marks the limit of stable meaning formation and at the same time opens up the possibility of its transformation.

7.5 Example: Power Outage

(Concrete Illustration of the Difference between Reality, Experience, and Constituted Reality)

The structure of the problem can be illustrated by an everyday event, such as a sudden power outage. In such a situation, what initially appears is not "reality in itself," but a change within experience: the light goes out, devices cease to function, and familiar routines are interrupted.

At first, this situation is not given as an understood event, but as an irritation within experience. The problem arises at the moment when existing orders of meaning no longer suffice, orientation is lost, and possibilities for action become unclear. The situation is not immediately interpretable, but calls for new meaning formation.

Only in the further course is the irritation structured: the interpretation "The power has gone out" is formed, possible causes are assumed, and actions are planned. In this process, concepts emerge, nexuses are established, and a new order is stabilized.

The decisive point is that the power outage as such does not constitute the problem. Rather, the problem is the instability of meaning triggered by the situation. The example illustrates the fundamental structure: experience generates irritation, the problem marks non-integration, understanding organizes it, and constituted reality stabilizes itself as the result of this process.

7.6 Experience as the Trigger of Order

(The Problem as a Transition to the Formation of Constituted Reality)

Problems function as points of transition between experience and constituted reality. They mark those situations in which existing orders of meaning are insufficient and new order must be formed. In this sense, the problem is not merely an interruption, but a productive moment within the formation of constituted reality.

Experience does not lead immediately to order, but only through the mediation of the problem. Only where instability occurs and is marked as a problem does the process of meaning organization begin. The problem is thus the trigger of the formation of constituted reality: it initiates those operations through which new nexuses are established and stabilized.

7.7 Difference between Experience and Understanding

Analog and Digital Organization of Meaning

The formation of constituted reality can be understood as the interplay of two different modes: experience and understanding. Experience is to be characterized as analog, continuous, and affective, whereas understanding operates discretely, conceptually, and structurally.

These two modes cannot be reduced to one another, but constitute different forms of meaning organization that are nevertheless inseparably intertwined. Experience provides the continuous stream of differences and irritations, whereas understanding translates them into discrete orders.

The problem arises precisely at the interface between these two modes. It marks the point at which continuous experience can no longer readily be translated into conceptual order and therefore requires reorganization.

7.8 Structural Coupling

Experience and understanding stand in a relation of structural coupling. This coupling takes place through the problem, which functions as a mediating instance between the two. Experience generates instability, the problem marks this instability, and understanding organizes it into new orders.

The problem is therefore the central point of mediation between experience and order. It connects the continuous dynamics of experience with the discrete structuring of understanding and thereby enables the ongoing formation of constituted reality.

7.9 The Non-Closability of Meaning Formation

Because reality functions as a limiting concept, every form of meaning formation remains fundamentally limited. Every order is selective, every stabilization provisional, and every explanation incomplete. Constituted reality can therefore never be completely closed.

The problem is an expression of this structural limitation. It indicates that every order is, in principle, revisable and that meaning formation never reaches a definitive conclusion. Problematicity is therefore not only the point of departure, but also a permanent companion of the formation of constituted reality. It marks the limit of stabilization and keeps meaning open.

7.10 Provisional Conclusion: Experience, Problem, and Limit

(Unity of Meaning Formation, Instability, and Limitation)

In summary:

- Experience is the locus of meaning formation.
- The problem is its instability.
- Understanding is its order.
- Constituted reality is its stabilization.

- Reality is its limit.

The guiding determination is:

Constituted reality arises in the process of experience-based meaning formation, is compelled by problems to reorganize itself, and remains in principle non-closable through its limiting relation to reality.

8. The Problem as a Boundary Structure of Knowledge

(The Problem as an Operative Difference in the Relation between Meaning Formation and Its Limit)

8.1 Difference between Experience and Understanding

(Two Operative Modes of Meaning Processing)

The preceding analyses have shown that the formation of constituted reality cannot be conceived as a unitary process, but takes place through the interrelation of two different modes of meaning processing: experience and understanding. These can be systematically determined as different forms of operative selection.

Experience operates as a continuous, bodily grounded, and pre-conceptual process in which differences are not yet unequivocally fixed. It is characterized by a high density of possibilities and can be described as analogically structured meaning processing. Understanding, by contrast, transforms this openness into discrete distinctions. It operates conceptually, relationally, and selectively, generating stable structures that secure connectivity.

The two modes cannot be reduced to one another, but constitute different yet mutually related forms of complexity processing. Their difference is irreducible and at the same time constitutive of meaning formation. This structural difference forms the point of departure for determining the problem.

8.2 Translation as Selection and Transformation

(Knowledge as Reduction of Complexity)

The relation between experience and understanding can be described as a process of transformation in which continuous offerings of meaning are translated into discrete structures. From a systems-theoretical perspective, this is a process of selection through which complexity is reduced and connectivity established.

Understanding does not operate as a representation of experience, but as its selective reconstruction. It draws distinctions, fixes relations, and generates orders that enable further operations. This transformation is necessarily reductive: it excludes possibilities in order to stabilize others.

Knowledge therefore consists not in correspondence with a given object, but in the operative reduction of complexity. It is a process of selection that translates experience into structured, connectable forms without ever being able to apprehend it completely.

8.3 The Problem as Operative Difference

(Non-Coincidence as the Systemic Limit of Selection)

The problem arises precisely where the selective transformation of experience into understanding reaches its limit. It marks the situation in which no sufficiently stable selection succeeds in securing connectivity.

From a systems-theoretical perspective, the problem can be determined as an operative difference in which the non-coincidence between continuous experience and discrete order becomes visible. Experience offers more possibilities than can be realized through selection, whereas understanding depends upon stable distinctions.

The problem is therefore neither a deficit nor a disturbance, but the expression of a structural limit of meaning processing. It arises from the difference between what is possible and what can be selectively realized. As such, it is a boundary phenomenon within the system of meaning formation itself.

8.4 The Structural Remainder as a Surplus of Contingency

(Non-Selection as a Condition of Further Selection)

The selective structure of meaning processing necessarily produces a structural remainder. Every selection implies non-selection; every order generates a domain of unrealized possibilities. This domain can be determined as a **surplus of contingency**.

The structural remainder cannot be eliminated, since every operation rests upon the difference between selection and exclusion. Nor can it be completely integrated, since every integration generates new differences. The remainder is therefore not a deficiency, but a constitutive condition of further operations of meaning.

The surplus of contingency secures the openness of meaning and enables the continuation of connecting operations. Without it, meaning would be completely determined and thereby operatively blocked.

8.5 Order and Surplus as the Dual Structure of Meaning

(Reduction and Preservation of Complexity)

Meaning formation can be described as the simultaneous reduction and preservation of complexity. Understanding reduces complexity by generating stable orders. At the same time, a surplus remains that cannot be completely integrated into this order.

This surplus is not external, but structurally connected with order itself. Every reduction generates new differences that must in turn be processed. Meaning is therefore never completely closed, but operates in a state of permanent openness.

The problem designates precisely this dual structure. It is the operative form in which the difference between order and surplus becomes visible. It marks the limit of reduction and at the same time the point of departure for further operations.

8.6 Knowledge as a Connecting Operation

(Processing Problematicity within the System)

Under these conditions, knowledge is to be understood neither as representation nor as discovery, but as a connecting operation within a system of meaning processing. It responds to problematicity by enabling new selections and restoring connectivity.

In doing so, knowledge reduces indeterminacy without completely abolishing it. It organizes differences in such a way that further operations become possible. Knowledge is therefore not a conclusion, but a continuation of meaning processing under altered conditions.

The problem functions in this context as a trigger of connecting operations. It signals the breakdown of existing orders and initiates their reorganization.

8.7 Observation and Exclusion

(The Dependence of Knowledge on Selection)

Every act of knowledge is bound to operations of observation that are necessarily selective. Observation means drawing a distinction and designating one side of that distinction. Every act of knowledge is therefore perspectival and associated with exclusions.

These exclusions are not accidental, but constitutive. They first enable the reduction of complexity required for connectivity. At the same time, they generate blind spots that cannot themselves be observed.

The problem arises precisely where these blind spots become operative. It marks the limit of observation and makes visible that every act of knowledge rests upon presuppositions that it cannot itself completely recover.

8.8 Problem and the Limiting Relation to Reality

(Reality as the Limit of Systemic Operations)

The structural remainder and the limits of observation point toward the limiting relation to reality. Reality is not to be understood here as part of the system, but as its environment in the systems-theoretical sense.

It is not operationally accessible and cannot become the object of meaning operations. Reality appears only indirectly, insofar as operations reach their limits and connectivity is interrupted.

The problem is the form in which this limiting relation appears within the system. It is not access to reality, but an indication of the limit of the system's own operations.

8.9 Provisional Conclusion: The Problem as a Systemic Boundary Structure

The analysis leads to a more precise determination of the problem in systems-theoretical terms. The problem is neither an object nor a deficit, but an operative difference within a system of meaning processing.

It designates the non-coincidence between experience and understanding that manifests itself as a limit of selection, observation, and connectivity. It is at once a limiting concept, a phenomenon of difference, and an operative structure.

The problem designates the operative manifestation of the non-coincidence of experience and understanding as a limit of systemic meaning processing in its limiting relation to reality.

The problem thereby proves to be a central structure of knowledge. It is not that which must be overcome, but that through which the system of meaning processing is kept in motion in the first place.

9. Integration and Overall Structure of the Theory

(Structural Unity of the Constitution of Constituted Reality)

9.1 Aim of the Integration

(From Conceptual Analysis to Systematic Unity)

The preceding chapters have determined the central concepts of this study—reality, experience, understanding, constituted reality, and problem—in their respective specific functions and situated them within different theoretical contexts. The aim of the present chapter is not merely to bring these determinations together, but to make their systematic unity visible.

This unity does not consist in the ordering of different domains of objects or in a stratification of ontological levels. Rather, it is a functional structure of meaning formation that takes place under conditions of problematicity. The individual concepts are therefore not to be understood as isolated magnitudes, but as moments of a nexus that can be adequately determined only through their interplay.

9.2 The Basic Structure of the Constitution of Constituted Reality

Interplay of Experience, Understanding, and Constituted Reality

The formation of constituted reality can be reconstructed as a process in which three operative moments interact: experience, understanding, and constituted reality.

Experience functions as the genetic mode of meaning formation. Within it, relevances, differences, and initial Gestalten emerge without yet being conceptually fixed or stably organized. Understanding assumes the structural organization of these offerings of meaning. It transforms continuous experience into discrete relations, fixes meanings, and establishes connectivity. Constituted reality, finally, designates the respectively achieved form of stabilized order of meaning in which these processes provisionally sediment.

These three moments are neither independent of one another nor reducible to one another. Rather, they form a functional unity: **experience generates meaning, understanding structures it, and constituted reality stabilizes it.** The constitution of constituted reality is therefore to be conceived not as a static givenness, but as an operative nexus.

9.3 Reality as a Limiting Relation

(Limitation and Preservation of the Openness of Meaning Formation)

Within this structure, reality does not appear as a further moment alongside experience, understanding, and constituted reality. It is not a component of meaning formation, but its limiting concept. As such, it eludes every operative determination.

Its function consists in limiting meaning formation without determining it substantively. Reality prevents the orders that have been brought forth from being identified with a “world in itself” and at the same time secures the principled openness of all meaning formation. It does not appear directly, but only indirectly at the limits where stabilization does not completely succeed.

Reality thereby functions as a necessary point of reference that structurally anchors the non-closability of the constitution of constituted reality.

9.4 The Problem as a Systematic Nodal Point

(Connection of All Moments of the Constitution of Constituted Reality)

Within this overall structure, the problem occupies a central position. It is the point at which the differences among the individual moments converge and become visible.

The problem arises where experience cannot be stably integrated, where understanding reaches its limit, and where constituted reality loses its existing order. It thus marks the situation in which the functional unity of experience, understanding, and constituted reality is interrupted and must be reorganized.

In this sense, the problem is to be determined as a **systematic nodal point**. It connects meaning formation and its limit, instability and order, openness and structure. It is neither an isolated phenomenon nor a secondary appearance, but the operative form in which the entire structure of the constitution of constituted reality is referred back to itself.

9.5 Dynamics of the Formation of Constituted Reality

(From Problem to Order and Back Again)

The structure described is not static, but processual. The formation of constituted reality takes place as an ongoing movement that can be described in a recurring sequence.

Experience initially generates offerings of meaning that remain open and unstable in their structure. The problem marks those situations in which these offerings of meaning cannot be sufficiently integrated. Understanding intervenes at this point and reorganizes the instability by establishing relations and fixing meanings. Constituted reality stabilizes this order and establishes connectivity. Yet from this stabilization new differences arise that can in turn become problematic.

The process is therefore, in principle, non-closable. In this context, the problem functions as the **driving force of the formation of constituted reality**. It initiates processes of reorganization and prevents order from passing into a final state.

9.6 Unity without Totality

(Nexus under Conditions of Openness)

The structure described forms a unity, but not a totality. Its unity consists not in completeness or final integration, but in the functional coherence of its moments.

This follows for several reasons: reality remains inaccessible as a limiting concept, meaning formation necessarily operates selectively, and every order remains provisional and open to revision. The constitution of constituted reality is therefore not to be conceived as a closed totality, but as an open nexus that stabilizes itself through ongoing reorganization.

The unity of the theory thus lies not in the abolition of differences, but in their structured interrelation.

9.7 Methodological Consequence

(Knowledge as the Processing of Problematicity)

From the integrated structure follows a clear methodological redetermination of knowledge. Knowledge is to be understood neither as a representation of a given reality nor as the discovery of an antecedent structure.

Rather, it is to be determined as the **processing of problematicity**. Knowledge consists in the structuring of experience, the stabilization of meaning, and the establishment of connectivity. It operates selectively, is in principle provisional, and remains open to revision.

The methodological focus thereby shifts: at the center stands not the securing of truth in the sense of correspondence with a reality, but the operative management of instability.

9.8 Avoidance of Ontological Misinterpretations

Modes of Order rather than Domains of Being

The concepts introduced within the framework of this study designate neither ontological entities nor separate worlds. Nor are they to be understood as levels of a hierarchically ordered being.

Rather, they are different modes of order within a unified process of meaning formation. Reality is not a being, constituted reality is not a second world, and experience and understanding are not separate spheres, but functional moments of a nexus.

This clarification is necessary in order to avoid misunderstandings resulting from an unreflective ontologization of the concepts employed.

9.9 Systematic Overall Formula

(Condensation of the Theory)

The entire structure of the constitution of constituted reality can be summarized in a compact formulation:

Constituted reality arises as an operatively stabilized order of meaning in the interplay of experience and understanding, yet remains in principle non-closable through its limiting relation to reality and is continuously compelled by the problem to reorganize itself.

9.10 Signature Sentence of the Approach

(Condensation of the Epistemic Point of Departure)

The central shift of the approach can be expressed in pointed form:

It is not meaning that makes understanding possible; rather, the problem compels meaning.

This sentence captures the systematic core of the study: meaning is not the point of departure, but the result of problem processing.

9.11 Significance and Scope

(Consequences for Theory and Practice)

The structure developed here has far-reaching consequences. For epistemology, it means that knowledge is to be understood as a process rather than as representation. For methodology, it follows that all forms of order are constructed and open to revision. For practice, it follows that problems are not disturbances to be eliminated, but productive points of departure to be processed.

The problem thus appears not as an obstacle, but as a central resource of knowledge.

9.12 Concluding Determination

(The Problem as Origin, Limit, and Driving Force)

The integrated analysis leads to a concluding determination of the problem. It is at once the origin of meaning, the limit of order, and the driving force of change. In it converge the conditions of the possibility of the formation of constituted reality.

The problem is thus not one phenomenon among others, but the central concept through which the entire structure of the theory can be disclosed.

10. The Problem as a Fundamental Structure of the Formation of Constituted Reality

(Systematic Overall Conclusion and Theoretical Consequences)

The present investigation aimed to release the concept of the problem from its marginal position within epistemological and systems-theoretical reflection and systematically to reconstruct it as a central category of the formation of constituted reality. Its point of departure was the thesis that the problem is to be understood not as a deficit, disturbance, or mere expression of ignorance, but as an autonomous structure that precedes the constitution of meaning while at the same time permeating it.

The analysis has shown that conventional epistemological approaches generally take their point of departure from already stabilized forms of order—whether in the form of nexuses of conditions, reality, or horizons of meaning. By contrast, the course of this study has shifted the epistemic beginning. In place of pregiven order stands the problem as that situation in which order is precisely not available but must first be produced.

This shift was developed in several systematic steps. First, it was shown that constituted reality is to be understood not as a given structure, but as the result of processes of meaning stabilization. Experience functions here as the genetic mode of meaning formation, whereas understanding assumes the discrete structuring and stabilization of meaning. Between the two there exists an irreducible difference that cannot be abolished but first makes possible the dynamics of the formation of constituted reality.

In this context, the problem was determined as a boundary phenomenon arising precisely at the interface between experience and understanding. It marks the non-coincidence between continuous experience and discrete order and thereby points to a structural limit of meaning formation. This limit is not contingent but constitutive: it results from the selective structure of meaning itself, which necessarily reduces complexity while always generating a surplus that eludes complete integration.

From a systems-theoretical perspective, this structure could be described as the difference between selection and non-selection, between order and a surplus of contingency. The problem appears here as the operative form in which this difference becomes visible. It is neither an external disruptive factor nor an internal deficit, but an expression of the limit of systemic meaning processing. As such, it functions as a trigger of connecting operations and sustains the dynamics of knowledge and the formation of constituted reality.

The comparison with alternative theoretical positions further sharpened this determination. In comparison with Buddhism, it became apparent that conditionedness is there conceived as an antecedent nexus from which problematicity can be derived. The approach developed here reverses this perspective by determining conditionedness itself as a result of problem processing. In comparison with New Realism, it became apparent that the assumption of an accessible reality as a point of departure likewise presupposes an already stabilized order. Reality was instead reconstructed as a limiting concept that eludes operative determination and marks the non-closability of meaning formation. Finally, in the engagement with hermeneutics, it could be shown that meaning, too, cannot be presupposed as an original horizon, but itself emerges from problematicity.

Understanding is therefore to be conceived not as the interpretation of an already given meaning, but as the operative production of meaning under conditions of instability.

From these analyses follows a fundamental redetermination of knowledge. Knowledge is neither a representation of reality nor the discovery of a pregiven order. Rather, it is to be understood as the processing of problematicity. It consists in the selective structuring of differences, the establishment of connectivity, and the temporary stabilization of meaning. Knowledge reduces indeterminacy without ever being able to abolish it completely.

This also shifts the status of truth and order. Truth no longer appears as correspondence with a reality, but as stability within processes of meaning formation. Order is not presupposed, but is the result of operations that themselves respond to problematicity. Every order remains selective, provisional, and in principle revisable.

Against this background, the problem proves to be a fundamental structure of the formation of constituted reality. It is the condition under which meaning must be formed at all and, at the same time, the limit at which every formation of meaning encounters its own finitude. It connects experience and understanding, initiates processes of knowledge, and points toward the limiting relation to reality.

The guiding determination of the study can therefore be formulated in pointed form:

The problem is the operative mode of appearance of the difference between meaning formation and its limit.

In this function, it cannot be dissolved but is constitutive. It is not that which must be overcome, but that through which constituted reality, knowledge, and meaning first become possible.

The theoretical consequence of this determination is that every form of order refers back to problematicity and remains dependent upon it. Constituted reality is not what is, but what can be stabilized under conditions of problematicity. Knowledge is not the abolition of indeterminacy, but its processing. And meaning is not given, but is the result of operations that always take place at a limit they themselves cannot cross.

The problem is thereby established as the central category of a theory of the formation of constituted reality. It marks not only the beginning of knowledge, but also its enduring condition. In it, it becomes apparent that meaning never becomes completely identical with itself, but always remains related to a difference that both makes it possible and limits it.

Constituted reality begins not with meaning, but with its becoming questionable. And it ends not with order, but at the limit at which it once again becomes problematic.

Mosaic Piece: Emotion Feeling Intuition



General Outline:[4]

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[4] A detailed outline is provided on pp. 457-459.

1. Object, Aim, and Method of the Study

1.1 Object of the Study

The object of the present study is the systematic determination of emotion, feeling, and intuition as fundamental structures of affective meaning formation on the basis of experience, understanding, and problem. The focus is not upon the isolated description of individual affective phenomena, but upon the reconstruction of their functional role within the constitution of constituted reality.

The point of departure is the thesis that constituted reality is not to be understood as a representation of a given reality, but as the result of an operative process of meaning formation that takes place primarily in the enactment of the formation of experience. Experience appears here as a bodily-affectively structured process in which relevances, Gestalten, and orders are brought forth before they are conceptually stabilized. Understanding is conceived as a mediating achievement that transforms experience-based meaning into symbolic, relational, and explicit forms. The problem, in turn, designates those situations in which these orders of meaning become unstable and reorganization becomes necessary.

Against this background, emotion, feeling, and intuition are determined as constitutive moments of this overall nexus. Emotions are to be understood not as subsequent reactions to already given situations, but as operative achievements of differentiation through which relevances, weightings, and orientations first emerge within the field of experience. They structure the field of lived experience prior to every conceptual order and thereby open up the possibility of meaning formation.

Feelings appear as the bodily experienceable manifestations of this emotional order. In them, the implicit structure of experience becomes manifest in a manner that can neither be completely dissolved conceptually nor regarded as arbitrary. Feelings mediate between the prereflective level of experience and the possibility of its later explication in thought.

Intuition, finally, can be determined as a particular form of implicit understanding. It designates those condensations of experience-based meaning formation in which, without explicit conceptual mediation, a form of orientation develops that can become effective in guiding action. Intuition is therefore neither irrational nor merely heuristic, but a distinctive mode of human organization of meaning in the transition from experience to thought.

The study thus aims to treat emotion, feeling, and intuition not as separate phenomena, but as functionally interrelated moments of a unified process of the constitution of constituted reality. Within this process, emotions form the structural basis of the setting of relevance, feelings its bodily evidence, and intuition its condensed Gestalt in the enactment of implicit understanding.

The object of the investigation is therefore not the individual affective event, but the affective structure of meaning formation itself—understood as a fundamental, irreducible component of the human relation to the world that permeates both experience and understanding and is continuously transformed under conditions of problematicity.

1.2 Aim of the Study

The aim of the present study is to develop a coherent theoretical model in which emotion, feeling, and intuition are systematically determined as constitutive structures of affective meaning formation and integrated into their nexus with experience, understanding, and problem.

Proceeding from the thesis that constituted reality is not pregiven but is brought forth in the enactment of experience, the study aims to clarify precisely the role of affective processes within this constitution. In particular, it rejects the assumption that emotions are merely accompanying or disruptive factors of rational knowledge. Instead, it seeks to show that they perform fundamental achievements of differentiation without which neither the formation of relevance nor orientation would be possible.

A first aim is therefore to reconstruct emotions as operative structures of meaning formation. Emotions are understood not as states, but as processes through which the field of experience is articulated. They mark what becomes significant, what is foregrounded or relegated to the background, and thereby form the basis of every further organization of meaning.

A second aim lies in the systematic differentiation between emotion and feeling. Whereas emotions are determined as implicit, structuring processes, feelings are to be reconstructed as their bodily experienceable manifestations. The study aims to clarify this distinction conceptually without dissolving the close functional interrelation between the two levels.

A third aim is to determine intuition as a form of implicit understanding. Intuition is understood not as an uncertain or irrationally abbreviated form of knowledge, but as a condensation of experience-based meaning formation in which orientation develops without explicit conceptual mediation. It thus appears as a transitional form between experience and thought and as a distinctive structure within the process of understanding.

A fourth aim of the study is to integrate emotion, feeling, and intuition into the overall nexus of the mosaic stones. In particular, it is to be shown:

- that emotions form the affective basis of the orders of meaning emerging within experience,
- that feelings render these orders bodily evident,
- that intuition represents their implicit organization within understanding,
- and that the problem, as a boundary phenomenon, destabilizes these structures and compels their reorganization.

A model is thereby developed in which affective processes do not stand alongside experience and understanding but co-determine their innermost structure.

Finally, an overarching aim is to formulate a non-reductionist theory of world-access in which affective, bodily, and conceptual processes are understood as moments that cannot be reduced to one another but are nevertheless interwoven.

Within this framework, constituted reality appears as a provisionally stabilized order that emerges from the interplay of experience, understanding, and affective meaning formation and is at the same time continuously affected by problematicity.

The study thus understands itself not as the completion of a theory, but as a contribution to the further elaboration of an open, processual understanding of knowledge in which emotion, feeling, and intuition are identified as indispensable fundamental dimensions of the human relation to the world.

1.3 Method of the Study

The present investigation follows a phenomenological-reconstructive approach. Its aim is neither the empirical measurement of affective states nor the construction of a closed theoretical system, but the explication of those structures in which emotion, feeling, and intuition manifest themselves in the enactment of experience and understanding.

The point of departure is the description of enactments close to experience. The inquiry asks how relevances emerge within lived experience, how situations are emotionally accentuated, how bodily affectedness manifests itself, and in what manner implicit forms of orientation and decision arise from these processes. These descriptions do not serve to illustrate already established theses, but to disclose those structures that precede every conceptual order.

The analysis thus moves within the tension between experience and thought. On the one hand, it takes account of the prereflective dimension of affective meaning formation in which emotions, feelings, and intuition are operative; on the other hand, it considers the reflective level of the understanding, at which these processes are conceptually explicated, stabilized, and rendered communicable. Methodologically, this difference is not abolished but deliberately maintained in order to make visible the distinctiveness of both levels.

The phenomenological description is supplemented by process-philosophical considerations. These make it possible to understand emotion, feeling, and intuition not as static states, but as dynamic, temporally structured processes. From this perspective, meaning does not arise punctually, but in movements of condensation, displacement, and reorganization.

In addition, systems-theoretical considerations are incorporated, particularly with regard to self-reference, stabilization, and relational order. This perspective makes it possible to conceive affective processes as operative structures that are effective within the overall system of experience and understanding without being reducible to individual psychological states.

The study deliberately refrains from reductionist explanatory models that reduce emotions either to neurobiological processes or to conceptual constructions. Instead, the difference between lived experience and its conceptual representation is taken seriously as constitutive.

Overall, the method aims to reconstruct the affective fundamental structures of meaning formation in such a way that their role within the constitution of constituted reality becomes visible without reducing them to other levels or incorporating them into a closed system.

1.4 Systematic Classification within the Context of the Mosaic Stones

(Emotion, Feeling, and Intuition as an Affective Fundamental Dimension within the Nexus of Experience, Understanding, and Problem)

The present mosaic stone is embedded within a broader theoretical nexus structured by the already developed mosaic stones **Experience**, **Understanding**, and **Problem**. Together, these

studies form an open, processual model of the constitution of constituted reality in which meaning is not presupposed but brought forth in enactment.

Within this nexus, the mosaic stone **"Emotion – Feeling – Intuition"** assumes a specific function: it reconstructs the affective dimension of meaning formation that is already implicitly present in the other mosaic stones but has not yet been systematically developed.

The mosaic stone **"Experience"** shows that constituted reality cannot be understood as a representation of a given reality, but as the result of a bodily and emotionally structured process of meaning constitution. Experience appears there as the primary mode in which relevances, Gestalten, and nexuses of meaning are brought forth. Emotions already become visible in this context as fundamental structural moments insofar as they enable the weighting and articulation of the field of experience.

The mosaic stone **"Understanding"** expands this perspective by determining understanding as a mediating process between experience-based meaning formation and conceptual stabilization. Understanding appears as a movement between an implicit, affectively shaped mode of experience and an explicit, symbolically structured mode of thought. The affective dimension nevertheless remains in the background, although it forms the basis of implicit understanding.

The mosaic stone **"Problem"** shifts the point of departure of the analysis by beginning not with stable orders of meaning, but with their instability. The problem is determined as the operative mode of appearance of the limit of meaning formation in which existing orders become questionable and new structuring becomes necessary. This makes clear that the constitution of constituted reality is not only a process of stabilization but equally a process of irritation and reorganization.

Against this background, the position of the present mosaic stone can be determined precisely:

- **Emotions form the affective fundamental structure of the order of meaning emerging within experience. They are the processes in which relevance, weighting, and orientation are brought forth.**
- **Feelings constitute the bodily evidence of this emotional order. In them, the structure of experience becomes immediately experienceable without yet being completely conceptually fixed.**

- **Intuition functions as an implicit organizational form of this meaning formation within understanding. It makes it possible to form action-guiding Gestalten under conditions of limited conceptual graspability.**

The mosaic stone thus fulfills a dual function within the overall project. First, it explicates the affective basis of experience that is presupposed in the other studies but has not yet been systematically developed. Second, it shows that understanding is not possible without affective structuring, since every form of meaning organization rests upon antecedent formations of relevance.

At the same time, the inclusion of the concept of the problem makes visible that affective order is not stable but changes continuously in the enactment of experience. Emotional structures can shift, intensify, or dissolve; feelings can lose their evidence; intuitions can prove inadequate. In these processes, the dynamics of the constitution of constituted reality become apparent as an interplay of stabilization and destabilization.

The present mosaic stone is therefore neither a mere supplement nor an isolated subfield, but a necessary deepening of the overall model. It makes clear that affective processes stand not at the margins but at the center of the constitution of experience, understanding, and constituted reality.

In systematic terms, the nexus of the mosaic stones can therefore be summarized as follows:

- Reality functions as a transcendental limiting concept.
- Experience forms the genetic process of meaning constitution.
- Emotion structures this process affectively.
- Feeling renders this structure bodily evident.
- Understanding organizes and stabilizes the meaning brought forth.
- Intuition mediates between implicit experience and explicit thought.
- Problem marks the limit and the driving force of these processes.

This structure forms the theoretical framework within which the following investigations of emotion, feeling, and intuition are conducted.

2. Emotion, Feeling, and Intuition in the Context of Experience and Understanding

(Affective Meaning Formation as a Fundamental Dimension of World-Access)

2.1 Emotion as a Structural Moment of Experience

Emotion as an Antecedent Achievement of Differentiation within Experience-Based Meaning Formation

The determination of emotion, feeling, and intuition must begin with their relation to experience. If—as developed in the mosaic stone **"Experience"**—experience is understood not as a representation of a given reality but as an operative process of meaning formation, the question arises as to what structures this process and how order can emerge at all within the openness of lived experience.

Experience does not appear as a uniform field of neutral impressions. Rather, it manifests itself as an occurrence of differentiations, weightings, and accentuations. Something comes to the fore while something else recedes; some things acquire urgency, while others lose significance. This structuring is not the result of subsequent conceptual ordering but is already operative within the enactment of experience itself.

At this point, the fundamental function of emotions becomes visible.

Emotions are not to be understood as reactions to already determined states of affairs. They do not begin with a finished, objectively given world in order subsequently to evaluate it from a particular perspective. Rather, they are those processes through which the field of experience is first articulated at all. Emotions operate as achievements of differentiation in which relevance emerges, attention is bound, and orientation becomes possible.

This fundamentally shifts the classical perspective on emotion. Emotions appear not as secondary accompaniments of processes of understanding, but as their presupposition. Without emotional structuring, there would be no foregrounding, no weighting, and therefore no meaningful organization of lived experience.

This insight stands in direct continuity with the determination of experience as an energetic process of meaning formation. Experience is not passive but an enactment in which nexuses of meaning develop. Emotions are that dimension of this enactment in which it is decided what appears as significant in the first place. In this sense, it can be said:

Emotions do not merely open access to the world; they determine the manner in which world appears at all.

This determination can be further specified by considering the role of emotions in the process of relevance formation. What comes to the fore within the field of experience is not accidental but follows implicit orders of proximity and distance, urgency and indifference, attraction and repulsion. These orders are not the result of conscious decisions but the expression of emotional structuring.

Emotions mark what emerges as significant before this significance can be conceptually explicated.

At the same time, these emotional structurings are not arbitrary. Human beings do not freely decide what affects, unsettles, or leaves them indifferent. Emotions elude complete control and thereby point to the embeddedness of the experiential process within conditions that cannot be fully controlled. In this respect, they exhibit a limiting relation that later reappears in the concept of the problem as the structural instability of orders of meaning.

The determination of emotions as a structural moment of experience thus leads to a twofold insight. **First**, emotions are constitutive of the formation of meaning because they bring forth the differentiations through which the field of experience is articulated. **Second**, they are not completely available to deliberate control, but point toward the limits of meaning formation within which experience takes place.

Emotions thereby appear as a fundamental, irreducible dimension of the experiential process. They can neither be reduced to bodily states nor completely translated into conceptual structures. Rather, they form a distinctive level of meaning formation that permeates and structures both experience and understanding.

In the further course of the investigation, it will be shown that feeling and intuition build upon this emotional structure and each represent specific ways in which this implicit order becomes experienceable and effective in guiding action.

2.2 Feeling as the Bodily Concretization of Meaning

Feeling as the Bodily Experienceable Manifestation of Emotionally Structured Constituted Reality

Building upon the determination of emotion as a structuring achievement of differentiation within experience, the question arises as to how this implicit order can become accessible at all. At this point, the concept of feeling acquires its systematic significance.

Feelings are not identical with emotions, but designate the manner in which emotional structures become bodily experienceable. They are not additional states appended to an already existing experience, but the mode of appearance in which the implicit order of emotion manifests itself within lived experience.

It thereby becomes clear that feeling cannot be understood as a purely intrapsychic state. Feelings are neither mere states of mind nor isolated mental contents. Rather, they are expressions of bodily embeddedness within the process of meaning formation.

In feeling, the manner in which world is always already disclosed becomes experienceable—not as an objective property, but as a mode of being affected.

This bodily dimension is decisive.

The body is not an external carrier medium, but the field in which proximity and distance, tension and relief, threat and openness can first manifest themselves. Feelings are the form in which these differences appear within lived experience. They do not merely provide information about an internal state, but articulate the structure of the relation to the world itself. In this sense, it can be said:

Feelings are the bodily evidence of meaning.

What is implicit in emotion as differentiation becomes experienceable in feeling as concrete affectedness. Feeling shows not only **that** something is significant, but also **how** it is significant—as oppressive, relieving, attractive, repellent, sustaining, or irritating.

This evidence, however, is of a particular kind. It is not the result of conceptual determination but precedes it. Feelings are immediate, though not in the sense of something raw and unformed. Rather, their immediacy is itself the result of an emotional structuring of the field of experience that has already taken place.

At the same time, feelings are neither completely unambiguous nor completely determinable. They resist complete conceptual fixation and always retain a qualitative surplus over their linguistic description. In this respect, they mark a limit of conceptual graspability that is of central importance for understanding experience and understanding itself.

This boundary position becomes particularly apparent in the relation between feeling and reflection. Feelings can become objects of thought; they can be described, classified, and interpreted. Yet at the moment in which they are conceptually grasped, they necessarily lose part of their original evidence. The bodily immediacy of feeling cannot be completely translated into conceptual structures.

A structural difference thereby becomes visible:

Feeling belongs to the implicit order of experience, whereas its conceptual determination belongs to the explicit order of understanding.

At the same time, feeling mediates between these two levels. It is the point at which the implicit structure of experience manifests itself in a manner that is in principle accessible but cannot be completely expressed linguistically. In this sense, feeling assumes a mediating function: it connects prereflective meaning formation with the possibility of its subsequent conceptual articulation.

This mediating function becomes particularly clear in relation to self-reference. In feeling, the human being experiences not only a relation to the world but also a relation to oneself. Feelings are therefore not merely world-relation but at the same time self-relation. They contribute to the constitution of the self by enabling a form of immediate self-certainty that is not based upon conceptual reflection.

Feelings are thus the bodily experienceable manifestations of emotional order. They render the implicit structure of experience evident without making it completely explicable. They mediate between the prereflective level of experience and the reflective level of understanding.

2.3 Intuition as Implicit Understanding

(Intuition as a Condensed Gestalt of Experience-Based Meaning Formation in the Transition to Thought)

Following the determination of emotion as a structuring achievement of differentiation and feeling as the bodily evidence of this structure, the question arises as to how forms of orientation emerge from this implicit order that go beyond mere affectedness and point toward decision, assessment, and the capacity for action.

At this point, the concept of intuition comes to the fore.

Intuition does not designate an additional source of knowledge alongside experience and thought, but a specific form in which experience-based meaning organizes itself. It is neither purely affective nor already conceptually elaborated. Rather, it is to be understood as a condensation of implicit meaning formation in which orientation takes shape in a manner that can become immediately relevant to action.

Intuition thereby differs from both emotion and feeling. Whereas emotions structure the field of experience and feelings render this structure bodily experienceable, intuition designates the manner in which this structure becomes a Gestalt of understanding. Intuition is therefore not a crude preliminary stage of thought, but a distinctive form of implicit understanding.

This determination can be specified by considering intuition within the context of the dual structure developed in the mosaic stone **"Understanding."** Understanding takes place there as mediation between an implicit, experience-based mode and an explicit, conceptually structured mode. Within this context, intuition belongs to the implicit domain without, however, being identical with mere experience.

Intuition is rather the point at which implicit meaning assumes a form that is already operative as understanding without being explicitly articulated in concepts.

In intuitive moments, this becomes apparent when something seems "clear" without this clarity being conceptually justifiable. Decisions are made, nexuses grasped, or assessments formed without the underlying differentiations being explicitly reconstructed. This immediacy, however, is not an expression of arbitrariness, but the result of meaning formation that has already taken place without being fully explicated.

Intuition is therefore not irrational, but **prereflectively rational**, insofar as it rests upon an order already formed within the process of experience.

This order is essentially shaped by emotional structuring. Intuition is not independent of emotion but builds upon it. The relevances established in emotion and the structures made experienceable in feeling condense in intuition into a form that enables orientation without taking the detour through explicit conceptual formation. In this sense, it can be said:

Intuition is the Gestalt in which emotionally structured meaning becomes operative as implicit understanding.

At the same time, intuition is not freely available. It cannot be arbitrarily generated or controlled. Intuitive insights arise in processes that elude complete direction. This points—analogously to the structure of emotion—to a dimension of unavailability that is constitutive of meaning formation as a whole.

This unavailability becomes particularly apparent in situations in which intuition fails or proves inadequate. Precisely in such moments, it becomes visible that intuitive certainty guarantees no absolute security but is itself part of an open process capable of revision. Here the connection with the concept of the problem emerges: intuition can be irritated, corrected, or reorganized through problematic situations.

Intuition thereby receives a twofold determination. **On the one hand**, it is a form of orientation that makes it possible to remain capable of action under conditions of limited explicability. **On the other hand**, it is itself part of an open process characterized by instability and reorganization.

In systematic terms, intuition assumes a mediating function. It stands between the implicit order of experience and the explicit order of thought. It can be transformed into conceptual forms without being completely absorbed by them. At the same time, it can be modified, specified, or corrected through conceptual reflection. Thus:

Intuition is neither mere experience nor already thought, but the transitional form in which both modes relate to one another.

It is the operative point at which it is decided whether and how implicit meaning is transformed into explicit order.

Intuition is therefore the condensed Gestalt of experience-based meaning formation in the mode of implicit understanding. It enables orientation and decision under conditions of limited conceptual expressibility. It mediates between emotionally structured experience and the conceptual order of thought.

2.4 Relation to Experience and Understanding

(Affective Meaning Formation in the Tension between Analog Experience and Digital Stabilization)

The preceding analysis has shown that emotion, feeling, and intuition are to be understood as different but interrelated moments of affective meaning formation. In order to clarify their systematic position fully, it is necessary to determine their relation to the two fundamental modes of world-access developed in the mosaic stones **"Experience"** and **"Understanding"**: experience-based, analog meaning formation and understanding-based, digital stabilization.

The point of departure is the insight that experience and understanding do not constitute isolated domains, but two structurally different yet complementary ways in which constituted reality emerges. Experience is the mode in which meaning arises bodily, situationally, and prereflectively; understanding is the mode in which this meaning is transformed into discrete, relational, and symbolically available forms.

Against this background, emotion, feeling, and intuition can be clearly situated.

Emotions belong primarily to the level of experience. They are an integral component of analog meaning formation, within which the field of experience is articulated. In them, it is determined what comes to the fore, what acquires significance, and how the field of possible orientation is structured. Emotions do not operate in clearly delimited units, but in continuous transitions, intensities, and tensions. They are therefore to be assigned to the analog character of experience.

Feelings occupy a particular position within this structure. They likewise belong to the level of experience, but at the same time mark a threshold toward explicability. In feeling, the implicit order of emotion becomes evident in a manner that can in principle be thematized without already being completely conceptually determined. Feelings are thus not only part of experience but at the same time points of departure for its reflective explication.

Intuition, finally, stands at the boundary between experience and understanding. It is neither purely analog nor already digitally structured. In intuition, experience-based meaning condenses into a form that is already effective as orientation but has not yet been transformed into discrete conceptual units. Intuition is therefore the transitional form in which the continuity of experience is transformed into a potential structure of thought.

This transitional position is decisive for understanding the process of understanding. Understanding operates in discrete units: concepts, categories, relations, and logical structures. It stabilizes meaning by fixing it, rendering it distinguishable, and situating it within a network of relations. This stabilization is necessary in order to enable communication, reflection, and systematic knowledge. At the same time, it entails a loss: the continuity and multilayered character of experience are necessarily reduced within conceptual order.

Emotion, feeling, and intuition stand in a relation of tension to this reductive achievement.

Emotions largely resist conceptual fixation. Their dynamics cannot be transformed into discrete units without loss. Feelings can indeed be described, but their bodily evidence always retains a surplus over their linguistic representation. Intuition, finally, can be translated into concepts, but in doing so loses its original immediacy and wholeness.

This tension is a constitutive feature of world-access.

Without the affective dimension, there would be no relevance, no orientation, and no basis for meaning formation. Without conceptual stabilization, there would be no possibility of fixing, examining, and communicating meaning. Both modes are therefore dependent upon one another without being reducible to one another.

In this context, the role of intuition becomes particularly clear. It functions as a mediating instance that makes it possible to transform implicit meaning into a form capable of connecting with understanding without completely determining it. Intuition, as it were, prepares conceptual order without fixing it.

At the same time, understanding can act back upon the affective dimension. Concepts, models, and reflections can alter emotional structures, reinterpret feelings, and correct or specify intuitions. The relation between experience and understanding is therefore not one-sided but reciprocal.

Accordingly, the relation can be determined as follows:

- Experience forms the primary mode of meaning formation in which emotions operate as achievements of differentiation.
- Feelings render this structure bodily evident and open it to partial explication.
- Intuition condenses this structure into implicit forms of understanding and mediates toward thought.
- Understanding stabilizes the meaning that has been brought forth in conceptual and relational structures, while remaining dependent upon its affective basis.

The relation of emotion, feeling, and intuition to experience and understanding is therefore not additive but structurally mediated. Affective and conceptual meaning formation constitute two irreducible yet interrelated dimensions whose interplay constitutes the enactment of understanding.

2.5 Interim Result

(Affective Meaning Formation as the Structural Basis and Mediating Dimension of Experience and Understanding)

The preceding analyses have shown that emotion, feeling, and intuition are not to be understood as mutually independent phenomena, but as functionally interrelated moments of a unified process of affective meaning formation. This process constitutes a fundamental dimension of world-access that underlies both experience and understanding and mediates between them.

Emotions were determined as antecedent achievements of differentiation through which the field of experience is first articulated at all. In them arise relevance, weighting, and orientation before these can be transformed into conceptual structures. Emotions are therefore constitutive of every form of meaning formation.

Feelings were reconstructed as bodily manifestations of this emotional order. They render the implicit structure of experience immediately experienceable without making it completely explicable. In them, it becomes apparent how the world is constituted and, at the same time, how the individual experiences oneself within this relation to the world.

Intuition, finally, was determined as a condensed Gestalt of experience-based meaning formation. It represents a form of implicit understanding in which orientation develops without taking the detour through explicit conceptual formation. Intuition thereby functions as a transitional form between the continuity of experience and the discrete structure of thought.

In their systematic interrelation, the following central determinations emerge.

First, affective meaning formation constitutes the basis of experience. Without emotional differentiation, there would be no foregrounding of relevance, no structuring of the field of experience, and therefore no meaningful world-access.

Second, the affective dimension is at the same time a presupposition of understanding. Understanding can begin only where an implicit order of significance has already arisen. Emotion, feeling, and intuition provide the basis upon which conceptual stabilization first becomes possible.

Third, intuition functions as the central mediating instance between experience and understanding. In it, implicit meaning assumes a form capable of connecting with conceptual processing without already being completely explicated.

Fourth, affective and conceptual meaning formation do not stand in a hierarchical relation, but constitute two irreducible, interrelated modes. The affective dimension is not subordinate to thought but forms its presupposition, while thought in turn contributes to the stabilization and transformation of affective structures of meaning.

Fifth, affective meaning formation contains a dimension of unavailability. Neither emotions nor feelings nor intuitions are completely controllable. This unavailability points toward the principled openness and provisionality of meaning formation and forms the transition to the concept of the problem, in which this openness appears as instability and the necessity of reorganization.

Emotion, feeling, and intuition thus jointly constitute the affective fundamental structure of meaning formation. They enable the articulation of experience, the bodily evidence of significance, and the implicit organization of understanding. In their interplay, they constitute the basis of world-access and mediate between experience and thought.

3. Emotions as Constitutive Structures of Meaning Formation

(Emotion as an Operative Achievement of Differentiation in the Constitution of Constituted Reality)

3.1 Departure from the Reaction Model

(Emotion Not as Subsequent Evaluation, but as an Antecedent Structure of Meaning Formation)

The systematic determination of emotions first requires a fundamental demarcation from widespread models in which emotions are understood as reactions to already given states of affairs. In such approaches, the world initially appears as objectively determined, while emotions are subsequently added as responses to this pregiven order. Emotions are thereby interpreted either as accompanying states or as potential disruptive factors of rational knowledge.

Within the model developed here, this perspective is untenable.

If experience—as shown in the mosaic stone **"Experience"**—is not a representation of a finished reality but an operative process of meaning formation, then emotion likewise cannot be understood as a subsequent reaction to already constituted significance. Rather, it must be conceived as part of that process in which significance first emerges.

The idea of an already completely determined world to which emotions merely respond presupposes precisely the structure that is first brought forth in the enactment of experience. It thereby fails to recognize the constitutive role of affective processes in the formation of meaning.

The reaction model must therefore be replaced by a structural understanding of emotion. Emotions are not secondary states but operative processes through which the field of experience differentiates itself. They do not act upon a finished order but participate in its production.

Emotion is therefore not a response to significance, but a condition of its possibility.

This redetermination has far-reaching consequences.

First, the position of emotion in relation to knowledge shifts. Emotions are no longer to be understood as irrational or pre-rational, but as a constitutive dimension of meaning formation itself. They do not stand in opposition to knowledge but form its basis.

Second, it becomes clear that emotions do not occur in isolation but are always embedded within a nexus of experience. They are not punctual events but processes that unfold over time and continuously structure the field of experience.

Third, this perspective opens up a new approach to the question of objectivity. If emotions participate in the constitution of constituted reality, objectivity cannot be understood as complete independence from affective processes. Rather, it must be conceived as the result of an interplay between affective structuring and conceptual stabilization.

The departure from the reaction model therefore does not mean that emotions are arbitrary or merely personal. On the contrary: precisely because they are constitutive of meaning formation, they are subject to structural conditions that elude complete control. Emotions are therefore

neither merely individual states nor objective properties of the world. They are relational processes in which world and individual are constituted in relation to one another.

This relational structure will have to be specified further in the course of the chapter. For the moment, however, it must be emphasized that emotions, as a fundamental dimension of meaning formation, can be adequately understood only if they are conceived not as reactions but as constitutive enactments.

3.2 Emotions as Energetic Processes of Differentiation

(Emotion as a Dynamic Structure of Intensity, Tension, and Relevance Formation)

Once emotions have been detached from the reaction model and determined as constitutive processes of meaning formation, the question arises as to their internal structure. How precisely do emotions accomplish that differentiation through which the field of experience is articulated?

An adequate approach emerges when emotions are understood not as discrete states but as dynamic processes. They operate not in clearly delimited units but in transitions, intensities, and tensions. **Emotions are not fixed contents but movements within the field of experience.**

In this context, the concept of the **energetic** is heuristically illuminating. "Energetic" does not designate a physical magnitude here, but the manner in which experience takes place as an occurrence of intensification, attenuation, condensation, and displacement. Emotions are precisely those processes in which such dynamics become operative.

What comes to the fore in lived experience does not do so uniformly. Something gains weight, something else loses significance; some things impose themselves, while others recede. These movements are not the result of conscious decisions but expressions of emotional processes of differentiation.

Emotions structure the field of experience by generating differences in intensity.

They mark what is relevant by foregrounding it. They generate tensions by opening differences between possibilities. They enable transitions by bringing about shifts within the field of attention and orientation.

In this sense, emotions are not merely achievements of differentiation but at the same time organizational principles of experience.

This organization, however, is not static. Emotional structures are mutable, processual, and temporal. They form, stabilize provisionally, and can dissolve or transform again. Experience is therefore not to be understood as a fixed configuration but as a dynamic process in which emotional orders continuously shift.

At the same time, these processes are not arbitrary. Emotional differentiations do not arise freely from nothing but in connection with bodily affectedness, situational conditions, and relational embeddedness. They are bound to the structure of the experiential process itself and thereby point toward the embeddedness of meaning formation within conditions that cannot be completely controlled.

This insight connects the analysis of emotion with the perspective developed in the mosaic stone **"Problem."** The dynamics of emotional differentiation are operative not only where existing order explicitly becomes fragile, but permeate every moment of world-apprehension. Every moment is to be understood as an irritation insofar as it does not merely reproduce the relation to the world but shifts it. The stability of the individual moment thereby proves to be a provisional stabilization within a process whose fundamental character is change. Emotional structuring therefore does not merely stabilize but takes place essentially as an ongoing modulation of order. Emotions are thus not only the basis of order but also the point of departure of its transformation.

Emotions are consequently energetic processes of differentiation through which the field of experience is articulated. They operate in intensities, tensions, and transitions and thereby generate relevance and orientation. They are dynamic, relational, and not completely available to deliberate control.

3.3 Emotions and Relevance Formation

(Emotion as the Origin of Significance, Weighting, and Orientation within the Field of Experience)

The determination of emotions as energetic processes of differentiation necessarily leads to the question of what these differentiations concern and what function they fulfill within the overall process of meaning formation. The answer lies in their role in the formation of relevance.

Experience is—as has been shown—not a uniform field, but a configuration of foregroundings and recessions. This structure, however, cannot be described merely as formal differentiation. What is decisive is that the differences generated through emotions simultaneously appear as significant.

Emotional differentiation is therefore always also relevance formation.

Relevance, in this context, does not designate an objective property of things, but the manner in which something acquires weight within the field of experience. Something is relevant insofar as it binds attention, demands orientation, or generates a relation to action. This relevance is not subsequently imposed but arises within the enactment of emotional structuring. It can therefore be understood as a qualitative accentuation of the field of experience: as a manner in which something comes to the fore, acquires urgency, and becomes effective in providing orientation.

Emotions are thus the processes in which it is determined what appears as significant at all.

Concepts can stabilize, differentiate, and render significance communicable, but they already presuppose an antecedent structure of relevance. Without emotional weighting, there would be no basis upon which conceptual order could build.

Emotions are therefore not merely involved in the formation of significance, but constitute its original condition.

This insight has far-reaching consequences for the understanding of knowledge. If significance already arises at the level of emotional differentiation, then knowledge cannot be understood as a purely intellectual process. Rather, it is embedded within an affective structure that determines what can be known at all and in what manner it appears as relevant.

Emotions thus not only open access to the world but simultaneously limit it.

What is not emotionally marked as relevant remains in the background or escapes attention. Relevance is therefore always selective. It structures the field of the possible by foregrounding certain aspects while excluding others.

This selectivity is a necessary condition of orientation.

Without it, experience would remain within the indeterminacy of a uniform field of impressions. Only through emotional relevance formation does it become possible to form meaningful nexuses from the abundance of possible impressions.

At the same time, this formation of relevance is not completely stable.

What appears significant can change. Situations shift, perspectives change, and emotional weightings are reorganized. Relevance is therefore not a fixed characteristic but a processual occurrence.

At this point, the connection with the concept of the problem once again becomes visible.

The problem designates those situations in which existing orders of relevance no longer sustain themselves. What previously appeared unequivocal becomes questionable; what was irrelevant can suddenly move into the foreground. Emotional relevance formation is set in motion and must reorganize itself.

Emotions are therefore not only the origin of significance,
but also the point of departure of its transformation.

3.4 Emotions in Their Limiting Relation to Reality

(Emotion as a Structure in the Tension between Experience-Based Meaning Formation and Transcendental Limitation)

The preceding analysis has shown that emotions, as processes of differentiation, bring forth the structure of the field of experience and, as formations of relevance, constitute the basis of significance.

This raises the question of how this emotionally structured meaning formation relates to what is designated as reality within the framework of the mosaic stones.

If constituted reality is understood as an order of meaning brought forth and stabilized in the enactment of experience, then reality cannot be conceived as an immediately accessible object. Rather, it appears as a limiting concept: as that which selectively limits and at the same time transforms the possibilities of meaning formation without being exhausted in this function. Against this background, emotions acquire an additional systematic dimension.

Emotional relevance formation does not take place in a vacuum. It cannot be freely constructed but is subject to conditions that elude the individual.

Human beings cannot arbitrarily determine what affects them, what unsettles them, or what leaves them indifferent. In this unavailability, it becomes apparent that emotional structuring is bound to a limiting relation.

This limiting relation, however, is not to be understood as a direct representation of reality. Emotions do not provide reliable representations of an objective world. Rather, they indicate that meaning formation encounters limits that it cannot itself completely determine.

Emotions thus refer not to reality as an object,
but to reality as a limit.

This determination can be specified further. Emotional processes can prove themselves or fail. A situation can be experienced as threatening without actually being dangerous; conversely, a situation that initially appears insignificant can prove consequential. In such cases, it becomes apparent that emotional relevance formation is corrigible.

This corrigibility indicates that the constituted reality structured through emotion is not arbitrary. It stands in relation to conditions that are not completely absorbed within it. Reality appears here not as a given content, but as resistance, irritation, or corrective within the experiential process.

Emotions are thereby embedded within a process that points beyond them.

They structure experience, but they do not guarantee the final validity of this structure. Their results are provisional, open to revision, and susceptible to change. Precisely in this provisionality, their embeddedness within the limiting relation to reality becomes apparent.

This insight is closely connected with the concept of the problem. The problem designates those situations in which existing orders of meaning lose their stability. In such situations, it becomes visible that emotional formations of relevance can prove themselves, cease to sustain themselves, or be relativized. What previously appeared unequivocal becomes questionable; orientation breaks down or must be formed anew.

Emotional irritation is therefore a central mode of appearance of the problem.

In it, it becomes apparent that constituted reality as structured through emotion encounters its limit. This limit becomes the point of departure for new forms of meaning formation. Emotional disorientation opens the possibility of a reorganization of structures of relevance.

The limiting relation thereby acquires a productive dimension.

Emotions are involved not only in the stabilization of meaning but also in its transformation. They do not merely react to problems but are themselves part of those processes in which problems arise and are processed.

Emotions thus structure constituted reality as an experience-based order of meaning, while at the same time standing within a limiting relation to reality that manifests itself in unavailability, irritation, and corrigibility. They are consequently not absolutely valid but provisional and open

to revision. In connection with the problem, they become carriers of instability and points of departure for new meaning formation.

3.5 Emotions as a Condition of the Constitution of Constituted Reality

(Emotion as a Transcendental Presupposition of the Formation of World-Relation and Significance)

The preceding considerations have shown that emotions differentiate the field of experience, generate relevance, and stand within a limiting relation to reality. This raises the systematic question of what status emotions possess within the constitution of constituted reality. Are they merely one component of the experiential process—or do they constitute a fundamental condition of its possibility?

The thesis advanced here is:

Emotions are not merely elements of experience,
but transcendental conditions of the constitution of constituted reality.

This determination requires a specification of the concept of the "transcendental." What is meant is not a sphere separated from experience, but those structural conditions without which experience and meaning formation would not be possible. In this sense, transcendental is that which logically precedes the enactment of experience without itself becoming graspable outside this enactment.

Against this background, the role of emotions can be determined more precisely.

Experience is—as has been shown—not a neutral registration of data, but a structured process in which significance develops. In order for a meaningful order to emerge at all, there must be a differentiation between the relevant and the irrelevant, between what is foregrounded and what recedes. Without such differentiation, the field of experience would remain unstructured and therefore meaningless.

Emotions accomplish precisely this differentiation. They are the processes through which it is determined what acquires significance within the field of experience. Without emotional relevance formation, there would be no orientation, no weighting, and no possibility of forming a meaningful order from the abundance of possible impressions.

In this sense, emotions do not merely participate in the constitution of constituted reality, they are its presupposition.

This insight has a decisive consequence: **constituted reality cannot be conceived independently of affective structuring.**

What appears as actual is always already shaped by emotional differentiations. The world does not first emerge as a neutral givenness that is subsequently interpreted, but appears from the outset as significant, urgent, indifferent, threatening, or attractive. These qualities are not secondary attributions but integral components of the appearance of world.

Emotions are therefore conditions of world-access.

They determine not only what is known but also how it appears. They open perspectives within which constituted reality manifests itself. Without emotional structuring, there would be no perspectivity and thus no world-relation in the proper sense.

At the same time, this perspectivity is not arbitrary. Emotional structurings are bound to conditions that cannot be completely controlled. They are bodily mediated, situationally embedded, and relationally determined. In this respect, emotions are neither purely individual nor objective, but constitutive elements of a relational process of the formation of constituted reality.

This determination makes it possible to locate the role of emotions precisely within the overall model:

- In experience, they operate as processes of differentiation and relevance formation.
- In feeling, they become bodily evident.
- In intuition, they condense into implicit forms of understanding.
- In thought, they are partially explicated and stabilized.

Emotions thus permeate all levels of world-access without being exhausted in any one of them.

At the same time, it becomes clear that this transcendental function is not to be equated with infallibility. Emotional structurings can prove inadequate or distorted. Precisely this possibility of correction points once again to the limiting relation to reality and to the role of the problem as a driving force of reorganization.

The transcendental character of emotion therefore does not mean its absoluteness, but its ineliminability.

Emotions cannot be replaced by other structures without the process of meaning formation itself collapsing. They are not an option within the constitution of constituted reality, but its necessary condition.

Emotions are thus transcendental conditions of the constitution of constituted reality. They make possible the differentiation, relevance formation, and perspectival structuring of the field of experience. They are not secondary but constitutive of world-access. At the same time, they remain provisional, corrigible, and embedded within an open process.

The systematic location of emotion within meaning formation has thereby been determined.

3.6 Interim Result

(Emotion as a Constitutive, Dynamic, and Limited Fundamental Structure of Meaning Formation)

The analysis of emotions as processes of differentiation, formations of relevance, and transcendental conditions of the constitution of constituted reality can now be condensed into a systematic interim result.

First, it has become apparent that emotions cannot be understood as reactions to already given states of affairs. They are not subsequent evaluations but constitutive processes involved in the production of meaning itself. Their position thereby shifts fundamentally: emotions stand not at the margins of knowledge, but at the center of the constitution of constituted reality.

It has further become clear that emotions operate as energetic processes of differentiation. They structure the field of experience not in discrete units but in intensities, tensions, and transitions. In them arise the fundamental differences through which the field of lived experience becomes articulated.

This achievement of differentiation is inseparably connected with the formation of relevance. Emotions mark what is significant by foregrounding and weighting it. Significance therefore does not first arise in thought but already in the enactment of emotional structuring. Concepts can stabilize this significance, but they cannot bring it forth.

At the same time, it has been shown that emotional meaning formation stands within a limiting relation to reality. Emotions are not freely available and cannot be completely controlled. They can prove themselves or prove inadequate; they can stabilize or irritate. Their corrigibility reveals their embeddedness within conditions that point beyond them.

This embeddedness becomes particularly visible in connection with the problem. Emotional orders can become unstable, relevances can shift, and orientation can be lost. In such situations, the limit of existing meaning formation emerges and compels its reorganization. Emotions are therefore not only the basis of order but also the point of departure of its transformation.

Finally, it has become clear that emotions are to be understood as transcendental conditions of the constitution of constituted reality. Without emotional differentiation, there would be no structuring of the field of experience, no formation of relevance, and thus no meaningful world-access. Emotions are ineliminable, even though their concrete manifestations remain variable and corrigible.

Emotions form the fundamental affective structure upon which feelings as bodily manifestations and intuition as an implicit Gestalt of understanding are built.

4. Feelings as Bodily Manifestations of Emotional Order

(Feeling as Bodily Experienceable Evidence of Implicit Structures of Meaning)

4.1 Difference between Emotion and Feeling

(Feeling as the Mode of Appearance of Emotional Structure in Bodily Experience)

The preceding analysis has determined emotions as constitutive processes of meaning formation. In order to clarify the role of feelings precisely, a systematic differentiation between emotion and feeling is first required. In everyday language, the two terms are often used synonymously; within the present theoretical context, however, they designate different, though closely interconnected, levels.

Emotions have been reconstructed as operative achievements of differentiation. They structure the field of experience by generating relevance, performing weightings, and enabling orientation. These processes are primarily implicit. They operate within the enactment of experience without necessarily themselves becoming objects of explicit perception.

Feelings, by contrast, designate the manner in which this implicit emotional structure comes to appearance within lived experience.

Feeling is therefore neither the cause of emotion nor a state independent of it. It is the mode of appearance of emotional order in the medium of bodily existence.

Whereas emotion concerns the structure of the field of experience, feeling concerns the manner in which this structure becomes experienceable for the individual.

This difference can be formulated as the difference between **structure and appearance**. Emotions operate at the level of structuring: they articulate, weight, and differentiate the field of experience. Feelings operate at the level of appearance: they make this structure experienceable as concrete affectedness. Feeling is thus the manner in which emotional order manifests itself in lived experience.

This determination has several consequences.

First, it explains why emotions are not always immediately accessible, whereas feelings are typically regarded as experienceable. Emotional structuring can be operative without becoming thematic; feelings, by contrast, are characterized precisely by being lived.

Second, it becomes understandable why feelings cannot be conceived as purely individual states in the sense of inner objects. If feelings are the mode of appearance of emotional structure, they always refer to the field of experience as a whole. They are not merely localized “within,” but are expressions of a relation to the world.

Third, it becomes clear that feelings cannot arise independently of emotions. Without emotional differentiation, there would be no structure capable of appearing in feeling. Feelings presuppose emotion, even though they are not identical with it.

This distinction makes it possible to avoid a widespread reduction. If feeling is equated with emotion, the structural dimension of meaning formation disappears from view. If emotion, conversely, is reduced to feeling, it appears as a mere state rather than as a constitutive process.

The differentiation proposed here keeps the two levels distinct without dissolving their interrelation:

Emotion is the implicit structure of meaning formation.
Feeling is the bodily experienceable appearance of this structure.

This interrelation is also evident in the fact that feelings are not simply "given," but change in the enactment of experience. They arise, change, intensify, or disappear. In them, the dynamics of the underlying emotional processes become manifest.

At the same time, feelings are not completely transparent. Even though they are experienceable, their structure can be explicated only in part. Feeling shows that something is significant without necessarily making clear why this is the case. In this respect, feeling points beyond itself toward the implicit order from which it arises.

It thereby becomes clear that feeling has a dual function: it makes the emotional structure of experience experienceable and at the same time points toward its implicit character, which cannot be completely grasped.

4.2 Feeling as Bodily Evidence of Meaning

(The Body as the Medium of the Appearance and Evidence of Emotionally Structured Constituted Reality)

The distinction between emotion and feeling has shown that feelings represent the mode of appearance of emotional structures within lived experience. In order to understand this mode of appearance more precisely, it is necessary to determine the role of the body. For feelings are not abstract contents but bodily anchored forms of evidence.

The body is not to be conceived here as merely one object among others. It is not simply the physical carrier of feelings, but the medium in which world first appears as near or distant, oppressive or opening, sustaining or burdensome. Feelings are the manner in which this bodily embeddedness in the world becomes experienceable. In this sense, it can be said:

The body is not in the world—the world appears in the body.
Feelings are the form of this appearance.

What is experienced in feeling is therefore not an internal state in the narrower sense, but a particular mode of world-relation. Fear, for example, is not merely an inner feeling, but the experience of a world as threatening; joy is not merely a state, but the experience of a world as opening and sustaining. Feelings are thus always already related to world.

This world-relatedness, however, is not conceptually mediated but bodily given.

Feelings possess an immediate evidence. They show that something is the case without conceptually justifying it. This evidence is not logical or argumentative but phenomenal: it consists in lived experience itself. Feeling "knows" that something is significant before this knowledge can be conceptually explicated.

This bodily evidence has a dual structure. On the one hand, it is immediate and does not require further justification. In feeling, something appears as evident without an additional process of justification being necessary. On the other hand, this evidence is not absolute. It can prove inadequate, distorted, or corrigible. Bodily evidence is therefore itself embedded within the open process of meaning formation.

This ambivalence points once again to the limiting relation of experience. Feelings show not only how world appears, but also that this appearance is not completely secured. They can deceive, change, or lose their basis. Precisely therein it becomes apparent that bodily evidence is not identical with objective validity.

Nevertheless, it remains indispensable to the process of meaning formation. Without the bodily evidence of feeling, there would be no immediate orientation. Concepts can stabilize significance, but they cannot replace the immediate evidence of feeling. Bodily experience is the basis upon which every further explication builds.

This insight has an important consequence for the relation between feeling and thought. Thought depends upon bodily evidence but cannot adequately correspond to it. It can describe, analyze, and classify feelings, yet it always remains secondary to their immediate quality.

There is therefore a structural difference between feeling and concept that cannot be abolished.

At the same time, feeling opens the possibility of reflection. By becoming evident in feeling, something can become an object of thought. Feeling thus constitutes the transitional point at which implicit structure of meaning passes into a potentially explicable form. It is the point at which experience, as it were, “shows itself” without already having been completely conceptually grasped.

This transitional position makes feeling a central mediating instance between experience and understanding.

That means:

- Feelings are bodily evidences of meaning.
- They make the emotional structure of experience immediately experienceable.
- They are world-related, not merely internal.
- They are evident, but not infallible.
- They form the basis upon which conceptual reflection can build.

4.3 Feeling and Self-Relation

(Feeling as a Medium of the Constitution of the I in the Enactment of Affective Experience)

The analysis of feeling as bodily evidence of meaning has shown that feelings possess not only world-relatedness but also a specific form of immediacy. This immediacy concerns, however, not only the manner in which world appears but also the manner in which the individual experiences itself.

Feelings are therefore not only directed toward world but are always also forms of self-relation.

In feeling, the human being experiences itself not as an abstract unity, but as a concretely affected, situated, and involved self. This self-relatedness is not the result of conceptual reflection but takes place immediately in lived experience. The human being "knows" itself in feeling without explicitly making itself an object.

It thereby becomes clear that the I does not first arise in thought.

Although the I can be thematized, described, and reflected upon in thought, this reflective form already presupposes an antecedent form of self-givenness. This antecedent self-givenness is essentially affectively structured.

Feelings are therefore central moments in the constitution of the I.

They mediate a form of immediate self-certainty that does not rest upon conceptual determination. In feeling, the human being is given to itself—not as an object, but as enactment. This form of self-givenness is not propositional but existential: it consists in lived experience itself.

This insight can be further specified. Feeling shows not only that something is significant, but also that it is significant **for me**. This personal dimension is not subsequently added but is an integral component of feeling. In it, it becomes apparent that meaning always also stands within a self-relation.

Feelings are therefore not only structures of world-relation but at the same time structures of self-constitution. This self-relation, however, is not static. It changes together with the emotional processes underlying it. The self is therefore not to be understood as a fixed substance but as a processual unity that forms and changes in the enactment of affective experience.

Feelings play a dual role in this process. On the one hand, they stabilize self-relation by mediating continuity and identity. Recurring emotional patterns can lead to stable forms of self-understanding. On the other hand, they are sources of change by opening new perspectives, irritating existing self-interpretations, or dissolving them.

In this sense, the I is neither independent of feelings nor completely determined by them. It arises in the interplay of affective experience and reflective processing.

This dynamic becomes particularly apparent in situations in which feelings change or become contradictory. In such cases, self-relation itself can become questionable. The human being no longer experiences itself as unequivocally determined, but as open, unstable, or conflictual. Here, once again, the connection with the problem becomes apparent:

The I is not only the bearer of problems, but is itself embedded within problematic processes.

Feelings are thus not merely expressions of an already existing self, but constitutive moments of its emergence and transformation. At the same time, this self-constitution remains bound to the bodily dimension. The self is not independent of the body but arises in the manner in which the body experiences world. Feelings are the form in which bodily self-relatedness comes to appearance.

That means:

- Feelings are not only world-relation but at the same time self-relation.
- They enable an immediate, non-conceptually mediated form of self-givenness.
- They contribute to the constitution of the I as a processual unity.
- They simultaneously stabilize and transform self-relation.

It thereby becomes clear that feelings play a central role not only in meaning formation but also in the constitution of the self.

4.4 Feeling between Implicitness and Explicability

(Feeling as the Boundary and Transition between Prereflective Meaning Formation and Conceptual Articulation)

The preceding analysis has shown that feelings constitute the bodily experienceable appearance of emotional structures and at the same time enable a form of immediate self-relation. This raises the question of how feelings relate to conceptual explicability: to what extent can feelings be transferred into language and thought—and where are the limits of this transfer?

Feelings belong primarily to the implicit order of experience.

They are not the result of conceptual determination but precede it. In feeling, significance manifests itself without already having been decomposed into discrete concepts or transformed into explicit relations. Feelings are therefore not initially linguistically structured but appear as qualitative wholes that cannot readily be analyzed.

At the same time, feelings are not completely withdrawn from explication.

Human beings can speak about their feelings, describe them, classify them, and reflect upon them. Feelings can become objects of thought. This possibility shows that feelings do not remain within an absolutely inaccessible domain but are, in principle, capable of connecting with conceptual processing.

This yields a dual determination:

Feelings are implicit—but not inarticulable.
They are explicable—but not completely explicable.

This dual structure is of fundamental importance. The explication of feelings is always a process of transformation. What is given in feeling as bodily evidence is transformed in thought into discrete, linguistically fixed units. In this process, part of the original quality is necessarily lost. The wholeness and immediacy of feeling can be translated into conceptual structures only interpretively. This difference is a structural necessity.

Thought operates through distinctions, categories, and relations. It renders meaning distinguishable, comparable, and communicable. Feelings, by contrast, operate in continuous qualities that are not completely differentiated. The difference between feeling and concept is therefore an expression of the difference between two modes of meaning formation.

Feelings thus mark a limit of explicability. They show that meaning is not completely exhausted by conceptual form. There is a dimension of lived experience that eludes every complete

linguistic fixation. This limit is to be understood as a productive tension between experience and thought.

Precisely because feelings cannot be completely explicated, the process of understanding remains open.

Conceptual determinations can never finally grasp feelings. They remain dependent upon further differentiations, corrections, and expansions. In this openness, the dynamics of understanding as an ongoing process become apparent.

At the same time, feelings function as the point of departure of these processes of explication. What becomes conceptually thematic has generally first become evident in feeling. Feeling thus constitutes the initial form in which meaning appears before being transformed into explicit structures. It is the point at which experience opens itself to thought.

This transitional position makes feeling a central mediating instance:

Feeling connects the implicit order of experience with the explicit order of understanding without itself being completely absorbed into either side.

In this mediating function, the proximity of feeling to intuition once again becomes apparent. Both move at the boundary between implicitness and explicability, but they differ insofar as feeling is grounded primarily in immediate experience, whereas intuition already contains a form of orientation and decision.

That means:

- Feelings are primarily implicit forms of meaning formation.
- They are, in principle, explicable, but not completely explicable.
- They mark the boundary between experience and thought.
- They open the space in which conceptual reflection can begin.

4.5 Feeling and the Stabilization of Constituted Reality

(Feeling as Enduring Givenness and Temporary Fixation of Meaning in the Process of Experience)

The preceding analyses have shown that feelings constitute the bodily evidence of emotionally structured experience and at the same time operate at the boundary between implicitness and explicability. Against this background, the question arises as to what role feelings play in the process of stabilizing constituted reality.

If constituted reality—as developed in the other mosaic stones—is understood as a provisionally stabilized order of meaning, then this stabilization requires not only conceptual structures but also antecedent forms of evidence and continuity. It is precisely here that feeling assumes a central function.

Feelings stabilize constituted reality by bodily anchoring significance.

What appears as significant in feeling acquires a certain duration and persistence. It does not remain merely a fleeting impression but becomes a stable point of reference within the field of experience. Feelings lend experience a form of persistence extending beyond the individual moment.

This stabilization, however, is not identical with conceptual fixation. Whereas understanding stabilizes meaning in discrete units, feelings stabilize meaning in the form of bodily continuity. A feeling can persist, recur, or intensify without being completely conceptually determined. In this respect, feelings constitute a distinctive form of stabilization.

This form of stabilization is particularly important for the development of orientation. What is emotionally and affectively stable forms the background against which new experiences can be situated. Feelings create a kind of implicit horizon of expectation: they structure what appears familiar or foreign, safe or unsafe, significant or indifferent.

Feelings thus contribute to the formation of constituted reality as a coherent nexus.

This coherence, however, is not absolute. Feelings can change, lose their intensity, or be modified by new experiences. Stabilization is therefore always provisional. It is the result of an ongoing process in which emotional structures repeat, condense, or shift.

Precisely in this provisionality, the connection with the problem once again becomes apparent. When feelings lose their stabilizing function or enter into tension with one another, the coherence of constituted reality itself can become fragile. What was previously taken for granted becomes questionable; familiar orientations lose their validity. In such situations, it becomes visible that the stability of constituted reality rests essentially upon affective evidence.

Feelings are therefore not only stabilizing but also potentially destabilizing.

They can interrupt, irritate, or dissolve existing orders of meaning. New feelings can call old orders into question and thereby initiate processes of reorganization. Stabilization and destabilization are therefore not opposites but two aspects of the same process of affective meaning formation.

This dynamic can be described as a relation of tension: feelings stabilize constituted reality by bodily anchoring significance. They destabilize constituted reality by altering or dissolving this anchoring. In both cases, they remain part of an open, processual occurrence.

At the same time, it becomes apparent that this affective stabilization cannot be replaced by conceptual operations. Concepts can fix meaning, but they cannot generate the bodily evidence necessary for constituted reality to be experienced as “real.” Without the stabilizing function of feelings, constituted reality would lose its experiential coherence.

That means:

- Feelings stabilize constituted reality through bodily evidence and continuity.
- They create orientation and horizons of expectation within experience.
- This stabilization is provisional and mutable.
- Feelings are simultaneously sources of stability and instability.

It thereby becomes clear that feelings play a central role not only in the appearance but also in the stabilization of constituted reality.

4.6 Interim Result

(Feeling as Bodily Evidence, Self-Relation, and Dynamic Stabilization of Affective Meaning Order)

The analysis of feelings as bodily manifestations of emotional order can now be condensed into a systematic interim result.

First, it has become apparent that feelings are not identical with emotions but represent their mode of appearance in bodily experience. Whereas emotions form the implicit structure of meaning formation, feelings render this structure experienceable as concrete affectedness. They are therefore neither mere states nor isolated inner contents but expressions of a bodily mediated relation to the world.

It has further become clear that feelings function as bodily evidences of meaning. They immediately show that something is significant without this significance already having to be conceptually explicated. This evidence is not argumentative but phenomenally given and forms the basis upon which conceptual reflection can begin at all.

At the same time, it has been shown that feelings are always also forms of self-relation. In feeling, human beings experience themselves not only in relation to the world but simultaneously in relation to themselves. Feelings enable an immediate, non-conceptually mediated self-givenness and thereby contribute to the constitution of the I as a processual unity.

A further central point concerns the position of feelings between implicitness and explicability. Feelings belong primarily to the implicit order of experience but are, in principle, capable of connecting with conceptual articulation. This articulation, however, necessarily remains incomplete. Feelings thus mark a limit of explicability that is constitutive of the relation between experience and thought.

Finally, it has become clear that feelings play a central role in the stabilization of constituted reality. They bodily anchor significance, create continuity, and enable orientation. At the same time, they are themselves mutable and can destabilize existing orders. Feelings are therefore both bearers of stability and points of departure for transformation.

From these determinations, a consistent overall picture emerges:

- Feelings are bodily modes of appearance of emotional structure.
- They constitute immediate evidences of meaning.
- They are simultaneously forms of world-relation and self-relation.
- They move between implicitness and limited explicability.
- They stabilize and transform constituted reality within an open process.

The systematic function of feelings within the overall model is thereby precisely determined. They form the level at which emotional structure becomes experienceable for human beings and at the same time provide the basis for the transitions to intuition and conceptual understanding.

5. Intuition as an Implicit Form of Understanding

(Intuition as a Condensed Gestalt of Experience-Based Meaning Formation in the Transition to Thought)

5.1 Intuition as a Misunderstanding

(Critique of the Conception of Intuition as an Irrational or Uncertain Form of Knowledge)

The determination of intuition as a distinctive form of implicit understanding requires a critical engagement with widespread conceptions in which intuition is regarded as an unreliable, subjective, or even irrational form of knowledge. From such perspectives, intuition appears either as a mere "gut feeling" or as an abbreviated, incompletely reflected form of rational judgment.

From the systematic perspective developed here, these conceptions are inadequate.

They presuppose that knowledge exists primarily or exclusively in conceptual, explicit form and that everything that does not conform to this model is to be regarded as deficient. Within this framework, intuition appears as incomplete or provisional knowledge that first has to be legitimized through conceptual clarification.

This view, however, overlooks the fundamental structure of understanding. As shown in the mosaic stone **"Understanding,"** understanding does not take place exclusively in the mode of explicit concept formation but in the interrelation of an implicit, experience-based mode and an explicit, symbolically structured mode. Intuition belongs not to the domain of deficiency but to that of implicit understanding.

Intuition is therefore not to be understood as a deficient preliminary stage of thought but as a distinctive form of meaning organization. It rests upon a structuring of experience that has already taken place but has not been completely explicated.

In intuitive processes, one does not "guess"; rather, one draws upon implicit nexuses that have formed in the course of experience and emotional differentiation.

The misunderstanding of intuition as irrational thus results from a narrowing of the concept of understanding. If understanding is identified exclusively with explicit, conceptual order, all implicit forms appear inadequate. If understanding is instead conceived—as it is here—as a mediating process between experience and thought, intuition becomes visible as a necessary component of this process.

This redetermination has several consequences.

First, it becomes clear that intuition possesses a form of rationality that is not exhausted by explicit justification. It is not irrational but **prereflectively rational**, insofar as it rests upon structured nexuses of experience.

Second, it becomes understandable why intuition is often experienced as immediate. This immediacy is not an expression of arbitrariness but the result of a condensation of meaning that has developed within the experiential process without having been completely explicated.

Third, this perspective opens up a differentiated approach to the question of reliability. Intuition is neither infallible nor unreliable in principle. Its validity depends upon the extent to which the underlying structures of experience are viable. Intuition is thus part of an open process capable of revision.

This revisability becomes particularly apparent in relation to the problem. In problematic situations, intuitive orientations can fail or prove inadequate. Precisely thereby, however, it becomes visible that intuition is not an isolated mechanism but remains embedded within the overall process of meaning formation. It can be corrected, expanded, or transformed.

In summary:

- Intuition is not an irrational or deficient form of knowledge.
- It is a distinctive form of implicit understanding.
- It rests upon condensed, experience-based structures of meaning.
- It is immediately effective but not infallible.

5.2 Intuition as a Condensation of Experience-Based Meaning Formation

(Intuition as an Integrative Structure of Implicit Nexuses of Relevance and Significance)

Building upon the critique of reductionist concepts of intuition, intuition can now be determined positively. If emotions accomplish the differentiation of the field of experience and feelings render this structure bodily evident, the question arises as to how coherent forms of orientation emerge from this multiplicity of differentiations and evidences.

The answer lies in the function of intuition as condensation.

Intuition designates the process in which experience-based structures of meaning combine into an integrative Gestalt.

It is not a mere addition of individual impressions but a form of integration in which multiple differentiations are condensed into a unity capable of becoming effective as orientation.

This condensation is neither accidental nor arbitrary. It rests upon the emotional formation of relevance already accomplished within experience and upon the bodily evidence given in feeling. Intuition takes up these implicit structures and brings them into a form that enables action. It is thus a process of integration in which nexuses of significance are bundled.

In intuitive moments, this structure manifests itself in the fact that a situation is grasped “at a glance.” This formulation, however, is not to be understood literally. It is not a matter of visual perception but of structural insight: different aspects of a situation are not analyzed one after another but grasped simultaneously within a nexus. This simultaneity is the result of condensation.

Intuition therefore operates not sequentially but in Gestalt form. Whereas thought proceeds step by step, explicates relations, and systematically elaborates differences, **intuition forms a unity in which these differences are already integrated. It does not constitute an alternative to thought, but a different mode of meaning organization.**

This mode is closely connected with the temporal structure of experience. Intuition draws not only upon the present moment but upon structures sedimented in experience. Past experiences, recurring patterns, and implicit expectations enter into intuitive condensation without being explicitly remembered or thematized. Intuition is therefore always also an expression of a history of experience.

This historicity explains why intuition can develop. It is not static but changes with experience. As nexuses of meaning become increasingly differentiated and integrated, intuitive assessments can become more precise, differentiated, and viable. At the same time, intuition remains open to irritation and correction.

This openness becomes particularly apparent in problematic situations. When the previous condensation no longer sustains itself, intuition itself can become unstable. The previously integrated Gestalt disintegrates or appears inadequate. In such cases, it becomes clear that intuition is not a completed result but part of an ongoing process of meaning formation.

This processuality is decisive. Intuition is not the end product of experience but a moment within its enactment. It is a form in which meaning is temporarily stabilized without being finally fixed. Its Gestalten are provisional and can change in the further course of experience.

At the same time, intuition remains bound to its affective basis. The condensation it accomplishes is based upon emotional formations of relevance and the evidence of feeling. Without this basis, there would be no structures capable of being integrated.

Intuition is therefore not independent of emotion and feeling
but their continuation at a higher level of integration.

That means:

- Intuition is the condensation of experience-based meaning formation.
- It integrates multiple differentiations into a Gestalt-like unity.
- It operates not sequentially but simultaneously and holistically.
- It is historically shaped, dynamic, and capable of revision.
- It remains bound to emotional and feeling-based structures.

5.3 Intuition as a Gestalt of Implicit Understanding

(Intuition as an Operative Form of Meaning Organization in the Mode of Prereflective Coherence Formation)

The determination of intuition as a condensation of experience-based meaning formation suggests that its specific position within the process of understanding should be clarified more precisely. Whereas condensation foregrounds its integrative function, the question now arises as to how this integration becomes effective as understanding.

Intuition is not only condensation but Gestalt formation.

The concept of Gestalt does not designate a static form here, but a dynamic unity in which different moments of experience appear within a coherent nexus. A Gestalt is not the sum of its

parts but an organized structure in which the individual elements first acquire their meaning through their interrelation.

Intuition is the manner in which such Gestalten develop within implicit understanding. Unlike explicit thought, which analyzes nexuses step by step and orders them conceptually, Gestalt formation in intuition takes place as immediate coherence formation. Different aspects of a situation appear not in isolation but as belonging together.

This belonging-together is not inferred but experienced.

Intuition is a form of understanding that operates without explicit justification. This does not mean, however, that it is groundless. The coherence that appears in intuition rests upon the antecedent emotional differentiation and the evidence of feeling. Intuition is thus the form in which these implicit structures are organized into an understandable nexus.

This organization is prereflective. Human beings understand without being able explicitly to reconstruct the process of this understanding. They can say that something "fits," "is right," or "does not fit" without being able to identify the underlying relations individually. Intuition is therefore a form of **implicit coherence testing**.

This coherence is not logical in the narrower sense but phenomenal. It manifests itself in lived experience as coherence or incoherence. Such coherence is not the result of explicit examination but the expression of an already integrated structure. Intuition is therefore not analytic but synthetic: it brings forth nexuses rather than deriving them from already given elements.

This synthetic achievement makes intuition a central moment of understanding. Without it, there would be no possibility of grasping complex situations as meaningful unities. Thought can analyze and explicate these unities, but it presupposes their antecedent Gestalt formation. Intuition thus provides the implicit basis of conceptual order.

At the same time, this Gestalt formation remains provisional. The nexuses formed in intuition can prove inadequate or erroneous. New experiences can alter or dissolve the existing Gestalt. Intuition is therefore not final understanding but a momentary state of coherence that remains open to revision.

This openness is closely connected with the concept of the problem. In problematic situations, existing Gestalten disintegrate or appear contradictory. Intuitive coherence is lost, and a state of indeterminacy arises. In such cases, implicit understanding itself becomes questionable and must be reorganized.

Intuition is therefore not only a result of meaning formation but also a site of its crises. These crises open up the possibility of new Gestalten. The dissolution of existing coherence creates space for new forms of integration. Intuition is thus part of a dynamic process in which understanding continuously changes.

That means:

- Intuition is the Gestalt of implicit understanding.
- It organizes experience-based structures of meaning into coherent unities.
- It operates prereflectively and without explicit justification.
- It enables experiences of coherence as a form of implicit coherence testing.

- It remains provisional and capable of revision.

5.4 Intuition and Decision

(Intuition as an Operative Form of Selection and Action Orientation under Conditions of Limited Explicability)

The determination of intuition as a Gestalt of implicit understanding leads directly to the question of its role in decision and action. If intuition forms coherent nexuses of meaning, the question arises as to how these nexuses become effective in guiding action.

Decision is not necessarily the result of explicit deliberation. In classical models, decision is often understood as a rational process in which different options are analyzed, evaluated, and selected on the basis of explicit criteria. This model, however, applies only to a limited domain of human practice. In many situations, decisions take place under conditions of limited time, incomplete information, and the absence of explicit criteria.

In such situations, intuition emerges as a central instance. Intuition makes it possible to select from a multiplicity of possible courses of action without this selection having to be completely conceptually justified. It represents a form of selection based upon implicitly formed structures of meaning.

This selection is not accidental. It rests upon the condensation and Gestalt formation described above. In intuition, a particular action appears “fitting,” “coherent,” or “obvious.” This coherence is the result of an implicit integration of relevances, experiences, and situational conditions.

Intuition is therefore not only understanding but action-oriented understanding.

It leads not merely to insights but to decisions. The Gestalt formed within implicit understanding becomes the basis for concrete action. Intuition thus connects knowledge and practice in an immediate manner.

This connection, however, is not equivalent to certainty. Intuitive decisions can prove viable but can also prove inadequate or erroneous. Their validity is not guaranteed but depends upon the quality of the underlying structures of meaning.

Intuition is therefore not a guarantee of correct decisions but a form of orientation under conditions of uncertainty. Precisely in this uncertainty lies its significance. Intuition enables the capacity for action where explicit procedures fail or are unavailable. It reduces complexity by making a selection without completely working through all possible alternatives.

In this sense, intuition is a necessary condition of practical action.

This function connects intuition closely with the concept of the problem. The problem designates situations in which existing orders of meaning are insufficient to ensure orientation. In such situations, explicit analysis is often inadequate or too slow. Intuition emerges here as a form of immediate reorganization that opens up new possibilities for action.

Intuitive decisions are therefore frequently responses to problematicity. They arise where existing structures become unstable and new forms of orientation are required. In this sense, intuition is not merely the application of existing structures of meaning but also part of their transformation.

This transformative function becomes particularly apparent in creative processes. New solutions often arise not through linear analysis but through intuitive insights in which previously separate elements combine to form a new Gestalt. Intuition is here not only selective but productive: it brings forth new possibilities.

At the same time, intuition remains embedded within the overall process of experience and understanding. Intuitive decisions can be examined, confirmed, or corrected through reflection. Conversely, conceptual analyses can influence and modify intuitive processes. Intuition and thought therefore stand in a reciprocal relation.

Thus:

- Intuition is a form of selection and decision formation.
- It enables action orientation under conditions of limited explicability.
- It is based upon implicit, experience-based structures of meaning.
- It is not infallible but capable of revision.
- It plays a central role in problematic and creative situations.

5.5 Intuition in the Transition to Conceptual Thought

(Intuition as a Transformational Form of Implicit Meaning Formation into Explicit Conceptual Order)

The analysis of intuition as a Gestalt of implicit understanding and as a basis of decision has shown that it occupies a central position within the overall process of meaning formation. In order to determine this position fully, its relation to conceptual thought must be clarified more precisely.

Intuition does not stand in opposition to thought but forms its presupposition and transition. Whereas thought transforms meaning into discrete, relational, and linguistically available units, intuition operates in the mode of implicit coherence formation. It generates nexuses that are already understandable without being fully explicated. The question therefore arises as to how conceptual order emerges from this implicit structure.

This transition is to be understood as a process of transformation. What is given in intuition as a Gestalt is decomposed in thought into individual elements, distinguished, and transformed into explicit relations. Thought makes visible what was already implicitly operative in intuition. It explicates, differentiates, and stabilizes the nexuses formed in intuition.

It must be noted, however, that this transformation is not lossless. The intuitive Gestalt is characterized by wholeness, immediacy, and simultaneous integration. Although it forms the basis of the organization of understanding, understanding does not take over its Gestalt but transforms its content into a conceptually structured form capable of further connection for understanding. In this process, the original wholeness is dissolved into discrete units; the

resulting structure becomes analyzable but at the same time fragmented. Some of the original evidence and density is thereby lost.

This difference is constitutive. Intuition and thought are not interchangeable forms of meaning formation but two different modes that complement one another. Intuition provides the integrative basis upon which thought can build; thought enables the stabilization, examination, and communicative mediation of what has been intuitively grasped.

In this sense:

Intuition opens meaning; thought stabilizes it.

This relation, however, is not one-sided. Thought can act back upon intuition. Concepts, models, and reflections can modify the implicit structures upon which intuition rests. Through conceptual clarification, intuitive processes can be specified, expanded, or corrected. Intuition is therefore not independent of thought but embedded within a reciprocal process.

This interaction becomes particularly evident in processes of learning. What is initially grasped intuitively can later be conceptually explicated. Conversely, conceptual knowledge can pass over into intuitive competence. This transition is not a one-time event but an ongoing process of transformation between implicit and explicit knowledge.

At the same time, a structural difference remains. Not everything that is intuitively grasped can be fully expressed conceptually. Conversely, conceptual knowledge cannot be completely transformed into intuitive evidence. This difference is an expression of the complementarity of the two modes.

This complementarity is central to understanding the process of understanding.

Understanding does not take place exclusively in thought but in the movement between implicit and explicit meaning formation. Intuition is the point at which implicit meaning assumes a form that can be transformed into conceptual order without being completely absorbed by it.

In this function, intuition is a key mediating instance. It connects the continuity of experience with the discreteness of thought without reducing either side. It is the point at which it is decided whether and how implicit meaning becomes explicit.

In summary:

- Intuition mediates between experience and thought.
- It transforms implicit structures of meaning into potentially explicable forms.
- This transformation is necessary but not lossless.
- Intuition and thought stand in a reciprocal relation.
- Their difference is constitutive of the process of understanding.

5.6 Interim Result

(Intuition as an Integrative, Action-Guiding, and Mediating Structure of Implicit Understanding)

The preceding analyses make it possible to summarize the systematic position of intuition within affective meaning formation and the process of understanding.

First, it has become clear that intuition is not to be understood as a deficient or irrational form of knowledge. It is not merely a preliminary stage of thought but a distinctive form of implicit understanding. Its apparent indeterminacy is not an expression of arbitrariness but a consequence of its belonging to a different mode of meaning organization.

It has further been shown that intuition functions as a condensation of experience-based meaning formation. Within it, the structures differentiated through emotions and rendered evident through feelings are integrated into a coherent Gestalt. This integration occurs not analytically but simultaneously and holistically.

In this condensation, intuition appears as a Gestalt of implicit understanding. It makes it possible to grasp complex nexuses as belonging together without explicitly decomposing them conceptually. Intuition is therefore a form of prereflective coherence formation in which coherence manifests itself as immediate evidence.

Moreover, the close connection between intuition and decision has been elaborated. Intuition is not only a form of understanding but at the same time a form of selection and action orientation. It enables decisions under conditions of limited explicability and reduces complexity without completely resolving it.

This action-guiding function makes intuition a central instance of practical orientation. At the same time, its position in the transition to conceptual thought has been analyzed. Intuition transforms implicit meaning into forms capable of connecting with conceptual explication. This transformation is necessary but not lossless. Intuition and thought stand in a complementary relation in which neither form can be reduced to the other.

A further central point concerns the processuality of intuition. Intuition is not a completed result but part of a dynamic occurrence. It is historically shaped, changes with experience, and remains open to correction. In problematic situations, it can lose its coherence and must be formed anew. Intuition is therefore not only stabilizing but also transformative.

From these determinations, a consistent overall picture emerges:

- Intuition is a distinctive form of implicit understanding.
- It condenses experience-based structures of meaning into Gestalt-like unities.
- It enables coherence, orientation, and decision.
- It mediates between experience and thought.
- It is dynamic, capable of revision, and embedded within problematic processes.

The systematic function of intuition within the overall model is thereby precisely determined. It forms the mediating instance between emotionally structured experience and conceptual order and is at the same time a central site of the transformation of meaning.

6. Emotion, Feeling, and Intuition in the Context of the Problem

(Affective Meaning Formation under Conditions of Instability, Irritation, and Reorganization)

6.1 The Problem as a Disturbance of Emotional Order

The Problem as an Irritation of Affective Structures of Relevance and Coherence

The preceding analyses have determined emotion, feeling, and intuition as interwoven moments of affective meaning formation. These structures, however, do not appear only in the mode of stability and orientation; their actual dynamics become particularly evident under conditions of instability. At this point, the concept of the problem comes to the fore.

The problem is not merely a deficit of understanding or a lack of knowledge. Within the theoretical context developed here, the problem instead designates a disturbance of existing orders of meaning. It is the situation in which previously operative differentiations, formations of relevance, and formations of coherence lose their self-evidence. Orientation becomes questionable, and the previous structure of experience no longer sustains itself.

This disturbance is primarily affective.

The problem does not first manifest itself as conceptual uncertainty but as an irritation within the field of emotional relevance. What was previously unequivocally significant becomes unclear; what was taken for granted loses its evidence. Emotional weightings shift, and the field of experience loses its familiar structure.

In this sense:

The problem begins as a disturbance of emotional order.

This disturbance affects all three levels of affective meaning formation:

- **At the level of emotion**, the structure of relevance becomes unstable. Differentiations lose their orienting force, while new relevances emerge without yet being ordered.
- **At the level of feeling**, this instability manifests itself as an irritation of bodily evidence. Feelings become contradictory or unclear, or lose their sustaining function.
- **At the level of intuition**, the Gestalt of implicit understanding breaks down. What previously appeared coherent now seems questionable or inappropriate.

The problem is therefore not an isolated event but a process that encompasses the entire affective structure of meaning formation.

This perspective differs fundamentally from conceptions that understand problems exclusively as challenges for thought. Problems can indeed be conceptually analyzed, but their genesis lies deeper: they concern the affective foundations upon which thought builds.

This insight has an important consequence. Problems cannot be processed by conceptual means alone. They require a reorganization of the affective structures themselves. New formations of relevance must emerge, new forms of evidence must develop, and new intuitive Gestalten must be formed.

The problem is therefore not only a state of disturbance but also a **driving force of transformation**. In it, the openness of meaning formation becomes apparent. Existing orders are not final but can be called into question and altered. The irritation brought about by the problem is at the same time the condition for new forms of orientation.

This dynamic can be described as a relation of tension:

The problem destabilizes affective order and
at the same time opens the possibility of its reorganization.

This reorganization, however, cannot be completely controlled. As has already been shown with regard to emotion and intuition, processes of meaning formation elude complete direction. This unavailability persists within the problem as well. New structures arise not through conscious decision alone but through the interplay of experience, affective irritation, and implicit reorganization.

The problem thereby points once again to the limiting relation of meaning formation. It shows that the order of experience is not absolute but remains bound to conditions that cannot be completely absorbed within it. In disturbance, this limit becomes visible.

Thus:

- The problem is a disturbance of emotional order.
- It concerns the relevance structure of emotion, the evidence of feeling, and the coherence of intuition.
- It is primarily affective, not merely a matter of understanding.
- It destabilizes existing orders of meaning while simultaneously opening up new possibilities.
- It is a driving force of transformation within the constitution of constituted reality.

6.2 Emotional Irritation and Shifts in Relevance

(The Restructuring of Affective Processes of Differentiation as the Point of Departure for New Meaning Formation)

The determination of the problem as a disturbance of emotional order makes clear that problematic situations manifest themselves primarily in a change within the affective structure of experience. This change can be described more precisely as emotional irritation and the associated shift in relevance.

Emotional irritation does not simply mean the occurrence of “strong feelings.” Rather, it designates a disturbance within the previously stable structure of emotional differentiation. Familiar formations of relevance lose their self-evidence, and the field of experience is reorganized. What was previously unequivocal becomes unclear; what stood in the background can suddenly move into the foreground.

This irritation concerns the fundamental function of emotion as an achievement of differentiation. Emotions structure the field of experience by generating relevance. When this structure becomes unstable, the entire orientation is set in motion. The differences that previously ordered the field lose their binding force. A state of heightened indeterminacy arises.

This indeterminacy simultaneously opens a space of new possibilities. As existing orders of relevance dissolve, the field of experience becomes newly accessible. Aspects that had previously been overlooked can now emerge. New differentiations become possible.

Emotional irritation is therefore not merely a loss of order but the beginning of its reorganization. This reorganization takes place as a shift in relevance. Relevance—as has been shown—is not a fixed property but the result of emotional structuring. In problematic situations, this structure shifts: new aspects gain weight, while old ones lose significance. This shift does not occur completely consciously or controllably but in the enactment of affective processes.

These processes are dynamic and often contradictory. Different formations of relevance can compete with one another without a stable order immediately emerging. The field of experience can be characterized by tensions in which different possibilities are simultaneously present. In this phase, orientation is more difficult, but at the same time the condition for new forms of meaning emerges.

This dynamic is also evident at the level of feeling. Feelings become unstable, ambivalent, or contradictory. The bodily evidence that previously provided orientation loses its unequivocal character. This irritation is an expression of the changing emotional structure.

Intuition, too, is affected by this shift. Existing intuitive Gestalten can lose their coherence. Decisions appear uncertain, nexuses unclear. At the same time, new intuitive insights can arise on the basis of the altered structure of relevance.

Emotional irritation thus permeates all levels of affective meaning formation.

This insight permits an important specification:

The problem is not a punctual event but a process of reorganizing affective differentiations.

Within this process, it becomes apparent that meaning formation is not static but takes place within the tension between stability and change. Emotional irritation is the form in which this change begins.

At the same time, this process remains bound to the limiting relation to reality.

Not every possible shift in relevance proves viable. Some lead to new stable orders; others prove inadequate. The reorganization of relevance is therefore an open process capable of revision.

- Emotional irritation is the disturbance of existing structures of relevance.
- It leads to a shift in weighting within the field of experience.
- This shift opens up new possibilities of meaning formation.
- It is dynamic, often contradictory, and not completely controllable.
- It affects emotion, feeling, and intuition alike.

6.3 Intuition as Reorganization under Problem Conditions

(Intuition as the Emergent Formation of New Coherence in the Process of Affective Restructuring)

The analysis of emotional irritation and shifts in relevance has shown that the problem not only destabilizes existing orders of meaning but simultaneously opens up the space for their reorganization. Within this process, intuition assumes a central role.

When existing intuitive Gestalten lose their coherence, a state of disorientation arises. The previously operative implicit coherence is no longer present. Decisions appear uncertain, nexuses fragmented, orientation fragile. In this situation, thought can attempt to establish order through explicit analysis. Yet such analysis alone is often insufficient to form a new viable structure.

At this point, the productive function of intuition becomes visible.

Intuition is not only the condensation of already existing structures of meaning but also the site of their new formation. Under problem conditions, it reorganizes the differentiations altered through emotional irritation into new Gestalten of coherence.

This new formation is an emergent process. It does not arise through linear derivation from existing structures but through a reorganization of the field of experience. New nexuses become visible, previously separate aspects combine, and new perspectives emerge. These processes cannot be completely consciously controlled but take place within the implicit domain of meaning formation.

Intuition functions here as an integrative force. It takes up the shifted relevances and brings them into a new order. This order is initially provisional and can continue to change, yet it already makes renewed orientation possible. Intuition thus constitutes the first form of restabilization after irritation.

This reorganization, however, is not arbitrary. It remains bound to the conditions that mark the limiting relation to reality. Not every newly formed intuitive Gestalt is viable. Some prove inadequate and lead to renewed irritation. The new formation of coherence is therefore a gradual process that takes place through repeated attempts.

This gradualness is characteristic of problematic processes. Intuition generates provisional solutions that can subsequently be examined, confirmed, or corrected. It is therefore part of an open search process in which new orders of meaning emerge.

At the same time, intuition does not operate in isolation. Reorganization concerns all levels of affective meaning formation:

- Emotional differentiations shift and open up new relevances.
- Feelings render these changes bodily experienceable and provide indications of their viability.
- Intuition integrates these changes into new Gestalten of coherence.

Intuition is thus the point at which these processes converge and pass over into a new form of orientation. This function becomes particularly evident in creative processes. New solutions often arise not through step-by-step analysis but through intuitive insights in which a new Gestalt suddenly becomes apparent. Such insights, however, are not accidental but the result of the affective restructuring described above.

Intuition is therefore not merely reactive but productive. It brings forth new possibilities by transforming existing structures. In this sense, it is a central mechanism of innovation within meaning formation.

Thus:

- Intuition reorganizes meaning under problem conditions.
- It forms new Gestalten of coherence out of irritation.
- This new formation is emergent, iterative, and not completely controllable.
- It remains bound to emotional and feeling-based structures.
- It is central to creative and transformative processes.

6.4 Feeling as an Indicator of Instability

(Feeling as Bodily Sensitivity to Ruptures, Tensions, and Transitions of Affective Order)

The analysis of intuition as an instance of reorganization has shown that problematic processes are essentially characterized by the new formation of coherence. Such new formation, however, presupposes that instability can become perceptible in the first place. At this point, feeling acquires a central diagnostic function.

Feelings are not only evidences of meaning but also indicators of its instability.

Whereas emotions accomplish the differentiation of the field of experience and intuition brings forth new Gestalten of coherence, feeling indicates whether and how these structures sustain themselves. It is the level at which stability or instability becomes immediately experienceable.

This function becomes particularly apparent in problematic situations. When existing orders of meaning become fragile, this does not first manifest itself in explicit conceptual uncertainty but in a change in bodily evidence. Feelings become unsettled, ambivalent, or contradictory. Something "does not fit," without it yet being clear wherein the disturbance consists.

Feeling thus registers changes before they can be conceptually grasped. This sensitivity makes it an early indicator of problematicity. It indicates that the previous order no longer sustains itself even before this can be explicitly reflected upon. In this sense, **feeling is a medium of prereflective diagnosis**.

This diagnostic function, however, is not unequivocal. Feelings do not provide clear statements but qualitative indications. They show that a tension exists without completely determining that tension. Precisely in their indeterminacy, they point toward the necessity of further clarification.

This indeterminacy is nevertheless productive. It keeps the process open and prevents premature fixation. By indicating instability without immediately fixing it, feeling opens up a space in which new differentiations and Gestalten can emerge.

At the same time, feeling also functions as an indicator of successful reorganization. When new intuitive Gestalten form, their viability frequently manifests itself first in feeling. A solution appears "coherent," a decision "right," a nexus "plausible." This coherence is not logical certainty but a form of bodily evidence.

Feelings thus accompany the entire problem process. They indicate the instability of existing orders and mark the stability of newly emerging structures. In both cases, they are closely interwoven with emotion and intuition. The alteration of the emotional structure of relevance becomes experienceable in feeling, while the new Gestalten formed through intuition are "tested" in feeling for their coherence.

Feeling thereby functions as a kind of **resonance space** in which the dynamics of meaning formation are reflected. This resonance, however, is not infallible. Feelings can deceive or mislead. Their diagnostic function is therefore not absolute but part of an open process. They must be understood in interaction with other levels of meaning formation—especially intuition and thought.

Nevertheless, their role remains indispensable. Without the bodily sensitivity of feeling, neither the perception of instability nor the experience of coherence would be possible. Feelings are therefore central points of orientation in the process of reorganizing meaning.

Thus:

- Feelings are indicators of instability and stability.
- They render ruptures and tensions within the order of meaning bodily experienceable.
- They indicate problematicity prereflectively.
- They accompany the new formation of coherence as an experience of coherence.
- They are not unequivocal, but indispensable to orientation.

6.5 Interim Result

(Affective Meaning Formation as a Dynamic Process of Stability, Irritation, and Reorganization)

The analysis of emotion, feeling, and intuition within the horizon of the problem makes it possible to summarize the dynamics of affective meaning formation in its processual structure.

It has first become clear that the problem cannot be understood as a purely cognitive phenomenon. It is not merely a gap in knowledge or a deficit of information, but a disturbance of the existing order of meaning. This disturbance primarily concerns the affective structure of experience: the differentiations of emotion, the evidences of feeling, and the formations of coherence of intuition.

The problem begins as an irritation of affective order. This irritation manifests itself as a dissolution of stable structures of relevance. Emotional differentiations lose their binding force, and the field of experience is set in motion. This movement, however, is not merely a loss of order but simultaneously opens up new possibilities of meaning formation.

In the process of emotional irritation, shifts in relevance occur. What previously remained in the background can move into the foreground; what was regarded as significant can lose weight.

These shifts are not completely controllable but take place within the dynamic nexus of affective processes. They form the point of departure for the new formation of meaning.

Within this context, intuition assumes a central role. It reorganizes the altered differentiations into new Gestalten of coherence. This new formation arises from within the process and develops gradually. It emerges from the situation without being completely plannable and remains open to further corrections. Intuition is thus not only stabilizing but also transformative.

Feeling accompanies this entire process. It functions as an indicator of instability by signaling ruptures and tensions within the existing order. At the same time, it marks the viability of newly emerging structures as an experience of coherence. Feelings are therefore a central medium of orientation within problematic processes.

From these determinations, a fundamental insight follows:

Affective meaning formation is not a static state but a dynamic process that takes place within the tension between stability and instability.

Stability is necessary in order to enable orientation; instability is necessary in order to enable change. The problem is the form in which this tension becomes visible and productively effective.

This dynamic can be summarized in a structural movement:

- Emotion differentiates and generates relevance.
- Feeling renders this structure experienceable as evidence and instability.
- Intuition integrates and reorganizes these structures into new coherence.

This movement is not linear but circular and processual. It repeats itself in ever new contexts and forms the core of the ongoing constitution of constituted reality. At the same time, this process remains bound to the limiting relation to reality. Not every reorganization is viable; not every intuitive Gestalt proves itself. Meaning formation therefore remains open, provisional, and capable of revision. This openness is not a deficit but a fundamental condition of learning, development, and knowledge.

Thus, the problem is a disturbance of affective meaning order; it leads to irritation and shifts in relevance; intuition reorganizes these structures into new coherence; feelings indicate instability and coherence; and affective meaning formation as a whole remains a dynamic, open, and revisable process.

7. Emotional Order and the Constitution of Constituted Reality

(Affective Relevance Formation as a Condition of the Appearance of World)

7.1 Emotions as Conditions of World-Access

(Emotional Differentiation as a Presupposition of the Appearance of World)

The preceding analyses have shown that emotions, feelings, and intuition do not merely represent individual moments of meaning formation but constitute a fundamental affective structure that permeates experience, understanding, and problem. Against this background, the further question arises as to the sense in which this affective structure makes world-access itself possible.

If constituted reality is understood not as a given order but as a structure of meaning brought forth in the enactment of experience, then access to the world cannot itself be presupposed but requires explanation. The question is what makes a relation to world possible at all.

The central thesis of this section is:

Emotions are conditions of world-access.

This determination takes up and develops further the transcendental function of emotion established in the preceding chapter. Emotions do not merely participate in structuring experience; they determine the manner in which world appears at all. World does not appear as something neutrally given. It does not emerge as a uniform collection of data but as a structured nexus of meanings. Something is important or unimportant, near or distant, relevant or irrelevant. This structure is not subsequently added but is constitutive of the appearance of world.

Emotions accomplish precisely this structuring. They differentiate the field of experience and determine what comes to the fore and what recedes. Without this differentiation, there would be no world in the proper sense but only an unstructured field of possible impressions. In this sense, emotions are not only conditions of experience but conditions of the appearance of world. **This appearance is always perspectival.**

What appears as world depends upon the emotional structures of relevance that articulate the field of experience. Different emotional orders lead to different modes of world-access. World is therefore not a unitary, objectively given structure but appears in multiple, affectively shaped perspectives.

This perspectivity, however, is not arbitrary. Emotional structurings are bound to conditions that cannot be completely controlled. They are bodily mediated, situationally embedded, and shaped by experience. In this respect, world-access is neither purely experience-bound nor objective, but relational.

Emotions mediate between human being and world. They are the processes in which this relation takes shape. Within them arises the nexus in which something appears as significant for someone. Without this relational structure, there would be no world-relation in the proper sense.

At the same time, this world-access is not stable. Emotional structures of relevance can change, shift, or dissolve. The manner in which world appears changes accordingly. World is therefore not something statically given but a dynamic nexus that is continuously reconstituted in the process of affective meaning formation.

This dynamic becomes particularly visible in connection with the problem. When existing emotional orders become unstable, world-access itself changes. What previously appeared self-evident becomes questionable; new aspects come to the fore. In such situations, it becomes apparent that world does not exist independently of affective structuring but is mediated through it.

Thus:

- Emotions are conditions of world-access.
- They structure the field of experience and make the appearance of world possible.
- World appears as an affectively shaped order of meaning, not as something neutrally given.
- This world-access is perspectival, relational, and dynamic.

7.2 Feeling and the Perspectivity of Constituted Reality

(Feeling as the Bodily Determination of the Manner in Which Constituted Reality Appears)

The determination of emotion as a condition of world-access has shown that world is not neutrally given but appears as an affectively structured order of meaning. This structure, however, initially remains implicit. In order to understand how this perspectivity is concretely enacted in lived experience, the role of feeling must be determined more precisely.

Feelings are the manner in which the perspectivity of constituted reality manifests itself bodily.

Whereas emotions accomplish the differentiation of the field of experience, feelings show how this differentiation appears for the human being. They are the form in which the affective structure of world-access becomes concretely experienceable.

In this sense:

Feelings do not determine what constituted reality is, but how it appears.

This mode of appearance is not secondary but constitutive. Constituted reality is not first given and then differently "interpreted." Rather, it appears from the outset in a particular manner—as threatening, inviting, burdensome, sustaining, or indifferent. These qualities are not subsequent attributions but integral components of appearance itself.

Feelings are the bearers of these qualities of appearance. They make experienceable the manner in which the human being is embedded in the world. In them, it becomes apparent whether the world is experienced as open or closed, familiar or foreign, safe or unsafe. These determinations are not purely governed by understanding but bodily given.

It thereby becomes clear that perspectivity is not primarily a question of standpoint but a question of affective structure. Different feelings open different perspectives upon the world. They structure what becomes visible, what acquires significance, and how nexuses appear. Perspectivity is therefore not merely a property of thought but is already rooted in bodily experience.

This perspectivity, however, is not static. Feelings change, and with them changes the manner in which constituted reality appears. A situation can appear threatening at one moment and challenging or even attractive at another. These changes are not merely personal fluctuations but expressions of the dynamics of affective meaning formation.

This dynamic is closely connected with the concept of the problem. In problematic situations, habitual perspectivity becomes unstable. Feelings lose their unequivocal character, and the manner in which constituted reality appears becomes questionable. This instability opens up the possibility of new perspectives. As feelings change, the structure of world-access itself can be transformed. Feelings are therefore not only expressions of perspectivity but also media of its transformation.

At the same time, this transformation remains bound to conditions. Not every possible perspective is equally viable. Some prove inadequate or lead to further instability. The perspectivity of constituted reality is therefore an open but not arbitrary process. This insight underscores the significance of feeling for the constitution of constituted reality:

Feelings are not merely personal reactions but constitutive elements of world-access. They determine how constituted reality appears and at the same time make possible the transformation of perspectives.

Thus:

- Feelings determine the manner in which constituted reality appears.
- They are bodily bearers of affective perspectivity.
- They structure world-access prior to every conceptual reflection.
- They are dynamic and make possible the transformation of perspectives.

7.3 Intuition as an Operative Structure of Selection

(Intuition as an Implicit Mechanism of the Selection and Organization of Constituted Reality)

The preceding considerations have shown that emotions open world-access and feelings determine the manner in which constituted reality appears. Against this background, the question arises as to how, within this affectively structured perspectivity, concrete orientations emerge that guide action and understanding. Here intuition assumes a central function.

Intuition is not to be understood merely as condensation or Gestalt formation but as an operative structure of selection. It determines which aspects of constituted reality become effective within a given perspective and how they are organized into coherent unities. For constituted reality does not appear as a complete totality: even within an affectively structured perspective, the field of experience remains in principle open and overcomplex. It contains more possibilities than can be processed simultaneously and therefore necessarily requires selection.

This selection is accomplished through intuition. From the multiplicity of possible differentiations, it selects those that are relevant to the respective situation and integrates them into a Gestalt capable of guiding action. This process does not take place explicitly but in the mode of implicit understanding. In this sense, intuition determines what actually becomes effective from within a perspective.

In doing so, intuition remains closely bound to its affective basis: the relevances established through emotions and the perspectivity experienced in feeling form the framework within which intuitive selection operates. Intuition is therefore not an autonomous mechanism but part of the overall process of affective meaning formation.

At the same time, it contributes an organizational achievement of its own. Whereas emotions bring forth differentiations and feelings render these experienceable as perspective, intuition organizes these differences into concrete, situation-related unities. It establishes nexuses, prioritizes possibilities, and directs attention toward particular options for action. Only thereby does orientation become possible: without intuitive selection, the perspectivity of experience would remain indeterminate, and clear direction for decisions and actions would be lacking.

This function becomes particularly evident in complex situations in which explicit thought cannot accomplish the necessary selection in time. Intuition then assumes the task of forming a structure capable of guiding action from the multiplicity of possible relations. At the same time, this structure remains provisional. Intuitive orders can prove inadequate and must be examined, adapted, or revised in the further course of experience. Intuition is therefore not a final mechanism of decision but part of an open, dynamic process.

This openness becomes especially apparent in problematic situations in which existing orders of relevance become unstable and established Gestalten lose their viability. In such cases, the intuitive structure of selection must itself be reorganized. Intuition thereby proves not only selective but also transformative: it adapts to altered conditions and enables the formation of new orientation.

In summary, intuition can be determined as an operative structure of selection within affective meaning formation. It selects relevant aspects of constituted reality, organizes them into coherent unities, and thereby enables orientation and the capacity for action under conditions of complexity. In doing so, it remains bound to emotional and feeling-based structures while simultaneously remaining open to revision.

7.4 The Interrelation of Emotion, Feeling, and Intuition

(The Unity of Affective Differentiation, Bodily Evidence, and Implicit Organization as a Structure of the Constitution of Constituted Reality)

The preceding analyses have determined emotion, feeling, and intuition in their respective functions. In order to grasp their systematic significance fully, it is now necessary to reconstruct their interrelation as a unity of affective meaning formation.

Emotion, feeling, and intuition are not separate processes but **functionally differentiated moments of a unified occurrence.**

This occurrence can be described as a threefold structure in which each level fulfills a specific function without existing independently of the others.

Emotion constitutes the level of differentiation. Within it, the field of experience is structured by establishing relevances and carrying out weightings. Emotion determines what comes to the fore and what recedes and thereby creates the fundamental order within which world can appear.

Feeling constitutes the level of evidence. It renders the order structured through emotion bodily experienceable. In feeling, it becomes apparent how the world is constituted for the individual and how the individual stands within this world. Feeling is the mode of appearance of emotional structure and at the same time a medium of self-relation.

Intuition constitutes the level of organization. It integrates the differentiated and evident structures into coherent Gestalten that enable orientation and action. Intuition selects, prioritizes, and connects the relevant aspects of experience into an implicit order of understanding.

These three levels are not built upon one another linearly but are circularly interwoven.

Emotional differentiation makes feeling-based evidence possible; this evidence forms the basis for intuitive organization; intuitive structures in turn act back upon emotional differentiations. The process of meaning formation is therefore to be understood not as a sequence but as a dynamic interplay.

This dynamic is decisive for the constitution of constituted reality.

Constituted reality does not appear as a finished structure but as the result of this interplay. It is the provisionally stabilized unity of differentiation, evidence, and organization. Without emotion there would be no structure, without feeling no evidence, and without intuition no coherent order.

At the same time, this unity remains open. The affective structure of meaning formation is not final but mutable. Emotional relevances can shift, feelings can lose or alter their evidence, and intuitive Gestalten can dissolve or be newly formed. Constituted reality is therefore not a static state but an ongoing process.

This openness becomes particularly visible in connection with the problem. When the unity of differentiation, evidence, and organization is disturbed, the previous order disintegrates. Emotion, feeling, and intuition enter into tension, and new forms of meaning formation must emerge. Precisely in this instability, the dynamic structure of the overall process becomes apparent.

The structure can therefore be summarized as follows:

- Emotion differentiates the field of experience.
- Feeling renders this differentiation evident.
- Intuition organizes it into coherent Gestalten.

In their interplay, they constitute constituted reality as an affectively structured order of meaning.

This determination makes it possible to locate the role of affective processes conclusively within the overall model:

Emotion, feeling, and intuition are not supplements to understanding but its foundation. They constitute the implicit structure upon which conceptual meaning formation builds.

It thereby becomes clear that a theory of the constitution of constituted reality remains incomplete if it fails to take affective structures into account.

Thus:

- Emotion, feeling, and intuition form a functional unity of affective meaning formation.

- They are interconnected in a circular and dynamic relation.
- In their interplay, they constitute constituted reality as a meaningful nexus.
- This constitution is open, provisional, and capable of revision.

7.5 Interim Result

(Affective Meaning Formation as a Constitutive Structure of the Perspectivity and Organization of Constituted Reality)

The analysis of emotional order in connection with the constitution of constituted reality makes it possible to summarize the role of emotion, feeling, and intuition at an overarching level.

First, it has become clear that emotions constitute the fundamental condition of world-access. They differentiate the field of experience and thereby make it possible for world to appear as a structured nexus in the first place. Without emotional relevance formation, there would be no foregrounding, no weighting, and thus no meaningful order of experience.

On this basis, it has been shown that feelings determine the perspectivity of constituted reality. They render the world structured through emotion bodily experienceable and give it a concrete mode of appearance. Constituted reality does not appear neutrally but in qualities determined through feeling. This perspectivity is constitutive of world-access and not merely a subsequent interpretation.

Intuition, finally, has been determined as an operative structure of selection and organization. From within the affectively structured perspective, it selects those aspects relevant to orientation and action and integrates them into coherent Gestalten. Intuition makes it possible to reach concrete decisions within the openness of experience.

In their interplay, a clear functional structure emerges:

- Emotion opens world-access through differentiation.
- Feeling determines the manner of appearance through bodily evidence.
- Intuition organizes this structure into unities capable of guiding action.

This structure is not additive but constitutive.

Constituted reality does not appear independently of the processes described but within them. It is to be understood as a provisionally stabilized unity of affective differentiation, evidence, and organization. Affective meaning formation is therefore not a peripheral aspect but a fundamental mechanism of the constitution of constituted reality.

At the same time, this constitution proves perspectival and dynamic. Different emotional structures open different forms of world-access; feelings shape the manner in which constituted reality appears, while intuition continuously organizes and restructures these perspectives. Constituted reality is therefore not to be conceived as something fixed and given but as a continuously changing nexus.

This mutability is closely connected with the concept of the problem. Where affective structures become unstable, world-access itself changes: new perspectives emerge while previous ones lose their validity. The constitution of constituted reality thus proves to be not only a process of stabilization but simultaneously a process of transformation.

From this follows the central insight that constituted reality does not exist independently of affective meaning formation but is constituted through it. This determination has far-reaching consequences for the understanding of knowledge, orientation, and world-relation, insofar as affective processes must be conceived not as subordinate but as constitutive of every form of understanding.

In summary, emotion, feeling, and intuition function as fundamental structures of the constitution of constituted reality: they determine the differentiation, appearance, and organization of world and mediate its perspectival and dynamic character. Affective meaning formation thereby constitutes the basis of all further forms of understanding.

8. Emotion, Feeling, and Intuition in the Tension between Experience and Thought

Affective Continuity and Conceptual Stabilization as Complementary Modes of Meaning Formation

8.1 The Analog Structure of Emotional Meaning Formation

(Continuous, Non-Discrete Differentiation as the Fundamental Form of Affective Experience)

The preceding analyses have shown that emotion, feeling, and intuition constitute central moments of affective meaning formation and decisively shape the constitution of constituted reality. In order to determine their position within the overall process of understanding adequately, it is necessary to analyze them in relation to thought. The point of departure is the difference between two fundamental modes of meaning formation: an experience-based, affectively structured order and a conceptually discrete order.

Affective meaning formation is analog in its structure. "Analog" here is not meant as a technical term but as a structural determination: emotions, feelings, and intuition do not operate in clearly delimited units but in continuous transitions, intensities, and relational configurations. The differences they bring forth are not binary but gradual. Emotions differentiate the field of experience not through fixed categories but through shifts in intensity; feelings do not appear as unequivocally delimitable states but as qualitative wholes with fluid transitions; and intuition organizes meaning not in discrete units but in Gestalt-like, interconnected structures.

This analog structure is fundamental to the dynamics of experience. It makes possible the perception of subtle differences, the apprehension of complex nexuses, and the formation of transitions without immediately transforming them into fixed categories. The continuity of affective meaning formation thus constitutes the condition for experience to appear as a living, continuously unfolding process.

This continuity, however, stands in a relation of tension to thought. Thought operates in discrete units: it distinguishes, categorizes, and orders in clearly delimited concepts. Whereas affective meaning formation is organized in fluid transitions, thought aims at stabilization through separation and fixation.

This difference, however, is not to be understood as an oppositional contrast but as a complementary structure. The analog form of affective meaning formation enables an open, flexible, and context-sensitive differentiation of experience but, due to its implicit structure, remains only partially communicable and difficult to examine completely. Thought, by contrast, generates clarity, explicitness, and communicative connectivity, yet does so at the cost of some of the original continuity.

Against this background, emotion, feeling, and intuition are not to be understood as deficient preliminary forms of thought but as a distinctive mode of meaning formation. Their analog structure does not constitute vagueness but the condition of their specific capacity. Precisely because they do not operate in discrete units, they are able to integrate complex nexuses and respond flexibly to change.

This insight is central to understanding the relation between experience and understanding. Understanding cannot be reduced to conceptual operations but takes place in the reciprocal

movement between analog and discrete meaning formation. Emotion, feeling, and intuition form the continuous basis upon which conceptual structures build and by which they continue to be sustained.

At the same time, this analog structure eludes complete explication. It cannot be exhaustively transformed into conceptual forms and remains implicit in essential respects. This non-closability is not to be interpreted as a deficit but as an expression of the structural difference between the modes of affective and conceptual meaning formation.

In summary:

- Emotional meaning formation is analog in structure.
- It operates in continuities, intensities, and transitions.
- This structure enables flexible and integrative forms of orientation.
- It stands in a complementary relation to discrete thought.

8.2 Digital Stabilization in Thought

(Conceptual Discretization as a Means of Fixing, Explicating, and Communicating Meaning)

The determination of affective meaning formation as analog in structure makes the complementary role of thought particularly visible. Whereas emotion, feeling, and intuition operate in continuous, non-discrete structures, thought exhibits a fundamentally different organizational form. It is digitally structured. “Digital” here does not designate a technical property but a structural one: thought takes place in distinguishable, mutually delimitable units. Concepts, categories, and relations are discrete; they enable clear distinctions, stable assignments, and comprehensible connections.

This discreteness fulfills a central function. It makes it possible to fix the continuous and multilayered structures of experience. What appears in the mode of affective meaning formation as a fluid nexus is decomposed in thought into distinguishable elements. Precisely this decomposition forms the presupposition for analysis, reflection, and systematic knowledge. Thought thus stabilizes what is initially given continuously in experience.

This stabilization is necessary because, without it, meaning would remain bound to the transience of immediate experience. It would be neither reliably repeatable nor examinable nor communicatively mediable. Only conceptual fixation opens up the possibility of comparing experiences, communicating them, and integrating them into overarching nexuses.

Thought thereby creates a second level of meaning formation. Whereas emotion, feeling, and intuition bring forth and prestructure meaning, thought provides its conceptual formulation and stabilization. It makes what is implicitly given thematizable and accessible to reflection.

This achievement, however, is necessarily connected with transformation. The continuous structures of experience are transferred in thought into discrete units; in the process, transitions, nuances, and ambiguities are at least partially lost. The stability of thought therefore rests upon a reduction of complexity.

This reduction is to be understood as a condition of conceptual order. Thought can stabilize only by selecting, separating, and fixing. It gains clarity at the price of diminished continuity. Precisely herein lies the constitutive tension in the relation between experience and thought.

Emotion, feeling, and intuition stand in a tension-filled but productive relation to this form of stabilization. They provide the basis upon which thought operates while at the same time resisting complete discretization. Their structures can be described, ordered, and conceptually grasped without ever being exhaustively transformed into conceptual units.

This difference becomes particularly clear in language. Concepts attempt to grasp what is given in feeling and intuition but necessarily remain behind its immediate evidence. Language can fix meaning and render it communicable, but it cannot completely reproduce it in its original immediacy.

Nevertheless, thought remains indispensable. It not only stabilizes but also opens the possibility of criticism and correction. Concepts can be examined, questioned, and altered; affective structures of meaning can thereby themselves become objects of reflection and, where appropriate, be transformed.

This feedback is decisive for the relation between affective meaning formation and thought. Although thought builds upon affective structures, it does not remain external to them. Rather, it can in turn act back upon them. New conceptual orders can lead to altered emotional differentiations, new configurations of feeling, and different intuitive Gestalten. The relation between affective and conceptual meaning formation is therefore not one-sided but reciprocally mediated.

In summary:

- Thought is digitally structured and operates in discrete units.
- It stabilizes and explicates the meaning brought forth in experience.
- This stabilization is necessary but involves reduction.
- Thought and affective meaning formation stand in a complementary and tension-filled relation.

8.3 Problems of Translation and Loss

(The Non-Coincidence of Analog Experience and Digital Concept Formation)

The contrast between analog-structured affective meaning formation and digitally constituted conceptual stabilization makes clear that the transition between the two modes does not proceed without friction. Rather, it is characterized by structural tensions, problems of translation, and unavoidable losses.

Thought cannot simply reproduce experience. Since affective meaning formation operates in continuous, multilayered, and non-discrete structures, every transfer into conceptual form is necessarily selective. Concepts grasp particular aspects of experience without being able to reproduce its totality completely.

This difference can be determined as a problem of translation. What is given in feeling as bodily grounded evidence must be transformed in thought into discrete units. This transfer is not a

mere correspondence but a transformation that changes the character of what is represented. Conceptual formulation is therefore always also reduction.

This reduction concerns several dimensions. First, qualitative nuances are lost because feelings and intuitive Gestalten contain subtle differences, transitions, and ambiguities that cannot be completely transferred into clearly delimited concepts. Second, the wholeness of experience is fragmented insofar as what appears in intuition as a coherent Gestalt is decomposed in thought into individual elements. Finally, temporal dynamics are reduced because experience proceeds processually, whereas concepts tend toward static organization.

These losses are unavoidable and are not to be understood as a deficit of inadequate concept formation but as an expression of the structural difference between the two modes of meaning formation. Every conceptual representation necessarily remains behind the immediacy of experience.

It does not follow from this, however, that conceptual formulation is inadequate or dispensable. On the contrary, precisely through its reduction it becomes possible to stabilize experience, make it comparable, and communicate it. Translation remains incomplete but is functionally necessary because it brings forth a distinctive form of meaning that is based upon experience without being identical with it.

A central differentiation follows from this: **a complete translation of experience into concepts is impossible, but a necessary and productive transformation is possible.**

This transformation does not proceed in only one direction. Thought in turn acts back upon experience insofar as conceptual structures enable new differentiations, render previously unnoticed aspects visible, and can thereby alter feelings and intuitive Gestalten. The movement of translation is therefore reciprocally mediated.

Nevertheless, a structural tension remains. Experience and thought are not congruent; an insurmountable distance exists between them. This distance is a condition of the possibility of understanding. Precisely because experience is not completely absorbed into thought, understanding remains open in principle. It takes place as an ongoing process in which new conceptual formulations emerge, existing ones are revised, and the difference between implicit and explicit meaning is continually renegotiated.

This openness is closely connected with the concept of the problem. Problems of translation can themselves become problems—for example, when existing concepts no longer adequately grasp experience or lose their orienting function. In such cases, a tension arises that requires new forms of meaning formation. The difference between experience and thought thereby proves to be not only a limit but simultaneously a driving force in the further development of understanding.

Thus:

- The transfer of experience into concepts is a process of translation.
- This process is necessary but involves losses.
- Experience and thought are structurally non-congruent.
- This difference is a condition of understanding.
- It opens space for reflection, criticism, and further development.

8.4 Intuition as a Transitional Form

(Intuition as a Mediating Structure between Analog Experience and Digital Thought)

The analysis of the problems of translation has shown that there is a structural difference between affective experience and conceptual thought that cannot be abolished. Against this background, intuition acquires a particular systematic significance. It is not merely a form of implicit understanding but the central mediating instance between the two modes of meaning formation. Whereas emotion and feeling belong to the analog structure of experience and thought undertakes digital stabilization, intuition operates at the boundary between the two domains. It is neither completely continuous nor already completely discrete.

Precisely this intermediate position is decisive for its function. Intuition transforms the continuous structures of meaning formed in experience into a form capable of connecting with thought without already completely transferring them into discrete units. It prepares conceptual order without being absorbed into it. In this sense, it marks the form in which experience passes over toward thought.

This transitional function manifests itself in several respects. First, intuition undertakes the integration of the differentiations that have arisen in experience. It forms Gestalten that already possess an initial internal order and thereby can first become explicable at all. Without such antecedent integration, conceptual formulation would remain largely impossible.

At the same time, intuition reduces the complexity of experience by bringing forth a coherent Gestalt from a multiplicity of possible differentiations. This reduction, however, is not yet of the same kind as that occurring in thought: it preserves a degree of continuity, openness, and ambiguity that can be retained only to a limited extent in conceptual operations.

Moreover, intuition performs a selective function by determining which aspects of experience enter into conceptual processing and which remain in the background. It thereby already influences in advance where thought begins and which structures it stabilizes.

In this way, intuition proves to be an indispensable bridge between implicit experience and explicit concept formation. Without it, the transition between the two modes of meaning formation would not succeed; experience and thought would remain largely unconnected alongside one another.

At the same time, intuition itself is characterized by a distinctive tension. It is neither completely determined nor wholly open but moves between coherence and indeterminacy, between wholeness and incipient differentiation. Precisely therein its mediating function finds expression.

This mediation, however, is not neutral. Intuition helps determine the manner in which experience is transformed into thought and thereby also shapes the form of the emerging conceptual order. It is therefore not merely a transition but itself form-giving.

Conversely, thought does not remain without effect upon intuition. Conceptual clarifications can alter, specify, or correct intuitive processes. The mediation between the two modes is therefore reciprocally structured: **intuition enables thought, and thought helps shape intuition.**

This reciprocal dynamic is central to understanding understanding. Understanding does not take place within a single mode of meaning formation but in the movement between implicit and explicit, between analog and discrete order. Intuition is the instance in which this movement becomes concrete and in which the mediation of experience and thought takes place.

Thus:

- Intuition is the transitional form between experience and thought.
- It integrates, selects, and transforms affective structures of meaning.
- It prepares conceptual explication without being absorbed into it.
- It is a central mediating instance in the process of understanding.
- It stands in a reciprocal relation to thought.

8.5 Interim Result

(Complementarity of Affective Continuity and Conceptual Discretion as the Fundamental Structure of Understanding)

The analysis of the tension between experience and thought makes it possible to determine systematically the position of emotion, feeling, and intuition within this nexus. It has first been shown that affective meaning formation possesses an analog structure. Emotions differentiate the field of experience in continuous transitions, feelings make these differentiations experienceable as qualitative evidences, and intuition organizes them into Gestalt-like unities. This form of meaning formation proves to be dynamic, context-sensitive, and integrative.

By contrast, thought has been determined as a digitally structured mode. It operates in discrete units, stabilizes meaning through concepts, and makes it thematizable, examinable, and communicable. This stabilization is indispensable but entails a reduction of the original complexity.

From this contrast follows the fundamental insight that affective and conceptual meaning formation are structurally different but functionally complementary. Neither form is capable of sustaining the process of understanding by itself. Whereas the affective dimension provides the basis of meaning formation, thought enables its stabilization and conceptual formulation.

This complementarity, however, is not free of tension. The transition from analog experience to digital concept formation is characterized by problems of translation. The wholeness, continuity, and multilayered character of experience cannot be completely transferred into discrete concepts; every conceptual formulation therefore necessarily involves losses. These losses are to be understood as an expression of the structural difference between the two modes of meaning formation.

Precisely because experience is not completely absorbed into thought, understanding remains an open process. The difference between implicit and explicit meaning cannot be abolished but is constitutive of the dynamics of knowledge.

Within this field of tension, intuition assumes a particular role. It has been determined as a transitional form that mediates between the two modes. Intuition integrates affective structures of meaning, reduces complexity, and makes them accessible to conceptual processing without

completely abandoning their continuity. It thereby forms the operative interface between experience and thought.

This mediating function is central to the process of understanding, for without intuition a transformation of implicit into explicit meaning would scarcely be possible. At the same time, intuition itself remains bound to affective structure and thus resists complete discretization.

From these considerations, a clear structural order emerges: emotion, feeling, and intuition form the continuous basis of meaning formation; thought stabilizes and formulates this basis in discrete forms; and intuition mediates between the two modes by enabling their transition.

This structure, however, is not static but processual. Understanding takes place in the ongoing movement between affective continuity and conceptual stabilization, with both modes acting upon and reciprocally altering one another.

Thus:

- Affective and conceptual meaning formation are complementary modes.
- Their difference is constitutive of understanding.
- Processes of translation are necessary but involve losses.
- Intuition functions as the central mediating instance.
- Understanding is a dynamic process between implicitness and explicability.

With this interim result, the relation between experience and thought with regard to affective meaning formation has been determined.

9. Decision as an Emergent Gestalt of Emotional Order

Decision as the Enactment of Condensed Affective and Intuitive Meaning Formation

9.1 Decision beyond Rational Models

Critique of the Reduction of Decision to Explicit Deliberation and Calculation

The preceding analyses have shown that emotion, feeling, and intuition constitute central structures of meaning formation and decisively shape the process of understanding. Against this background, the question arises as to how decision is to be determined within this overall nexus.

Classical theories frequently conceive decision as a rational process, as the result of conscious deliberation in which different options are compared and evaluated according to explicit criteria. Such a model, however, presupposes that the relevant information is available, the criteria sufficiently clear, and the alternatives unambiguously determinable.

Yet precisely these presuppositions are not given in many real situations. Decisions frequently take place under conditions of uncertainty, time pressure, and incomplete information. In such constellations, a complete explicit analysis is neither possible nor practicable. The model of rational deliberation proves insufficient here because it primarily takes into account the conceptually explicit dimension of understanding while excluding the affective structures upon which this understanding rests. It presupposes an already ordered world without reflecting upon how this order comes about in the first place.

Decision, however, is not to be understood merely as a cognitive act but as an enactment within affective meaning formation. It is based upon emotional formations of relevance, sustained by feeling-based evidences, and organized in intuitive Gestalten. What appears as an option at all is already the result of affective differentiation; and what counts as preferable is co-determined by emotional weightings.

Decision therefore does not begin with conscious deliberation but with the affective structuring of the situation.

This structuring precedes rational calculation and determines which alternatives come into consideration at all and which criteria count as significant. Without such antecedent structuring, there would be no basis for explicit decision.

This does not, of course, mean that rational deliberation is insignificant. Thought can support decisions by conceptually formulating options, analyzing consequences, and clarifying criteria. Yet it remains dependent upon the affective basis. It can work only with what has already emerged as relevant within the experiential process.

From this follows a redetermination of decision: **it is not a pure act of understanding but the emergent result of an interplay of affective and intellectual processes.** Emotion, feeling, intuition, and thought interlock; none of these levels is sufficient on its own. Only their interplay makes concrete action possible.

This emergence also manifests itself in the experience of decision itself. Decisions are frequently experienced not as the result of a completely reconstructable train of thought but as

sudden certainty or as the feeling that something is “right.” In this, the experience of decision points toward the role of intuition and affective evidence within the decision process.

At the same time, such certainty remains provisional. Decisions can prove viable or inadequate; they are embedded within an open process in which new experiences generate new evaluations. Decision is therefore not a final conclusion but a moment within dynamic meaning formation.

This dynamic is closely connected with the concept of the problem. Decisions arise particularly where existing structures are insufficient and orientation must be regained. They are attempts to establish order under problematic conditions and to recover the capacity for action. In this sense, decisions are not merely responses to problems but are themselves part of their processing.

In summary:

- Decision cannot be reduced to rational calculation.
- It is based upon the affective structuring of the situation.
- It arises through the interplay of emotion, feeling, intuition, and thought.
- It is emergent, provisional, and capable of revision.

9.2 Microstructure of Affective Decision

(The Interplay of Differentiation, Evidence, Condensation, and Selection in the Decision Process)

The critique of rational models of decision has shown that decision cannot be understood as an isolated act of deliberation but as the emergent result of affective and intellectual processes. In order to specify this determination, the microstructure of affective decision must be analyzed more closely.

Decision is not a punctual event but a multilayered process that can be described as the interplay of **differentiation, evidence, condensation, and selection**.

First, differentiation: At the beginning stands the emotional structuring of the situation. Emotions differentiate the field of experience by establishing relevances and foregrounding particular aspects. What appears as a possible option at all is already the result of this differentiation. Without emotional relevance formation, there would be no basis for decision.

Second, evidence: The situation structured through emotion becomes bodily experienceable in feeling. Feelings provide indications of how the different possibilities are to be evaluated. They mediate a form of immediate evidence: something appears coherent, burdensome, attractive, or repellent. This evidence is not conceptual, but it provides direction.

Third, condensation: On the basis of differentiation and evidence, intuition forms a Gestalt-like integration of the situation. Different aspects are condensed into a coherent nexus. Within this condensation, an implicit order emerges in which particular options appear fitting or unfitting.

Fourth, selection: The intuitive Gestalt ultimately leads to the selection of a possibility for action. This selection is not the result of a complete analysis but the expression of an implicit coherence. The decision appears "obvious" or "right" without having to be completely justified.

These four moments, however, are not to be understood as strictly separate phases of a linear sequence. Rather, they form a dynamic configuration in which they reciprocally influence one another. Differentiation influences evidence, evidence shapes condensation, condensation directs selection, and conversely selective tendencies can act back upon the perception of relevances. The decision process is therefore circular and processual.

Several characteristic features of decisions can be explained from this microstructure. Their **immediacy** results from the fact that the processes underlying them take place largely implicitly. Their **provisionality** follows from the mutability of the affective and intuitive structures upon which they rest. Their **context-dependence** results from their being bound to the specific structure of a situation.

At the same time, thought remains integrated into this process. Conceptual reflection can clarify relevances, interpret feelings, examine intuitive Gestalten, and subsequently justify decisions. Nevertheless, it remains dependent upon the affective basis because it can begin only with what has already emerged as significant within the process of experience.

In this sense, decision can be determined more precisely as **the operative condensation of affective meaning formation into a form capable of guiding action**. It is not the endpoint of a purely cognitive process but a moment within the ongoing constitution of constituted reality.

This dynamic becomes particularly evident in problematic situations. Here the individual moments can become unstable: differentiations remain unclear, feelings prove contradictory, and intuitive Gestalten lose their viability. Decision is made more difficult or delayed under such conditions. At the same time, precisely this instability opens up the possibility of developing new forms of orientation. Problematic situations therefore reveal not only the fragility of existing decision structures but also their openness to transformation.

In summary:

- Affective decision consists of differentiation, evidence, condensation, and selection.
- These moments are closely interwoven and dynamic.
- Decisions are immediate, context-dependent, and provisional.
- Thought is integrated but not primarily determinative.

9.3 Feeling as an Indicator of Decision

Bodily Coherence as a Prereflective Criterion of Selection

The analysis of the microstructure of affective decision has shown that feelings play a central role in the formation of evidence. Against this background, it must now be determined more precisely in what sense feelings themselves can function as an instance of decision.

Feelings are not merely accompanying phenomena but operative indicators of decision. Although they do not provide explicit criteria in the sense of rational deliberation, they do provide an immediate form of orientation. In feeling, it becomes apparent whether a particular

option appears coherent, viable, or problematic. This coherence is not conceptually grounded but bodily evident.

Feelings therefore do not primarily answer the question of what is objectively correct but indicate what is experienced as coherent within a given situation. This coherence, however, must not be misunderstood as merely personal feeling in the sense of arbitrary preference. Rather, it is an expression of the affective structure of the situation itself. Feelings integrate experiences, formations of relevance, and implicit expectations into a bodily experienceable evidence. Within them, the complexity of the situation is condensed into a form that need not first be conceptually mediated in order to become effective.

Precisely this achievement of condensation makes feelings an important resource within the decision process. They make it possible to gain orientation even where explicit criteria are lacking or where neither sufficient time nor adequate information is available for a complete analysis. Particularly under conditions of uncertainty and complexity, feelings can therefore indicate an initial direction and prestructure the decision process.

At the same time, this function of feelings is ambivalent. Feelings are not infallible; they can be misleading, rest upon limited or distorted experiences, and be influenced by situational factors. Their role as indicators of decision therefore possesses no absolute character but is embedded within an open process of meaning formation. This ambivalence does not speak against their relevance but instead points toward the necessity of understanding feelings in interaction with other levels of understanding. Intuition integrates feeling-based evidence into coherent Gestalten, while thought can reflect upon, examine, and, where necessary, correct these Gestalten. Decision thus arises not from a single instance but from the interplay of affective and intellectual processes.

Nevertheless, the specific role of feeling remains. It is the level at which a decision often first announces itself. Even before an option is explicitly selected, a tendency already manifests itself in feeling: an urge, an aversion, an inclination, or a hesitation. This prereflective tendency often forms the first indication of a possible decision. Precisely therein lies its selective function. Feelings are already operative in advance of explicit decision insofar as they help determine which options are pursued further and which are deferred or rejected.

This function becomes particularly evident in complex or unclear situations. Where explicit analysis reaches its limits, feelings can serve as points of orientation. They indicate where heightened attention is required, where caution appears appropriate, or where a possibility opens that should be pursued further. At the same time, their role remains dynamic. Feelings can change over the course of the decision process; an option initially experienced as coherent can lose its evidence, while another gains weight. Decision is therefore not to be conceived as a one-time act but as a process in which feeling-based evidence continuously shifts and reorganizes itself.

Thus:

- Feelings are indicators of decision.
- They provide bodily evidence of coherence or incoherence.
- They enable orientation without complete conceptual analysis.
- They are not infallible but part of an open process.
- They structure the decision process even in advance of explicit choice.

9.4 Intuition as an Integrating Instance of Decision

(Intuition as the Synthesis of Affective Evidences into Action-Guiding Coherence)

The analysis of feeling as an indicator of decision has shown that decision does not begin only at the moment of explicit choice but is already prestructured in the bodily evidence of coherence. This evidence, however, initially remains fragmentary: it points in particular directions without itself already producing a coherent decision. Against this background, intuition assumes a decisive function.

Intuition is the instance in which fragmentary evidences are integrated into an action-guiding unity. It combines feeling-based indications, emotional relevances, and situational factors into a coherent Gestalt that can serve as the basis of decision. In this sense, intuition can be determined as a synthesis of affective orientation.

Whereas feelings indicate what appears coherent or incoherent, intuition organizes these indications into a structure within which a particular option emerges as appropriate or obvious. This foregrounding is not the result of explicit deliberation but the expression of an implicit formation of coherence.

Precisely this coherence is constitutive of decision. Only when a situation becomes ordered in a particular manner does action become possible. Intuition creates this order by bringing forth a consistent perspective from the multiplicity of possible relations. It reduces the complexity of the situation to a form that enables orientation and the capacity for action.

This reduction, however, is not to be understood mechanically. Intuition does not operate according to fixed rules but in the mode of implicit understanding. It integrates experiences, expectations, and current relevances in a manner that cannot be completely explicated. Its achievement consists precisely in establishing nexuses without completely dissolving them analytically.

This property makes intuition a central instance of decision. It makes it possible to arrive at decisions even where explicit criteria are lacking or analytical procedures reach their limits. Intuition thereby provides a form of orientation that goes beyond the possibilities of purely conceptual analysis.

At the same time, the coherence it brings forth remains provisional. It is not final but can prove viable or inadequate. New information, altered feelings, or further experiences can modify the intuitive structure. Intuition is therefore not to be conceived as a closed instance of decision but as a moment within an open process.

This openness becomes particularly evident in problematic situations. When existing intuitive Gestalten lose their coherence, intuition is required to bring forth new forms of integration. In such cases, it becomes apparent that intuition operates not only stabilizingly but also transformatively. Intuition does not merely integrate what is already present but is productive insofar as it can form new coherences.

This productivity stands in close relation to creativity. New solutions frequently emerge from intuitive insights in which an altered order of the situation becomes apparent. Such insights are not the result of linear analysis but the expression of a reorganized affective structure.

Nevertheless, intuition remains dependent upon other levels of understanding. Feelings provide immediate indications, emotions the fundamental differentiations, and thought can reflect upon, examine, and conceptually elaborate the intuitive decision. Intuition is thus not an isolated instance but part of a complex interplay in which affective and cognitive processes interlock.

Thus:

- Intuition integrates affective evidences into coherent decision structures.
- It enables action-guiding orientation under conditions of complexity.
- It operates implicitly and is not completely explicable.
- It is provisional, capable of revision, and productive.
- It forms a central instance within the decision process.

9.5 Interim Result

Decision as the Emergent Integration of Affective Differentiation, Evidence, and Intuitive Coherence Formation

The analysis of decision within the framework of affective meaning formation makes it possible to bring together its structure and function systematically. It has first become clear that decision cannot be understood as a pure act of understanding. It is not the result of isolated deliberation but is grounded in affective processes that precede conceptual reflection. What appears as an option for decision at all is already prestructured through emotional differentiation.

Decision thus begins at the level of emotion. Emotions determine what comes to the fore as relevant within the field of experience and thereby first create the condition under which alternatives can become visible. Without this differentiation, there would be no basis for decision. On this basis, feelings enter as the instance of evidence. They render the structured possibilities bodily experienceable and provide immediate indications of their viability. In this respect, they function as indicators of coherence and incoherence and enable an initial orientation within the situation.

These indications, however, initially remain fragmentary. Only through intuition are they integrated into a coherent structure. Intuition combines the various affective indications into a Gestalt within which a particular option emerges as fitting. It thereby proves to be a central instance of decision formation. Decision consequently arises not as an isolated act but from the interplay of differentiation, evidence, and coherence formation. Within this interplay, affective meaning formation condenses into an action-guiding form.

The structure of decision can therefore be determined as follows:

> **Emotion differentiates the situation and generates relevance;**
> **feeling renders this differentiation experienceable as evidence;**
> **intuition integrates these evidences into a coherent orientation.**
> **and decision enacts this integrated structure in action.**

On this basis, several central characteristics of decisions become understandable. Their immediacy is explained by the fact that their presuppositions are formed largely implicitly. Their context-dependence results from their remaining bound to the respective structure of the

situation. Their provisionality, in turn, points to the mutability of the underlying affective structures and thus to the fact that decisions always remain, in principle, capable of revision.

At the same time, it becomes apparent that thought plays a complementary but not primary role within this context. It can reflect upon, justify, and examine decisions but remains dependent upon the affective basis from which what appears relevant, viable, or problematic first emerges. Decision is therefore not to be understood as a product of thought alone but as an emergent phenomenon within the overall process of meaning formation.

This dynamic is closely connected with the concept of the problem. Decisions arise especially under conditions of instability in which existing orders are no longer sufficient and orientation must be regained. In this respect, they are not merely results of a process but themselves moments in the transformation of meaning, in which new order is brought forth and the capacity for action is restored.

Thus:

- Decision is an emergent result of affective meaning formation.
- It is based upon emotion, feeling, and intuition.
- It is immediate, context-dependent, and capable of revision.
- It connects implicit meaning formation with concrete action.

With this interim result, the structure of decision within the overall model has been determined.

10. Synthesis – The Unity of Experience, Understanding, Problem, and Affective Meaning Formation

An Integrative Model of the Constitution of Constituted Reality and Orientation

10.1 Integration of the Mosaic Stones

Experience, Understanding, Problem, and Affective Meaning Formation as a Functional Unity of a Dynamic Process

The preceding analyses have developed the mosaic stones **"Experience," "Understanding," "Problem,"** and **"Emotion, Feeling, and Intuition"** in terms of their respective structures and functions. The aim of this concluding chapter is to bring these perspectives together within an integrative model. In doing so, it becomes apparent that the individual moments do not stand alongside one another without connection but refer to a unified process within which they reciprocally condition one another.

The point of departure is experience. It is not to be understood as the passive reception of something already given but as an operative process of meaning formation. Within it, constituted reality is not merely encountered but brought forth. This bringing-forth takes place through differentiation, weighting, and structuring and is therefore essentially grounded in affective meaning formation. Experience is consequently inconceivable without affective meaning formation. Emotion, feeling, and intuition constitute its internal structure: emotions differentiate the field of experience, feelings render these differentiations bodily evident, and intuition organizes them into coherent Gestalten. Without these processes, there would be neither relevance nor orientation and therefore no meaningfully disclosed world.

Understanding builds upon this basis. It cannot be detached from experience but must be understood as its explication and stabilization. Understanding transforms implicit structures of meaning into conceptual forms, makes them communicable, and renders them accessible to examination. Yet it remains dependent upon the affective basis that it can never completely capture. Understanding thus proves to be the reflective continuation of experience: it takes up its implicit order without allowing that order to be completely absorbed into conceptual form.

This configuration is dynamically intensified by the mosaic stone **"Problem."** The problem designates those situations in which existing orders of meaning become unstable. It marks a disturbance in the unity of differentiation, evidence, and coherence. In problematic situations, experience loses its self-evidence, understanding its stability, and new forms of meaning formation become necessary. The problem is therefore not merely a deficit but a motor of transformation. It compels the reorganization of affective structures and thereby opens new possibilities of understanding. Without problems, there would be neither development nor the new formation of meaning and consequently no expansion of experience.

Experience, understanding, and problem are thus related to one another through affective meaning formation. Emotion, feeling, and intuition form the common basis upon which all three moments operate. They are the processes within which meaning arises, changes, and becomes provisionally stabilized.

Against this background, the overall model can be determined as follows:

Experience is the process of bringing forth meaning; emotion, feeling, and intuition constitute the internal structure of this process; understanding is the conceptual formulation and stabilization of meaning; and the problem designates its disturbance and transformation.

This structure, however, is not linear but circular. Experience passes over into understanding, understanding stabilizes experience, problems destabilize both, and affective meaning formation reorganizes the structures thereby set in motion. The overall process remains continuous and open.

At the same time, this unity is not to be understood as a homogeneous fusion. The individual mosaic stones retain their respective functions and cannot be reduced to one another. Precisely their difference makes possible the dynamics of the whole. For without difference there would be no movement, and without movement no development.

This yields the concluding determination that the constitution of constituted reality is to be understood as a dynamic, affectively structured process in which experience, understanding, and problem stand in a reciprocal relation.

Constituted reality is not simply given but arises within this process. It is the respectively provisionally stabilized form of an ongoing occurrence characterized by differentiation, evidence, organization, conceptual formulation, and transformation.

10.2 Systematic Implications

(Consequences for Knowledge, Self-Relation, and World-Relation within the Framework of Affective Meaning Formation)

The integration of the mosaic stones shows that the model developed here does not merely provide a description of individual processes but leads to a systematic reconfiguration of central concepts such as knowledge, self-relation, and world-relation. From a systems-theoretical perspective, it becomes apparent that these concepts do not refer to presupposed units but must be understood as results of operative processes that take place within the medium of affective meaning formation.

Under these conditions, knowledge is not to be understood as an operation of understanding alone but as a specific form of meaning processing within an operatively closed, self-referential nexus. Emotions accomplish the primary differentiation of the field of experience by establishing relevances and selectively foregrounding possibilities. Feelings transform these differentiations into forms of bodily evidence, while intuition enables an implicit formation of coherence that prepares the transition to conceptual processing. Thought builds upon this by transforming these implicit structures into discrete forms and thereby generating stabilization, connectivity, and communicative availability.

Knowledge thus appears as a multilevel process based upon a non-conceptual, affectively structured achievement of selection. Objectivity, within this context, is not to be understood as the elimination of affective moments but as their reflective integration into stabilized forms of observation.

Self-relation, too, is not to be determined as a given unity but as the effect of recursive operations. The I appears not as a substance but as a form that reproduces itself in the enactment of differentiations. Feelings function here as modes of immediate self-reference in which the individual registers its own affectedness. This self-relatedness, however, is not transparent but operates within the medium of implicit structures of meaning.

Self-relation is therefore to be understood as a dynamic, continuously reproducing structure arising from the interrelation of emotional differentiation, feeling-based evidence, and intuitive organization.

It is a form of operative closure that at the same time remains dependent upon relations to the environment without being able to control them completely.

World-relation, within this model, is not to be understood as a relation of representation but as the result of system-internal operations. World does not appear as an independently given totality but as the correlate of distinctions made in the process of affective meaning formation. Emotions structure the field of possible observations, feelings determine the modality of appearance, and intuition organizes these differences into connectable units. World is thus not an object outside the system but an environmental reference generated through operations. This reference remains perspectival because it depends upon system-internal structures; it is dynamic because these structures vary; and it is contingent because alternative orders always remain possible. Nevertheless, the possibility of irritation and failure shows that the operative constitution of world is bound to conditions that are not completely at the system's disposal.

The problem assumes a particular role within this context. It can be determined as a form of intensified irritation in which existing achievements of selection and organization lose their connectivity. It marks a state in which the previous coupling of differentiation, evidence, and coherence becomes unstable. Problems are therefore not to be understood as defects but as system-internal events that compel reorganization. They function as triggers of structural transformations by calling existing orders of meaning into question and opening new possibilities of selection. In this sense, problems are motors of system development: they increase sensitivity to alternatives and enable the reconfiguration of structures of meaning.

Finally, this perspective yields a new determination of the relation between experience and thought. Both are to be understood as different but interrelated modes of meaning processing. Experience operates within the medium of continuous, affectively structured differences, whereas thought generates discrete forms that secure stabilization and connectivity. Intuition functions here as a mediating operation that enables transformation between the two modes. It reduces complexity without completely abandoning continuity and thereby establishes connectivity between implicit and explicit forms of meaning processing. This difference cannot be abolished but is constitutive of the system's capacity to function.

Overall, it becomes apparent that knowledge, self-relation, and world-relation are not to be understood as separate entities but as different perspectives upon a unified process that is operatively closed and at the same time dependent upon its environment. Affective meaning formation constitutes the fundamental medium within which differentiation, selection, stabilization, and transformation take place. Constituted reality appears in this context not as a pregiven order but as the result of ongoing operations unfolding under conditions of contingency, irritation, and structural coupling.

10.3 Concluding Reflections

The Constitution of Constituted Reality as an Open, Affectively Structured Process between Experience, Understanding, and Problem

The present study pursued the aim of systematically reconstructing the relation among emotion, feeling, and intuition within the context of the mosaic stones **"Experience," "Understanding,"** and **"Problem,"** and of integrating them into a consistent model of meaning formation. Its point of departure was the thesis that affective processes are not peripheral but constitutive of the formation of constituted reality.

Over the course of the investigation, it has been shown that experience is not to be understood as a passive representation of a pregiven reality. Rather, it proves to be an operative process in which meaning is brought forth through differentiation, weighting, and structuring. This structuring is essentially grounded in affectivity: emotions differentiate the field of experience, feelings render these differentiations bodily evident, and intuition organizes them into coherent Gestalten. Experience is thus to be understood as a process in which constituted reality is not simply encountered but constituted in enactment.

Understanding was determined as the explicating and stabilizing continuation of this process. It transforms implicit structures of meaning into conceptual forms, making them communicable and examinable without, however, being able to capture their affective basis completely. There is therefore no categorical separation between experience and understanding but a continuous transition mediated by intuition. Intuition functions here as a mediating instance that transforms implicit coherences into a form accessible to conceptual processing without relinquishing their origin in affective dynamics.

The concept of the problem ultimately brought the dynamic dimension of this model to the fore. Problems were understood not as mere deficits of knowledge but as disturbances of affective order. Within them, the existing structure of meaning loses its stability, so that new forms of differentiation, evidence, and coherence formation become necessary. The problem thereby proves to be a motor of transformation and a necessary moment in the further development of meaning.

When these perspectives are brought together, a coherent overall picture emerges: **constituted reality is not given but arises in the enactment of a dynamic process of affective meaning formation.** This process is characterized by several fundamental features. First, it is affectively structured insofar as emotion, feeling, and intuition constitute the conditions of meaning formation. Second, it is processual because meaning is continuously formed, stabilized, and transformed. Third, it is relational because world and self-relation do not exist independently of one another but are constituted together in the enactment of experience. Fourth, it is open and provisional because every stabilization of meaning remains bound to conditions that cannot be completely controlled.

These determinations have far-reaching consequences. They lead to a conception of knowledge that cannot be reduced to conceptual operations but includes the affective foundations of meaning formation. They lead to a conception of self-relation that must be understood not substantially but processually and relationally. And they lead to a conception of constituted reality not as something fixed and given but as the result of an ongoing, open occurrence.

At the same time, the limiting relation to reality is preserved. The affective constitution of constituted reality is not arbitrary. It can prove viable or fail, stabilize itself or pass over into problematic processes. This corrigibility shows that meaning formation is bound to conditions that point beyond it without, however, being accessible independently of it.

The study therefore does not end with a closed theory but with the insight into the fundamental openness of its object. Affective meaning formation is not a system that could be completely captured but a process that continually reshapes itself in its enactment. Theoretical reconstruction can make this process visible without being able to fix it conclusively.

In this sense, the model developed here understands itself not as a final description but as a structural proposal that renders intelligible the dynamics of experience, understanding, and problem within the horizon of affective meaning formation. In conclusion, it can be stated: **the unity of emotion, feeling, and intuition forms the foundation of experience and understanding; the problem functions as the motor of their transformation; and constituted reality arises through the open interplay of these structures.** The relation among the mosaic stones is thereby determined in a manner that preserves their differences while simultaneously making their unity visible.

10.4 Outlook

(Perspectives of a Theory of Affective Meaning Formation for Further Research and Application)

The present investigation has developed a model of affective meaning formation that determines emotion, feeling, and intuition as constitutive structures of experience, understanding, and the constitution of constituted reality. This model, however, is not to be understood as closed but opens up a series of further questions.

A first point of departure lies in the further elaboration of the relation between affective and conceptual meaning formation. The analysis has shown that a structural difference exists between analog experience and digital thought and that this difference is mediated by intuition. This mediation could be further differentiated, for example with regard to different forms of concept formation, linguistic articulation, or scientific model formation. In particular, the question arises as to how different disciplines develop their own specific forms of this transformation.

A second field of inquiry concerns the intersubjective dimension. The study has focused primarily on the constitution of meaning in the relation between individual and world. Further investigation would need to examine how affective meaning formation is structured in social contexts. How are emotions, feelings, and intuitions shared, synchronized, or brought into tension with one another? What role do language, communication, and cultural practices play in the stabilization or transformation of affective order?

A third point of departure concerns fields of practice. The model developed here has potential implications for areas such as decision research, pedagogy, psychology, and organizational practice. Wherever orientation under conditions of uncertainty is required, the structures of affective meaning formation described here could provide a more differentiated basis than purely intellect-based models.

A fourth aspect concerns methodological development. The present study is primarily systematic-theoretical in orientation. Further research could attempt to operationalize the concepts developed here empirically or deepen them phenomenologically. In particular, the analysis of bodily evidence and intuitive processes offers a broad field for further investigation.

Finally, a fundamental philosophical perspective opens up. The determination of constituted reality as an affectively constituted, open process calls classical distinctions—such as those between subject and object, feeling and knowledge, or experience and thought—into question. A continuation of the inquiry could systematically elaborate these implications in dialogue with existing philosophical traditions.

Mosaic Piece: Knowing

General Outline[5]:



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1. Introduction: Epistemic Interest, Point of Departure, and Methodological Approach

The present study proceeds from the observation that, in large parts of contemporary epistemology, the cognitive sciences, and adjacent disciplines, knowing is modeled primarily as a cognitive, functional, or representational process. Explanatory, objectifying, and systemically controllable approaches occupy the foreground, whereas the experience-based inner perspective of knowing is often considered only marginally or methodologically excluded. This emphasis has the consequence that the enactment of knowing itself recedes behind its theoretical reconstructions.

The enactment of knowing is the lived occurrence in which experience, meaning, and orientation combine in such a way that something appears to someone as true, meaningful, or viable.

Example:

You read a thought and suddenly it "makes sense."
This moment is not merely logical—it is an enactment: perception, prior understanding, affective resonance, and conceptual clarity come together.

The epistemic interest of this study consists in making this lacuna systematically visible and developing an approach to knowing that understands the inner perspective not as a mere accompanying phenomenon but as a constitutive moment of knowing. Knowing thereby comes into view as an occurrence that cannot be disclosed solely through the analysis of external conditions or formal structures but manifests itself in the lived enactment of understanding. Knowledge appears less as the result of completed operations than as an ongoing process unfolding in the engagement with world, others, and oneself.

The point of departure of the study is the generalization that knowledge is not to be understood as access to objectively and independently existing truths, but as a processual enactment in which knowledge constitutes itself through the recognition of **coherence** between experience, meaning, and situational understanding. This recognition is not to be conceived as the mere reproduction of what is already known, but as a dynamic process in which new experiences connect with existing horizons of meaning and find their place within them. Knowing thus takes place within prestructured yet mutable nexuses of experience in which understanding gradually condenses.

The concept of **coherence** refers in this context to a criterion of knowing that is not purely formal and that manifests itself in the experience of fit, consistency, or viability. The convincing force of knowledge therefore does not primarily rest upon correspondence with external standards but upon the manner in which experience, meaning, and perspectives for action fit together. The inner perspective of knowing thereby proves to be the locus at which truth is not merely established but **enacted**.

In this sense, knowing appears not primarily as the discovery or representation of world, but as a situated enactment anchored in concrete nexuses of experience and occurring in the interplay between what has become and new orientation. The aim of the study is to make this enactment

conceptually accessible and to elaborate its epistemological implications without reducing it to psychological, functional, or objectifying models.

This theoretical basic assumption simultaneously gives rise to the fundamental methodological decision of the study. If knowing is essentially understood as a processual enactment constituted from the inner perspective, then it cannot be reconstructed exclusively from an external, objectifying observer position. Here, inner perspective designates neither subjective arbitrariness nor introspective privacy, but that perspective from which experience, meaning, and understanding first become possible at all. Knowing is therefore not primarily described from the outside but disclosed from within its own logic of enactment.

This methodological orientation implies a deliberate distinction from strictly naturalistic or purely functional models of knowing without fundamentally calling their explanatory achievements into question. The study does not aim to replace or refute neurobiological, algorithmic, or systemic explanations of knowing. Rather, its purpose is to make their epistemological presuppositions visible and to supplement them with a perspective that remains systematically underrepresented in objectifying approaches. Knowing is understood not as an isolated act of the intellect but as a bodily-affective, processual enactment in which perception, emotion, intuition, and thought are inseparably intertwined.

Against this background, the choice of a dialogical form of presentation follows not as a stylistic or literary decision but as a methodological consequence. If knowing takes place in the recognition of coherence between experience and meaning, then this enactment cannot be adequately represented through monological systematics alone. The dialogical epistolary form therefore serves as an epistemological instrument for making knowing visible in its movement, perspectivity, and situational embeddedness.

The letters are not to be read as biographical self-statements or as literary fictions in the narrower sense. Rather, they function as methodically controlled thought experiments in which different theoretical positions are reconstructed and brought into relation with one another. The fictional character of the letters is not to be understood as a departure from scholarly rigor but as a methodological means of perspectivization. It makes it possible to mark different epistemological standpoints clearly and to explore their respective consequences without prematurely harmonizing them or imposing a uniform terminology upon them.

The personal forms of address in the letters do not designate authorial intentions or psychological roles but different epistemological perspectives. The dialogues aim neither at agreement nor refutation, but at making visible. They render comprehensible how theoretical concepts prove themselves or are called into question through recognition or resistance in relation to one’s own experience. In this way, epistemology is not merely described but made comprehensible in its enactment.

The selection of the theoretical positions treated in the letters makes no claim to historical completeness or systematic representativeness. What is decisive, rather, is their respective function within the argument. The perspectives employed represent different ways of determining, grounding, and situating knowing. They function as contrasting points of reference through which the epistemological approach developed here can be sharpened, without being understood as a developmental history or canonization.

Taken as a whole, the present study understands itself as an epistemological and phenomenologically oriented investigation. It makes no claim to empirical generalization and

does not develop a formal theory in the sense of an axiomatic system. Its scholarly character lies in conceptual precision, systematic reflection upon its own presuppositions, and transparent presentation of its methodological procedure. It distinguishes itself both from naïve subjectivism and from reductive objectivism and reconstructs knowing as a relational, experience-bound, and perspectival enactment.

On this basis, the following chapter develops the fundamental assumption that knowing can, in its essence, be understood as **recognition**. This systematic clarification provides the conceptual framework for the subsequent dialogical reconstructions. The letters are not to be read as illustrative supplements but as independent methodological forms in which the process of knowing itself is enacted. The following presentation therefore begins not from established truths but from the movement of understanding that occurs in the recognition of one's own experience in the mirror of unfamiliar theoretical perspectives.

2. Selection and Function of the Theoretical Points of Reference

The selection of the theoretical points of reference treated in this study makes no claim to historical completeness or canonical representativeness. What is decisive, rather, is their respective systematic function within the argument. The positions employed represent different ways of determining, grounding, and situating knowing. They do not serve to reconstruct a developmental history but function as contrasting perspectives through which the epistemological approach developed in this study can be sharpened.

The selection is guided by the central question of how knowing can be described from the inner perspective as a processual enactment of recognition. The individual positions open up different approaches to this field of problems by each placing specific emphases and, at the same time, making certain dimensions of knowing visible while leaving others out.

Baruch Spinoza represents a model of knowing as rational insight into a necessary order. Here, knowing means grasping the intrinsic lawfulness of nature and understanding freedom as insight into necessity. Order, truth, and knowledge coincide within the systematic structure of this approach. Spinoza's position thus marks a strongly objectivist approach in which knowledge is understood as the alignment of thought with a pregiven order.

Thomas Metzinger represents a functional-naturalistic approach in which knowing is described as a process of self-modeling. The I appears as the phenomenal construction of a neurocognitive system. Knowledge is rendered explicable without recourse to an experience-based enactment of recognition. This position stands exemplarily for contemporary naturalistic models in which the inner perspective of knowing is indeed explained but is not accorded an independent epistemic status.

With his concept of resonance, Hartmut Rosa opens up a relational approach that understands knowing not as mastery over world but as a responsive relation to world. Knowledge occurs where individual and world enter into a reciprocal relation that is also shaped socially, culturally, and institutionally. Rosa's approach shifts the focus from knowing as the achievement of an individual toward an occurrence that takes place within relations.

Rudolf Steiner marks a borderline case within the chosen spectrum insofar as knowing is here related to a spiritual dimension of reality. Knowledge appears as the recognition of supersensible nexuses, with the I understood as the bearer of a spiritual development. This position makes visible how far the concept of knowledge can be extended beyond a strictly immanent perspective and at the same time sharpens the question concerning the limits and presuppositions of such an approach.

The Buddhist perspective, represented through the dialogical reference to Dietmar, introduces an approach in which knowing is understood not as construction but as the dissolution of fixations. Recognition here means seeing through attachment and identification. Knowledge takes place as non-attachment and as openness toward the impermanence of all appearances. This perspective shifts the emphasis from knowledge as appropriation toward knowledge as letting go.

Markus Gabriel represents a contemporary realist approach that describes knowing as orientation within fields of sense. Constituted reality does not appear as a unified whole but as a plurality of domains, each with its own conditions of validity. Knowledge is here neither

merely constructed nor posited absolutely but structured in relation to fields. This position makes it possible to pose the question of objectivity anew without falling back into a naïve realism.

Martha C. Nussbaum, finally, represents an emotion-based approach to knowledge in which emotions are understood as cognitive evaluations. Knowing takes place as the recognition of what is experienced as significant, vulnerable, or valuable. Emotions appear here not as opposites of reason but as constitutive conditions of meaning and judgment.

The positions named above are not evaluated in this study in terms of right or wrong. Rather, they are analyzed as different modes of world- and self-constitution whose juxtaposition serves to make commonalities, differences, and boundary lines visible. In this way, the epistemological approach developed here is gradually brought into sharper focus without being prematurely fixed.

Within this context, the dialogical form of presentation fulfills a central methodological function. It serves to explicate different models of knowing without reducing them to a uniform terminology or systematics. The letters function as reconstructive movements of thought, not as biographical or psychological self-statements. Personal forms of address are to be understood functionally: they mark perspectives, not authorial intentions. In this way, epistemology is not merely described but made visible in its enactment.

3. Knowing as Recognition (Systematic Elaboration)

The following chapter develops the fundamental assumption of the study that knowing can, in its essence, be understood as **recognition**. This does not mean that knowledge is to be reduced to mere remembering or to the repetition of already existing knowledge. Rather, it means that every act of knowing takes place within already prestructured experiential, affective, and semantic structures and stabilizes itself at the moment when something appears meaningful, fitting, or viable. In this sense, knowing is not a punctual act but an enactment constituted in time and in the movement of understanding.

3.1 Problem and Point of Departure

In everyday understanding, knowing is frequently conceived as an achievement of thought—as insight, inference, or the conceptual grasp of a state of affairs. This description captures an important domain but fails to address the question of the conditions under which something can appear as knowable in the first place. Conceptual thought already presupposes that something has emerged as significant, that attention has acquired a direction, that relevances have been marked, and that a nexus has been organized in such a way that it can be experienced as understandable. These antecedent moments are not merely accompanying phenomena of knowing but contribute essentially to the very possibility of knowledge.

It is precisely here that the significance of the **inner perspective** becomes apparent. Whoever describes knowing exclusively as an objectifiable process may indeed grasp structural, functional, or causal conditions, but easily loses sight of what characterizes knowing in its enactment: namely, that it takes place as an event of meaning that acquires significance for an individual within a situation. The present study therefore does not begin with an external description of knowing but with the reconstruction of that logic of enactment in which experience, meaning, and understanding are intertwined.

3.2 Conceptual Basic Figure: Recognition

Recognition designates in this study a structure of knowing in which what is new does not appear as radically foreign but as capable of connecting with already existing horizons of meaning and experience. This connection need not be conscious. It can occur prior to conceptual reflection—for example as familiarity, intuitive certainty, coherence, or even resistance, which precisely as resistance points toward an existing structure of expectation. Recognition therefore does not mean merely the positive feeling of already knowing something but, more generally, the manner in which an object, a thought, or an experience appears within the horizon of what has already been prestructured as significant, possible, or plausible.

This basic figure has several consequences.

First, it means that knowing is always embedded in a history. What is known does not appear from nothing but within a field of presuppositions, habits, affective dispositions, and orders of meaning. Knowing is therefore always already situated, even where it strives for neutrality.

Second, it means that knowing is not merely a relation to objects but a relation to world that is already structured. Knowing is not merely an act of access but a mode of being-in-the-world in

which certain things become manifest while others remain inconspicuous. The horizon of what counts as knowable is therefore not self-evident but is itself part of the occurrence of knowing.

Third, recognition means that knowing includes a movement of self-orientation. In knowing, not only a state of affairs becomes ordered but at the same time one's own position in relation to that state of affairs. This concerns not only theoretical convictions but also evaluations, attitudes, and forms of involvement. Precisely thereby it becomes understandable why knowing cannot be reduced to mere representation: it changes the one who knows, and it changes the manner in which world appears as world.

3.3 Coherence as a Criterion of Enactment

If knowing is conceived as recognition, the question arises as to what gives knowledge its convincing force. At this point, the concept of **coherence** becomes relevant. In this study, coherence designates neither a subjective feeling of well-being nor arbitrary agreement. What is meant is a criterion of enactment indicating that experience, meaning, and understanding fit together in such a way that a nexus becomes viable.

Coherence can assume different forms. It can be experienced as consistency when individual moments close into a meaningful nexus. It can appear as fit when a concept or interpretation grasps an experience in such a way that it becomes clarified and oriented. It can appear as viability when an understanding proves itself within contexts of action and enables orientation. It can also appear negatively, as incoherence, when expectations are disappointed and reorganization becomes necessary. Incoherence therefore also belongs to the process of knowing because it makes visible differences through which understanding can further develop.

The concept of coherence simultaneously makes clear that knowing is not exclusively subsequent justification. Justifications are important, but they often already presuppose that something has been experienced as coherent or problematic. Coherence therefore points toward a level of knowing that precedes explicit argument without being irrational. It is a way in which meaning shows itself before being formalized.

3.4 Inner Perspective, Embodiment, and Affectivity

The thesis of knowing as recognition necessarily leads to the question of the supporting structures of knowing. If recognition manifests itself as familiarity, relevance, fit, or resistance, then knowing is not merely an operation of the intellect. It is bodily and affectively-emotionally shaped.

Embodiment is understood here not as a biological substrate but as the manner in which world is given bodily in the first place. Perception is not neutral but perspectival, directed, and selective. Affectivity marks what appears important, threatening, interesting, or valuable. Emotions and moods are not merely accompanying reactions but participate in the structuring of experience. They determine what emerges as an object of knowing at all and what significance it assumes.

This also shifts the role of thought. Thought is not the origin of knowing but a form of its stabilization, clarification, and explication. Concepts order and fix what has already been prestructured in experience. They permit distance, comparison, and justification, but they do

not replace the enactment from which they emerge. Thought is therefore a moment of knowing, not its entire essence.

3.5 Knowledge, Truth, and Objectivity in the Mode of Enactment

The generalization underlying the study is that knowledge is not to be understood as access to objectively and independently existing truths but as a processual enactment. This formulation does not mean that truth is denied or arbitrariness asserted. Rather, truth is not treated primarily as a finished entity lying ready independently of the occurrence of knowing, but as something that develops within practices of understanding, contexts of justification, and experiences of coherence.

Objectivity is thereby not abolished but relocated. From this perspective, objectivity can be understood as the claim to make coherence intersubjectively comprehensible. This includes concepts, arguments, criteria of consistency, forms of criticism, and the willingness to take incoherence seriously. Objectivity is then not the exclusion of the inner perspective but its controlled opening. It consists not in eliminating perspective but in reflexively working through perspectivity.

This also makes understandable why a processual concept of knowledge need not be relativistic. Relativism devalues the distinction between viable and non-viable understanding. A conception of knowledge as enactment, by contrast, can make visible precisely the conditions under which understanding stabilizes, remains corrigible, and becomes capable of learning. The guiding question is then not whether knowledge is absolute, but how it can be justified, criticized, and transformed in enactment.

3.6 The Systematic Function of Recognition for the Following Chapters

The thesis of knowing as recognition provides the conceptual framework within which the subsequent dialogical reconstructions are situated. It makes it possible to examine different models of knowing not only in terms of their results but also in terms of their respective logic of enactment. In what manner is knowing understood—as insight, construction, relation, transcendence, detachment, or orientation? What role do experience, affect, meaning, and embodiment play? What form of coherence is presupposed or sought? What limits and costs become visible?

This also explains the function of the points of reference introduced in the preceding chapter. They mark not merely theoretical alternatives but contrasting modes in which the basic structure of recognition is either contested, reinterpreted, radicalized, or presupposed. This enables an investigation that does not remain at the level of juxtaposing positions but reconstructs the occurrence of knowing itself as a movement of understanding.

On this basis, the following dialogical letters can begin. They do not serve to illustrate an already established theory but to test and refine the epistemological framework developed here in a methodically controlled manner. Knowing is thereby not merely thematized but made visible in its enactment, as one's own experience recognizes itself in the mirror of unfamiliar movements of thought or encounters them in productive resistance.

Guiding proposition:

Knowing is, in its essence, recognition from the inner perspective.

The following letters develop this guiding proposition through different theoretical positions. The dialogical epistolary form functions as the methodological expression of a concept of knowing that understands comprehension not as access to fixed truths but as a processual enactment occurring in the recognition of one's own horizons of meaning and experience in confrontation with unfamiliar movements of thought.

4. Letters That Were Never Sent

4.1 Letter to Baruch Spinoza

(Knowing as Recognition of Necessity. Recognition here does not mean biographical or psychological familiarity, but the epistemological insight of the intellect into a necessary order.)

Berlin, 29 October 2025

Dear Mr. Spinoza,

Since my intensive engagement with your writings, I have remained deeply impressed by the clarity, rigor, and systematic coherence of your thought. Your philosophy opens the possibility not only of rationally comprehending the world but also of understanding it as the expression of an overarching, necessary order. With this letter, I would like to set out some reflections on how your ideas appear to me from a contemporary perspective and to what extent systematic parallels with present-day theoretical approaches can be discerned.

Your thought possesses a distinctive timelessness. It understands itself not as a historically contingent philosophy but as the presentation of a necessary order of being. In nature, you recognize the one substance in which God expresses himself. Everything that exists follows from the immanent necessity of this substance. Knowing therefore does not mean distance from the world but insight into its internal order. Freedom appears in your philosophy not as arbitrariness but as insight into the necessity that permeates all being. Thought becomes free by aligning itself with the lawfulness of nature.

At the same time, it becomes apparent that this rational insight does not replace affective and embodied enactment but transforms it. Your analysis of the affects makes clear that human experience is not to be overcome but transformed into an adequate form of understanding. In the highest form of knowledge, insight and affect coincide: understanding acquires a qualitative dimension in which cognitive clarity and affective determination interpenetrate one another.

The systematic coherence of your approach can, from a contemporary perspective, be read in functional analogy to modern theories of complex orders. There, too, the primary concern is not the description of isolated phenomena but the presentation of structures that generate and reproduce their own laws of movement.

A concrete example is provided by modern systems theory, for instance in its understanding of the legal system. The legal system does not acquire its unity by directly representing an external truth but by continuously connecting to its own distinctions, such as legal and illegal, and generating its decisions on this basis. Truth in such contexts appears not as something external to the system but as an expression of its internal consistency.

From this arises a general principle: every contextually closed configuration—whether metaphysical, scientific, economic, or narrative—generates its specific form of truth by integrating its presuppositions into the order of the whole. In your *Ethics*, this principle becomes particularly evident in the geometrical method. The sequence of definitions, axioms, propositions, and demonstrations structures thought in a manner that makes the necessary

interconnection of all things visible. Knowledge appears here as the successive unfolding of an order already inherent in the system. At the same time, your distinction among the kinds of knowledge goes beyond purely formal rationality: in intuitive knowledge, the order is not merely inferred logically but immediately apprehended in its necessity.

Against this background, I understand my own thinking as a continuation of your methodological consistency under altered epistemological presuppositions. Whereas you conceive the order of nature as ontologically given, I proceed from a double transformation in relation to a reality that is not immediately accessible. This reality functions not as a directly apprehensible object but as a limiting concept and a concept of initiation that sets processes of experiential and structural formation in motion.

Initially, impressions are transformed into evaluated experiences. Experience is not mere perception but already a first form of order in which relevances, differences, and meanings emerge. In a second step, elements of this experience are transformed into structures of thought. Thought is therefore not a representation of a pregiven constituted reality but an operative achievement of ordering. It consists in the formation of unities and their relation to one another within coherent configurations.

The structures arising in this manner derive their validity not from correspondence with a presupposed reality but from the consistency and viability of their internal relations. Truth therefore appears as the result of successful structuring rather than as correspondence. From this perspective, your interpretation of nature as an internally necessary order can likewise be read—not as an immediate description of being but as the expression of an especially consistently executed form of ordering. The strength of your system lies precisely in the radical implementation of this principle.

I thank you for the enduring inspiration your philosophy continues to provide from a contemporary perspective. It demonstrates in exemplary fashion how rationality, systematic coherence, and ethical orientation can be united within a coherent nexus of thought.

Yours respectfully,
Klaus Wroblewski

Relation to the guiding proposition:

From my perspective, recognition in Spinoza does not shift from embodied-affective enactment to purely rational insight but into a transformation in which affect and knowledge coincide in an adequate manner. The inner perspective is preserved but acquires the form of evidence directed toward necessary relations.

From my own perspective, this evidence appears not as insight into an ontologically given order but as the result of a structure-forming enactment of thought that constitutes its objects within relational configurations.

4.2 Letter to Thomas Metzinger

(Knowing as Functional Recognition without Experiential Rediscovery)

Berlin, 29 October 2025

Dear Mr. Metzinger,

In recent years, I have repeatedly encountered your reflections on the self-model and phenomenal self-representation in the course of my work. Your writings have not only challenged me intellectually but have also prompted me to define my own epistemological presuppositions more precisely. With this letter, I would like to formulate some thoughts arising from my engagement with your theory that at the same time serve to clarify my own understanding of knowing.

We share, it seems to me, a fundamental insight: what we experience as the I is not a substantial unity. The self appears neither as a fixed core nor as an ontologically independent instance, but as a dynamic occurrence. In your theory, this occurrence is described as a self-model generated by neurocognitive processes that enables the organism to orient itself, regulate itself, and act. In this context, the inner perspective in your account largely coincides with the self-model. The phenomenal experience of the I is explained through the functioning of the neurocognitive system and is thereby reconstructed functionally. The experience of an I appears as the transparent effect of modeling processes whose structure and dynamics can be made intelligible from an explanatory external perspective.

In my view, however, the relation among the I, inner perspective, and knowing presents itself differently. The I is itself neither a static core nor merely a subsequent construction but is dynamic in nature. It becomes effective in the moment of experience and arises as a condensation of experience, particularly of affective and emotional processes, within enactment itself. I understand this dynamic not primarily as a functional effect but as an enacted reality within which knowing first becomes possible.

The inner perspective does not designate a stream of experience separate from the I but the living enactment in which I and experience are constituted together. The I is neither the origin nor merely the product of experience but a Gestalt of this experience constituting itself in enactment. From this perspective, knowing occurs neither beyond the I nor in the form of a fixed unity but within the dynamic condensation of experience in which meaning arises.

Only in thought does the I detach itself from this enacted genesis. It is retrospectively fixed and conceptually stabilized and then appears as a seemingly static unity. In this transition from experience to thought, the I, as it were, forgets its own emergence from affective condensation and appears as something pregiven. This conceptual stabilization is necessary, yet at the same time it conceals the enactment from which knowing emerges.

Precisely here the decisive difference between our approaches becomes visible. Agreement in describing the I as a dynamic occurrence must not obscure the fact that our positions differ in their epistemological assessment of this enactment. The difference lies not in the dynamics of the I itself but in the question of where knowing begins.

In your theory, the dynamics of the I are reconstructed within a functional explanatory framework. Affective and emotional processes appear as systemic states whose efficacy can be analyzed and explained from the perspective of external description. The enactment of experience thereby acquires the status of a real but explanation-requiring phenomenon of neurocognitive processes. It is acknowledged as real but possesses no privileged epistemological status in relation to the models that explain the conditions of its emergence.

In my perspective, the emphasis shifts precisely at this point. The enacted moment in which experience is affectively condensed and an I becomes effective is not merely the object of an explanation but itself a bearer of knowledge. Knowing does not first take place where experience is conceptually modeled or functionally reconstructed but already in the moment of coherence in which experience acquires meaning, orientation, and viability. Enactment is not secondary but constitutive.

This also changes the role of thought. Whereas thought in your theory functions primarily as an explanatory instance that makes experience intelligible from the outside, I understand thought as a secondary movement of stabilization. In thought, the knowing that has arisen in enactment is conceptually fixed, generalized, and integrated into coherent nexuses. This conceptual clarification is necessary and indispensable, but it does not replace the knowledge-bearing enactment from which it emerges.

The decisive difference therefore lies not in whether the I is dynamic but in how knowing is understood. In your theory, the emphasis lies upon explaining the conditions under which experience and self-modeling are possible. In my perspective, it lies upon the enactment in which knowing occurs. Knowing does not first become intelligible when it has been explained but gains its primary evidence in the co-enactment of its own experiential logic.

It is precisely at this point that the different assessment of the inner perspective becomes apparent. Whereas in your approach it appears primarily as a phenomenon requiring explanation, I understand it as the epistemically effective locus at which meaning, orientation, and truth arise in the mode of recognition. The inner perspective is thus not that which is explained at the end but that from which knowledge emerges.

I understand this difference not as a refutation of your position but as an epistemological demarcation. This does not dispute the truth-content of your reflections but determines their scope. Your work makes a decisive contribution by clarifying the conditions of the possibility of experience from a naturalistic perspective. My approach begins where this explanation reaches its methodological limit: with the question of the epistemic status of enactment itself.

Yours sincerely,
Klaus Wroblewski

Relation to the guiding proposition:

In Metzinger, knowing appears as the functional coherence of a self-model. Recognition thereby becomes explicable but loses its status as a primary experience-based enactment. In the perspective represented here, enactment itself bears knowledge; knowing occurs in the recognition of coherence within the inner perspective.

4.3 Letter to Hartmut Rosa

(Knowing as Recognition within a Resonant Relation to the World)

Berlin, 29 October 2025

Dear Mr. Rosa,

Your work on resonance has appealed to me in a particular way because it places at the center a dimension of the relation to the world that remains underrepresented in many contemporary theories of knowing. You do not primarily describe how the world is known or explained, but how it is experienced and under what conditions it responds to the subject. With this letter, I would like to explain how I read your reflections within the horizon of my own understanding of knowing and at what point a proximity, but also an epistemologically significant difference, becomes apparent.

Central to your theory is the idea that successful relations to the world do not arise through availability, control, or cognitive penetration but through resonance. You describe resonance as a reciprocal process of response in which subject and world affect one another without merging into one another. This occurrence can neither be planned nor compelled and eludes complete conceptual fixation; it occurs in the enactment of the relation itself.

Within this context, experience acquires a particular status. Knowledge appears in your work not primarily as cognitive representation or functional explanation but as a moment of being-in-relation to the world. What is known does not show itself independently of experience but within the occurrence of resonance itself. The world is not objectified but responds, and this response is meaningful without being completely conceptually determined.

You thereby place the enactment of experience at the center. Resonance is neither an inner state nor merely a subjective feeling but a relational occurrence unfolding between subject and world. In this occurrence, not only the relation to the world but also the subject itself changes. Knowing is here always connected with transformation: one emerges from a resonant experience differently from how one entered it.

I share this perspective on a decisive point. In my understanding as well, knowing is not merely an act of representation or explanation but an enacted occurrence. Meaning does not arise independently of experience but in the moment of coherence in which experience becomes ordered and sustaining. In this respect, our approaches meet in their departure from a purely cognitive or representational concept of knowledge.

At the same time, however, a difference becomes apparent that is central to my project. In your theory, resonance deliberately remains underdetermined. You characterize it as an unavailable occurrence that eludes complete conceptual penetration; precisely this unavailability is a constitutive feature of resonant relations to the world. Resonance can be described, but it cannot be transferred into a systematic epistemology without losing something of its character.

My own question begins precisely here. Whereas you employ resonance as a relational and at the same time normative category, I am interested in the epistemological status of enactment itself. I ask how meaning stabilizes itself in experience, how recognition becomes possible, and what characterizes coherence within enactment. For me, enactment is not only the locus of a

successful relation to the world but a knowledge-bearing occurrence that can be systematically reflected upon without thereby being made completely available.

From my perspective, resonance can be determined more precisely without abolishing its unavailable character. What you describe as a responsive occurrence appears to me at the same time as a specific form of the condensation of experience in which affective contact, meaning, and orientation become intertwined. In this sense, resonance is not only a successful relation to the world but an enactment in which experience organizes itself in such a way that it becomes viable.

Whereas resonance in your work primarily designates the quality of the relation between subject and world, I am interested in the inner structure of this occurrence. I ask what characterizes those moments in which experience not only affects us but at the same time becomes ordered and proves coherent. Resonance can then be understood as a privileged case of such an enactment, one in which recognition develops with particular intensity. It is not the presupposition of knowledge, but it is a form in which the enactment of knowledge manifests itself in an intensified manner.

In your perspective, knowing remains closely connected with the moment of response: knowledge occurs when the world responds and the subject allows itself to be affected. In my perspective, the emphasis lies more strongly upon the inner structure of this occurrence. Recognition designates the manner in which experience condenses itself in enactment so as to enable orientation. This condensation is not identical with resonance, but it can develop with particular clarity within resonant relations.

This also results in a different assessment of thought. In your theory, conceptual thought sometimes appears as a potential threat to resonance insofar as it can contribute to making the world available. In my approach, by contrast, thought is a secondary but necessary movement: it fixes, stabilizes, and reflects upon what has already been experienced as meaningful in enactment. Thought does not replace enactment but follows it. Enactment itself eludes objectifying apprehension, but it can be phenomenologically described insofar as its temporal, bodily, and affective structure is disclosed through re-enactment.

I understand this difference not as a refutation of your position but as an epistemological demarcation. This does not dispute the truth-content of your reflections but determines their scope. Your work makes a decisive contribution by showing that successful relations to the world arise not from control but from responsive relations. My approach begins where this insight reaches its methodological limit: with the question of how knowledge forms, stabilizes, and becomes recognizable within enactment itself. Thought explains knowledge; it does not generate it but follows its enactment.

Your theory of resonance thereby opens an experiential space within which my understanding of knowing can be situated without being absorbed into it. It shows under what conditions relations to the world remain alive; my interest concerns the question of how knowledge takes place within such relations.

Yours sincerely,
Klaus Wroblewski

Relation to the guiding proposition:

In Rosa, knowing appears as a moment of a successful relation to the world in the mode of resonance. The enactment of experience is central but deliberately remains underdetermined. In the perspective represented here, this enactment itself becomes the epistemological point of departure. Knowing occurs as the recognition of coherence within the inner perspective.

4.4 Letter to Rudolf Steiner

(Knowing as Recognition of a Spiritual Reality)

Berlin, 29 October 2025

Dear Mr. Steiner,

Your epistemological and spiritual-scientific works mark a particular borderline case within my investigation. They open an approach to knowing that deliberately extends beyond a strictly experience-immanent framework and claims to make spiritual reality itself an object of knowledge. With this letter, I would like to explain how I read your position in connection with my question concerning knowing as an enactment of recognition and at what point a fundamental proximity, but at the same time an epistemologically significant difference, becomes apparent.

Central to your approach is the assumption that knowledge is grounded not solely in sensorially mediated experience but is related to an independent spiritual dimension of reality. Knowing appears in your work as a process in which supersensible connections are not merely constructed or interpreted but can be apprehended as objectively valid contents. The claim to truth of your epistemology therefore consists in the view that spiritual reality can not only be individually experienced but also intersubjectively retraced and methodically examined.

The I thereby functions as the bearer of a development that, through methodically guided inner training, leads to a transformation of the capacities of perception and thought. In this sense, knowledge is not merely an ordering of experience but a progression toward forms of consciousness in which a previously concealed reality manifests itself with its own claim to validity. Recognition here does not merely designate the recurrence of something familiar within experience but the conscious apprehension of a reality initially withdrawn from ordinary consciousness and nevertheless conceived as objectively accessible.

The systematic strength of your approach lies precisely in this expansion of the concept of knowledge. It makes visible that knowing need not necessarily remain bound to the limits of sensory experience but can in principle extend to other dimensions of reality, provided that a corresponding methodology is developed.

At the same time, this ontological expansion marks the point at which my own question differs from yours. Whereas you relate knowing to a spiritual reality that precedes individual enactment and is disclosed through it, I locate knowing within enactment itself. In my approach, recognition does not designate remembering or apprehending an objectively pregiven spiritual order but the manner in which experience organizes and condenses itself in enactment so that coherence, orientation, and meaning arise.

This difference concerns not only the object-domain of knowing but its fundamental structure. In your perspective, enactment is directed toward something that exists independently of it; it

is the means and path toward insight into a presupposed order. In my perspective, enactment itself is the locus at which knowledge is constituted. Knowing does not arise through approximation to an ontologically expanded reality but through the internal connectivity of experience, in which nexuses prove viable. Recognition here is not the rediscovery of a pregiven structure but a process in which experience itself proves coherent.

The role of the I likewise receives a different determination within this context. In your approach, the I appears as the bearer of a development that points beyond individual experience and is embedded in a spiritual reality. In my perspective, the I is not the bearer of such a transindividual dimension but a dynamic occurrence constituted within enactment itself. It arises as a condensation of affective, bodily, and temporal experience and is inseparably connected with the process in which knowledge first becomes possible.

This also changes the epistemological role of thought. In your approach, thought is an essential instrument of training that opens and deepens access to spiritual reality. It is an integral component of the path of knowledge and possesses a constitutive function for the expansion of consciousness. In my approach, by contrast, thought is a secondary, though indispensable, movement. It fixes, stabilizes, and reflects upon what has already been experienced as meaningful within enactment. Thought does not generate knowledge but follows it; it gives linguistic form to what has already proved coherent in enactment.

The decisive difference therefore lies not in the concept of recognition itself but in its epistemological anchoring. In your work, recognition refers to a spiritual reality that exists independently of individual experience and is disclosed through it. In my perspective, recognition refers to the internal coherence of experience in enactment. Knowledge arises not through the disclosure of an ontologically expanded reality but through the experience of coherence within lived nexuses.

I understand this difference not as a refutation of your position but as an epistemological demarcation. Your work makes a decisive contribution by showing that a purely empiricist or naturalistic concept of knowledge cannot fully capture the depth of human movements of knowing. You open a horizon within which knowing can be conceived as access to an expanded reality. My approach begins where such an ontological expansion can no longer be methodically co-enacted and directs attention toward enactment itself as the locus of knowledge.

I do not ask what lies beyond experience but how experience itself bears knowledge, how it stabilizes itself, and how recognition becomes possible within it. Your theory thereby makes visible the consequences that arise when knowing is related to a spiritual reality. My interest, by contrast, concerns the question of how knowing forms within experience without exceeding the experiential nexus. Both perspectives meet in the concept of recognition but differ in the question of what this recognition ultimately refers to.

Yours sincerely,
Klaus Wroblewski

Relation to the guiding proposition:

In Steiner, knowing appears as recognition of a spiritual reality that ontologically precedes individual experience and becomes accessible through methodically guided development of consciousness. Enactment is directed toward insight into a pregiven order. In the perspective represented here, enactment itself bears knowledge. Recognition designates the coherence of

experienced nexuses within the inner perspective and requires no ontological expansion of the concept of constituted reality.

4.5 Letter to Dietmar (Buddhist Perspective)

(Knowing as Recognition of Emptiness and Non-Attachment)

Berlin, 29 October 2025

Dear Dietmar,

Our conversations about meditation, experience, and knowledge have repeatedly prompted me to reconsider and refine my own understanding of knowing. In particular, your observation that, in Buddhist thought, knowledge is understood less as a gain in knowledge than as a process of letting go has directed my attention toward a form of knowing that differs fundamentally from many Western epistemological traditions.

With this letter, I would like to explain how I understand this perspective in connection with my own question concerning knowing as an enactment of recognition and at what point a profound proximity, but at the same time a systematic difference, becomes apparent.

In the Buddhist understanding, knowing appears not as an appropriation of world but as seeing through the conditions under which world appears as fixed, permanent, or identical in the first place. What is known is not an isolated object but the structure of appearing itself: the impermanence, dependence, and emptiness of all phenomena. Knowledge is therefore directed not toward a something but toward insight into the manner in which experience constitutes itself.

Central here is the insight that everything that appears arises only dependently and possesses no independent existence. Recognition in this context means noticing the recurrent structure of attachment: the tendency to fix experiences and attribute permanence, identity, and meaning to them. Knowledge consists in seeing through this movement within experience itself and ceasing to enact it.

What is recognized, therefore, is not an order of the world but the habit of ordering itself.

This perspective represents a radical questioning of Western models of knowledge in which knowledge is frequently associated with stabilization, conceptual determination, and justification. In the Buddhist understanding, it is precisely attachment to concepts, identities, and supposed truths that is regarded as a source of delusion. Knowing occurs not through additional determination but through reduction, through the gradual relinquishing of false attributions. Knowledge here is not an increase in knowledge but a decrease in entanglement.

The concept of recognition thereby acquires a particular depth: what is recognized is not only attachment but also its consequence, namely the continual generation of suffering through the solidification of what is, by its nature, fluid. In this sense, knowing is not merely insight but at the same time a transformation of the manner in which experience is enacted.

At the same time, this form of knowing is inseparably bound to the inner perspective. It does not take place theoretically but in immediate experience. Mindfulness, meditation, and bodily

presence are not preparatory stages of knowing but its actual form. Enactment itself is the locus of knowledge. Knowing means allowing experience to occur without holding onto it, evaluating it, or conceptually appropriating it.

In this sense, Buddhist knowing appears as a radical form of recognition: what is recognized is not a hidden reality behind experience but the insight that experience itself possesses no fixed core and consists only of changing conditions. Not-knowing here designates no deficiency but an attitude of openness in which experience is not prematurely fixed.

From my perspective, however, a difference remains that concerns less the enactment itself than its epistemological interpretation. Whereas the Buddhist path of knowledge ultimately aims at the dissolution of the I and its attributions, I understand the I as an unavoidable, though processual, Gestalt of experience. For me, it is neither a substantial center nor something that can be completely dissolved. Rather, it arises in enactment as a condensation of affective and bodily experience and remains effective as a functional orientation.

The decisive point for me is that even the insight into non-attachment itself takes place within an experiential nexus that presupposes a minimal form of orientation. In this context, a distinction between experiential understanding and conceptual understanding proves helpful. Knowing proper takes place in experiential understanding, in which meaning manifests itself in enactment and fixations are loosened. Thought follows this enactment as a secondary movement: it stabilizes, reflects, and communicates without replacing the knowledge-bearing character of experience.

In this way, the I remains preserved as a functional orientation without once again becoming a source of fixation. Knowing therefore means for me not the disappearance of the I but a changed relation to it: at the level of experience, it becomes more permeable and less fixed without disappearing completely as a figure of orientation.

Knowing does not take place through the I but within the experiential nexus itself, within which the I becomes visible as a dynamic condensation. The stabilized I remains effective at the level of thought. It enables orientation and reflection upon what has already been known in enactment.

Whereas the Buddhist path of knowledge aims at non-attachment through the dissolution of the I, I am interested in the question of how knowing can be reflectively comprehended within this remaining I-structure without thought once again solidifying the experiential relation. My answer lies in connecting the analytically distinguishable but inseparable levels of experience and thought: thought receives no constitutive priority but remains indispensable as a reflective and communicative instance.

Nevertheless, I see in Buddhist practice a decisive correction of Western attitudes toward knowledge. It makes visible that knowing need not necessarily be accompanied by availability, justification, or securing but can also occur as letting go, becoming still, and not-knowing. Knowledge here manifests itself as an enactment that is not exhausted in thought but relativizes thought and assigns it its appropriate place.

In this respect, the Buddhist perspective opens an experiential space within which my own understanding of knowing acquires an essential deepening without being absorbed into it.

Warm regards,
Yours, Klaus

Relation to the guiding proposition:

In the Buddhist understanding, knowing appears as recognition of the emptiness of all determinations and of the structure of attachment. The inner perspective remains central but is directed toward non-attachment and the dissolution of identification. In the perspective represented here, enactment likewise remains knowledge-bearing, but it is not interpreted in terms of the complete dissolution of the I; rather, it is understood as a process in which experience organizes itself into coherence and the I is preserved as a functional, non-substantial Gestalt.

4.6 Letter to Markus Gabriel

(Knowing as Recognition within Particular Orders of Sense)

Berlin, 29 October 2025

Dear Mr. Gabriel,

Over the past years, I have repeatedly encountered your reflections on emotions, fields of sense, and realism in the course of my work. Your writings have prompted me to examine critically and clarify systematically my own assumptions concerning the relation among experience, emotion, and knowing.

In what follows, I would like to reconstruct your position as precisely as possible while at the same time marking those points at which my own approach connects with and differs from it. My concern is not to raise objections but to work out the lines of difference in such a way that they become epistemologically robust.

A central approach to your theory arises for me from your determination of emotions. Particularly convincing is your argument that emotions are not to be understood as merely inner states or neuronal processes but as ways in which world encounters us with a particular meaning. Emotions are events of sense: in fear, the world appears threatening; in joy, open and affirmative. World-relation and self-relation are therefore not separate in emotional experience but structurally intertwined.

I explicitly share this view. For me as well, emotions are constitutive moments of our relation to the world. I shift the emphasis, however: whereas emotions in your work appear as ways in which already structured sense manifests itself, I understand them as enactmental condensations of experience in which sense first arises at all. From my perspective, meaning is not primarily given but forms itself in affective enactment as coherence. Only in subsequent thought is this coherence conceptually grasped and transferred into explicit nexuses of sense.

This difference leads directly to a different determination of realism. In your conception, constituted reality appears as an ensemble of fields of sense in which something is given as something. There is no world as totality but a plurality of domains of objects, each structured by its own conditions of sense. Knowing, in this context, means orienting oneself within such fields of sense and identifying something as meaningful. Sense thereby acquires an ontological

status: it is not merely a mode of appearance but part of what is. Precisely therein lies the systematic strength of your position, because it avoids reducing meaning to individual states or natural-scientific descriptions and explicitly recognizes the reality-character of sense.

At this point, I begin with an epistemological distinction that is constitutive of my own approach. I distinguish between reality and constituted reality. By reality, I understand an ontological point of reference that eludes our immediate knowing and is not available as an object. Constituted reality, by contrast, designates the phenomenal nexus in which reality comes to appearance in experience at all by being perceived, interpreted, and experienced as meaningful.

Knowing takes place exclusively at the level of constituted reality. This constituted reality, however, is not the result of subsequent conceptual processing but already arises in the enactment of experience itself. Experience is interpretive from the outset; it is affectively, bodily, and situationally structured and contains within itself a prereflective form of knowledge. Knowing therefore does not begin in thought but in enactment as the recognition of coherence within experienced **nexuses.** Thought enters only subsequently into this enactment. It explicates, stabilizes, and reflects upon what has already been experienced as meaningful. Knowledge is therefore not access to reality in itself but an immanent process within constituted reality that is structured as recognition.

From my perspective, this transcendental difference between reality and constituted reality is necessary in order to prevent appearance and being from collapsing into one another. Precisely at this point, I see a fundamental difference from your theory. By determining fields of sense ontologically, you accord the level of constituted reality the status of being. Sense appears not merely as a mode of appearance but as a real structure. From my perspective, this means that the prereflective interpretive achievement of experience is not identified as an independent epistemological enactment but is already situated within an ontologically determined order.

The locus of knowing thereby shifts as well. Whereas, in my perspective, knowing begins in experience-immanent enactment and thought subsequently retraces this enactment, in your account knowing appears primarily as orientation within already existing fields of sense. The difference therefore lies not in the recognition of sense but in its systematic location: either as the result of an enactment or as a structure of being.

I understand this difference not as a refutation of your position but as an epistemological boundary marking. Your theory makes convincingly clear that there is no absolute external perspective and that knowing is always context-bound. My approach begins where the ontological status of these contexts itself becomes questionable and focuses upon the epistemic status of the enactment in which sense arises.

In this respect, our positions appear to me less as opposites than as different emphases. Whereas you determine order primarily through ontologically understood fields of sense, I understand order as the result of a dynamic interplay of experience, emotion, and thought. And whereas you reject the idea of reality in itself, I regard it as indispensable in a transcendental sense—not as an apprehensible totality but as a regulative point of reference that prevents constituted reality from being identified with being.

My concern is therefore to identify the enactment of knowing itself as knowledge-bearing without ontologically overdetermining it. I hope that this presentation makes my perspective in relation to your theory sufficiently clear. My aim has been to formulate the differences in such

a way that they can serve as a point of departure for further clarification of the relation among sense, constituted reality, and knowledge.

Yours sincerely,
Klaus Wroblewski

Relation to the guiding proposition:

In Gabriel, knowing appears as recognition within ontologically understood orders of sense. In the perspective represented here, recognition remains bound to the level of constituted reality, while reality is preserved as a transcendental point of reference beyond immediate knowledge.

4.7 Letter to Martha C. Nussbaum

(Knowing as Recognition of Normative Meaning)

Berlin, 12 December 2025

Dear Professor Nussbaum,

For some time, I have followed your work on the theory of emotions with great attention and appreciation. I find particularly compelling your consistent emphasis on the normative dimension of emotions. Your analysis of emotions as evaluative attitudes toward one's own well-being makes clear that they are not mere affects but central moments of human self- and world-orientation. In the view that emotions are constitutive of sense and value and substantially structure human flourishing, I see a fundamental commonality with my own position.

My concern in what follows is to determine this proximity precisely while at the same time working out a difference that represents less a counterposition than a shift in the epistemological point of departure. Should I present your position in an abbreviated manner, I ask that this be understood as an unintended simplification.

A central point of my engagement concerns the systematic position of emotions within the process of knowing. In your work, emotions appear primarily as cognitively structured value judgments or evaluative attitudes relating to one's own well-being, vulnerability, loss, or flourishing. Feelings frequently function here as the subjectively experienced dimension of these judgments. Knowing, within this framework, essentially takes place as the apprehension of normative meaning: something is known insofar as it is judged to be valuable, threatening, worthy of protection, or harmful.

I share this perspective insofar as, for me too, emotions are inseparably connected with value-orientation and moral judgment. My question, however, begins one level earlier. I understand emotions not primarily as already structured value judgments but as enactmental, mostly implicit experiential processes through which world first appears as meaningful at all. Emotions are, in this sense, bodily-affective dynamics that structure perception, attention, and readiness for action before explicit evaluations are formulated.

From my perspective, meaning is not initially given and subsequently recognized but arises in enactment as coherence. Only in subsequent thought can this coherence be conceptually grasped and transformed into normative judgments.

This shift can be illustrated through simple experiential situations. If a person walks alone along a dark street at night, the emerging fear can, from your perspective, be understood as the expression of an evaluative judgment—for example, the assessment that one's own safety is endangered. The emotion makes the situation normatively readable.

In my view, however, the process begins earlier. First, experience itself changes: the body tenses, attention narrows, and the surroundings appear differently. This bodily-affective restructuring takes place before an explicit judgment is formulated and first provides the ground upon which such a judgment can meaningfully arise. The same applies to joy: it appears to me initially as an experiential openness and expansion from which a positive evaluation of one's own well-being only subsequently develops.

From this follows for me a precise distinction between emotion and feeling. Emotions designate the structuring, mostly implicit processes through which experience is organized as meaningful. Feelings, by contrast, are the bodily perceptible mode of appearance of these processes through which they become consciously accessible to the person. Without this affective-bodily dimension, emotions would indeed be structure-forming but not experienceable and therefore not knowledge-bearing.

Against this background, it seems to me that a primarily cognitive-evaluative concept of emotion presupposes an epistemologically prior dimension without explicitly identifying it. Many emotional processes already structure perception and behavior at a prelinguistic and prereflective level. They occur without being preceded by an explicit value judgment and thereby first open the experiential space within which such judgments can be formed.

Knowing, in my understanding, therefore takes place initially within emotional enactment itself. Recognition means affectively apprehending a situation as meaningful even before it is conceptually or normatively explicated. Thought follows this enactment as a secondary movement: it explicates, stabilizes, and justifies what has already been experienced as meaningful.

Normative meaning therefore appears not as a primary property of emotions but as an elaboration of what is already implicit in emotional enactment. In this sense, emotions are not primarily judgments about values but the experience-immanent condition of their possibility.

I understand this difference not as a refutation of your position but as an epistemological boundary marking. Your theory makes convincingly visible that emotions are indispensable for normative orientation and moral knowing and that they cannot be reduced to mere natural processes. My approach begins where one must ask about the conditions under which such normative orientation can arise in the first place.

The focus thereby shifts from judgment to the emotional experiential process in which meaning initially assumes affective and bodily Gestalt. We are united by the conviction that emotions are inseparably connected with human vulnerability, value-orientation, and practical judgment. The difference concerns not the goal but the point of departure: you locate knowing closer to normative judgment; I locate it closer to the emotional experience from which such judgments emerge.

I hope that these reflections can be understood as a contribution to a shared philosophical conversation.

Warm regards,
Klaus Wroblewski

Relation to the guiding proposition:

In Nussbaum, knowing appears primarily as recognition of normative meaning in the mode of evaluative judgment. Bodily-affective experience forms an implicit presupposition. In the perspective represented here, knowing begins earlier, within emotional enactment itself, from which normative meaning first emerges.

5. Concluding Systematic Assessment and Synthesis of the Letters

The preceding letters are not to be understood as subsequent illustrations of an already completed theoretical framework. Rather, they constitute the locus at which the epistemological claim of this study proves itself in enactment. What was conceptually prepared in the introductory chapters—the thesis that knowing is, in its essence, to be understood as recognition from the inner perspective—is not merely applied in the dialogical reconstructions but tested in its viability, tensions, and limits.

The letters thus function as methodically controlled movements of knowing. They reconstruct different epistemological positions not primarily according to their propositional content but according to the respective manner in which knowing is conceived, experienced, and justified. What matters is not whether a position is to be judged right or wrong, but how it relates to the enactment of recognition and which dimension of experience it privileges, limits, or excludes.

The letter to Spinoza already makes this basic figure visible by reconstructing knowing as insight into a necessary order. Recognition here does not take place in a bodily-affective manner but as rational evidence. The decisive difference from the position represented in this study, however, lies in the fact that, for Spinoza, the order of the world precedes knowing. Recognition here means the alignment of thought with an ontologically posited necessity. By contrast, this study understands order not as a pregiven standard but as the result of an experience-bound enactment of meaning. Coherence is not a representation of objective necessity but a nexus stabilizing itself within experience. The letter makes visible that even an objectivist system cannot dispense with recognition, although it detaches recognition from the experiential process.

The subsequent letter to Metzinger fundamentally shifts the focus. Knowing appears here as the functional coherence of a self-model that does not require recourse to an experiencing instance. The central difference from the position developed here consists in the fact that experience itself becomes something requiring explanation in Metzinger without retaining an epistemic status of its own. Whereas this study understands knowing as an enactment in which experience brings forth meaning, Metzinger describes this enactment from the outside as model formation. Recognition remains correctly analyzed but loses its character as lived coherence. This difference makes clear why this study insists upon the co-enactment of experience. It understands the inner perspective not as an illusion or mere epiphenomenon but as a constitutive condition of knowing.

In the letter to Rosa, this difference is not merely criticized but productively developed further. Knowing appears here as a resonant relation to the world that can be reduced neither to representation nor to function. The difference from the position developed here lies, however, in the location of this resonance occurrence. Whereas Rosa describes resonance primarily as a relation between subject and world, this study analyzes resonance as a processual enactment within the inner perspective in which world and self are brought forth simultaneously. The social and institutional dimension that stands in the foreground in Rosa is not disputed here but traced back to an experience-related fundamental movement. The letter makes clear that resonance can be explained without losing its bodily-affective basis.

The letter to Steiner marks a deliberate boundary point. The proximity consists in the shared emphasis upon the I as an active structure of knowing. The decisive difference, however, lies in the ontological expansion undertaken by Steiner. Whereas Steiner understands knowing as recollection of a spiritual reality, this study remains strictly immanent. The I is not conceived as the bearer of a supersensible reality but as a processual Gestalt within experience itself. The letter shows that knowledge can be deepened without crossing the boundary of experience. Precisely this deliberate limitation sharpens the epistemological claim of the study.

This difference is further intensified in the Buddhist letter to Dietmar. Here, knowing is reconstructed as seeing through attachment and fixation. The difference from the position developed here lies not in the emphasis upon the inner perspective but in the aim of the process of knowing. Whereas Buddhism aims at the dissolution of the I, this study understands the I as an unavoidable, though mutable, structure of experience. Knowing here does not mean the disappearance of the self but a changed relation to it. The letter thus functions as a critical corrective to Western logics of fixation without abandoning the experiential orientation of this study.

The letter to Gabriel shifts the question once again by describing knowing as orientation within fields of sense. The difference lies in the fact that Gabriel locates fields of sense ontologically, whereas this study asks how sense becomes experienceable in the first place. Recognition here does not primarily mean discovering objective domains of validity but experiencing coherence within an experiential nexus. Objectivity is not denied but conceived from the primacy of experience. This position therefore differs both from naïve realism and from radical constructivism.

In the concluding letter to Nussbaum, a central motif of the study is condensed. The proximity lies in the shared view that emotions are constitutive of knowing. The difference lies in emphasis. Whereas Nussbaum analyzes emotions primarily as cognitive evaluations, this study understands emotions as bodily-affective resonances in which meaning arises prior to conceptual judgment. The letter thus supplements the experience-oriented perspective with a normative dimension without reducing it to acts of judgment.

Taken together, it becomes clear that the letters do not form a loose sequence of theoretical statements but a systematically coordinated field of contrasting models of knowing. The approach developed here positions itself neither as a synthesis nor as a superior meta-theory, but as an experience-bound perspective that questions the respective positions according to their relation to the enactment of knowing. In all the approaches considered, knowing appears bound to coherence, connectivity, or dissolution, although this structure is situated differently in each case.

The dialogical epistolary form thus proves methodologically appropriate for a concept of knowing that understands comprehension not as access to fixed truths but as a movement of recognition. Knowledge is not judged from a neutral external standpoint but reflected upon in the mirror of unfamiliar movements of thought. The personal form of address does not mark psychological proximity but an epistemological perspective in which difference becomes visible and productive.

The letters thereby show that epistemology is not merely an object of analysis but itself a practice of knowing. Knowing appears not as the possession of truths but as an ongoing enactment in which world and self are formed simultaneously. The letters do not mark an endpoint but an orienting Gestalt of knowing that remains open to further development.

With this synthesis, the present chapter is concluded. It has shown that the epistemological claim of this study is not exhausted in systematic fixation but proves itself in enactment—where knowing itself becomes visible as recognition within the movement of understanding. With the systematic evaluation of the letters, the level has been reached at which the epistemological approach of this study has proved itself not only conceptually but also in enactment. The dialogical reconstructions have shown that knowing cannot be fixed as a static structure but takes on different forms within different theoretical configurations. At the same time, it has become clear that this diversity does not lead to arbitrariness but points toward a common fundamental movement that can be described as recognition from the inner perspective.

Against this background, the concluding chapter can bring together the yield of the study without systematizing or absolutizing it. Its purpose is not to establish a final concept of knowing but to reflect upon what has proved viable in the course of the investigation and to mark those open lines along which the understanding of knowing developed here can be continued.

6. Epistemological Yield and Outlook

The present study has investigated knowing not as a completed object but reconstructed it as a movement. Its central epistemological contribution lies in the consistent shift of the concept of knowing. Knowing no longer appears primarily as the possession of truths, as the representation of an objectively given world, or as the result of functional processes, but as an enactment in which experience, meaning, and orientation are formed in the mode of recognition.

This shift has several consequences. First, it becomes clear that knowing cannot be reduced to cognitive representation or conceptual operations. Perception, bodily experience, emotions, moods, and intuitive condensations are not merely preliminary stages of thought but constitutive moments of the process of knowing itself. Thought appears in this context not as the origin but as a form of stabilization, clarification, and explication. It orders, reflects, and justifies without replacing the experience-related enactment from which meaning emerges.

Second, the inner perspective proves not to be a methodological deficit but a fundamental condition of knowing. Without an inner perspective, there would be no relevance, no meaning, and no orientation. Knowledge is necessarily perspectival without therefore becoming relativistic. Its validity arises not from the elimination of perspectivity but from its reflexive elaboration. Objectivity appears from this perspective not as a standpoint beyond all experience but as an intersubjectively accountable form of coherence that includes criticism, correction, and the capacity to learn.

Third, it becomes apparent that knowledge can neither be completely systematized nor completely privatized. The dialogical letters have shown that different epistemological positions each bring forth specific configurations of recognition. These configurations are neither arbitrary nor universal but context-dependent and at the same time communicable. Knowledge thus moves within a field of tension between order and openness, between stabilization and change, between systematic clarification and fragmentary experience.

An essential methodological result of the study lies in the legitimation of a dialogical, non-reductive form of philosophical knowledge. The epistolary form makes it possible not only to analyze theoretical positions but also to make their effect upon one’s own knowing visible. Epistemology thereby itself becomes reflexive. It not only describes conditions of knowledge but enacts them. The epistemological claim of the study therefore lies not in the development of a closed system but in the transparent presentation of a movement of understanding.

Taken as a whole, knowing appears as a dynamic, relational process that is not exhausted in the possession of truths but consists in continual self- and world-orientation. Truth appears not as a fixed endpoint but as an event that occurs where experience, interpretation, and response enter into a coherent relation. Coherence is not a subjective feeling of well-being but a viable nexus that enables orientation while remaining open to irritation and revision.

The study makes no claim to ultimate justification. Its claim consists rather in making visible an open, dynamic, and at the same time accountable Gestalt of knowing. It understands itself as a contribution to an epistemology that does not close but orients, and that acknowledges that knowing always remains in motion. In this sense, the reflections developed here invite a continuation of the cartography of knowing—not through the establishment of a final standpoint but through the continuing readiness to relate experience, meaning, and understanding to one another anew.

With this outlook, the present investigation comes to an end. It concludes not with a final answer but with a more precisely formulated question:

How can knowing be understood in such a way that its experiential depth, its capacity for critical reflection, and its orienting function are equally preserved?

The present study has shown that the concept of **recognition from the inner perspective** offers a viable, though open, orientation for this purpose.

Mosaic Piece: Inner Perspective – Spirituality

General Outline:[6]



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[6] A detailed outline is provided on pp. 460-462.

1. Introduction

1.1 Point of Departure and Epistemic Interest

The point of departure of this investigation is the insight that human beings never encounter the world immediately. Perception, thought, and experience are always mediated by perspective, prior understanding, language, cultural orders, and embodied constitution. The world does not appear to human beings "in itself," but only as it is interpreted from within their own inner perspective. This insight provides the epistemological framework of the study.

The present mosaic stone, entitled **"Inner Perspective Spirituality,"** takes up this question and focuses upon an aspect that is frequently either marginalized or metaphysically elevated within scholarly discourse: spirituality. The aim is to analyze spirituality not as a transcendent special reality or as an irrational counterpart to rationality, but as a specific form of human meaning-practice that takes place within the conditions of world-understanding.

1.2 Problem

Although philosophy, cultural studies, and psychology widely recognize that human world-understanding is perspectivally and constructively mediated, spirituality is frequently treated implicitly either as referring to an objective transcendent reality or as an irrational residue of prescientific forms of thought. Both views fall short.

On the one hand, a metaphysical interpretation of spirituality fails to recognize its embeddedness in individual experience, emotion, embodiment, and cultural symbolic systems. On the other hand, a purely skeptical or reductionist perspective underestimates the existential and action-guiding significance that spiritual practices and interpretations can possess for the individual.

The central question of this study is therefore:

How can spirituality be understood as a component of human world-understanding without metaphysically elevating it or psychologically trivializing it?

1.3 Guiding Thesis and Aim

The guiding thesis of this study is that spirituality can be understood as a practice of meaning formation within a space of possibility structured by the inner perspective. It is neither access to an objectively transcendent reality nor merely a personal illusion, but a way in which human beings interpret, order, and integrate experiences into their actions.

Spirituality makes use of the same space of possibility within which abstract thought, symbolic constructions, scientific models, and ethical orientations arise.

Spirituality operates with abstractions, symbols, and narratives that are emotionally anchored and bodily experienced and thereby acquire real efficacy for the individual. What is decisive is not the ontological existence of spiritual contents but their function within the individual structure of meaning and action.

The aim of this study is therefore to work out systematically the inner perspective as a fundamental condition of world-understanding, to introduce the concept of the space of possibility as a central theoretical instrument, and to analyze spirituality as an embodied, symbolic, and culturally embedded practice within this space of possibility.

1.4 Methodological Location

The investigation is situated at the intersection of epistemology, phenomenology, philosophy of symbolic forms, and cultural theory. It follows neither a metaphysical nor a theological logic of justification, but an analytic-phenomenological perspective focused upon experience, interpretation, and the constitution of meaning.

Philosophical points of reference include Immanuel Kant, Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Ernst Cassirer, as well as more recent constructivist and cultural-theoretical approaches. Analogies from physics, particularly quantum mechanics, are also employed, though explicitly in a heuristic rather than ontological sense.

Spirituality is not evaluated normatively in this study but analyzed descriptively and functionally.

Spirituality is a specific way of using the space of possibility of human experience in order to generate orientation, meaning, and the capacity for action.

1.5 Structure of the Study

The study is divided into several systematically interconnected chapters. First, the inner perspective is developed as the epistemological basic condition of human world-understanding. Building upon this, the space of possibility is introduced as a space of abstraction, interpretation, and action and reflected upon in terms of its limitations. Language, symbolism, and myth are then examined as central forms of mediation.

In the second part of the study, spirituality is analyzed as an embodied practice within this space of possibility, before its relation to religion, emotion, belief, and collective meaning formation is systematically situated.

2. The Inner Perspective: Fundamental Form of Human World-Understanding

2.1 World-Understanding as a Process of Interpretation

Human world-understanding is not a passive process of receiving given information but an active process of interpretation. Impressions, perceptions, and events do not appear to human beings as raw data but are always integrated into a nexus of meaning. Meaning does not arise from what is given itself but from the interpretive achievement through which what is given is related to prior knowledge, expectations, contexts, and cultural systems of order.

A sign, a spoken word, a gesture, or an event is not exhausted by its mere appearance. Only through the attribution of meaning does it become intelligible and relevant to action. Interpretation functions in this context as a mediating instance between perception and meaning. It connects the immediate impression with an already existing or newly formed horizon of sense.

This fundamental structure is already apparent in everyday situations. When, for example, a traffic light is perceived, colors are not merely registered. Rather, these colors are immediately interpreted as instructions for action. “Red” means stop; “green” means proceed. Without this interpretation, perception would be functionally meaningless.

The example makes clear that perception and interpretation are inseparably connected and that even apparently objective signs acquire their meaning only through interpretive achievement.

2.2 The Inner Perspective as an Epistemological Point of Departure

The fact that world-understanding is always based upon interpretation points to the central role of the inner perspective. By inner perspective is meant the first-person perspective from which world is experienced, interpreted, and understood. It designates the manner in which the world appears to human beings, not how it is constituted independently of them “in itself.”

From an epistemological standpoint, a presuppositionless and completely objective third-person perspective is inaccessible. Even where objectivity is claimed, as in scientific contexts, all knowledge remains bound to presuppositions. The choice of a method, a conceptual apparatus, or a theoretical framework already implies assumptions and normative determinations. Objectivity therefore proves to be not perspectivelessness but **intersubjectively stabilized perspectivity**.

Every representation is intentional; that is, it is always directed toward something and embedded within a nexus of meaning. The attribution of meaning consequently always takes place from a first-person perspective and is structured by its intentionality.

World-understanding is therefore never neutral but always perspectivally mediated.

2.3 Phenomenological Foundation of the Inner Perspective

This insight receives systematic elaboration in phenomenology. Edmund Husserl pointed out that objects are never completely given but always appear only in perspectival adumbrations. Perception is therefore always accompanied by a horizon of what is not seen, co-intended, and expected. What is perceived is inseparably connected with an inner horizon of sense that structures understanding.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty radicalizes this perspective by placing embodiment at the center. Human beings are not merely situated in the world but constitute themselves through perception and action within the world. Knowledge does not arise through detached observation but through embodied and situated experience. Human beings recognize themselves not through introspective withdrawal from the world but through their being-in-the-world.

It thereby becomes clear that the inner perspective must not be misunderstood as a closed internal space.

The inner perspective is not a retreat into the individual
but the necessary condition of every experience of world.

Inner and outer world are not strictly separated but intertwined. The world always appears in the manner in which it is experienced from the perspective of an embodied, situated individual.

2.4 Systems, Unities, and Relations

World-understanding does not take place in isolated individual acts but within a system of meanings. Impressions are combined into unities, and these unities in turn are related to one another. Meaning arises not from the unities themselves but from their relations within a system.

The individual system of meaning is dynamic and self-referential. It continually draws upon its own experiences, integrates new impressions, and orders them within existing structures. Language, cultural patterns, scientific models, and personal experiences together form the framework within which world becomes intelligible.

The inner perspective thus refers to a personal system that provides the horizon of understanding. This system is not static but mutable; nevertheless, it always remains the framework within which meaning can arise.

The world appears to the individual not in its intrinsic nature,
but in the manner in which it is interpreted through this system.

2.5 Limits of World-Understanding

The systemic and perspectival structure of world-understanding simultaneously implies its limitation. Reality in itself remains inaccessible. Knowledge is confined to appearances structured by forms of intuition, categories, and systems of interpretation. This insight can already be found in Immanuel Kant, who emphasizes that the “thing in itself” remains withdrawn from the human capacity for knowledge.

World-understanding is therefore always mediated, constructed, and provisional. It enables orientation and the capacity for action without being able to claim a complete or final apprehension of reality. This limitation, however, is not a deficiency but a necessary condition of meaning formation. Precisely because world is not immediately given, a space for interpretation, abstraction, and the attribution of meaning arises.

2.6 State of the Argument

The inner perspective proves to be a fundamental structure of human world-understanding. Perception, thought, and experience are always perspectivally mediated, bodily situated, and systemically organized. Meaning does not arise from an objective reality in itself but through the interplay of impression, interpretation, and an existing nexus of meaning.

This insight forms the prerequisite for understanding the space of possibility introduced in the following chapter. Only against the background of the inner perspective can it be understood how abstraction, symbolic constructions, and spiritual interpretations arise and why they can acquire real efficacy for the individual.

3. Unities, Relations, and System Formation – Constitution of Meaning

3.1 Meaning as a Systemic Achievement

The insight that world-understanding is always perspectivally mediated requires a more precise determination of the structure within which meaning arises. Meaning is neither an objective feature of the world nor a property of isolated impressions. Rather, it is a systemic achievement arising from the ordering of perceptions, experiences, and attributions of meaning.

From a constructivist perspective, meaning is not discovered but generated. World does not appear as a finished structure but as the result of ongoing processes of ordering. These processes operate with unities formed through abstraction and with relations through which these unities are placed within meaningful nexuses. Only on this basis can world be experienced as coherent, intelligible, and relevant to action.

Meaning is therefore neither individually arbitrary nor objectively given, but the result of stabilized operations within a system that orients itself toward experience while simultaneously reproducing its own structures.

3.2 Unities as Operative Constructions

Unities do not belong to the ontological basic structure of reality but arise only through the operative disclosure of constituted reality. They emerge through the human setting of particular differences, the bundling of relevant characteristics, and the exclusion of others. In this sense, unities are products of selective perception and abstraction.

Constructivism has pointed out that knowledge is based not upon representation but upon functionality. Unities prove themselves not by "corresponding to reality," but by enabling orientation within a system. They are instruments of coping with the world, not representations of an objective order.

Even apparently elementary unities such as "thing," "event," or "I" are results of such constructive achievements. They stabilize nexuses of experience and make recognizability possible. Their validity, however, always remains system-dependent and context-bound.

3.3 Relations and Difference as Bearers of Meaning

Whereas unities function as fixed points, meanings arise only through relations.

Meaning is constituted not from substances but from differences.

This insight forms a central point of connection with systems-theoretical thought. Niklas Luhmann determines meaning as a medium operating through the distinction between actuality and possibility. Meaning arises where something is perceived as this rather than that while alternative possibilities of connection are simultaneously implied.

Relations are therefore not secondary connections between already meaningful unities but the actual locus of meaning production. Meaning is relational, context-dependent, and dynamic. It shifts with altered frames of reference, new experiences, or changed standards of evaluation.

Stability arises not through fixation
but through the repetition of similar relational patterns.

3.4 System Formation and Self-Reference

Unities and relations organize themselves into systems. A system is not a container of contents but an operative configuration that maintains itself through its own operations. From a systems-theoretical perspective, a system is characterized by distinguishing between itself and its environment and orienting its operations toward this distinction.

The individual system of meaning operates self-referentially. It uses its own structures to process new impressions and thereby continually reproduces itself. Experiences are not immediately received but interpreted within the system.

The environment becomes effective as a problem (irritation), but not as meaning.

This self-reference does not imply isolation. Systems are structurally coupled to their environment, particularly to other systems. Language, social interaction, and cultural practices enable such couplings and create intersubjective connectivity.

3.5 Individual Systems of Meaning and Intersubjectivity

Systems of meaning are primarily individual because they are bound to the respective inner perspective. At the same time, they are socially embedded. Language functions as a central medium of system coupling. It allows individual constructions to be externalized, stabilized, and coordinated with other systems.

Intersubjective understanding does not arise through the identity of worldviews but through sufficient compatibility among structures of meaning. Within this framework, truth appears not as correspondence with an objective reality but as system-internal validity that stabilizes itself through communication, practice, and successful application.

This makes it understandable why different systems, scientific, religious, aesthetic, or interpersonal, can coexist without having to agree upon a common ontological foundation. They operate with different distinctions but each generate internally consistent worlds of meaning.

3.6 Constituted Reality, Construction, and Limit

The constructivist-systems-theoretical perspective implies a clear boundary: systems generate meaning and thereby constituted reality. Constituted reality is not a property of the environment but the result of system-internal achievements of ordering. Reality as such remains unavailable. It becomes effective only in the form of irritations against which systems test and adapt their structures.

This boundary protects against two theoretical misconceptions: a naïve realism that equates meaning with reality, and a relativism of arbitrariness that regards every formation of meaning as equally valid. Systems are not arbitrary but functionally bound to their capacity to provide orientation, connectivity, and the capacity for action.

Systems of meaning prove themselves in practice. Their validity becomes apparent in whether they can integrate experiences, enable decisions, and coordinate actions.

3.7 State of the Argument

Meaning arises as a systemic achievement through the construction of unities whose significance unfolds within relational nexuses. These processes take place within self-referential systems that are perspectivally bound yet intersubjectively connectable. World-understanding is therefore neither representation nor free invention but a functional construction within the inner perspective.

On this systems-theoretical and constructivist basis, the space of possibility can now be determined more precisely. It is the domain within which systems not only stabilize meaning but can also generate new meanings, designs, and interpretations.

4. Abstraction and the Space of Possibility

4.1 Abstraction as an Expansion of Access to the World

Human thought is not exhausted in dealing with what is immediately perceptible. Everyday experience already shows that perception is always accompanied by interpretation and points beyond what is concretely given. In this context, abstraction designates the capacity to detach oneself from immediate sensory perception and to construct unities, relations, and scenarios that are not directly given but can nevertheless become meaningful and relevant to action.

Abstraction is not a secondary or subsequent achievement but a fundamental condition of world-understanding. Even the recognition of an object as “something” presupposes an abstractive achievement through which individual sensory data are combined into a unity. What appears to be concrete thus itself proves to be the result of an abstractive process. World does not appear to the individual as an unformed given but as an already structured and interpreted constituted reality.

This insight shifts the relation between the concrete and the abstract. Abstraction is not the opposite of experience but its continuation on another, translated level. It opens a space in which selected experiential data can be varied, combined, and newly designed. From this perspective, abstraction is not a departure from the concrete but a transformation of experience. Experience is not abandoned but transformed in such a way that it can be continued in thought.

4.2 The Space of Possibility as a Theoretical Concept

The concept of the **space of possibility** designates the domain in which abstract thought, symbolic constructions, and hypothetical designs operate. It is neither a real place nor an ontological sphere, but a functional space of thought and interpretation arising within the inner perspective. Within it, potential meanings, options for action, and designs of sense coexist without yet being actualized.

The space of possibility arises from the human capacity to think beyond what is given.

It makes it possible to design alternatives, play through scenarios, estimate consequences, and imagine new orders. It thereby forms the prerequisite for planning, creativity, reflection, and normative orientation.

At the same time, the space of possibility is not unlimited. It is primarily structured by individual experiences in conjunction with cultural patterns, linguistic categories, and social expectations. It arises within existing systems of meaning and remains bound to them. Only what is thinkable, imaginable, or connectable within a system can appear as possible.

4.3 Abstraction, Truth, and System-Dependence

The existence of a space of possibility raises the question of truth and validity. If thought moves within an abstract space of possible designs, how can viable constructions be distinguished from non-viable ones?

From a systems-theoretical and constructivist perspective, truth is not an absolute correspondence between representation and reality but a system-internal validity. What is true is what proves itself within a system, remains connectable, and enables orientation. This validity is context-dependent.

The space of possibility is therefore not a domain of unlimited arbitrariness but a field of selective options. Abstract designs compete with one another and are validated or rejected through experience, communication, and practice. Truth does not appear as a final result but as processual stabilization within a system of meaning.

This perspective explains why different systems—for example, scientific, religious, or everyday systems—can formulate different truth claims without logically cancelling one another out. They operate within different spaces of possibility, each of which follows its own rules of validity.

4.4 Intersubjectivity and the Social Structuring of the Space of Possibility

The space of possibility is not a purely individual construction. Although it is disclosed from the inner perspective, it is substantially shaped by social and cultural influences. Language, symbols, norms, and shared narratives structure which possibilities can appear thinkable in the first place.

Intersubjective understanding exerts an ordering effect upon the space of possibility. Through communication, individual designs are examined, confirmed, modified, or rejected. In this way, shared horizon structures emerge that make collective action possible. The space of possibility thus becomes a mediating domain between individual meaning formation and social coordination.

In this context, the idea of intersubjective stability also acquires significance. Abstract constructions develop social efficacy only when they can be interpreted by others in a connectable manner. Without such stabilization, they would remain private thought experiments without practical relevance.

4.5 Validation and Limitation of the Space of Possibility

Although the space of possibility is open in principle, it is subject to clear limitations. Abstract designs remain speculative as long as they are not connected with concrete experience, action, or emotional resonance. Only through such connections do they acquire relevance and efficacy.

This is where the idea of practical confirmation becomes relevant. A design proves itself not through logical consistency alone but through its capacity to provide orientation within a system and to guide action. This confirmation can occur individually, through personal experience, or socially, through communicative recognition.

The space of possibility is therefore not a reservoir of finished truths but a field of selective testing. It is continually limited by experience without losing its fundamental openness. Precisely this tension between openness and limitation makes it productive.

4.6 Abstraction between Fiction and Practice

A central characteristic of the space of possibility is the ambivalence between fiction and practice. Abstract constructions initially exist as conceptual designs. In this sense, they are fictional. They acquire a new quality, however, as soon as they are translated into actions, decisions, or forms of life.

This translation does not transform the abstract into objective reality but into personal or social constituted reality. A design becomes action-guiding when it is experienced within a system as meaningful and realizable. The space of possibility thereby functions as a bridge between thought and action, between imagination and lived practice.

Abstraction makes it possible to think beyond existing orders without detaching oneself from the world of experience. It expands the scope of action without dissolving it into arbitrariness.

4.7 State of the Argument

Abstraction opens a space of possibility in which human thought operates beyond what is immediately perceptible. This space is not an ontological domain but a functional space of thought and interpretation within the inner perspective. It is structured by individual experience, cultural symbolism, and social communication while remaining open to new designs.

The space of possibility enables meaning formation, orientation, and the capacity for action by making alternatives conceivable while simultaneously being limited by experience and practice. On this basis, it can be shown that spiritual interpretations and practices likewise operate within this space of possibility and develop their specific efficacy there.

5. Limiting the Space of Possibility: Real Utopias and Practical Confirmation

5.1 The Necessity of Limitation

The space of possibility developed in the preceding chapters describes an open domain of abstract designs, interpretations, and options for action. This openness is a prerequisite for creativity, reflection, and meaning formation. At the same time, it carries the danger of theoretical arbitrariness unless it is clarified according to which criteria possibilities are selected, evaluated, and stabilized.

An unlimited space of possibility would be unsuitable for orientation and action. If, in principle, everything conceivable and imaginable were equally valid, thought would lose its selective function.

Meaning formation therefore requires not only openness but also limitation.

This limitation does not occur from the outside through objective truth but from within through functional criteria such as connectivity, realizability, and confirmation in experience and practice.

The space of possibility is consequently not a neutral reservoir of possibilities but a selective space of action and interpretation that is continuously structured and restricted.

5.2 Fictional Space of Possibility and Practical Relevance

Abstract designs initially exist in the mode of the fictional. They are conceivable but not realized; imaginable but not experienced. This fictionality is not a deficiency but a productive prerequisite. Only through it is it possible to design alternatives to existing constituted reality, formulate hypotheses, and imagine new orders.

At the same time, the fictional space of possibility remains ineffective as long as it is not connected with concrete life-practice. Abstract constructions develop their significance only when they are translated into decisions, actions, or experiences. Only in this translation does it become apparent whether a design is viable or not.

A distinction thereby arises between mere conceivability and practical relevance. Not everything conceivable is meaningful, and not every representation guides action. The space of possibility must therefore be used selectively, with orientation emerging through processes of tentative testing.

5.3 Erich Fromm's Concept of the "Real Utopia"

A central theoretical refinement of this limitation is provided by Erich Fromm with his concept of the **"real utopia."** Fromm distinguishes between abstract wishful thinking and those designs that are realizable within human capacities and social conditions. Real utopias are not descriptions of existing constituted reality but orienting visions that remain realizable in principle.

Fromm's approach makes it possible to focus the space of possibility upon practicable options without fundamentally abandoning its openness. The real utopia functions as a filter that reduces theoretically infinite possibilities to those compatible with the human world of experience, social structures, and emotional viability.

In this sense, the real utopia is not a counter-concept to abstraction but its disciplining form. It translates speculative freedom into an orientable space of action.

5.4 Practical Confirmation as a Criterion of Validity

The decisive instance for limiting the space of possibility is **practical confirmation**. Abstract constructions acquire their validity not through logical consistency alone but through their confirmation in experience, action, and emotional resonance.

Practical validation does not mean objective verification in the natural-scientific sense but functional confirmation within a system. A design is regarded as viable when it provides orientation, enables decisions, and proves itself in the experience of the individual or in social practice.

Such confirmation can assume different forms: individual experience, emotional coherence, social recognition, or long-term stabilization within cultural practices.

In this way, a feedback relation arises between the space of possibility and the world of experience. Abstract designs are tested, modified, or rejected through experience. The space of possibility thereby remains open without becoming arbitrary.

5.5 Selection, Decision, and Reduction of Complexity

Limitation always means selection. From the multiplicity of possible designs, certain options are preferred while others are excluded. Such selection is necessary in order to preserve the capacity for action. From a systems-theoretical perspective, this selection can be understood as a reduction of complexity.

The space of possibility contains more options than an individual can realize simultaneously. Decisions reduce this multiplicity to concrete intentions for action. This reduction is irreversible and involves risk because it excludes alternative possibilities. Precisely therein, however, lies its productive function: without decision, every possibility would remain without consequence.

The inner perspective assumes a central role in this process.

The inner perspective evaluates possibilities in the light of personal experience, emotional weighting, and normative orientation.

Selection is therefore not a purely rational act but an interplay of thought, feeling, and bodily resonance.

5.6 Between Fiction and Constituted Reality: Personal Reality

Abstract designs that are practically confirmed enter the domain of personal reality. What is meant here is not objective reality but a constituted reality that becomes action-guidingly effective within the individual system of meaning.

A design becomes real as soon as it structures the individual's thought, feeling, and action. It remains ontologically fictional but can nevertheless be existentially effective. This distinction makes it possible to separate effective reality from ontological reality without denying the efficacy of abstract constructions.

Precisely here the significance of the space of possibility for spiritual, ethical, and normative orientations becomes apparent. These, too, frequently operate with designs whose objective existence is questionable but whose practical effects remain undeniable.

5.7 State of the Argument

The space of possibility is not an unlimited realm of abstract arbitrariness but a selective space of thought and action that is limited by practical criteria. Abstract designs acquire their validity not through truth in the ontological sense but through practical confirmation, emotional resonance, and social connectivity.

Erich Fromm's concept of the real utopia offers a central instrument for connecting speculative freedom with practical realizability. In this way, the space of possibility remains open to new designs without losing its orienting function.

With this limitation, the theoretical framework has now been established for showing, in the further course of the study, that spirituality can be understood as a specific practice within this limited space of possibility. Spirituality does not open up a metaphysical special world but constitutes a functionally effective form of human meaning formation.

6. Space of Possibility and Quantum Theory (Analogy and Limit)

6.1 Occasion and Function of the Analogy

The introduction of the space of possibility as a central space of thought and interpretation raises the question of how this concept can be further clarified theoretically without being misunderstood ontologically. In this context, quantum mechanics offers an illuminating analogy. It provides a physical model in which reality does not appear as a fixed given but as the result of processes of selection within a field of possible states.

The aim of this chapter is not to explain mental or spiritual phenomena physically or to identify them ontologically with quantum-mechanical processes. Rather, quantum theory serves here as a **heuristic comparative model** for making structural similarities between physical possibility and thinking in terms of possibility visible. The analogy thus has a clarifying, not a justificatory, function.

6.2 The Physical Space of Possibility in Quantum Mechanics

In quantum mechanics, the state of a system prior to measurement is not described as unambiguously determined but by a wave function representing a superposition of possible states. These states do not simultaneously exist in the sense of classical reality but as a probability distribution of potential outcomes.

Only through an interaction, such as a measurement, is a concrete state actualized. The so-called collapse of the wave function does not describe a physical process in the classical sense but the transition from a multiplicity of possible states to a determinate, observable result.

Reality in quantum mechanics is thus not understood as something statically given but as processually brought forth. Possibilities precede actuality without themselves already being actual reality.

6.3 Structural Correspondences with the Conceptual Space of Possibility

A structural correspondence can be found in human thought. Here, too, prior to a decision, action, or interpretation, there is no unambiguously determined state but a field of possible options. Ideas, hypotheses, interpretations, and designs for action coexist within the space of possibility without already being realized.

Only through selection, decision, or experience is one of these possibilities actualized. As in quantum mechanics, this transition is not purely deterministic. Emotional weightings, situational factors, and biographical influences play a role alongside rational deliberation.

The space of possibility of thought can therefore be described as a field of potential options of meaning and action from which concrete constituted reality emerges through selective processes. This is understood as personal or social constituted reality, not as ontological reality in itself.

6.4 Potentiality and Actuality

The structure described here can already be found in the Aristotelian distinction between potentiality and actuality. Possibilities do not exist merely as empty abstractions but, in Aristotle, as real potentials that can be actualized under certain conditions.

Within the space of possibility of thought, such imaginary potentials are always present. They form the background against which decisions acquire meaning. A decision is meaningful only because it is made against alternative possibilities that remain unselected. Actuality acquires its meaning only within the horizon of what has not been actualized.

This structure makes clear that the space of possibility must not be misunderstood as a reservoir of equivalent options. Possibilities differ in their proximity to actualization, their connectivity, and their emotional plausibility.

6.5 Limitation through Conditions and Frameworks

Both the physical and the conceptual space of possibility are subject to clear limitations. In quantum mechanics, the set of possible states is restricted by physical laws. Not every theoretically conceivable state is realizable.

Analogously, the human space of possibility is limited by thought, emotional dispositions, social norms, and cultural patterns. Although many options can be conceived, only some of them are practically connectable or accessible to experience.

This limitation is constitutive of meaning. A completely unlimited space of possibility would provide no orientation. Only through restriction does selection become possible, and only through selection does action arise.

6.6 No Ontologization of the Analogy

It is crucial to mark clearly the limit of the analogy. The conceptual space of possibility is not a physical space, and processes of thought do not follow the laws of quantum mechanics. The analogy serves exclusively as a means of structural illustration.

A category mistake would arise wherever ontological identifications were derived from formal similarity—for example, by interpreting consciousness as a quantum-mechanical phenomenon or spirituality as physical energy. Such interpretations exceed the heuristic framework of the analogy and lead to metaphysical short circuits.

The space of possibility remains an epistemological and cultural-philosophical concept. Its reality is functional, not physical.

6.7 Significance for Spirituality and Meaning Formation

The analogy with quantum mechanics nevertheless clarifies a central point: constituted reality does not arise through mere presence but through selection, interaction, and actualization. This thought is of particular significance for the understanding of spirituality.

Spiritual interpretations operate within the space of possibility by foregrounding particular options of meaning and excluding others. Rituals, symbols, and narratives function as mechanisms of selection through which particular possibilities become real for the individual. This reality is not objective transcendence but an existential constituted reality that shapes thought, feeling, and action.

6.8 State of the Argument

The analogy between the space of possibility and quantum theory makes clear that both physical and mental constituted reality arise processually. Possibilities precede actuality and are concretized through selective processes.

At the same time, the clear delimitation of the analogy shows that the space of possibility is not an ontological domain but a functional space of thought and interpretation. Its strength lies not in metaphysical depth but in its explanatory power for meaning formation, decision, and spiritual orientation.

With this clarification, it becomes possible in the next step to show how spirituality can be understood as a deliberate practice within this space of possibility—not as an exceptional phenomenon but as a paradigmatic case of human meaning constitution.

7. Thinking and Feeling as Embodied Spirituality

7.1 An Expanded Concept of Spirituality

In the preceding argument, spirituality was determined as a practice within the space of possibility that generates meaning, enables orientation, and structures the capacity for action. This determination makes it possible not to restrict spirituality to extraordinary experiences, religious rituals, or explicitly transcendent conceptions. Rather, it opens up an expanded concept of spirituality in which even everyday processes of thinking and feeling can be understood as spiritual.

This expansion is not intended as a conceptual dilution but as a systematic consequence of the preceding analysis. If spirituality is conceived as a mode of meaning formation within the inner perspective, then those processes through which meaning first arises must also be taken into account. Thinking and feeling are, in this context, not merely preliminary stages of spiritual experience but its elementary forms of enactment.

7.2 Thinking as an Embodied Enactment of Meaning

In many philosophical traditions, thinking appears as an abstract activity detached from the body. Against this conception, however, both phenomenological and neuroscientific perspectives suggest that thinking is always bound to bodily processes: to neural activity, sensory feedback, affective states, and bodily rhythms.

As a process of meaning formation, thinking operates within the space of possibility. It develops hypotheses, compares options, forms abstract unities, and establishes relations. These operations, however, are not value-neutral. They are always already directed, weighted, and selective. Thinking is therefore not merely a pure product of the intellect but existentially embedded.

In this sense, thinking can be understood as a spiritual practice insofar as it structures one's view of the world, opens or closes horizons, and thereby shapes one's relation to world and self. Reflection, self-questioning, or philosophical contemplation are not merely intellectual activities but practices of working upon meaning that intervene deeply in personal conduct of life.

7.3 Feeling as Primary Orientation of Meaning

Whereas thinking structures possibilities, feelings assume a central orienting function. Feelings evaluate, prioritize, and condense experience. They lend weight and significance to impressions and decisively determine which contents within the space of possibility appear relevant. In this sense, they function not merely as accompanying states of thought but as effective instances of meaning selection.

Feelings are not merely accompanying phenomena but embodied indicators of meaning. They point toward specific dimensions of significance within experience: fear toward threat, hope toward the future, guilt toward norm violation, trust toward relationship. In all these cases, feelings structure the space of possibility by foregrounding certain options and pushing others into the background.

Feelings are inseparably connected with emotional experiences. They do not arise independently but within the enactment of concrete situations, memories, and bodily resonances. As emotion-bound indicators of meaning, they reflect lived experience while simultaneously transforming it into orientation. Their evaluative force is therefore neither purely individual nor arbitrary but embedded in experience-based nexuses of meaning.

Feelings are thus an integral component of spiritual experience. They connect abstract designs of meaning with bodily resonance and render them existentially significant. A spiritual interpretation acquires its efficacy not through argumentative conviction alone but through emotional coherence that proves viable and orienting in experience.

7.4 The Unity of Thinking, Feeling, and the Body

Against this background, the separation of thinking and feeling proves to be an analytical abstraction rather than a real given. Both are expressions of bodily processes and together form the basis of human disclosure of world and self.

The body functions here not as a mere bearer of mental processes but as the medium through which world first becomes experienceable at all. Following Merleau-Ponty, perception, thinking, and feeling can be understood as different modes of one and the same embodied relation to the world.

In this understanding, spirituality appears not as a transcendence of embodiment but as its deepened interpretation. Spiritual practices such as meditation, mindfulness, or prayer make this unity explicit by directing attention toward bodily sensations, breathing, or emotional states and thereby reorganizing nexuses of meaning.

7.5 Delimitation from Metaphysical Concepts of Spirituality

The conception represented here differs clearly from concepts that understand spirituality as access to a transindividual or transcendent instance. Spirituality is not interpreted as contact with an objective spiritual reality but as a form of individual work upon meaning within the bodily experienced world.

This position is close to Ernst Cassirer's understanding of the spiritual as an expression of human disclosure of world. Whereas Cassirer describes the human being as an *animal symbolicum* that structures its world through symbolic forms, the present approach supplements this perspective by explicitly emphasizing embodiment. Meaning arises not only symbolically but is always also bodily mediated.

Spirituality is thus not an additional metaphysical dimension but a way in which symbolic, emotional, and bodily processes are integrated into a coherent understanding of self and world.

7.6 The Everyday Character of Spiritual Experience

Embedding spirituality in thinking and feeling emphasizes its everyday character. Spiritual experience is not an exceptional state but a continuous dimension of human existence. It manifests itself in dealing with uncertainty, in the search for meaning, in the evaluation of life events, and in orientation toward values.

Scientific thought, ethical reflection, and aesthetic experience can also be understood within this broad concept of spirituality insofar as they go beyond what is immediately purposive and raise questions concerning meaning, connection, and orientation.

Spirituality thereby loses its special status without losing its depth. It becomes visible as a fundamental dimension of human meaning formation.

7.7 State of the Argument

Thinking and feeling are embodied processes of meaning constitution and form the elementary modes of enactment of spiritual experience. They structure the space of possibility, evaluate options, and lend existential significance to abstract designs.

Spirituality thus appears neither as the opposite of rationality nor as a metaphysical exception but as an integral component of human world-understanding. This insight prepares the ground for the further analysis of symbolic and narrative forms of expression in which this embodied spirituality becomes culturally stabilized.

8. Spirituality and Mythologization: Narrative Stabilization of Meaning

8.1 The Need for Expression in Spiritual Experience

Spirituality, understood as an embodied practice of meaning formation, is initially an individual experience. It takes place within the inner perspective and is bound to personal perceptions, emotions, and interpretations. This immediately raises the question of how such experiences can become communicable and stabilized beyond the individual level.

Individual experiences are fleeting, situational, and perspectival. Without forms of expression, they would remain within personal experience and could neither be reflected upon nor passed on. Spiritual experience therefore depends upon symbolic and narrative mediation. Only through language, images, rituals, or narratives can it assume a form that enables repetition, remembrance, and communication.

This necessity of expression points toward a fundamental connection between spirituality and mythologization. Mythologization here does not designate a relapse into prescientific thought but a cultural process of stabilizing meaning.

8.2 Myth as an Achievement of Structuring

Myths are not mere fictions or irrational narratives but fundamental forms of human meaning formation. They fulfill a specific function within individual systems of meaning by ordering and condensing experience narratively and integrating it into coherent nexuses. In this sense, the individual myth is the primary locus of mythological meaning constitution: it arises wherever biographical experiences are narratively linked and brought into a meaning-bearing Gestalt.

Mythical narratives therefore do not primarily answer empirical questions but existential ones: questions concerning origin, meaning, order, and orientation. Myth functions as a narrative form of the space of possibility in which experiences are interpreted not as mere events but as significant stages within a larger nexus. It operates with symbolic figures, actions, and orders that function not as factual assertions but as offers of interpretation.

Collectively transmitted myths do not constitute superordinate instances of meaning within this process but cultural spaces of resonance upon which individual meaning formation can draw. They provide narrative patterns, motifs, and symbolisms that can be appropriated, varied, and transformed within the enactment of personal experience. In this way, mythological structure makes it possible to transform individual experiences—such as suffering, loss, guilt, or hope—into a form that bears meaning beyond the individual event without losing its biographical anchoring.

8.3 From Individual Experience to Collective Form of Meaning

The transition from individual spirituality to a collective form of meaning does not occur automatically but through processes of cultural selection and stabilization. Not every individual experience becomes mythically effective. Only where experiences are repeatedly shared,

symbolically condensed, and narratively embedded do collective patterns of interpretation emerge.

Myths fulfill a double function here. On the one hand, they relieve the individual by placing personal experiences within a larger nexus. On the other hand, they have a normative effect by providing orientations and structuring expectations. In this way, they connect individual inner perspectives with social systems of order.

Mythologization is therefore not the opposite of individuality but its cultural extension. It makes individual work upon meaning connectable and enduring.

8.4 Myth, Symbol, and Ritual

Mythical narratives develop their efficacy not through narration alone but through their connection with symbols and rituals. Symbols condense complex meanings into perceptible forms, while rituals render these meanings bodily experienceable.

Rituals translate narrative structures of meaning into repeatable actions. They anchor abstract meanings in the body and stabilize them through repetition. In this way, they connect directly with the embodiment of spiritual experience elaborated in the preceding chapters.

Myth, symbol, and ritual together form a coherent configuration that not only interprets spirituality but makes it practically effective. They transform individual experiences into culturally shared forms of meaning.

8.5 Mythologization and the Status of Reality

A central misunderstanding in dealing with myths consists in assessing their status of reality ontologically. Myths are understood either as literally true or as mere fiction. Both perspectives fail to grasp their function.

Within the framework of this study, myth is understood functionally. Its efficacy does not lie in asserting objective facts but in its capacity to generate meaning, provide orientation, and structure action. A myth is significant not because it “really happened,” but because it is effective within a system of meaning.

This also explains why mythical figures or narratives can possess real significance for believers without requiring their ontological existence to be presupposed.

The status of reality of myth is existential, not ontological.

8.6 Mythologization between Openness and Stabilization

Mythologization moves within a field of tension between openness and fixation. On the one hand, myth permits diverse interpretations and actualizations. Myths can connect with different situations and experiences. On the other hand, they tend toward consolidation when they become institutionally stabilized.

This consolidation can be productive insofar as it enables orientation and continuity. It can, however, also become problematic when myths are dogmatized and closed off against alternative interpretations. In that case, myth loses its function as an open space of possibility and becomes a normative structure of constraint.

A reflective spirituality is therefore characterized by recognizing the mythical character of its forms of meaning and keeping them open. **Myth remains interpretation, not description.**

8.7 Mythologization beyond Religious Contexts

Mythologization is not an exclusively religious phenomenon. Narrative structures of meaning that function mythically can also be found in secular contexts. National founding narratives, narratives of progress, or guiding scientific metaphors perform comparable functions of meaning formation and orientation by ordering and condensing complex experiences and embedding them within overarching nexuses of meaning.

It thereby becomes clear that mythologization is a fundamental cultural practice that occurs wherever experiences must be stabilized, made memorable, and rendered communicable. It makes it possible to structure contingency and gain orientation within open horizons of meaning. Against this background, spirituality is not a singular or isolated practice but a particular form of mythologization distinguished by its explicit orientation toward existential questions of meaning.

For the individual sphere, this means that mythologization does not begin only at the level of collective traditions but is already operative in the enactment of biographical meaning formation. Wherever individual experiences are remembered, interpreted, and narratively connected, narrative orders arise that structure the personal space of possibility. Spirituality appears in this context as a reflective practice in which individuals consciously appropriate, examine, and shape their own mythological nexus.

8.8 State of the Argument

Spirituality depends upon mythologization in order to transform individual experiences into enduring, shareable forms of meaning. Myths function as narrative structures of the space of possibility that order experience, provide orientation, and establish cultural connectivity.

Mythologization does not thereby signify a departure from rationality but a specific form of stabilizing meaning. Its efficacy lies not in ontological truth but in existential significance. With this insight, the relation among spirituality, religion, and the inner perspective can be systematically clarified in the following chapter.

9. Spirituality, Religion, and the Inner Perspective

9.1 Need for Clarification: Spirituality and Religion

In public as well as scholarly discourse, the concepts of spirituality and religion are frequently used imprecisely, overlap, or are treated synonymously. At the same time, there is an opposite tendency to separate them strictly, characterizing spirituality as individual, open, and authentic, while religion is described as institutional, dogmatic, and normative. Both simplifications are regarded as analytically inadequate.

Against the background of the preceding argument, a precise conceptual clarification is therefore required. The aim of this chapter is not to treat spirituality and religion as competing phenomena but as different forms of meaning formation within the inner perspective. Both operate within the space of possibility but differ in their forms of stabilization, institutionalization, and normative bindingness.

9.2 Spirituality as an Individual Practice of Meaning

Spirituality has been defined in this study as an embodied practice of meaning formation operating within the inner perspective. It draws upon abstract, symbolic, and emotional resources in order to interpret experiences, gain orientation, and secure the capacity for action. Spirituality is primarily individual in character. It arises from personal experience, emotional resonance, and personal interpretation.

This individuality does not, however, imply arbitrariness. Like all designs of meaning, spiritual interpretations are subject to functional criteria. They must be experienceable, emotionally plausible, and connectable with practical life. Spirituality thus remains bound to the space of possibility of the respective individual and changes with that individual's experiences, life situations, and processes of reflection.

Characteristic of spirituality is its openness. **Spirituality remains in principle mutable, situational, and perspectival.** Its authority lies in the experienced coherence within the inner perspective.

9.3 Religion as an Institutionalized Order of Meaning

Against this background, religion can be understood as an institutionally stabilized form of spiritual meaning formation. It takes up individual spiritual experiences, condenses them symbolically, narratively, and normatively, and transforms them into enduringly binding orders. Religious traditions provide structured systems of interpretation, rituals, ethical norms, and collective narratives that frame and orient individual inner perspectives.

Religion reduces complexity by privileging certain interpretations and excluding others. This reduction is functionally necessary in order to ensure collective stability. It enables reliability, repeatability, and social coordination. At the same time, it entails a loss of openness.

In contrast to individual spirituality, religion is more strongly oriented toward intersubjectivity, permanence, and bindingness. It transforms the open space of possibility into a normatively structured space of interpretation.

9.4 Inner Perspective and Religious Authority

Religious systems, too, operate within the inner perspective. Religious contents are not experienced immediately but interpreted, construed, and emotionally appropriated. Rituals, texts, and symbols develop their efficacy only where they generate meaning within the personal inner perspective.

Religious authority therefore does not exist independently of the individual but becomes effective within the inner perspective. Dogmas, commandments, or articles of faith structure the individual system of meaning only insofar as they are experienced as plausible, significant, or binding. Religious certainty, too, is ultimately a form of individual attribution of validity, even when it is collectively supported.

This insight relativizes the claim to absolute religious truth without denying the existential significance of religious systems. Religion operates not through ontological certainty but through interpretive and emotional stabilization.

9.5 Transitions and Hybrid Forms

There is no sharp break between spirituality and religion but rather a continuum. Individual spiritual experiences can be integrated into religious systems, while religious practices can be individually spiritualized. Many contemporary forms of lived religion move within hybrid constellations in which institutional prescriptions are selectively appropriated, reinterpreted, or supplemented.

This hybridization points to the central role of the inner perspective as a mediating instance. It determines which religious contents are adopted, transformed, or rejected. Religion therefore does not exist independently of individual meaning-practice but only in its enactment.

9.6 Potential Conflicts and Boundary Questions

Tensions between spirituality and religion arise where institutional fixations restrict the open space of possibility of individual meaning formation. Dogmatization, claims to exclusivity, or normative constrictions can delegitimize or suppress spiritual experience.

Conversely, radically individualized spirituality can lapse into arbitrariness when it becomes completely detached from intersubjective understanding and social embeddedness. Religion and spirituality therefore stand in a reciprocal relation of tension that can have either productive or destructive effects.

A reflective perspective recognizes this tension as structurally necessary. It should avoid both the absolutization of religious systems and the idealization of individual spirituality.

9.7 State of the Argument

Spirituality and religion are not opposing phenomena but different forms of meaning formation within the inner perspective. Spirituality is open, individual, and situational; religion is stabilized, collective, and normative. Both operate within the space of possibility and differ primarily in the manner of their limitation and institutionalization.

The inner perspective forms the common ground upon which both spiritual and religious forms of meaning become effective. With this clarification, the way is prepared for examining more closely, in the following chapter, the role of belief, emotion, and intuition as forms of validity within spiritual and religious systems of interpretation.

10. Belief, Emotion, and Intuition as Forms of Personal Confirmation

10.1 The Problem of Validity within the Space of Possibility

The preceding chapters have shown that human world-understanding operates within a space of possibility in which different designs of meaning coexist. This openness raises a fundamental question: According to what criteria do certain interpretations acquire validity while others are rejected or marginalized?

Since objective, perspective-independent criteria of truth are not available, the question of validity shifts from the level of ontological truth to that of individual and intersubjective validity. Within this context, belief, emotion, and intuition play a central role. They function as mechanisms through which abstract designs of meaning are experienced within the inner perspective as plausible, binding, or action-guiding.

10.2 Belief as Action-Guiding Plausibility

Belief is frequently understood as the opposite of knowledge. Such a dichotomy, however, falls short. In the understanding represented here, belief does not designate a deficient form of knowledge but a specific mode of attributing validity. What is believed is not what is regarded as uncertain, but what is experienced as sufficiently plausible to enable action, trust, and orientation.

Belief is therefore not a statement concerning the ontological status of a content but concerning its personal reliability. A believed design of meaning need not be objectively true in order to become effective. What matters is that it is experienced as viable within the inner perspective.

This form of belief is found not only in religious contexts but equally in everyday life, ethical convictions, and expectations concerning the future. Trust in persons, institutions, or life plans always rests upon belief-like assumptions of plausibility.

10.3 Emotion as an Instance of Evaluation and Weighting

Emotions play a central role in the confirmation of designs of meaning. They function as evaluative instances indicating which contents within the space of possibility appear significant, threatening, hopeful, or desirable. Emotions lend weight and urgency to abstract constructions.

Emotional resonance is often the decisive factor in whether a design of meaning is adopted. A concept that is logically consistent but produces no emotional coherence remains ineffective. Conversely, emotionally highly charged interpretations can exert considerable efficacy even where their rational justification is weak.

Emotions are not irrational disruptive factors but embodied mechanisms of orientation. They integrate experiences, expectations, and evaluations and thereby structure processes of selection within the space of possibility.

10.4 Intuition as Condensed Experience

Intuition designates a form of immediate insight that is not derived discursively but is experienced as "coherent" or "evident." It is not the opposite of rationality but the result of condensed experience. Intuitive judgments draw upon implicit knowledge nourished by previous experiences, cultural patterns, and emotional evaluations.

Within spiritual and religious meaning formation, intuition frequently functions as an initial instance of validation. It determines whether a design is reflected upon further at all or rejected. Intuition operates rapidly, selectively, and context-sensitively and thereby reduces the complexity of the space of possibility.

Its validity is nevertheless limited. Intuition can mislead, particularly where it is distorted by fear, wishful thinking, or cultural predispositions. Its strength therefore lies not in infallibility but in its function as a heuristic instrument of preselection.

10.5 The Interplay of Belief, Emotion, and Intuition

Belief, emotion, and intuition do not operate in isolation but in close interaction. Intuition opens possibilities, emotions evaluate them, and belief stabilizes them as action-guiding. This process is circular: stabilized trust reinforces emotional resonance, while emotional confirmation deepens belief.

This interplay explains why spiritual, political, or religious convictions can develop a high degree of stability even when they are open to rational criticism. Their validity rests not primarily upon argumentative justification but upon their integration into an emotionally and bodily supported system of meaning.

At the same time, this explains why such convictions are not arbitrarily interchangeable. They are embedded in personal life history and fulfill concrete functions of orientation.

10.6 Validation without Ontologization

A central advantage of this approach lies in its ability to explain validity without making ontological assumptions. Belief, emotion, and intuition do not establish objective truth but personal plausibility. They render designs of meaning effective without determining their metaphysical status.

This makes it possible to take spiritual and religious convictions seriously without having to interpret them as factual claims. Their efficacy lies in their function within the inner perspective, not in their claim to objective reality.

10.7 State of the Argument

Belief, emotion, and intuition are central mechanisms of personal confirmation within the space of possibility. They determine which designs of meaning become plausible, significant, and action-guiding for the individual. Their validity is functional, not ontological.

This insight forms the basis for the concluding chapter, in which it will be shown how unities, relations, and emotions interact to generate stable personal constituted realities and to provide a practical foundation for world-understanding.

11. Unities, Relations, and Emotions: Synthesis of the Constitution of Meaning

11.1 Aim of the Chapter

The preceding chapters have shown step by step that human world-understanding is not based upon immediate givenness but upon interpretation, abstraction, and selective meaning formation within the inner perspective. In this process, unities, relations, the space of possibility, embodiment, spirituality, myth, as well as belief, emotion, and intuition have been elaborated as central elements of this process.

11.2 Unities as Stabilizations of Understanding

Unities form the fundamental points of orientation of human understanding. They make it possible to bundle the multiplicity of impressions and render them recognizable. Without unities, perception would be fragmented, experience fleeting, and thought without orientation.

These unities are not representations of reality but results of abstractive operations. They arise from selective attention, linguistic designation, and cultural formation. Their function is not to represent constituted reality but to make it manageable.

Unities are therefore always provisional. They can be expanded, reinterpreted, or replaced when new experiences require this. Their stability is functional, not ontological.

11.3 Relations as Bearers of Meaning

Whereas unities generate stability, relations generate meaning. Meaning arises not from isolated concepts or experiences but from their relations to one another. Unities acquire their meaning through comparison, differentiation, contextual embedding, and narrative connection.

Relational structures make it possible to situate experiences within larger nexuses. They create coherence and continuity and form the basis of narrative identity. Without relations, unities would remain meaningless.

Relations are dynamic. They change with new experiences, shifts in perspective, or altered emotional evaluations. Systems of meaning are therefore not statically but processually organized.

11.4 Emotions as Instances of Selection and Weighting

Within this configuration, emotions assume a central selective function. They evaluate unities and relations and determine which contents within the space of possibility appear relevant. Emotions lend urgency, depth, and existential significance to designs of meaning.

Emotional resonance is frequently the decisive factor in the stabilization of personal constituted reality. A design of meaning that is emotionally sustaining is remembered, defended, and further developed. An emotionally empty concept remains abstract and ineffective.

Emotions are not irrational but embodied mechanisms of orientation. They integrate experience, evaluation, and tendencies toward action and thereby function as a bridge between thought and practice.

11.5 The Constitution of Personal Constituted Reality

From the interplay of unities, relations, and emotions arises what has been designated in this study as personal constituted reality. This constituted reality is not objective reality but a functional order within which the individual acts, decides, and experiences meaning. It is not reality in itself but constitutes itself within individual experience as what is given.

Personal constituted reality is sufficiently stable to provide orientation and sufficiently flexible to respond to new experiences. It does not arise once and for all but is continually reproduced and adapted. Experiences irritate existing structures, while existing structures interpret experiences.

This circularity is the fundamental form of human world-understanding.

11.6 Spirituality as a Paradigmatic Case

In light of this synthesis, spirituality proves not to be an exceptional case but a paradigmatic manifestation of human meaning constitution. It makes visible what is operative in all forms of world-understanding: abstraction, emotional evaluation, narrative embedding, and embodied resonance.

Spiritual designs of meaning operate within the space of possibility, stabilize themselves through emotional resonance, and are culturally anchored through symbols, rituals, and narratives. Their efficacy lies not in ontological truth but in their capacity to structure personal constituted reality.

This makes it understandable why spirituality can be both individually effective and culturally powerful without presupposing metaphysical assumptions.

11.7 Limits and Openness of Understanding

The conception developed here simultaneously makes visible the limits of human understanding. Since meaning is always systemically, perspectivally, and emotionally mediated, complete knowledge remains unattainable in principle.

World never appears in its intrinsic nature
but always in the form of personal constituted reality.

This limit is the condition of meaning. It keeps the space of possibility open, enables shifts of perspective, and protects systems of meaning from dogmatic hardening. Understanding therefore remains an open, reflexive process.

12. Outlook: Inner Perspective, Space of Possibility, and Human Orientation

12.1 Conclusion and Review of the Central Argument

Unities structure experience,
relations generate meaning,
emotions confer weight.

Only their interplay constitutes personal constituted reality and makes world intelligible.

Within this framework, spirituality appears not as a metaphysical special domain but as a particularly condensed form of human work upon meaning within the inner perspective.

With this synthesis, the argumentative arc of the study closes. The inner perspective proves to be an indispensable condition of world-understanding, the space of possibility a central space of thought and interpretation, and spirituality a functionally effective practice of meaning formation integrating thought, feeling, and action.

The point of departure of this study was the insight that human world-understanding is not based upon immediate givenness but upon interpretation, abstraction, and the attribution of meaning. The analysis has shown that every experience, every act of thought, and every form of orientation takes place within an inner perspective that structures and limits the horizon of understanding.

On this basis, the concept of the space of possibility was introduced to describe the domain in which abstract designs, symbolic constructions, and potential options of meaning coexist. The space of possibility proved not to be an ontological space but a functional space of thought and interpretation limited by experience, emotional resonance, and practical validation.

In the further course of the study, spirituality was shown to assume a paradigmatic role within this space of possibility. It is neither a metaphysical special world nor an irrational residue but an embodied, symbolic, and culturally embedded practice of meaning formation in which thought, feeling, and action are integrated.

12.2 Theoretical Contribution of the Study

The central theoretical contribution of this study lies in the systematic integration of epistemology, constructivism, systems theory, and phenomenological approaches into a coherent model of human world-understanding. The inner perspective has been determined not as a personal space of withdrawal but as a necessary condition of every constitution of meaning.

With the space of possibility, a conceptual instrument has been developed that makes it possible to analyze abstraction, creativity, spirituality, and normative orientation within a common theoretical framework without ontologically elevating or psychologically reducing them. Spirituality appears within this model not as an exception but as a particularly condensed expression of general processes of meaning formation.

Particularly noteworthy is the functional determination of validity. Ontological claims to truth are replaced by criteria such as connectivity, emotional plausibility, and practical confirmation. This makes it possible to take spiritual and religious forms of meaning seriously without metaphysically absolutizing them.

12.3 Limits of the Approach

The perspective developed here deliberately refrains from making statements about the ontological constitution of reality. It makes no claim to decide whether transcendent realities exist or not. This restraint is a methodological decision. The study consistently operates at the level of world-understanding, not at the level of ultimate metaphysical justification.

At the same time, it must be acknowledged that the functional approach to meaning formation cannot fully capture all dimensions of religious or spiritual experience. Ecstatic or radically transformative experiences in particular partly elude systematic description. The present approach can explain their efficacy but cannot fully encompass their individual depth.

It also remains open to what extent individual systems of meaning can be stabilized over the long term without tipping into dogmatic constriction or arbitrariness. This tension is structurally inherent and cannot be definitively resolved.

12.4 Implications for the Understanding of Spirituality

The results of this study suggest that spirituality should in future be treated less as an object of ontological debate and analyzed more strongly as a practice of orientation, self-interpretation, and meaning formation. Spirituality thereby becomes connectable with psychology, cultural studies, pedagogy, and ethics without losing its existential seriousness.

Particularly in pluralistic societies, this approach opens the possibility of considering different spiritual and religious forms of meaning comparatively without arranging them hierarchically. Their significance is measured not by their truth claims but by their capacity to make human life intelligible and livable.

12.5 Concluding Remark

This study understands itself as a contribution to an open, reflexive understanding of human world-understanding. It argues neither for metaphysical certainty nor for relativistic arbitrariness, but for an attitude that takes seriously the conditions, limits, and possibilities of meaning.

The inner perspective appears here not as an obstacle but as a condition of possibility. Precisely because human beings do not know the world immediately but disclose it through interpretation, meaning remains open, negotiable, and alive.

Spirituality, in this sense, is not a retreat from the world
but a way of finding orientation within it.

Mosaic Piece: World Constitution through Unity Formation

General Outline:[7]



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1. World Constitution through Unity Formation

(A Systems-Theoretical Analysis of Reality, Constituted Reality, and Meaning Production)

1.1 Statement of the Problem

The question concerning the relation among constituted reality, logic, and knowledge belongs to the fundamental problems of philosophy. Yet it arises not merely as a question concerning the content of world, but above all as a question concerning the conditions under which world can appear as world in the first place.

Philosophical positions have answered this question in different ways. Whereas some approaches assume that the world possesses a structure independent of thought that can be known, others emphasize that this structure is first brought forth in the process of knowing. Still others understand constituted reality as a necessarily determined unity that is neither constructed nor perspectivally relativized.

These differences concern not merely competing theories about the same object. Rather, they concern the presuppositions of what can count as an object at all. The problem thereby shifts:

> **the primary question is no longer how the world is,**
> **but how world as ordered constituted reality is possible.**

This shift leads to a fundamental tension. On the one hand, the assumption of a reality independent of thought appears necessary in order to secure objectivity. On the other hand, it becomes apparent that every form of access to world is bound to conditions determining what can appear as constituted reality at all.

Philosophy therefore confronts a twofold problem: it must explain how constituted reality appears as ordered without simply presupposing this order and, at the same time, clarify the relation in which this appearance stands to a possibly independent reality.

1.2 Aim of the Study

Against this background, the present study aims to treat different philosophical models not as competing descriptions of one uniform world but to reconstruct them as independent forms of world constitution.

The positions of Kant, Nietzsche, Einstein, and Spinoza occupy the center of the investigation. They are examined not primarily with regard to their claims to truth but as theoretical systems that each bring forth their own forms of constituted reality.

The guiding assumption is that these positions do not provide different answers to the same question but represent different ways of generating world in the first place. They differ in which distinctions they employ, how they stabilize unities, and what role they assign to difference.

The aim of the study is to transfer these models into a common theoretical framework that makes their structural commonalities and differences visible without reducing them to a unified ontology.

1.3 Guiding Thesis

The central thesis of the study is:

Constituted reality appears as ordered because it is apprehended in unities that are generated and stabilized through distinctions.

This thesis implies a fundamental shift in the concept of world. Order is not to be understood as a property of an independently given world but as the result of processes in which differences are selectively fixed.

Accordingly, unities are not ontologically presupposed but arise in the enactment of operations that structure constituted reality. What appears as world is inseparably connected with the forms in which it is distinguished and stabilized.

This perspective makes it possible to redefine the difference between reality and constituted reality. Reality designates the conception of a world independent of thought, whereas constituted reality is the form in which this world appears within processes of meaning production.

1.4 Methodological Approach

The investigation follows a reconstructive and systems-theoretically oriented approach. Philosophical positions are not evaluated primarily with regard to their truth but analyzed as systems that operate through specific distinctions and thereby bring forth their own forms of world.

Systems theory serves here as a metaperspective that makes it possible to compare different models of world constitution. It understands constituted reality not as a representation of a pregiven reality but as the result of system-internal operations.

This perspective makes it possible to reconstruct central concepts such as truth, identity, and knowledge not as presupposed categories but as results of processes of meaning production.

Methodologically, the investigation proceeds in three steps:

1. Reconstruction of classical models (Kant, Nietzsche, Einstein, Spinoza)
2. Transformation of these models into a systems-theoretical perspective
3. Development of an independent theory of unity formation

This procedure makes it possible to grasp the diversity of philosophical positions systematically while at the same time developing an independent theoretical position.

1.5 Structure of the Study

The study is divided into five parts.

The first part develops the conceptual foundations of the investigation and introduces the central distinctions, particularly those between reality and constituted reality, understanding and problem, and unity and difference.

The second part analyzes the positions of Kant, Nietzsche, Einstein, and Spinoza as different models of world constitution.

The third part reconstructs these models from a systems-theoretical perspective and develops a theory of meaning production.

The fourth part formulates the central thesis of unity formation and differentiates between static and dynamic forms of world constitution.

The fifth part critically engages with New Realism and determines its scope within the context of the previously developed theory.

The sixth part brings together the results and reflects upon their consequences for the understanding of constituted reality, knowledge, and order.

2. Reality and Constituted Reality

(Distinction between an Independently Conceived World and the Experienced World)

The question concerning the relation between reality and constituted reality forms a central point of departure for the present investigation. It concerns not only the ontological determination of what exists but, above all, the conditions under which world can appear as world in the first place. The distinction between reality and constituted reality serves not merely as a conceptual differentiation but functions as a fundamental structure by means of which different philosophical models can be systematically ordered.

In what follows, this distinction is not presupposed as an already clarified philosophical position but introduced as an analytical instrument that makes it possible to differentiate and compare different forms of relation to world.

2.1 Reality as an Ontological Assumption

(The Idea of Thought of a World Independent)

Within the framework of this study, reality is understood as the assumption of a world that exists independently of every observer, every act of knowing, and every form of description. Reality in this sense designates that which is, independently of whether and how it is known. It functions as a limiting concept marking the possibility of an existence independent of thought.

This conception of reality is implicitly or explicitly present in many philosophical traditions. It underlies, in particular, those approaches that assume that knowledge is directed toward an already structured world whose properties exist independently of the conditions of its perception. Reality appears in this context as something that can be discovered, described, or represented.

At the same time, this form of reality remains problematic in principle. For every statement about reality necessarily occurs within a particular epistemic framework and is therefore already shaped by the conditions under which it is made. Reality can consequently be thought, but it eludes immediate accessibility. It remains a concept designating the idea of a being independent of thought without itself being determinable independently of thought.

Reality thereby acquires the status of a regulative concept: it marks a limit toward which knowledge can orient itself without ever being able to exhaust it completely.

2.2 Constituted Reality as a Nexus of Appearance and Construction

(World as the Result of Experience, Interpretation, and Operation)

In contrast to reality, constituted reality designates that which appears within processes of experience, knowledge, and meaning. Constituted reality is not that which exists independently of thought but that which becomes accessible in the enactment of perception, interpretation, and theoretical construction.

Constituted reality is therefore always bound to the conditions of its production. It arises in the interplay of distinctions through which something is determined as something. Without such distinctions, there would be no objects, no properties, and no relations. Constituted reality is

therefore not simply given but is generated to the extent that systems structure their environment.

This perspective implies a fundamental shift: world is no longer understood as a prior structure that is known, but as the result of processes in which order is produced. What appears as constituted reality is the result of selective operations through which certain forms are stabilized and others excluded.

Constituted reality therefore possesses no fixed ontological core. It is neither wholly arbitrary nor independently given but arises within a field of possibilities that is actualized through operative processes. It is what appears as world in the enactment of observation, interpretation, and model formation.

2.3 Consequences of the Distinction

(Shift from Ontology to World Constitution)

The distinction between reality and constituted reality has far-reaching consequences for the understanding of world, knowledge, and truth. It shifts the focus of the investigation from the question of the world in itself to the question of the conditions of its appearance. The central issue is no longer what exists but how what exists can appear as something determinate.

At the same time, it becomes clear that different philosophical positions do not merely provide different descriptions of the same world but generate different forms of constituted reality. Depending upon which distinctions are taken as fundamental, different world-models arise, each bringing forth its own forms of order, identity, and truth.

The status of truth itself thereby changes: if constituted reality is not independently given but arises in the enactment of processes of knowing, truth can no longer be understood as correspondence with a pregiven reality but only as coherence within a particular nexus of constituted reality.

At the same time, the distinction between reality and constituted reality opens up a productive tension. Reality remains preserved as a limiting concept that maintains the conception of an independent world, while constituted reality designates the concrete form in which this world appears to us. This tension cannot be eliminated but forms the basis of every relation to world.

In the further course of the study, therefore, the question will be examined of how different philosophical models determine this relation and which forms of constituted reality they respectively bring forth. The difference between reality and constituted reality thereby functions as the guiding distinction by means of which these models are analyzed and rendered comparable.

3. Understanding and Problem

(Meaning Formation between Stabilization and Irritation)

Having introduced, with the distinction between reality and constituted reality, a fundamental framework for the analysis of world constitution, the question now arises as to how meaning emerges within constituted reality. Constituted reality appears not only as a structured world of objects and relations but also as a nexus that can be understood or can resist understanding.

The distinction between understanding and problem serves to determine this dynamic more precisely. It describes two complementary moments within processes of meaning: the stabilization of meaning on the one hand and its interruption or calling into question on the other. The two moments are not independent of one another but stand in a constitutive relation. Without understanding there would be no order; without problems there would be no movement within that order.

3.1 Understanding as Stabilization of Meaning

(Order through Unities, Concepts, and Meanings)

Within the framework of this study, understanding does not designate a unitary act but a process in which experience-based meaning formation and conceptual stabilization are related to one another. In this context, a specific dimension of understanding can be determined as stabilization of meaning.

To understand something in this sense means being able to place it within a nexus, identify it as something determinate, and relate it to other unities. Understanding here takes place as the transformation of an initially implicit nexus of meaning into an explicit, structured order.

This process rests upon the formation and stabilization of unities. Concepts, objects, properties, and relations function as forms through which the structure of meaning already operative in experience, but not yet explicitly fixed, is transformed into a discrete and manageable order. Understanding reduces complexity by selecting and emphasizing differences and transforming them into relatively stable forms.

What is decisive is that this stabilization cannot be understood as a mere representation of a pregiven order. The order that appears in understanding is not simply given but is the result of a selective and transformative process. By determining something as “this” and not as “that,” a unity arises that may appear self-evident but in fact emerges from a specific manner of distinguishing.

It must, however, be taken into account that these unities do not first arise in understanding in the narrower sense. The basis of understanding lies in experience, in which preconceptual nexuses of meaning, Gestalts, and structures of relevance have already developed. Understanding draws upon these implicit structures, stabilizes them conceptually, and makes them explicitly available.

Understanding therefore has a double structure:

Understanding is, on the one hand, an act of ordering insofar as it transforms meaning into conceptually determined unities and, on the other hand, an act of simplification

insofar as it forms selective and reduced forms from the multilayered character of experience.

In this sense, understanding is a form of stabilization that generates continuity, identity, and expectability. What is understood appears familiar, recognizable, and as part of an ordered constituted reality. This stability, however, is not absolute but bound to the conditions of its production and is therefore fundamentally open to revision.

3.2 Problem as Interruption and Difference

(Irritation as a Point of Departure for Knowledge)

A problem arises where existing forms of understanding are no longer sufficient to grasp a situation. It marks an interruption of meaning, an irritation within an otherwise stabilized nexus.

A problem is not simply a deficit of knowledge but a structural difference. It indicates that previous distinctions no longer hold, that what counted as a unity becomes unstable or can no longer be determined unambiguously.

The problem thereby opens a space of possibility. It makes visible that constituted reality is not completely fixed but could be structured differently. In this sense, the problem is not merely an obstacle but the condition of the possibility of change.

Whereas understanding aims at stability, the problem introduces movement into this stability. It interrupts routines, calls self-evident assumptions into question, and compels the drawing of new distinctions.

The problem is therefore not situated outside meaning but is a moment within meaning production itself. It belongs to the structure of constituted reality insofar as every stabilization simultaneously contains the possibility of being called into question.

3.3 Relation between Understanding and Problem

(Dynamics of Order and Disturbance)

Understanding and problem are not opposites in the sense of a simple opposition but stand in a reciprocal relation. They are two moments of the same process through which constituted reality arises and changes.

Understanding stabilizes constituted reality by extracting determinable unities from the continuum of experience and fixing their differences. In this way, an order arises in which something appears as this and not as something else. The problem counteracts this stabilization: it makes visible that such unities and distinctions are not necessarily given but represent only particular ways of ordering. It thereby destabilizes not constituted reality as such but the concrete form in which constituted reality has been fixed through understanding.

This dynamic can be described as a cyclical process: beginning from a problem, new forms of understanding are developed, which in turn generate stability. This stability, however, does not endure permanently but is itself called into question by new problems.

In this sense, constituted reality is neither completely stable nor completely unstable. It is the result of an ongoing interplay of stabilization and irritation.

This insight has far-reaching consequences for the understanding of knowledge. Knowledge no longer appears as a linear approximation to a pregiven reality but as a process in which constituted reality unfolds through the tension between understanding and problem.

At the same time, it becomes clear that every form of order is contingent. What is understood could also have been understood differently. The problem makes this contingency visible and opens the possibility of alternative forms of world constitution.

3.4 Consequences for the Further Investigation

(Understanding and Problem as an Operative Structure of World Constitution)

The distinction between understanding and problem supplements the previously introduced difference between reality and constituted reality. Whereas this difference describes the fundamental structure of the relation to world, the distinction between understanding and problem reveals the internal dynamic through which constituted reality arises and changes.

For the further investigation, this means that philosophical models will be analyzed not only according to how they determine reality and constituted reality but also according to how they deal with the tension between stabilization and irritation.

Some positions tend to privilege understanding and present constituted reality as an ordered whole. Others emphasize the role of the problem and conceive constituted reality as an open, dynamic process.

The following chapters will show that the positions of Kant, Nietzsche, Einstein, and Spinoza can also be read along this distinction. Each develops its own forms of stabilization and irritation and thereby generates different models of world.

The distinction between understanding and problem thus becomes a central analytical instrument that makes it possible to reveal the dynamics of world constitution in their full complexity.

4. Unity and Difference

Fundamental Structure of Every World Constitution

The preceding reflections have shown that constituted reality cannot be presupposed as a given structure but arises in the enactment of processes of knowledge, interpretation, and meaning. This raises the question of which fundamental operations underlie these processes.

At the center of this investigation stands the thesis:

Every form of constituted reality is based upon the formation of unities.

Something appears as something determinate only insofar as it is distinguished from something else. Unity and difference are therefore not independent categories but two inseparable moments of the same process.

The distinction between unity and difference is not merely one among many possible distinctions but the fundamental form through which anything can appear as something at all. Without difference there would be no determinacy; without unity there would be no stability. Constituted reality arises through the interplay of both.

4.1 Unity as a Form of Stabilization

(How Order Arises through Demarcation)

A unity is the result of a process in which something is determined as identical and distinguished from something else. It constitutes a form that makes it possible to recognize, name, and relate something to other things.

Unities form the fundamental building blocks of constituted reality. Whether objects, concepts, properties, or relations—all appear as unities possessing a certain degree of stability. This stability, however, is not presupposed but arises through the fixation of differences.

By determining something as a unity, one simultaneously determines what it is not. The boundary defining a unity is therefore always also a difference. Unity is not independent of difference but its specific form.

It follows that unity cannot be understood as a substantial given. It is not a property of things in themselves but the result of an operation that posits something as identical. Unity is thus an achievement: it arises in the enactment of distinctions and persists only insofar as these distinctions are maintained.

4.2 Difference as a Condition of Possibility

(Why No World Appears without Distinction)

If unity is the result of a demarcation, then difference constitutes the condition of its possibility. Difference designates the operation through which something is distinguished from something else. Without difference there would be no form, no identity, and no determinacy.

Difference is not simply a relation between already existing unities. Rather, it is the original act through which unities are first brought forth.

By drawing a difference, a form arises that separates one side from another. This separation, however, is not merely a division but a productive operation: it generates what it distinguishes.

Difference is therefore not secondary to unity but primary. **Unity is always already the result of a difference.**

This perspective implies that constituted reality does not consist of finished unities that subsequently enter into relations with one another but of processes in which unities are brought forth through differences.

4.3 World as an Effect of Distinctions

(From the Given World to Constructed Constituted Reality)

From the reciprocal dependence of unity and difference, a fundamental consequence follows:

World is not what exists independently of distinctions,
but what appears as world through distinctions.

Constituted reality is the result of operations in which differences are drawn and unities stabilized. These operations are not optional but constitutive. Without them, there would be no world in the sense of an ordered, determinate, and experienceable constituted reality.

The understanding of world thereby shifts fundamentally. World is no longer a given totality of things but an effect of processes of form formation. What appears as constituted reality is the result of selective stabilization within an open field of possibilities.

This insight does not, however, mean that constituted reality is arbitrary. The distinctions through which constituted reality arises follow particular structures and conditions. They are neither completely free nor completely determined but move within a field of tension between possibility and constraint.

In this sense, it can be said: **Constituted reality is neither simply given nor freely constructed. It arises in a process in which differences are drawn and unities are formed.**

4.4 Consequences for the Analysis of World Models

(Unity and Difference as the Guiding Structure of Philosophical Theories)

The distinction between unity and difference forms the basis for the further investigation of philosophical world models. Different theories can be distinguished according to how they constitute unities and what role they assign to differences.

Some models assume that unities are ontologically given and that differences possess merely descriptive character. Others understand unities as results of processes in which differences play a constitutive role.

These differences concern not merely individual concepts but the entire structure of the respective theory. They determine how world is understood, what role is assigned to the individual, and how truth is defined.

In the further course of the study, the positions of Kant, Nietzsche, Einstein, and Spinoza will be analyzed from this perspective. It will become apparent that each stabilizes different forms of unity and difference and thereby brings forth different models of constituted reality and reality.

The perspective developed here makes it possible not merely to describe these models but to compare them in terms of their structural logic. Unity and difference thereby function as fundamental categories guiding the analysis and enabling a systematic comparison.

5. Kant

5.1 Kant: Constituted Reality as Transcendental Order

(The World as Appearance Structured by the Subject)

Kant's philosophy marks a decisive turning point in determining the relation between reality and constituted reality. With his transcendental turn, the focus of epistemology shifts fundamentally: the conditions of the possibility of knowledge are no longer located in the world itself but in the knowing subject.

This gives rise to a model in which constituted reality is not understood as immediate access to an independent reality but as the result of structures supplied by the subject. The world does not simply appear; it appears only under particular conditions.

Within the framework of the present investigation, this perspective can be described as a specific form of world constitution characterized by stable forms of unity formation.

5.2 Constituted Reality instead of Reality

(The Shift from Being to Appearing)

Kant's central insight consists in the claim that knowledge is directed not toward things in themselves but toward appearances. A fundamental difference is thereby introduced: the difference between what exists independently of thought and what is accessible within the conditions of knowledge.

Within the conceptual framework employed here, this difference can be reconstructed as the distinction between reality and constituted reality. Reality designates the thing in itself, which exists independently of the subject, whereas constituted reality is the world of appearances accessible only under the conditions of intuition and understanding.

This distinction has far-reaching consequences. It means that constituted reality is not simply given but determined by the structure of the faculty of knowledge. What appears as world is always already ordered through space, time, and the categories.

Kant thereby effects a fundamental shift: the question concerning the world becomes the question concerning the conditions of its appearance. Constituted reality is not what exists independently but what can appear under particular conditions.

5.3 Understanding as Transcendental Stabilization

(Order through A Priori Structures)

Within Kant's theory, understanding can be described as a process in which experiential constituted reality is stabilized through a priori structures. These structures are not derived from experience but form the conditions of the possibility of experience.

The categories of the understanding function here as forms of unity formation. They order the manifold of intuition and make it possible to determine something as an object. Without these synthetic achievements of the understanding, there would be no experience of objects but merely an unordered manifold of intuition.

Understanding in Kant is therefore not a subsequent act but a constitutive condition of experiential constituted reality. The world appears ordered because it must be ordered according to the structures of the understanding in order to be experienceable at all.

This stabilization possesses a necessary and universal character, though only with regard to the form of experience. The concrete contents of experience remain contingent. The categories do not determine what is experienced but how something can be experienced as an object.

Understanding thus has the character of a formal order in Kant: it guarantees the unity, lawfulness, and intersubjective validity of experience without determining its concrete content.

5.4 Unity as Category

(The Constitution of Objects through Difference)

The significance of unity formation becomes particularly evident in Kant's doctrine of the categories. Categories such as unity, substance, or causality are forms of the understanding through which objects can first be determined as objects. From the perspective developed here, these categories can be understood as forms of stabilization.

They order the manifold of intuition, fix differences, and thereby enable the constitution of enduring unities. By bringing what is given under categorial forms, the understanding makes the world appear as a nexus of identical, persistent, and lawfully ordered objects. Unity here is not the result of an open process but the expression of a necessary structure.

At the same time, difference remains the presupposition of every unity formation. Without distinguishability, there would be nothing that could be combined, determined, or identified as an object. Yet difference is not conceived by Kant as an open movement but as something ordered through the forms of the understanding and transformed into stable objecthood.

The unity formation accomplished through the categories guarantees the stability of objects by transferring differences into a fixed order. Objects thus appear as identical, persistent, and lawfully determined. Yet precisely this stability marks a limit. For categorially formed unities appear necessary even though they are bound to particular forms of ordering. The possibility that the same manifold might also be determined differently remains largely excluded within the Kantian model.

Here the structure of the problem begins to emerge. It appears where the self-evidence of this unity formation becomes questionable. The problem makes visible that the unities formed are not necessarily given but are results of a particular manner of ordering. It thereby destabilizes not the possibility of unity as such but the concrete form in which unity appears self-evident. Difference shows itself here not only as the presupposition of unity formation but also as that which can potentially break it open.

5.5 The Problem of Reality

(The Limit of Knowledge in the Thing in Itself)

The difference between reality and constituted reality receives its systematic culmination in Kant's distinction between appearance and the thing in itself. Whereas constituted reality, as the ordered world of appearances, is accessible to knowledge, the reality of things in themselves remains in principle unknowable.

This limit is not an accidental deficiency but structurally necessary. It follows from the fact that knowledge is always bound to the conditions under which objects can appear at all. What does not fall under these conditions can indeed be thought but cannot be known.

The thing in itself thus marks a limit of knowledge. It points toward the possibility of a reality independent of the conditions of experience without itself being capable of becoming an object of knowledge.

A fundamental difference thereby emerges: constituted reality designates the ordered world of appearances, whereas reality is thought as that which remains withdrawn from this order. The boundary between the two cannot be overcome but is constitutive of the very structure of knowledge.

5.6 Consequences for World Constitution

(Kant as a Model of Static Unity Formation)

Far-reaching consequences for the constitution of world follow from Kant's determination of knowledge. If the order of constituted reality is bound to the categorial forms of the understanding, unity appears as necessarily stabilized: objects are not simply given but are the result of unity formation governed by fixed structures.

In this model, difference comes into view merely as a presupposition of unity formation. It is not conceived as an autonomous dynamic but is integrated into unity and determined by it. Constituted reality thus appears as a continuous order of identical, persistent, and lawfully interconnected objects whose intersubjective validity is secured by the forms of the understanding.

Yet precisely here lies a systematic limitation. Categorial unity formation explains how stable objects are possible but not how this stability itself can be called into question. The order of constituted reality appears necessary without its contingency becoming thematic.

Against this background, the limit marked by the concept of the thing in itself can be reread from the perspective of the problem approach developed here. It designates not only the end of possible knowledge but also a point at which the stability of constituted reality appears in principle open to irritation. At this point, however, it is not Immanuel Kant himself but the present analysis that intervenes: the concept of the problem designates those moments in which the self-evidence of unity formation becomes questionable.

It thereby becomes visible that the unities stabilized by the understanding are not necessarily given but are results of a particular manner of ordering. The problem is therefore directed not against the possibility of unity as such but against its concrete, apparently self-evident form. Difference now appears no longer merely as the presupposition of unity formation but as the moment capable of interrupting its stabilization and transferring it into new orders.

This perspective, however, remains without systematic development within the Kantian model itself. Whereas the present analysis conceives the problem as a moment of possible reordering, in Kant it appears primarily as a boundary phenomenon of reason. The resulting tension between stabilization and irritation is explicitly determined only in the following section.

5.7 The Problem as a Boundary Phenomenon of Reason

(Understanding and Problem in Kant)

The tension between stabilization and irritation that became visible in the preceding section can be determined more precisely within the framework of Kantian philosophy. Here, too, the distinction between understanding and problem designates two mutually related moments within processes of meaning: understanding stabilizes meaning by bringing the manifold of intuition under categorial forms; the problem marks those points at which this stabilization reaches its limit and becomes questionable in its validity. Without understanding there would be no order of experience; without the problem there would be no reflection upon its scope.

Within the Kantian model, however, this relation remains asymmetrical. Understanding possesses systematic priority because it provides the conditions of the possibility of experience as such. Constituted reality structured through space, time, and categories appears necessarily ordered, identical, and lawfully determined. The possibility of an irritation of this order, indicated in section 5.6, is not developed within Kant's theory as a real reordering of constituted reality.

Instead, the problem appears as a boundary phenomenon of reason. It arises where reason moves beyond the domain of possible experience and seeks to make the unconditioned an object of knowledge. In the antinomies, this movement manifests itself as contradiction: reason generates irresolvable oppositions because it transgresses its own conditions. The problem thereby acquires a specific function. It does not designate a productive redetermination of constituted reality but an interruption of the self-evidence of understanding at its boundary. The irritability developed in section 5.6 is here transferred into the framework of critical self-limitation: the problem makes visible that the order of appearances cannot be extended to everything that can be thought.

Its function therefore remains critical and regulative. The problem does not lead to a transformation of order but to its limitation. It compels reason to restrict its claims to the domain of possible experience and to become conscious of its own conditions. Understanding and problem thus stand, in Immanuel Kant, in a constitutive but unequal relation. Whereas understanding guarantees the stability and unity of constituted reality, the problem appears as the form in which this stability is reflected upon at its boundary. The interruption of meaning does not lead to its reordering but to its securing.

Precisely here the systematic distinctiveness and, at the same time, the limitation of the Kantian model become apparent: the possibility, visible in section 5.6, that order itself might be transformable is not pursued further. The problem remains bound to the function of marking a boundary and is not conceived as a moment of an open redetermination of constituted reality.

6. Nietzsche

6.1 Nietzsche: Constituted Reality as Interpretation

(The World as the Result of Perspective and Power)

Nietzsche's philosophy constitutes a radical counterposition to the model of world constitution developed by Kant. Whereas Kant anchors the order of constituted reality in the fixed structures of the subject, Nietzsche dissolves this stability and replaces it with a dynamic conception of world.

For Friedrich Nietzsche, reality is not an ordered whole but an open, dynamic occurrence subject to no fixed structure. What appears as constituted reality is the result of interpretations, perspectives, and relations of force that provisionally stabilize this occurrence. Within the framework of the present investigation, Nietzsche's approach can be reconstructed as a theory of dynamic unity formation in which unity is not presupposed but continually generated.

6.2 Constituted Reality without Reality

(Dissolution of an Independently Given World-Structure)

Nietzsche does not undermine the assumption of a reality independent of thought by refuting it but by shifting the problem. The question of a reality "in itself" recedes in favor of the analysis of interpretations in which world is constituted in each case. Stability is thus no longer a property of reality but an effect of interpretive processes that bring forth constituted reality.

The difference between reality and constituted reality therefore shifts fundamentally in Nietzsche. Whereas Kant retains reality as the unknowable but necessary correlate of appearance, it loses this function in Nietzsche. There is no fixed point of reference outside interpretation to which knowledge could relate.

Constituted reality is therefore not the appearance of an underlying reality but the only form in which world can be known at all. Yet this constituted reality is not stable but the result of ongoing interpretations. It thus becomes clear:

Reality in the sense of independently existing being is not denied by Nietzsche, but it is deprived of epistemological relevance.

In its place comes the analysis of perspectives **constituted reality consists not of things in themselves but of interpretive orders.**

6.3 Understanding as Perspective

(Meaning as a Product of Interpretation and Simplification)

Understanding consequently acquires a fundamentally different meaning in Nietzsche than in Kant. It is not the application of necessary structures but a perspectival process that simplifies and stabilizes constituted reality.

For Nietzsche, understanding is always interpretation. It is based not upon fixed categories but upon selective approaches that foreground certain aspects of a complex, unmanageable occurrence while excluding others.

This perspectivity means that understanding does not disclose an independently given objective order but brings forth a particular form of order. Concepts, identities, and logical structures are not immediate expressions of a stable world but forms of orientation within an open and inexhaustible occurrence.

Understanding therefore has a functional character. It serves not primarily truth in the classical sense but the manageability of constituted reality. It reduces complexity by selecting differences, leveling them, and transforming them into stable unities.

These unities appear self-evident but are the result of historical and cultural processes. Understanding is therefore not to be conceived as a timeless or completely universal structure but as a contingent and mutable process that remains bound to specific conditions.

6.4 The Primacy of the Problem

(Irritation as the Fundamental Structure of Constituted Reality)

In contrast to Kant, for whom the problem appears primarily as a limit of knowledge, Nietzsche places the problem at the center of the constitution of constituted reality. The world is not primarily to be understood as an ordered unity but as a contradictory, ambiguous, and unstable occurrence. What appears as a problem is therefore not merely a disturbance within an already ordered world but an expression of its fundamental structure.

For Nietzsche, the problem is not an exceptional case but the normal condition, whereas stability remains secondary and first arises through interpretations that provisionally order the openness and tensions of constituted reality.

The relation between understanding and problem is thereby reversed as well. Whereas in Kant the problem appears as a limit within a stable order, in Nietzsche order itself is a reaction to the problem. The problem functions here as the motor of meaning production: it compels interpretation, the new formation of unities, and the provisional stabilization of meanings. Without the problem, there would be no movement, no change, and no development of constituted reality.

6.5 Unity as an Effect of Power

(The Emergence of Stable Forms from Dynamic Forces)

For Nietzsche, unities do not arise through necessary structures but through processes of assertion. The concept of the **“will to power”** describes this dynamic as a play of forces in which particular interpretations dominate and stabilize themselves.

Unity in this context is not an ontological point of departure but the result of a process of stabilization. It arises where particular interpretations prevail and displace others. Concepts, identities, and truths are results of such processes.

These unities possess no absolute validity. They have arisen historically, are culturally shaped, and can change at any time. Their stability rests not upon necessity but upon continued reproduction.

Difference plays a central role in this process. It is not merely that which is ordered but the nexus from which tensions, distinctions, and new determinations emerge. Unity therefore arises not despite difference but as the result of its provisional stabilization.

It thereby becomes clear that constituted reality in Nietzsche must be understood as a dynamic process in which unities are continually generated and dissolved again.

6.6 Consequences for World Constitution

(Nietzsche as a Model of Dynamic Unity Formation)

Nietzsche's philosophy can as a whole be described as a model of dynamic world constitution. Constituted reality arises not through fixed structures but through processes of interpretation in which differences are selectively stabilized.

This perspective has several consequences.

First, constituted reality is radically de-ontologized. It is not a stable, antecedent order but an effect of interpretations. World is not given but arises as constituted reality in the enactment of interpretive processes.

Second, understanding becomes visible as a contingent and perspectival process. It generates order without being able to secure this order definitively.

Third, the problem acquires a central position. It is no longer the limit of knowledge but its point of departure.

Finally, unity is understood as a temporary effect. It arises in the play of forces and persists only insofar as it is continually reproduced.

Nietzsche thus develops a world-model in which stability does not precede its production but is produced, and in which every form of order remains unstable in principle. Constituted reality appears as an open process in which unity and difference continually reconfigure themselves.

6.7 The Problem as the Motor of Interpretation

(Nietzsche's Reversal of the Problematic Structure)

Following the preceding discussion, Nietzsche's relation to the problem can be determined as a fundamental shift in comparison with Kant. For him, the problem does not mark the boundary of an already secured order but the point of departure of those movements in which constituted reality is first constituted at all. It designates not the interruption of a necessarily ordered world but the original openness of an occurrence that is only provisionally stabilized through interpretation.

The problem appears in Nietzsche wherever no final order can be presupposed. Because world is not given as an intrinsically structured constituted reality but appears only in perspectival interpretations, every form of order is precarious in principle. What is problematic, therefore,

is not merely the scope of knowledge but already the constitution of meaning itself. The problem points toward the incompleteness, conflictuality, and revisability of every interpretation.

The problem thereby acquires a productive function. It does not merely indicate the limit of understanding but is the moment from which new orders can emerge. Where existing interpretations lose their self-evidence, what arises are not simply deficits but possibilities of redetermination. The problem is therefore not a lack but a form of movement: it irritates established unities, dissolves fixed meanings, and opens the formation of new perspectives.

Understanding and problem thus stand in a different relation in Nietzsche than in Kant. Understanding is not primarily the stabilization of a necessarily ordered constituted reality but is itself an interpretive practice that arises from problematic constellations and produces only provisional orders. The problem is not external to this practice but its inner *movens*. Without the problem there would be no occasion for interpretation; without interpretation, no temporary stabilization of constituted reality.

Precisely here lies the consequence for world constitution. If every unity exists only as an effect of interpretive processes, then its destabilization is not an exception but a structural moment. In Nietzsche, the problem therefore appears as an expression of the fundamental dynamics of constituted reality itself: it designates the openness of an occurrence in which orders can form, assert themselves, and disintegrate again.

Yet behind all this stands the following:

Nietzsche does not simply deny the concept of a reality independent of thought; rather, its function is dissolved. At the center stands constituted reality as an interpretively produced order that cannot be traced back to things in themselves.

The decisive break thereby becomes apparent: whereas in Immanuel Kant reality remains as the boundary of knowledge, in Friedrich Nietzsche it loses this function in favor of a constituted reality brought forth solely within interpretive orders.

7. Einstein

7.1 Einstein: Constituted Reality as Model

(The World as a Theoretically Disclosed but Never Completely Apprehended Structure)

Einstein's epistemological position can be understood, within the framework of this investigation, as a mediating form of world constitution. Whereas Kant stabilizes constituted reality through necessary structures and Nietzsche describes it as a dynamic process of interpretation, Einstein develops a model in which constituted reality is disclosed through theoretical constructions.

These constructions are neither necessary *a priori* nor merely expressions of perspectival forces. They arise as free conceptual designs that must prove themselves in relation to experience. In this context, constituted reality appears not as immediately given but as that which can be apprehended and described through models.

This gives rise to a specific form of world constitution in which order is neither presupposed nor completely relativized but emerges through the interplay of theoretical construction and empirical testing.

7.2 Reality as a Postulated Structure

(The Assumption of a Rational but Not Directly Accessible World)

Einstein assumes that the world possesses an objective structure independent of thought. This structure, however, is not immediately knowable but can only be inferred indirectly.

Within the distinction introduced here, this means that reality remains in place for Einstein, though in a modified form. It is not an object of immediate knowledge but a theoretical point of reference.

The assumption of a rationally ordered reality is reflected in the fact that scientific models successfully explain phenomena and enable predictions. These successes suggest that there is a real structure to which the models refer.

At the same time, this structure remains fundamentally inaccessible. There is therefore a difference between model and reality that cannot be completely overcome. Reality is thus neither fully knowable nor meaningless but functions as a regulative framework of scientific knowledge.

7.3 Understanding as Model Formation

(Knowledge as the Construction of Theoretical Connections)

For Albert Einstein, understanding takes the form of model formation. Scientific knowledge consists in developing theoretical structures that make it possible to bring phenomena into a coherent nexus. These models are not direct representations of reality but constructions that foreground certain aspects of the world while excluding others.

They do not arise from logical necessity but from creative processes in which new concepts and connections are devised. Logic plays an important but limited role in this context. It ensures

consistency within the model but is not the source of new knowledge. New knowledge arises rather through intuition, imagination, and theoretical innovation.

Understanding is therefore neither necessary in the Kantian sense nor purely perspectival in Friedrich Nietzsche's sense, but must be conceived as a constructive process in which theoretical models are designed and tested. It is bound to rational criteria without being completely derivable from them.

The validity of these models does not result from an immediate correspondence with reality but from their capacity to apprehend theoretically structural connections within the world. They must explain phenomena, organize connections, and enable reliable predictions. Understanding is therefore directed toward the explanatory and predictive power of models, not toward immediate representation.

At the same time, the reference to reality is preserved, though in mediated form. Models are attempts to apprehend theoretically a world independent of us without ever being able to represent it completely. There therefore remains a permanent difference between model and reality, one that cannot be eliminated but instead structures the process of knowledge.

Understanding thus appears as a dynamic nexus of construction, testing, and revision. Models can be improved, expanded, or replaced without thereby calling the possibility of knowledge as such into question. For Albert Einstein, knowledge is therefore neither the expression of necessary structures nor mere perspectivity, but an open, methodically guided process of theoretical disclosure of the world in which models apprehend the structure of the world without ever representing it completely.

7.4 The Problem as the Motor of Theoretical Innovation

(Problem and Knowledge in Einstein)

Following the determination of understanding as model formation, the problem can be identified in Albert Einstein as a central component of scientific processes of knowledge. Unlike in Kant, it does not appear as a boundary phenomenon limiting the scope of knowledge, and unlike in Nietzsche, it does not appear as an expression of a fundamental instability of constituted reality. Rather, the problem designates those situations in which existing models lose their explanatory power and a redetermination of theoretical connections becomes necessary.

Problems arise where empirical findings, theoretical inconsistencies, or conceptual tensions can no longer be resolved within a given model. They mark points of rupture within the structure of scientific order without abolishing this order as a whole. The problem is therefore neither a mere lack of knowledge nor a radical destabilization but a structured occasion for the revision of existing models.

In this sense, the problem has a productive function. It compels the development of new concepts, the questioning of existing assumptions, and the design of alternative theoretical constructions. Knowledge advances not despite problems but through them. They are the point of departure for those creative processes in which new models emerge that can apprehend a broader nexus of phenomena.

At the same time, the problem remains embedded within a framework of rational control. New models must be measured against criteria such as consistency, explanatory power, and empirical confirmation. The problem therefore does not open an arbitrary space of redetermination but a structured process of theoretical innovation.

Understanding and problem thus stand in a dynamic relation in Einstein. Understanding stabilizes the world in the form of theoretical models, while the problem marks those points at which this stabilization no longer holds and must be transformed through revision. Unlike in Kant, the problem does not lead to a limitation of knowledge but to its expansion; unlike in Nietzsche, however, this movement remains bound to the idea of a rationally accessible world.

The problem thus appears as the motor of scientific development. It interrupts existing orders without calling their fundamental possibility into question and opens the space for new, more powerful forms of model formation. Knowledge acquires its dynamism within this tension between stabilization and revision.

7.5 Unity as Theoretical Construction

(Stable Quantities and Invariants as Forms of Scientific Order)

For Albert Einstein, unities appear in the form of theoretical quantities and mathematical structures. Concepts such as space, time, energy, or mass are not immediately given but arise within a particular theoretical framework. These unities possess relative stability. They are not immutable but can be redetermined in the course of scientific developments. At the same time, within a model they form stable points of reference that make it possible to describe and compare phenomena.

Particular significance attaches to invariants. They are those quantities that remain preserved under specific transformations and thereby make stability possible within an otherwise dynamic system.

Unity here is neither *a priori* nor merely perspectival but functional. It arises within the context of a model and is bound to its structure. Difference manifests itself in the possibility of developing different models that describe the same phenomena in different ways. Unity and difference thus stand in an open relation determined by theoretical and empirical processes.

7.6 Consequences for World Constitution

(Einstein as a Model between Stability and Dynamism)

Einstein’s approach can be understood as an intermediate position between the models of Kant and Nietzsche. Constituted reality is neither completely determined by fixed structures nor entirely open and chaotic but is disclosed through theoretical models.

This perspective has several consequences:

First, the idea of an independent reality is retained but epistemically relativized. Reality is not directly accessible but can only be disclosed through models.

Second, understanding becomes visible as a constructive process moving between stability and change. Models create order but remain fundamentally revisable.

Third, the problem acquires a productive function. It drives the development of knowledge forward without fundamentally negating the possibility of order.

Fourth, unity is understood as a functional magnitude. It is neither necessary nor arbitrary but arises within the context of theoretical constructions.

Einstein thereby develops a world-model in which constituted reality appears as an approximation to a structured reality without this reality ever becoming completely accessible. Order is possible but not final; knowledge stabilizes but always remains provisional.

8. Spinoza

8.1 Spinoza: Reality as Necessary Unity

(The World as an Ontologically Given, Logically Structured Substance)

Spinoza's philosophy represents, within the present investigation, a position that differs fundamentally from the approaches considered thus far. Whereas Kant anchors the conditions of constituted reality in the subject, Nietzsche understands constituted reality as a dynamic process of interpretation, and Einstein describes it as the result of theoretical model formation, Spinoza develops a world-model in which reality and constituted reality are not separated.

For Spinoza, there exists only one substance, from whose essence everything that is follows necessarily. This substance is not merely the foundation of the world but identical with it. Constituted reality is therefore not the result of processes of knowledge but the expression of an already completely determined reality.

Within the framework of the present investigation, Spinoza's approach can be described as a model of ontological unity constitution in which unity is not generated but presupposed.

8.2 Abolition of the Difference between Reality and Constituted Reality

(The Identity of Being and Appearance)

The central movement in Spinoza's thought consists in the abolition of the difference between reality and constituted reality. There is no separate sphere of appearance distinct from an underlying reality. Everything that exists is an expression of the same substance and is therefore equally constituted reality and reality.

In contrast to Kant, for whom reality functions as the unknowable thing in itself, and to Einstein, for whom it remains a theoretical point of reference, in Spinoza the distinction itself disappears. Reality is fully present in constituted reality.

This identity has far-reaching consequences. It means that there is no hidden level that withdraws from knowledge. What is can be completely determined in its structure because it follows necessarily from the essence of substance.

World appears here not as constructed or interpreted but as the necessary expression of an underlying unity. The difference between reality and constituted reality is not mediated but abolished.

8.3 Understanding as Insight into Necessity

(Knowledge as Participation in the Order of Being)

Understanding acquires a specific meaning in Spinoza. It does not consist in the construction or interpretation of constituted reality but in insight into the necessary order of substance.

Knowledge means grasping the reasons why something cannot be otherwise than it is. Truth is therefore not a correspondence between statement and world but the expression of adequate knowledge of this necessity.

Within the distinction developed here, it can be said that understanding is maximally stabilized in Spinoza. There is no fundamental contingency, no perspectivity, and no principled incompleteness of knowledge.

Understanding is not a process of approximation but a state of insight. The more complete this insight is, the closer it comes to the structure of reality itself.

8.4 The Disappearance of the Problem

(Order without Irritation)

With the assumption of a completely determined reality, the problem also loses its fundamental function. A problem arises where something is not understood or cannot be integrated into existing orders. In a world-model that assumes complete necessity, however, this is only a provisional phenomenon.

For Spinoza, the problem does not appear as a structural moment of constituted reality but as an expression of insufficient knowledge. It points not to a fundamental openness of the world but to the limitation of human understanding.

To the extent that knowledge increases, problems disappear. They are replaced by insight. The problem is thus not a constitutive element of world constitution but a transitional phenomenon on the path toward complete understanding.

8.5 Unity as Ontological Origin

(Substance as Absolute Unity)

The central role of unity appears in radical form in Spinoza. Unity is not the result of processes but the point of departure of all constituted reality. Substance is absolutely unitary, infinite, and necessary. Everything that exists consists of modes of this substance, that is, particular forms of expression of its structure.

Unity here is not relative, functional, or perspectival but absolute. It is not dependent upon difference but encompasses it completely. Differences appear as internal modifications of a fundamental unity.

In contrast to the positions considered previously, unity is not generated here but presupposed. It is the foundation from which all further determinations proceed. It thereby becomes clear that Spinoza's model represents a form of static unity constitution that traces every form of processuality and contingency back to a necessary order.

8.6 Consequences for World Constitution

(Spinoza as a Model of Ontological Closure)

Spinoza's philosophy can be described as a model of completely closed world constitution. Constituted reality is not the result of distinctions but the expression of an already given unity.

This perspective has several consequences:

First, the difference between reality and constituted reality is abolished. There is no separation between what is and what appears.

Second, understanding is determined as insight into a necessary order. Knowledge has not a constructive but a disclosive character.

Third, the problem loses its structural significance. It appears merely as a consequence of insufficient knowledge and disappears with increasing insight.

Fourth, unity is rendered absolute. It is not the result of difference but its presupposition.

Spinoza thereby develops a world-model in which order does not have to be produced but is given from the outset. Reality and constituted reality are completely determined, and every form of difference is integrated into a superordinate unity.

9. System and World

9.1 System and World

(Systems-Theoretical Redetermination of Reality and Constituted Reality)

The preceding analyses have shown that the positions of Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Nietzsche, Albert Einstein, and Baruch Spinoza do not merely represent different answers to a common question but each develop their own models of world constitution. Each position determines in a specific way what counts as constituted reality, how unity arises, and what role understanding and problem play. This diversity suggests that there is no uniform standard by which these models could be evaluated directly. Rather, they operate within different conceptual frameworks that determine what appears as world in each case.

In order to grasp these differences systematically, a perspective is therefore required that makes it possible to compare these models without reducing them to a common ontological foundation. Systems theory offers such a perspective.

In what follows, it will be shown that the philosophical positions analyzed above can be understood as systems that bring forth their respective worlds through specific operations. From this perspective, world appears not as a given totality but as the result of operations in which it is determined which distinctions are relevant, which relations can be formed, and what can become visible and determinable as constituted reality within a particular order.

The systems-theoretical perspective thereby makes explicit what the preceding analyses have already implicitly presupposed: world does not appear independently of its forms of constitution but is brought forth within specific nexuses of order and distinction.

9.2 System and Environment

(The Fundamental Difference of World Constitution)

At the center of the systems-theoretical perspective stands the distinction between system and environment. A system is not a thing in the classical sense but a nexus of operations that determines itself by maintaining a difference from its environment.

This difference is not secondary but constitutive. A system exists only insofar as it distinguishes itself from its environment and continuously reproduces this distinction. It is not simply given but arises and maintains itself through continuous differentiation from what it is not. At the same time, it remains related to this environment, since the difference through which it determines itself is possible only in relation to it. Without an environment, there would be no boundary and therefore no system.

The environment is therefore not something external in the sense of an independent counterpart but a necessary point of reference through which the system determines and stabilizes itself.

Within the framework of the present investigation, this distinction can be understood as a specific form of differentiation through which constituted reality arises.

The system determines what counts as relevant for it by drawing certain distinctions and not others.

World therefore appears not as a unified totality but as that which a system differentiates as environment in the enactment of its operations and thereby first brings forth as relevant, connectable, and determinable. Different systems generate different worlds because they employ different distinctions.

9.3 Constituted Reality as a System-Internal Construction

(World as the Result of Operative Distinctions)

If systems bring forth their world through distinctions, then constituted reality is not independently given but system-relative. Constituted reality is what appears as constituted reality within a system. This perspective fundamentally shifts the understanding of constituted reality. It is no longer the counterpart of a knowing individual but the result of operations through which a system structures its environment.

This does not, however, mean that world is completely absorbed into the system. Rather, the following becomes apparent:

The constituted reality of a system always remains bound to the conditions of its own operations and therefore never encompasses world as such.

Following the distinction introduced above, it can therefore be said:

Reality remains as a limiting concept and designates a world independent of the system that cannot be directly transformed into system-internal constituted reality.

Constituted reality, by contrast, is the form in which this world appears for a system, namely as the result of the distinctions and operations through which the system structures its environment.

It thereby becomes clear that constituted reality appears only within systems. Every constituted reality is bound to the operations through which it is generated. This insight does not, however, imply that constituted reality is arbitrary. Systems operate under particular conditions and constraints that structure their possibilities. Constituted reality is therefore neither freely constructed nor independently given but arises within a field of structured possibilities.

9.4 Understanding and Problem as Systemic Operations

(Stabilization and Irritation within Systems)

The distinction between understanding and problem introduced above can be interpreted within the systems-theoretical perspective as a description of two fundamental modes of system operation.

Understanding corresponds to the stabilization of meaning. It designates a system's capacity to establish connections, form expectations, and generate continuity. Understanding ensures that individual operations do not remain isolated but can be related to one another and integrated into recognizable nexuses. In this way, events, communications, or perceptions do not appear as merely isolated moments but as parts of an ordered constituted reality.

Understanding thus has the function of reducing complexity by making certain connections probable and excluding others. It stabilizes meaning by generating forms of repetition, expectability, and order within which a system can experience its constituted reality as consistent and connectable.

The problem, by contrast, designates an irritation within the system. It arises where existing structures are no longer sufficient to ensure connectivity and where established forms of meaning processing reach their limits. Problems mark situations in which expectations are disappointed, distinctions lose their unambiguity, or existing orders no longer provide sufficient orientation. They interrupt the flow of operations because the system cannot readily connect with previous patterns.

Precisely therein, however, lies their productive function: problems compel the system to develop new forms of distinction, restructure existing arrangements, or open alternative possibilities of connection in order to enable the renewed stabilization of meaning under changed conditions. The problem is therefore a moment in which the contingency of existing structures of meaning becomes visible and from which the necessity of their reorganization arises.

These two moments are not separate but mutually dependent. Without stabilization there would be no continuity; without irritation, no change. Systems exist within the tension between understanding and problem.

This dynamic corresponds to the movement between stabilization and difference described above. Systems generate constituted reality by continually processing this tension.

9.5 Unity as the Result of Operative Processes

(Unity Formation as the Central Achievement of Systems)

Within the systems-theoretical perspective, unities do not appear as pregiven structures but as results of operative processes. A system generates unities by stabilizing and repeating particular distinctions.

These unities can assume different forms: concepts, objects, identities, or relations. In every case, they are forms stabilized through repeated operations.

Unity is therefore not an antecedent state but the result of an ongoing achievement of the system. It does not arise once and for all but through the continuous enactment of operations that stabilize particular connections, order relations, and reproduce nexuses of meaning. Unity therefore persists only insofar as these operations continue to be enacted. It is not secured substantially but generated processually and dependent upon its continuous reproduction.

This perspective connects the concepts introduced above. Unity arises through difference, is stabilized in the process of understanding, and can again be called into question by problems.

It thereby becomes clear that **unity formation is the central principle of world constitution. Constituted reality appears ordered because systems generate unities that sustain this order.**

9.6 Consequences for the Understanding of World
(World as an Effect of Systemic Meaning Production)

The systems-theoretical perspective leads to a fundamental redetermination of the concept of world. World is no longer a given totality but the result of processes in which systems structure their environment.

This redetermination has several consequences.

First, the idea of a single world identical for all is relativized. Different systems generate different constituted realities that cannot be reduced to a common foundation. This is already evident in the positions analyzed above: whereas Baruch Spinoza assumes an absolutely unified order in which differences are aufgehoben, Immanuel Kant determines constituted reality as a world of appearances ordered through transcendental structures, Friedrich Nietzsche as the result of perspectival interpretations, and Albert Einstein as a nexus of models that discloses the world under particular theoretical presuppositions. The systems-theoretical perspective does not level these differences but renders them intelligible as different modes of world constitution.

Second, the status of truth shifts. Truth is no longer correspondence with a pregiven reality but a form of coherence within a system. This, too, can be traced in the positions examined: in Kant, truth consists in conformity with the conditions of possible experience; in Nietzsche, in the validity of particular perspectives; in Einstein, in the explanatory power of theoretical models; and in Spinoza, in adequate insight into necessary order.

The systems-theoretical perspective understands these different concepts of truth as system-internal criteria of validity that cannot be reduced to a single standard.

Third, the role of the observer is redefined. Observation is not the passive apprehension of a world but an active operation that contributes to bringing forth that world. This insight radicalizes elements already present in the preceding positions: Kant's transcendental subject structures experience, Nietzsche's perspectivism binds knowledge to standpoints, Einstein's model formation reveals the constructive dimension of scientific knowledge, and even in Spinoza knowledge appears as insight from within a particular order. Systems theory brings these elements together under the concept of observation as an operation through which world is determined in each case.

Fourth, it becomes clear that world constitution is an ongoing process. Constituted reality is not complete but continually arises anew through the operations of systems. Whereas Spinoza still assumes a completely determined order and Kant stable structures of experience, Nietzsche and Einstein already exhibit a stronger dynamization of constituted reality. The systems-theoretical perspective develops this dynamism consistently: world appears not as a finished whole but as a continuously generated nexus that changes and is restabilized with every operation.

The systems-theoretical perspective thus makes it possible not merely to place the positions developed above alongside one another but to understand their differences as expressions of different modes of world constitution. It functions in this sense as a metaperspective insofar as it does not itself replace the other positions with a particular world-order but reconstructs the conditions under which, in each approach, anything can appear as world, constituted reality, unity, understanding, or problem at all. From this perspective, unity and constituted reality appear not as antecedent givens but as effects of operations that order and stabilize differences.

Understanding and problem can be described in this context as complementary moments: understanding stabilizes meaning and enables connectivity, whereas the problem interrupts this stability, makes its contingency visible, and generates the necessity of its reorganization.

Precisely herein lies the theoretical consequence of the present investigation: world is neither necessarily given nor freely disposable but arises within a dynamic nexus of operation, difference, and stabilization. The task of the theory presented here is therefore not to justify a final order but, from a metatheoretical perspective, to analyze those conditions under which order is respectively brought forth, stabilized, and transformed.

10. Meaning Production and Operational Closure

(World as the Result of System-Internal Operations)

The systems-theoretical perspective leads to a fundamental shift in the understanding of world. Constituted reality no longer appears as an object that is known but as the result of processes in which systems bring forth their own world. These processes can be described as meaning production.

Meaning is not to be understood as a property of things but as the form in which constituted reality becomes accessible to a system. It arises through operations that establish differences, stabilize unities, and open possibilities of connection.

At the center of this perspective stands the concept of **operational closure**. **Systems operate exclusively through their own operations** and cannot directly access a reality lying outside them. This does not mean that there is no environment, but that this environment appears only in the form in which it can be processed system-internally.

Meaning production is therefore a process in which systems generate their own constituted reality by selectively processing and stabilizing differences.

10.1 Meaning as a Form of Access to World

(Meaning as the Medium of the Constitution of Constituted Reality)

Meaning designates the manner in which world can become determinable as difference for a system and thereby accessible at all. It constitutes the condition under which something can be apprehended as something and integrated into a nexus. From this perspective, constituted reality is not what would be immediately given to a system but what is constituted in meaningful form within its own operations. Meaning is therefore not a property of things but the form in which anything can become real for a system at all.

Meaning arises through distinctions. Something acquires significance only by being distinguished from something else and thereby fixed as a determinate unity. Every distinction is selective: it actualizes one possibility while simultaneously referring to other, unrealized possibilities that remain available as a horizon for further connections. Meaning thus designates the form in which actuality and possibility are mediated.

The decisive point is therefore:

It is not merely that something is distinguished. Rather, in every distinction one possibility is actualized while others are carried along but not realized.

Meaning has a necessarily selective structure. It does not encompass the totality of all possibilities but actualizes only a particular selection that functions as constituted reality. Every determination is therefore simultaneously a limitation: by determining something as something, something else is excluded, though not completely eliminated, but retained as a horizon of possibility.

This selectivity is constitutive. Without it, constituted reality would remain indeterminate and could not be experienced or processed as a structured unity. Meaning enables orientation by reducing the excess of possible connections and stabilizing particular differences. It thereby

creates the conditions under which expectations can be formed, connections secured, and further operations become possible.

It thereby becomes clear that **meaning is not simply present but is generated. Constituted reality is what appears in the medium of meaning.**

10.2 Operational Closure

(Systems Generate Their World through Their Own Operations)

The concept of operational closure describes the structure within which systems bring forth their constituted reality. A system operates exclusively through its own operations and cannot directly access anything outside itself. This means that every perception, every cognition, and every description already takes place within the system. The environment appears only in the form in which it is processed through system-internal operations.

Operational closure therefore implies a fundamental self-reference. Systems refer in their operations to their own structures and continuously reproduce them.

At the same time, operational closure does not mean isolation.

Systems depend upon their environment, since without difference they could not exist. Yet this environment is not apprehended immediately but only in system-internally processed form.

The distinction between reality and constituted reality can therefore be further specified:

Reality designates what is thought as outside the system, whereas constituted reality is what appears within the system as the result of its operations.

10.3 Understanding and Problem as Modes of Meaning Production

(Stabilization and Irritation within Operational Closure)

The systems-theoretical perspective leads to a fundamental shift in the understanding of constituted reality. It no longer appears as an object given independently of the observer but as the result of processes in which systems bring forth their own world. These processes can be described as meaning production.

Meaning designates the form in which world becomes accessible to a system at all. It constitutes the condition under which something can be distinguished as something, determined, and integrated into a nexus. Constituted reality, from this perspective, is not what immediately confronts a system but what is constituted in meaningful form within its own operations. Meaning is therefore not a property of things but the manner in which anything can become real for a system at all.

Meaning does not arise from itself but through the enactment of distinctions. Something acquires significance only by being distinguished from something else and thereby fixed as a determinate unity. Every distinction is selective: it actualizes one possibility while simultaneously referring to other, unrealized possibilities that remain available as a horizon for further connections. Meaning thus consists in the unity of actuality and possibility.

From this follows the necessarily selective structure of meaning. It does not actualize the totality of all possibilities but only a specific selection that functions as constituted reality. Every determination is therefore simultaneously a limitation: by determining something as something, other possibilities are excluded without disappearing completely. They remain present as a horizon of possibility. This selectivity is constitutive, for without it world would remain indeterminate and could neither be experienced nor processed. Meaning reduces complexity by stabilizing differences and thereby enables orientation and connectivity.

At the center of this perspective stands the concept of operational closure. Systems operate exclusively through their own operations and have no immediate access to a reality lying outside them. This does not mean, however, that there is no environment, but that it can appear only in the form in which it can be processed system-internally.

Understanding, against this background, designates the system-internal stabilization of meaning. It ensures that operations can connect with one another, that expectations can be formed, and that continuities can be maintained over time. Understanding thereby secures the embedding of individual operations within an overarching nexus.

The problem, by contrast, designates an irritation of this stabilization. It occurs where existing structures of meaning and expectation are no longer sufficient to integrate new situations into established nexuses. Problems mark interruptions of established relations of connectivity and make visible the limits of existing orders of meaning. At the same time, they open the possibility of a reorganization of meaning by introducing new distinctions and disclosing alternative possibilities of connection.

10.4 Unity Formation as the Fundamental Operation

(The Generation of Stable Forms in Process)

The central operation of meaning production is unity formation. Systems generate constituted reality by not merely establishing differences but stabilizing them in repeated operations in such a way that particular distinctions can be retained as unities.

A unity is not to be understood as a pregiven substance but as the result of selective operations through which something is demarcated from something else and rendered identifiable in this demarcation. Unities therefore do not arise once and for all but processually. They acquire persistence only insofar as the operations through which they are brought forth continuously connect with them and reproduce their identity. What appears as stable or enduring is therefore not independent of the process of its production but an expression of its continued reproduction.

Every unity formation necessarily presupposes a difference. Something can appear as a unity only by being distinguished from something else. This difference is not abolished through the stabilization of the unity but remains effective as its constitutive condition. Unity is therefore not the opposite of difference but a form of its organization: it designates the stabilization of a distinction in which one side is foregrounded as an identifiable unity.

Constituted reality appears ordered from this perspective because systems continuously form, reproduce, and relate unities to one another within relational nexuses. Order is therefore not a property of the world in itself but the result of processes of unity formation in which differences are selectively stabilized and processed as consistent structures.

10.5 Consequences for the Understanding of Knowledge and World
(World as a Dynamic Process of Meaning Production)

The theory of meaning production leads to a fundamental redetermination of knowledge and world.

First, knowledge is understood as a process in which systems generate their own constituted reality. It is not the representation of a pregiven reality but a form of meaning production.

Second, world becomes visible as a dynamic process. It arises in the enactment of operations and is not given independently of them.

Third, the role of stability and change is redetermined. Constituted reality is neither completely fixed nor completely open but arises in the interplay of unity formation and difference.

Finally, it becomes clear that every form of order is contingent. It rests upon specific distinctions that could also have been drawn differently.

This establishes the basis for the further investigation, in which the forms of unity formation will be analyzed more precisely. It will become apparent that different world-models employ different forms of stabilization and thereby generate different constituted realities.

11. Truth as System-Internal Coherence

(Departure from the Correspondence Model of Truth)

The systems-theoretical perspective developed thus far leads to a fundamental redetermination of the concept of truth. If constituted reality cannot be understood as the representation of an independently given reality but arises as the result of system-internal operations, truth can no longer be determined as correspondence between statement and world.

The classical correspondence model of truth presupposes that there is an unequivocally determined reality against which statements can be compared. Yet this presupposition becomes problematic through the distinction introduced above between reality and constituted reality. If reality functions as a limiting concept and constituted reality arises system-relatively, there is no immediate point of reference against which truth could be measured.

Against this background, truth will in what follows be understood as **system-internal coherence**. Truth designates the consistency, connectivity, and stability of statements within a particular system.

11.1 Critique of the Correspondence Model

(Why Truth Cannot Be Understood as a Representation of Reality)

The correspondence model determines truth as agreement between statement and reality. A statement accordingly counts as true if what it asserts corresponds to what is actually the case. Such a model, however, presupposes that both sides of this relation can be determined independently of one another: the statement must be identifiable as a statement, and reality as reality, before the two can be compared. Truth thus appears as the subsequent determination of a fit between linguistic representation and an antecedent world.

It is precisely this presupposition that is questionable within the framework of the present investigation. Statements are not neutral representations of a constituted reality independent of them but arise within systems whose operations are structured through specific distinctions. Likewise, the reality to which statements refer is not immediately given but accessible only in the form in which it can be processed system-internally. There is therefore no standpoint independent of these conditions from which it could be determined whether a statement corresponds with reality. Every attempt at such a comparison is itself already a system-bound operation and thus bound to the distinctions that first make the comparison possible.

The correspondence model therefore proves problematic because it presupposes a neutral relation to world that is unavailable under conditions of operational closure.

11.2 Truth as Connectivity

(Coherence within Systemic Operations)

If truth cannot be determined as correspondence with an independent reality, it must be conceived differently. From a systems-theoretical perspective, truth can be understood as the connectivity of statements. A statement is then true when it can be processed within a system in such a way that it enables further operations, stabilizes expectations, and can be integrated into existing nexuses of meaning.

Truth thereby designates not a property of the statement itself but a system-internal function of securing and continuing communication.

Truth is system-relative insofar as it depends upon the distinctions with which a system operates. Different systems can treat different statements as true because they possess different criteria for what counts as connectable. This relativity, however, is not equivalent to arbitrariness. Truth is instead bound to internal consistency, the stabilization of expectations, and the possibility of further connections. **True is what proves stabilizable, expectation-securing, and operationally continuable within a given nexus.**

11.3 Understanding, Problem, and Truth

(Truth between Stabilization and Irritation)

The previously introduced distinction between understanding and problem can also be applied to the concept of truth. Understanding designates the stabilization of nexuses of meaning; with regard to truth, this means that particular statements are established as valid within a system and secured in their connectivity. What is understood can count as true insofar as it is integrated into existing distinctions, expectations, and referential nexuses. Truth thus appears not as correspondence with a reality independent of statements, but as the system-internal validity of statements that enable further operations and ensure continuity in our engagement with reality.

The problem, by contrast, designates an irritation of this stabilization. It arises where existing statements, interpretive patterns, or structures of expectation are no longer sufficient to integrate new situations into established nexuses. Problems thereby make visible that what has hitherto counted as true cannot simply be continued unchanged. They prompt the system to examine, modify, or replace existing statements. In this way, problems open new possibilities of truth formation by revealing the limits of established truths and compelling a reorganization of meaning.

Truth thus arises within the tension between stabilization and irritation. It is neither a definitively fixed body of knowledge nor an arbitrarily open magnitude, but the result of an ongoing process in which nexuses of meaning are reproduced and secured while simultaneously being transformed under conditions of irritation. This perspective makes clear that truth cannot be understood independently of the structure of meaning production. It is itself a moment of those processes through which systems order, stabilize, and revise their constituted reality.

11.4 Truth and Unity Formation

(Stable Unities as Bearers of Truth)

The connection between truth and unity formation becomes apparent in the fact that truth is bound to stable forms. Statements, concepts, and theories can count as true only insofar as they are stabilized as unities that can be recognized, reproduced, and integrated into new nexuses. Truth therefore presupposes not only validity but also a form of unity in which something remains identifiable as the same across different operations.

Unity functions in this respect as a bearer of truth because it creates the condition under which truth claims can be retained, repeated, and continued. Without stable unities, no enduring truth would be possible, since statements would dissolve into the transience of individual operations.

This connection can be further specified through the concept and the symbol. The concept designates a form of determination in which a unity remains identifiable across different situations. It stabilizes distinctions by determining what can count as the same and thereby creates the condition under which statements can be examined, compared, and integrated into new nexuses. The symbol supplements this function by rendering unities representable and reproducible in condensed form. It secures the recognizability of complex contents of meaning and enables their transfer into different contexts. **In the concept, unity is determined; in the symbol, it is represented.** Both are therefore forms of unity formation through which truth claims acquire duration, repeatability, and connectivity.

The stability of such unities is not absolute, however, but is itself the result of ongoing reproduction. Unities can be confirmed, modified, called into question, or dissolved when the operations that sustain them can no longer secure their previous form. To the extent that the unity of a statement, concept, or theory changes, what can count as true within a system changes as well.

Truth therefore cannot be understood independently of the processes of unity formation but remains bound to them. It arises where unities are sufficiently stabilized to bear validity, and it changes where this stabilization loses its self-evidence and must be reorganized.

11.5 Consequences for the Further Investigation

(Truth as Part of World Constitution)

The redetermination of truth as system-internal coherence has far-reaching consequences for the further investigation.

First, it makes clear that truth does not stand outside constituted reality but itself belongs to the forms of its constitution. Truth does not arise independently of meaning but in the enactment of those processes through which systems draw distinctions, stabilize nexuses, and bring forth constituted reality in a form that can be processed. It is therefore not to be understood as an external standard but as a system-bound form of validity that remains tied to the conditions of meaning production.

Second, this perspective makes it possible to analyze different philosophical models comparatively without presupposing an external criterion of truth. What matters is no longer whether a model correctly represents an objective reality, but how it generates, stabilizes, and legitimizes truth within its own structure.

Third, this determination establishes the basis for the following theory of unity formation. If truth can acquire durability only where unities are stabilized, then the analysis of these unities moves to the center of the investigation. This chapter thus marks the transition from the systems-theoretical reconstruction to the study's own theoretical position by showing that truth itself must be understood as a processual result.

12. The Thesis of Unity Formation

(World as an Effect of Distinction and Stabilization)

The preceding analyses have shown that constituted reality can be understood neither as immediate givenness nor as mere construction. Rather, it arises in processes in which systems draw differences, produce meaning, and develop stable forms. The theoretical focus thereby shifts from the question of what constituted reality is to the question of the conditions under which it can appear as constituted reality at all.

At the center of the present study stands the thesis that constituted reality appears as ordered only insofar as it is apprehended in unities. These unities are not ontologically presupposed but arise through processes of distinction, stabilization, and reproduction. They designate those forms in which something becomes identifiable as something, recognizable, and capable of being integrated into nexuses.

Order is therefore not a pregiven inventory of the world
but the effect of successful unity formation.

This can be illustrated by different forms of unity. What appears as a concrete unity, such as a "table," a "person," or an "event", is not simply given but the result of distinctions through which certain aspects are foregrounded while others are excluded. A table is a unity only insofar as it is demarcated from its surroundings, recognized as the same, and treated as identical across different situations. Its unity therefore does not exist independently of these operations but consists in their ongoing stabilization.

This becomes even clearer in the case of abstract unities and symbolic forms. Concepts such as "justice," "number," or "truth" do not designate objects in an immediate sense but highly condensed unities that exist only through conceptual and symbolic stabilization. Mathematical signs, linguistic concepts, and theoretical models likewise function as unities insofar as they can be reproduced in recognizable form and employed in different contexts. Their unity lies not in substantial existence but in the stability of the distinctions that sustain them.

The thesis of unity formation thus formulates a fundamental theoretical shift:

World is not simply what is, but what appears as unity.

This formulation does not mean that nothing exists outside unity, but that constituted reality acquires determinacy only where differences are transformed into unities. Unity formation is therefore the condition under which world does not dissolve into an indeterminate manifold but becomes apprehensible as ordered constituted reality.

The following theoretical development begins precisely at this point. It asks how unities arise, through what they acquire stability, how they relate to the differences underlying them, and under what conditions they can be altered or dissolved. The theory of unity formation is therefore directed not toward individual objects but toward the form in which objecthood itself first becomes possible.

Concrete unities, too, are results of distinction and stabilization. The difference between concrete and abstract unities lies not in their ontological constitution but in the degree and manner of their stabilization.

12.1 World as the Result of Distinctions

(The Constitutive Role of Difference)

Every form of constituted reality presupposes that distinctions are drawn. Without difference, there would be no determinacy, no identity, and no order. Something appears as something only insofar as it is distinguished from something else. This distinction is not merely a subsequent description but a constitutive operation: it first brings forth the form in which something appears at all.

From this perspective, world is therefore not to be understood as a pregiven totality of things but as the result of differences that are selectively drawn and stabilized.

Such differences are not arbitrary but are bound to the structures within which they are operationally enacted. They open a horizon of possibilities, only some of which can be actualized at any given time. Every distinction determines not only what currently counts as real but also points toward other possibilities that are not realized in the act of determination. If something is determined, for example, as a "table" or a "tree," this occurs against the background of other possible determinations that are excluded but not erased. Likewise, abstract unities such as "justice" or symbolic forms such as mathematical signs actualize particular contents of meaning without closing the horizon of further possibilities of connection.

Constituted reality thus arises as the selective actualization of possibilities in which a particular determination is realized while others are deferred. World is consequently not given as ordered constituted reality independently of distinctions but appears only in the form in which it is determined through differences, transformed into unities, and stabilized in its connectivity.

Every actualization therefore has a double structure: it fixes a determination while simultaneously preserving the horizon of non-actualized possibilities from which further connections can emerge.

12.2 Unity Formation as the Stabilization of Difference

(How Stable Forms Arise from Differences)

The forms generated through difference do not necessarily remain unstable but can be stabilized through repetition and thereby retained as unities. Unity arises when a distinction is not merely enacted once but is taken up again in subsequent operations and confirmed in its form. Through this recursive repetition, difference acquires relative persistence: it appears as an identical unity, although it persists only insofar as the operations that bring it forth continue to connect with it.

Unity is therefore not to be understood as substance but as an effect of stabilized repetition. This processuality can be seen, for example, in the fact that an object such as a "table" counts as the same only insofar as it is recognized across different situations, used in comparable ways, and processed under the same distinctions. Its unity lies not in an independently existing identity but in the continued reproduction of those distinctions that determine it as a table.

The same applies to abstract and symbolic unities. Concepts such as "number" or "justice," scientific laws, or social identities possess their unity not by virtue of an inherent substance but because of the stability of the operations in which they are used, confirmed, and continued. A mathematical law counts as the same only insofar as it remains reproducible in different

contexts; a social identity persists only as long as it is continuously confirmed in communication and practice.

The stability of constituted reality therefore rests not upon fixed foundations but upon the continuous reproduction of unities that fix differences in repeatable form. These unities may appear as things, concepts, laws, or identities, but in every case they are to be understood as forms generated through differences and maintained through recursive stabilization.

Constituted reality appears stable insofar as the processes of its unity formation are reproduced with sufficient reliability.

12.3 Constituted Reality as an Effect of Unity Formation

(Order as Result, Not Presupposition)

If unities are generated and stabilized through differences, then the order of the world is not presupposed but is the result of these processes.

Constituted reality appears ordered because it is structured in unities.

This order, however, is not a representation of an independently existing structure but an effect of unity formation.

This perspective makes it possible to reinterpret the philosophical models analyzed above. They differ not primarily in how they describe a given world but in how they form and stabilize unities. Kant generates stable unities through *a priori* categories, Nietzsche through interpretation and power, Einstein through theoretical models, and Spinoza through ontological necessity. All these models can be understood as different forms of unity formation.

It thereby becomes clear that the plurality of philosophical positions does not point toward different realities but toward different forms of world constitution.

12.4 Relation between Stability and Instability

(Unity as a Temporary Achievement)

Unity is not a permanent given
but the temporary stabilization of a difference.

Unities often appear stable, enduring, and self-contained. This stability, however, is not to be understood as a permanent property of the unity itself but as the result of its ongoing reproduction. Unity is, in this sense, a temporary achievement: it exists only insofar as the operations through which it was brought forth continue to connect with it and reconfirm its form.

What appears as identical or persistent owes its duration not to an underlying substance but to the temporal continuity of repetitions in which the same distinction is actualized again and again. Unity is therefore not stable despite its temporality but only in the form of temporally continued stabilization.

It follows that every unity is unstable in principle. Its possibility of being called into question, altered, or dissolved is not an external exception but belongs to its internal structure. Because

unity exists only as reproduced unity, it always depends upon the continued availability of the conditions of its reproduction. If these conditions change, the unity itself changes.

The apparent permanence of things, concepts, institutions, or identities thus rests upon a precarious achievement that can at any time be interrupted, disturbed, or reorganized. Precisely therein lies its temporary character: unity is never a definitive state but always only a provisionally secured form.

The distinction introduced above between understanding and problem can once again be systematically situated here. Understanding designates those operations through which unities are stabilized in their validity, recognized, and embedded within existing nexuses. It secures their temporal continuability and thereby contributes to their reproduction.

The problem, by contrast, marks the point at which this reproduction no longer proceeds smoothly. It makes visible that unity is by no means self-evident but rests upon conditions that can fail or become insufficient. Problems thus disclose the instability inherent in every unity and at the same time open the possibility of its transformation.

Constituted reality therefore arises within a field of tension between stabilization and destabilization. It is to be understood neither as a completely fixed inventory nor as unlimited openness, but as the result of a dynamic process in which unities are temporarily consolidated and, under conditions of irritation, altered or dissolved.

The persistence of constituted reality consequently rests not upon immutable foundations but upon the capacity of systems continually to generate unities anew and maintain them for a certain period of time. This is precisely the meaning of defining unity as a temporary achievement.

12.5 Consequences for the Understanding of World

(From Ontology to Process Logic)

The thesis of unity formation leads to a fundamental redetermination of the concept of world.

First, world is no longer understood as an ontological given but as the result of processes. The question of being is replaced by the question of the emergence of unities.

Second, it becomes clear that order does not precede these processes but is generated through them. Constituted reality is not what is, but what appears as ordered.

Third, the role of the subject is relativized. World arises not through an isolated subject but through systemic processes that operate independently of individual perspectives.

Fourth, every form of constituted reality becomes visible as contingent. It rests upon particular distinctions that could also have been drawn differently.

This shift can be illustrated through the classical philosophical positions. In Kant, world is not thought as immediately given but as structured through the forms of intuition and the categories of the understanding. The unity of experience arises through the synthetic activity of the understanding. From the perspective of unity formation, this can be read as an early attempt to

determine the genesis of unity as a condition of constituted reality, even though it remains bound to a transcendental subject.

With Nietzsche, the focus shifts. Unity no longer appears as a necessary condition of knowledge but as the result of interpretations shaped by relations of force and perspectives. What appears as world is a configuration of interpretations in which particular unities prevail and stabilize themselves. The thesis of unity formation can take this up by conceiving unity as the effect of selective stabilization without binding it to personal perspectives.

A comparable shift can also be observed in the natural sciences. In Einstein's theory of relativity, space and time are no longer given as absolute magnitudes but depend upon relations and conditions of observation. The unity of physical quantities arises from structural relations, not from an antecedent order. From the perspective developed here, this can be understood as an indication that physical constituted reality, too, appears only within particular forms of unity formation.

Finally, Baruch Spinoza offers a position in which world is conceived as a single substance expressing itself in infinitely many attributes and modes. The unity of the world is here posited ontologically. By contrast, the thesis of unity formation shows that unity need not be presupposed but can itself be understood as the result of difference and stabilization. Spinozistic unity thereby appears as a specific form of fixation rather than as an ultimate foundation.

The thesis of unity formation thus constitutes the theoretical core of the present study. It makes it possible to evaluate different world-models not according to whether they correctly represent an objective reality but according to how they generate and stabilize unities and render them plausible within their respective nexuses. In this way, structural commonalities and differences between philosophical positions can be made visible without recourse to an external standard of truth that classifies the models as right or wrong independently of their own structural conditions.

13. Static Unity Formation

(Order through Fixed Forms, Concepts, and Structures)

The thesis of unity formation has shown that constituted reality arises through processes in which differences are stabilized and fixed as unities. These processes can assume different forms. One fundamental form is **static unity formation**.

Static unity formation designates that mode of world constitution in which unities appear as stable, enduring, and independent of their process of emergence. They are understood not as the result of ongoing operations but as given or necessarily determined structures.

This form of unity formation is characteristic of many philosophical and scientific models. It makes it possible to conceive constituted reality as an ordered whole in which objects, properties, and relations possess a fixed identity.

13.1 Unity as Fixed Form

(Stability through Abstraction and Fixation)

In static unity formation, unities appear as fixed forms. They are conceived as self-identical and retain their determination independently of concrete situations or perspectives. This stability arises through abstraction: different appearances are subsumed under a common concept and thereby determined as an identical unity. The unity thus formed appears independent of the concrete processes through which it was brought forth.

From this perspective, unity is understood as something that persists. It possesses a clear boundary, a defined identity, and a stable relation to other unities. Precisely this form of stabilization makes it possible to apprehend constituted reality as structured and calculable. It thereby creates the basis for concepts such as object, substance, or law.

13.2 Understanding as Stabilization of Order

(The Priority of Consistency and Identity)

In static unity formation, understanding is conceived primarily as the stabilization of order. Something counts as understood when it can be unequivocally determined, placed within a system, and related to other unities through fixed relations.

Understanding here aims at consistency: contradictions are avoided, ambiguities reduced, and uncertainties excluded. Constituted reality appears as a coherent whole in which every element has its fixed place.

The problem recedes into the background from this perspective. It appears as a disturbance of an otherwise ordered structure and is treated as something that must be overcome or resolved. This form of understanding generates a world that is stable, calculable, and intersubjectively accessible. It thereby forms the basis of many scientific and philosophical systems.

13.3 Difference as Secondary Order

(Differences Are Overformed by Unities)

In static unity formation, difference is not understood as the constitutive operation from which unities first emerge but as a subsequent distinction between already determined unities. Differences appear from this perspective not as productive acts of distinction through which determinacy is first generated, but as relations occurring within an already presupposed order. They therefore possess no independent structure-forming status but are interpreted from the standpoint of stable unities and incorporated into an overarching order.

This shift rests upon an axiomatic positing of unity. Identity, determinacy, and order are not demonstrated as results of processes of distinction and stabilization but presupposed as points of departure. Unity thereby appears as primary, difference as secondary. The question concerning the genesis of order recedes in favor of the assumption of an already structured constituted reality within which differences can merely be identified and described.

Under these conditions, difference can appear only as variation within a given nexus, not as its constitutive condition. As a consequence of this axiomatic priority of unity, the relation between stability and process changes fundamentally. Stability is no longer understood as the effect of ongoing reproduction but as a property of unities themselves. Unity counts as that which guarantees identity, fixes boundaries, and unequivocally determines relations to other unities. Difference thereby loses its operative character and is reduced to a derivative function.

The result is a world-view in which order appears as given or at least as fundamentally presupposable. Constituted reality is understood as a structured whole in which unities occupy fixed places and stand in stable relations to one another. The processual character of unity formation recedes behind the conception of an already ordered world.

The axiomatic positing of unity thereby conceals the fact that this order, too, arises only under particular conditions and is by no means independent of the processes through which it is brought forth.

13.4 Philosophical Models of Static Unity Formation

(Kant and Spinoza as Paradigmatic Examples)

The previously analyzed positions of Kant and Spinoza can be understood as paradigmatic examples of static unity formation.

In Kant, unities arise through *a priori* categories that order the manifold of experience. These categories are necessary and unchanging and generate a stable structure of constituted reality.

In Spinoza, unity is conceived even more radically. The whole of constituted reality is understood as the expression of a single substance whose order is necessary and completely determined. Unity here is not the result of a process but the ontological point of departure.

The two models differ in their presuppositions but share the assumption that order rests upon stable unities. Constituted reality appears structured because it is determined through fixed forms.

13.5 Limits of Static Unity Formation

(The Invisibility of Process)

Static unity formation makes possible a world that appears stable, coherent, and calculable. Precisely this achievement constitutes its strength, but at the same time its limitation. For to the extent that unities appear as fixed forms, the process through which they are brought forth becomes invisible. Unities then appear as given even though they are results of operative achievements.

At the same time, the contingency of constituted reality is concealed: what counts as necessary and self-evident rests upon particular distinctions and stabilizations and could equally well have been formed differently.

This concealment is accompanied by a systematic underestimation of difference. Because unities occupy the foreground, their dependence upon constitutive distinctions recedes from view. The problem, too, appears only as an external disturbance rather than as a structurally necessary moment of every constitution of constituted reality. Irritations are thereby marginalized even though they reveal precisely that no unity is definitively secured.

Static unity formation thus proves to be a limited form of world constitution: it explains the stability of constituted reality but not adequately its genesis, provisionality, and transformability. This gives rise to the need for a complementary perspective that understands constituted reality not primarily from finished unities but from the processes of their formation, reproduction, and transformation.

13.6 Consequences for the Further Investigation

(Static Unity Formation as a Necessary but Limited Perspective)

The analysis of static unity formation shows that it represents a fundamental but insufficient form of world constitution. It is necessary because it enables stability, order, and orientation. Without it, reality would not be manageable. At the same time, it is limited because it conceals the processes through which this order emerges. It fixes what is in fact dynamic and presents as given what is produced.

In the further course of the study, therefore, a second form of unity formation will be examined that places this processuality at the center: **dynamic unity formation**. This perspective is intended to show that constituted reality consists not only of stable unities but of processes in which these unities are continuously generated and transformed.

14. Dynamic Unity Formation

(Order as Process and Temporal Self-Production)

Whereas static unity formation describes constituted reality primarily as structured through fixed forms, dynamic unity formation places at the center the process through which such forms are first brought forth, stabilized, and transformed. Dynamic unity formation designates that mode of world constitution in which unities are not presupposed as given entities but understood as temporary results of ongoing operations.

From this perspective, constituted reality appears not as a stable configuration of already determined forms but as an occurrence in which order develops only insofar as distinctions are enacted, repeated, modified, and secured in their connectivity. Order is therefore not the point of departure but the effect of a processual nexus.

This perspective makes visible that unity does not exist independently of time, difference, and process. It arises in the enactment of operations and persists only insofar as these operations are continued and recursively connected with one another. Unity is thus not a fixed substance but a temporally bound stabilization whose persistence always depends upon the conditions of its reproduction.

Constituted reality consequently appears not as a closed system of finished unities but as a dynamic nexus in which forms arise, become consolidated, are irritated, and can be reconstituted under changed conditions. Dynamic unity formation thus aims at reconstructing those processes through which constituted reality does not simply exist but is continuously brought forth.

Order is therefore not the point of departure
but the effect of a processual nexus.

14.1 Unity as Process

(The Temporal Generation of Stability)

In dynamic unity formation, unity is not a state but a process. It arises through repeated operations that stabilize differences and thereby generate a form of continuity. This continuity, however, must not be misunderstood as static identity. Rather, it is a temporal achievement: a unity persists only insofar as it is continuously generated anew in ongoing operations and confirmed in its form. Without this continued reproduction, it would not simply persist unchanged but would lose its determinacy.

Unity therefore cannot be conceived independently of time but must be understood as the effect of processes that unfold in time and acquire stability only within it.

This can be shown equally in concrete and abstract unities. A social nexus such as an institution—for example, a university or a court, exists as a unity not because it is grounded in an immutable substance but because rules, forms of communication, decision-making procedures, and symbolic orders are continuously reproduced. The institution remains the same only insofar as these operations connect with one another and repeatedly confirm its unity.

The same applies to personal identity. In everyday life, a person appears self-identical even though they are constantly changing biographically, physically, and psychologically. Their

unity rests not upon timeless sameness but upon the continuous linking of memories, ascriptions, social expectations, and self-interpretations. Identity appears here as continuity through reproduction, not as stasis in relation to time.

The same can also be illustrated with abstract unities. A concept such as “justice” or “state” remains the same only insofar as it can be taken up again in different contexts, interpreted, and connected with new situations. Its identity lies not in an immutable essence but in the stability of its repeatable use. The same structure can also be observed in the natural sciences: a law or theoretical concept possesses unity not independently of its application but insofar as it remains reproducible in different contexts and can be treated as the same nexus despite varying situations.

Stability in all these cases is not the opposite of change but a particular form of its organization.

Dynamic unity formation thereby dissolves the apparent self-evidence of identity. What appears identical proves, on closer examination, to be the result of a process that continuously bridges differences without abolishing them. Unity is consequently not to be understood as timeless sameness but as temporally organized continuity. Precisely therein lies the decisive difference from static unity formation: identity is grounded not in the absence of change but in the capacity of a nexus to reproduce itself through change in such a way that it can continue to be determined as the same.

Identity appears here as continuity through reproduction,
not as stasis in relation to time.

14.2 Difference as a Productive Force

(The Dynamics of Distinction)

In dynamic unity formation, difference assumes a central role. It is not only the condition of the possibility of unity but the driving force of its emergence. Differences generate tension, variation, and change. They prevent unities from becoming completely stable and at the same time open up the possibility of new forms.

Unity therefore arises not despite difference but through it. Differences are not abolished but selectively stabilized, whereby this stabilization always remains provisional and can at any time be irritated or reorganized.

This can be seen paradigmatically in abstraction. When different concrete appearances are brought together under a general concept, their differences are not eliminated but transferred into a particular order. Abstraction therefore consists not in the erasure of difference but in its selective processing in favor of a provisionally stable unity.

Difference is thus not something that must first be ordered but the medium in which order arises at all. Abstract unities such as “state,” “truth,” or “justice” likewise exist only insofar as they are taken up again in different contexts, varied, and nevertheless treated as identifiable unities. Their stability lies not in substantial identity but in the reproducibility of a form that orders differences without making them disappear.

From this perspective, constituted reality consequently appears not as a closed system but as an open process of unity formation in which differences are the condition both of stability and of change.

14.3 Understanding and Problem as Process Dynamics

(The Continuous Transformation of Meaning)

The distinction between understanding and problem acquires its full significance within dynamic unity formation. Understanding stabilizes unities by fixing particular differences and transforming them into coherent nexuses. It generates continuity, secures connectivity, and makes it possible for operations not to remain isolated but to be embedded within continuable nexuses of meaning.

The problem, by contrast, interrupts this stability. It makes visible that existing forms are insufficient for apprehending new situations and thereby opens new possibilities of meaning formation.

From the dynamic perspective, the problem is therefore not an exceptional case but a constitutive element. It marks the limits of existing stabilization and, precisely thereby, acts as the motor of the process of unity formation. Understanding and problem thus do not form a mere opposition but a dynamic unity: understanding creates stability; the problem compels change.

From this perspective, constituted reality arises in the continuous interplay of both, that is, in the ongoing tension between the stabilization of forms and their possible irritation.

14.4 Temporality and Recursion

(Constituted Reality as Continuous Self-Reference)

Dynamic unity formation is inseparably connected with time. Time is not merely an external framework within which processes take place but the condition of their possibility.

Unities arise through recursive processes in which operations connect with earlier operations. This self-reference generates a form of continuity that appears as identity.

Recursion means that a system incorporates its own past into its present. In this way, a structure arises that stabilizes itself without depending upon a fixed foundation. Temporality appears here not as a linear sequence but as continuous actualization.

Constituted reality is what arises in the moment of operation while simultaneously referring back to earlier states.

This perspective makes clear that stability is a temporal achievement. It arises not through immutability but through the continuous reproduction of forms.

14.5 Philosophical Models of Dynamic Unity Formation

(Nietzsche and Systems Theory as Paradigmatic Examples)

The previously analyzed position of Nietzsche and the systems-theoretical perspective can be understood as paradigmatic examples of dynamic unity formation.

In Nietzsche, constituted reality arises through interpretation, which provisionally stabilizes chaotic becoming. Unity is here an effect of forces that assert themselves and fix meanings.

In systems theory, this idea is formalized. Systems generate their constituted reality through operations that stabilize differences and bring forth unities. These unities, however, are not permanent but must be continuously reproduced.

Both approaches share the insight that constituted reality does not precede the process but arises within it. **Order is not a point of departure but the result of a process.**

14.6 Consequences for the Understanding of World

(Constituted Reality as an Open, Processual Nexus)

Dynamic unity formation leads to a fundamental redetermination of the concept of world because it conceives constituted reality not from finished forms but from the processes through which they are brought forth. From this perspective, constituted reality appears not as an inventory of what is but as an occurrence in which unities continuously form, stabilize, and change.

Stability is thereby also redefined. It no longer counts as an original property of constituted reality but as the effect of repeated operations through which particular differences are fixed in a temporarily persistent form. What appears enduring, identical, or reliable therefore rests not upon an ultimate foundation but upon the continued reproduction of those forms that make order possible.

Within this context, difference also acquires a new status. It is no longer to be understood as a deficit, disturbance, or deviation to be overcome but as the condition of every form of order. For only because distinctions are drawn, varied, and stabilized anew can unities arise at all.

The problem is likewise redefined. It appears not as a mere interruption of an intrinsically closed order but as a constitutive moment of those processes in which unities reveal their limits and new forms are brought forth.

It thereby becomes visible that constituted reality is fundamentally open. It is neither completely determinable nor fixed once and for all but changes in the enactment of its own processes. Dynamic unity formation therefore not only supplements the static perspective but simultaneously corrects it: it makes clear that constituted reality may appear in stable forms, but has its ground in processes of continuous self-production.

15. Identity, Relation, and Time

(Consequences of Unity Formation for the Understanding of World)

The theory of unity formation has shown that constituted reality cannot be understood as a given structure but as the result of processes in which differences are stabilized and unities generated. This perspective has far-reaching consequences for fundamental philosophical concepts.

In particular, the concepts of identity, relation, and time must be redetermined. In classical models, they frequently appear as fundamental properties of world. Within the framework of the present investigation, however, they prove themselves to be results of processes of unity formation.

In what follows, these concepts are therefore treated not as presupposed categories but as forms that arise within world constitution.

15.1 Identity as Process

(Self-Sameness as the Result of Continuous Stabilization)

In many philosophical traditions, identity is understood as the property by virtue of which something remains identical with itself. This presupposes the existence of stable unities that persist independently of change.

The theory of unity formation rejects such a presupposition. According to it, identity does not precede the process but is the result of processes in which differences are stabilized, reproduced over time, and transformed into continuity. Something counts as identical only insofar as it can repeatedly be determined as the same in successive operations.

This determination, however, is not the simple recurrence of the ever-same but an operative achievement of bridging difference. Identity is therefore to be understood not as a static property but as a processual form of continuity. Its stability remains fundamentally precarious because it rests not upon an ultimate foundation but upon the continuous reproduction of the unities that sustain it. Identity can therefore at any time be irritated, altered, or dissolved.

15.2 Relation as Operation

(Relations as Generated Connections)

Relations are frequently understood as connections between already existing unities. This presupposes that unities exist independently of their relations and are only subsequently connected with one another.

The theory of unity formation calls this conception into question. According to it, relations are not secondary but arise within the same process as the unities themselves. A relation is therefore not to be understood as a connection between finished things but as an operation of relating through which both the relation and the unities related by it are first brought forth.

Relations are consequently not mere properties of the world but forms of its constitution. They determine not only how unities are connected with one another but also the manner in which these unities can appear as meaning-bearing forms. The separation between unity and relation

thereby proves to be derivative. Both arise within the same constitutive nexus and are inseparably connected.

15.3 Time as a Condition of Unity Formation

(Temporality as a Structure of the Production of Constituted Reality)

Time is frequently understood as a dimension within which events take place. This presupposes that an already existing world undergoes changes within a temporal medium external to it. The theory of unity formation rejects this assumption.

According to it, time is itself part of the constitutive process through which constituted reality is brought forth. Unities can appear as enduring only if they are reproduced across different operations, and this reproduction presupposes a differentiation of past, present, and future.

Time is therefore not an external framework of constituted reality but a condition of its constitution. Without time, there would be neither the stabilization of unities nor their transformation nor the continuity within which something can be continued as the same. At the same time, time does not arise independently of the processes that take place within it but only in the enactment of operations that refer to one another.

Temporality thus designates the self-referential structure of constituted reality: the manner in which it preserves what is past, actualizes what is present, and opens what is future as a horizon of further unity formation.

15.4 Interplay of Identity, Relation, and Time

(The Structure of the Constitution of Constituted Reality)

The concepts of identity, relation, and time are not to be understood independently of one another but form an interconnected structure within the process of unity formation.

Identity designates not a pre-existing self-sameness but the determinability of a unity as the same across different operations. A unity can appear as identical only if it does not begin completely anew in every enactment but is continued in a manner that enables recognizability. Identity therefore already depends upon temporal continuity and upon those connections through which individual operations are joined into a nexus.

These connections can be determined as relations. Relations are not merely subsequent connections between already finished unities but those forms of connection through which unities can appear within a nexus at all. They establish that one operation can be related to another, that something can be determined as continuation, repetition, variation, or opposition. Relations thus contribute essentially to the stabilization of identity because they connect individual enactments in such a way that a unity can be reproduced as the same across differences. Identity therefore cannot be thought without relationality; it rests precisely upon different moments being placed in a structured relation to one another.

Time, in turn, is the condition under which such relations of continuation and reproduction become possible at all. Only if a distinction is made between past, present, and future can something be determined as having already been, as presently actual, or as capable of future connection. Temporality thereby opens the horizon within which relations become effective and identity can develop.

At the same time, time, relation, and identity cannot themselves be isolated from one another but arise jointly within the process of unity formation.

From this perspective, constituted reality appears as a nexus in which unities are stabilized through relations over time. This stabilization, however, remains fundamentally incomplete: it must be continuously reproduced and therefore remains open to displacement, irritation, and change.

15.5 Redetermination of the Concept of World

(World as a Processual Structure of Stabilization and Change)

The redetermination of identity, relation, and time leads to a fundamental revision of the concept of world. World no longer appears as an inventory of fixed things but as a nexus of processes in which identities are brought forth, relations formed, and temporal structures constituted.

From this perspective, constituted reality is to be understood neither as a sum of isolated unities nor as a timelessly given order but as a configuration of continuous connections in which unities develop and stabilize in the enactment of operations. Time proves not to be an external framework but a constitutive moment of these processes, while stability is not the opposite of change but must be understood as its particular, self-reproducing form.

This gives rise to a conception of world that is neither purely static nor purely dynamic but mediates both aspects within a processual structure. Constituted reality appears as a nexus in which order and change do not exist separately from one another but mutually bring one another forth. Unity, relation, and time are not independent of one another but form an interconnected structure within which the conditions of the possibility of constituted reality organize themselves.

This also shifts the theoretical status of the present reflections. The theory of unity formation is not merely to be understood as a description of individual phenomena but as a systematic approach determining the form in which constituted reality can appear at all. It formulates an ontology without classical ontology by conceiving being not as substance but as a process of unity formation; an epistemology without a correspondence model by conceiving truth as the system-internal stabilization of meaning; and a processual theory of world in which constituted reality is understood as the continuous formation, stabilization, and transformation of unities.

This determination simultaneously establishes the systematic position of the theory presented here within the philosophical field. It stands close to systems-theoretical, difference-philosophical, and process-ontological approaches insofar as it conceives constituted reality not as a given inventory but as the result of processes. At the same time, it differs from these positions by not presupposing unity but determining it as the result of difference and stabilization. It thereby combines the insight into the processuality of constituted reality with an analysis of the forms in which stability develops within these processes.

The theory of unity formation thus aims not at describing a particular constituted reality but at determining that structure within which constituted reality becomes possible at all. It understands itself as a contribution to a systematic philosophy that does not presuppose the conditions of the possibility of order, identity, and change but reconstructs them from the processes through which they are brought forth.

16. New Realism as an Ontology of Static Unities

(Facts, Fields of Sense, and Independent World-Structure)

Following the development of a theory of unity formation, the question arises as to the extent to which its viability can be tested against concrete philosophical positions. The present chapter therefore pursues not primarily a reconstructive but an exemplary and evaluative aim. New Realism is treated here not merely as another position within contemporary debate but as a paradigmatic countermodel to the perspective developed here.

This countermodel is paradigmatic insofar as it brings together, in particularly clear form, the assumptions of a reality independent of thought, given unities, stable facts, and a world-structure that is not constituted but precedes constitution.

Precisely for this reason, New Realism is suitable not merely as an example but as a theoretically illuminating test case: it makes it possible to show what a world-model looks like that does not derive unity from difference and stabilization but presupposes it ontologically. The analysis of this countermodel thus serves to make visible the presuppositions, scope, and limits of the theory of unity formation in an exemplary and systematically sharpened case.

So-called New Realism claims to rehabilitate the existence of a reality independent of thought. Against constructivist, relativist, and systems-theoretical approaches, this position advances the thesis that there is an objective world that is not brought forth through processes of knowledge but exists independently of them. It thereby stands in a fundamental tension with the perspective developed here, which understands constituted reality not as a given inventory but as the result of processes of unity formation.

Within the framework of the present investigation, New Realism is therefore read as a model of static unity formation. It describes a form of world constitution in which unities appear not as the result of difference and stabilization but are presupposed as ontologically given. The analysis of this approach serves to determine more precisely both the scope and the limits of such a perspective in comparison with the theory of unity formation.

16.1 Reality as a Presupposed Structure

(Ontological Independence as a Point of Departure)

New Realism proceeds from the assumption that there is a reality that exists independently of every form of thinking, knowing, or observing. This reality is not merely a regulative concept but an ontologically determined structure that forms the point of reference of all knowledge. Knowledge is possible because statements can refer to real states of affairs that exist independently of them.

In contrast to Kant, reality is not divided here into a world accessible only as appearance and a fundamentally unknowable thing in itself, but is conceived as in principle accessible. Likewise, in contrast to Nietzsche and systems-theoretical positions, reality is not understood as an effect of interpretation, perspective, or operation but as that to which such processes refer. Reality thus counts not as first constituted through knowledge but as independently existing and in principle knowable.

This perspective rests upon an axiomatic positing: reality is presupposed as independent and structured without itself being demonstrated as the result of processes. The question concerning

the genesis of constituted reality thereby recedes in favor of the assumption of an already existing order. The question concerning the genesis of constituted reality recedes in favor of the assumption of an already existing order, whereby the distinction between reality and constituted reality that is central to the present investigation simultaneously becomes blurred, since constituted reality no longer appears as a constituted form of appearance but primarily as the disclosure of a presupposed reality.

16.2 Facts and Fields of Sense as Static Unities

(The Structure of World as an Ontologically Given Configuration)

A central element of New Realism is the assumption that the world consists of a plurality of facts organized in so-called fields of sense. A field of sense designates a domain in which particular objects and facts appear. These fields of sense are not products of processes of knowledge but real structures that exist independently of whether they are known.

Facts are understood as fundamental unities. They consist in something being the case, independently of how or whether it is described. Truth results from statements correctly apprehending these facts. Constituted reality thereby appears as an articulated configuration of stable facts that exist independently of processes through which they are brought forth.

From this perspective, the world is described as an order of static unities. Fields of sense structure this order without themselves being demonstrated as results of operations of differentiation. Unity appears here as primarily presupposed, not as a result.

16.3 Understanding as Referential Relation to World

(Knowledge as the Apprehension of Given Facts)

Within New Realism, understanding is described as a process in which thought refers to real states of affairs. Knowledge consists in identifying facts and describing them correctly. Understanding is therefore not constructive but referential: it is directed toward something that exists independently of thought.

This perspective connects with classical conceptions of truth. A statement is true when it corresponds to a fact. Truth is thus understood as correspondence between statement and reality. The possibility of knowledge rests upon the assumption that such correspondence is in principle attainable.

The problem does not appear in this context as a constitutive moment of constituted reality but as an epistemic difficulty. It arises where facts have not yet been recognized or have been described incorrectly. Its function is to mark deficits of knowledge, not to affect the structure of constituted reality itself.

16.4 Unity as Ontological Givenness

(Substantial Stability instead of Processual Formation)

The central role of unity in New Realism becomes apparent in the assumption that the world consists of clearly determined, mutually distinguishable unities. Objects, properties, and facts exist independently of the operations through which they are known. Unity is here not functional or processual but ontologically given.

This conception implies that stability need not be understood as the result of reproduction but as a property of things themselves. Unities retain their identity independently of temporal processes and changes. Difference appears in this context as a relation between already existing unities, not as a condition of their emergence.

This gives rise to a world-view in which stability takes priority over process and order is presupposed as given. Unity functions as the foundation of the world, not as the result of its constitution.

16.5 Limits of New Realism from the Perspective of Unity Formation
(Concealment of Process, Difference, and Contingency)

From the perspective of the theory of unity formation, New Realism proves to rest upon a series of implicit presuppositions that conceal the process of world constitution. The central assumption consists in treating unities as given rather than demonstrating them as results of processes of differentiation and stabilization. The operative genesis of constituted reality thereby becomes invisible. An object such as a "table" or a "planet," for example, appears as an already determined unity whose identity is thought independently of the operations through which it is identified, delimited, and placed within nexuses. The processes of differentiation through which something is first determined as a unity recede behind the assumption of an already existing determinacy.

In particular, the role of difference is systematically underestimated. Differences appear merely as differences between already existing unities, not as constitutive operations through which unities first arise. Thus, for example, the difference between two objects is understood as a relation between already given things rather than as the result of distinctions through which these things are first determined as distinct from one another.

Temporality likewise remains underdetermined. Stability is understood not as an effect of continuous reproduction but as a property of unities themselves. A scientific state of affairs or a law of nature thereby appears as timelessly valid without taking into account that its identity is stabilized only through continued application, repetition, and confirmation. The possibility of change consequently becomes secondary.

The problem, too, is marginalized. It appears only as an epistemic difficulty, not as a constitutive moment of the formation of constituted reality. An error or contradictory observation is thus interpreted as a deficit of knowledge rather than as an indication that existing unities or patterns of order themselves might be inadequate. The contingency of constituted reality is thereby concealed. What appears necessary—such as the structure of a particular field of sense or the validity of a fact—rests, from this perspective, upon presupposed structures that are not further justified and therefore do not become visible as results among alternative possibilities.

New Realism thus makes possible a stable and coherent description of world, but purchases this stability at the cost of excluding those processes through which constituted reality comes about at all. The unity of the world appears as given rather than brought forth; its order as antecedent rather than as the result of selective stabilization.

The processes of differentiation recede behind an axiomatic positing of determinacy and order.

16.6 Consequences: World as Static Order

(A Realist Model of Ontologically Fixed Unities)

New Realism thus develops a world-model in which reality is understood as independent and structured. Constituted reality appears as access to this reality, while truth is determined as correspondence between statement and state of affairs. Unity is presupposed as ontologically given, while difference and time recede into the background.

This model enables a description of world characterized by stability, unambiguity, and intersubjective accessibility. At the same time, the analysis shows that this stability rests upon presuppositions that do not capture the processual character of constituted reality.

In comparison with the theory of unity formation, it becomes clear that this is a model of static unity formation. Constituted reality appears as an order of given unities, not as a process through which they are brought forth. The distinction between reality and constituted reality is thereby also tendentially flattened, since constituted reality is no longer determined as an autonomous form of constitution but primarily as epistemic access to a presupposed reality. Reality and constituted reality thus blur into one another insofar as both are no longer systematically distinguished but related to the structure of an already given order.

Precisely in this difference it becomes visible how the theory of unity formation opens an alternative perspective in which unity, difference, and time are understood not separately but as moments of a common constitutive process.

17. Critique from the Perspective of Unity Formation

(Why Static Models of Reality Are Problematic)

New Realism claims to rehabilitate a reality independent of thought and thereby to secure the foundation of objective knowledge. Within the framework of the present investigation, it has been shown that this approach rests upon the assumption of static unities that are supposed to exist independently of processes of world constitution.

The theory of unity formation makes it possible to examine these assumptions systematically. It becomes apparent that New Realism does not sufficiently take into account central aspects of the constitution of constituted reality. In particular, the processes through which unities arise and are stabilized are themselves presupposed as ontologically given.

The following critique is therefore directed not against individual theses but against the structural presuppositions of this approach.

17.1 The Problem of Independence

(Why Reality Cannot Be Thought Independently of Distinction)

New Realism assumes that reality exists independently of every form of knowledge, description, or observation. This assumption initially possesses considerable plausibility because it promises to secure the possibility of objective knowledge: if reality exists independently, then knowledge can be understood as referring to something that is not first brought forth by the act of knowing.

From the perspective of the theory of unity formation, however, it becomes apparent that such independence cannot be conceptually captured in an immediate way. For every determination of reality presupposes that distinctions are drawn through which it is first established what appears as something and how it differs from something else.

Herein lies the fundamental problem. The reality that is thought as independent of knowledge can be described only in forms brought forth through distinctions, concepts, and relations. The description of reality therefore remains unavoidably bound to precisely those operations from which its independence is asserted.

The assumption of a completely independent reality can consequently claim only the status of a limiting concept: it is thinkable as an assumption but cannot be positively determined without recourse to the processes of world constitution that it simultaneously seeks to exclude. Precisely in this respect, it becomes apparent that the assertion of ontological independence may fulfill a regulative function but cannot be redeemed in a description that dispenses with constitutive distinctions.

17.2 The Problem of Stability

(Why Unities Cannot Be Presupposed)

New Realism understands the world as a configuration of stable unities that exist independently of the processes through which they are known. Objects, properties, and facts appear from this perspective as given and form the basis of what counts as constituted reality. Precisely therein

lies the theoretical strength of this approach: it enables a description of world in which stability, unambiguity, and objectivity appear secured.

From the perspective of the theory of unity formation, however, it becomes apparent that this stability cannot simply be presupposed. Unities are not to be understood as finished entities but as results of processes in which differences are selectively stabilized, repeated, and reproduced across different operations.

If unity is assumed as given, the process of its emergence becomes invisible. What appears as stable, identical, and necessary can then no longer be recognized as an effect of ongoing operations but assumes the character of an ontological self-evidence. Precisely thereby, the contingency of constituted reality is concealed. Unities appear necessary even though they rest upon specific distinctions and could therefore in principle also have been formed differently.

New Realism thus explains stability by presupposing it; the theory of unity formation, by contrast, begins at the point at which stability itself becomes something requiring explanation. It asks not which finished unities underlie the world but how it is possible in the first place for something to appear stably as a unity.

17.3 The Problem of Temporality

(Why Static Models Miss the Processual Structure of Constituted Reality)

A further central point concerns the role of time. In New Realism, the world appears as a set of facts that exist independently of their temporal emergence. Time tends in this context to be understood as an external framework within which changes occur to already determined objects or states of affairs. The identity of unities is regarded not as temporally brought forth but as fundamentally independent of temporal processes. The world can thereby be described as a configuration of stable facts whose determinacy need not first be explained through their temporal genesis.

From the perspective of the theory of unity formation, precisely this proves problematic. Time is not merely the medium in which already existing unities undergo changes but itself a constitutive condition of their stability. Unities can appear as enduring only if they are reproduced across different operations and continuously confirmed in their identity.

This can be illustrated by the concept of the self. In everyday life, the self appears as a self-identical unity even though it changes in every situation. Its identity rests not upon a timeless substance but upon different experiences, memories, and self-ascriptions being connected in such a way that they appear to belong together. The self is therefore not independent of time but exists only insofar as it reproduces itself in time.

Stability in this case is not the opposite of change but its organized form. Static models miss this structure because they treat unities as essentially timeless and thereby overlook that their persistence arises only from the continuity of their repetition. The dynamics of constituted reality are thereby excluded: change appears secondary even though it is constitutive of the possibility of stability itself.

17.4 The Problem of the Problem

(Why Irritation Is Not Merely Epistemic)

New Realism interprets problems primarily as epistemic phenomena. They arise where facts have not yet been recognized, have been inadequately described, or have been incorrectly classified. Problems therefore designate primarily deficits of knowledge, not moments affecting the structure of constituted reality itself. The world is regarded as fundamentally ordered and determinate; what is problematic is not its constitution but at most our incomplete or erroneous access to it. The problem thereby appears as a provisional limit of knowledge, not as a constitutive element of what is to be known.

Within the theory of unity formation, by contrast, the problem acquires a deeper structural significance. Problems arise where existing forms of unity formation are no longer sufficient to process new situations, integrate new differences, or maintain previously stable nexuses. They therefore mark not merely a deficit of knowledge but make visible that constituted reality itself is not completely stabilized.

Precisely therein lies their constitutive function: problems indicate the limits of existing orders and simultaneously open the possibility of their transformation. By reducing the problem to an epistemic dimension, New Realism fails to recognize this structural role. Irritation then appears as an exceptional case within a world that is ordered in itself, although it is in fact a necessary component of those processes in which constituted reality is formed, stabilized, and changed.

17.5 Consequences of the Critique

(Unity Formation as a More Comprehensive Theory of World Constitution)

The analysis of New Realism shows that it enables a stable and internally coherent description of world but leaves central moments of the constitution of constituted reality unconsidered. It proceeds from stable unities without sufficiently explaining the processes of their emergence and reproduction. Objects, facts, and fields of sense appear as ontologically given, although their determinacy becomes intelligible only when the differences, distinctions, and achievements of stabilization through which they emerge as unities are also reconstructed. Precisely this operative genesis remains concealed in New Realism.

This can be seen exemplarily in the domain of feelings and emotions. In everyday life, emotions often appear as clearly determinable states—such as “fear,” “joy,” or “grief”—that can be presupposed as given. On closer examination, however, they prove to be highly processual phenomena that stabilize themselves only in the interplay of bodily states, situational interpretations, linguistic distinctions, and social contexts. What appears as a particular emotion is therefore not simply given but the result of processes of differentiation and stabilization that are not themselves thematized in New Realism.

In addition, reality is presupposed as independent without this independence being conceptually determinable in positive terms. The reality to which New Realism appeals is supposed to exist beyond constitution, yet it can be described only in the concepts and distinctions that are themselves part of processes of world constitution. This, too, can be illustrated by emotions: feelings appear as immediately real and independent, yet they are determinable only insofar as they are distinguished, named, and placed within nexuses. Their supposed independence is therefore not independent of the forms of their articulation and stabilization.

Time and the problem are likewise reduced to secondary phenomena. Time appears primarily as an external framework of already existing facts, while the problem is treated as an epistemic deficit rather than as a constitutive moment in the transformation of constituted reality.

Emotions, however, make particularly clear that stability is only temporary: feelings change, shift into one another, contradict one another, or dissolve. Their identity rests upon continuous reproduction and always remains precarious.

The theory of unity formation, by contrast, offers a more comprehensive perspective. It does not presuppose stability but explains it; it treats unities not as given but as results of difference, temporality, and reproduction; and it understands irritation not as an exception but as a necessary moment of every formation of constituted reality.

New Realism is thereby not simply refuted but delimited in its scope. It appears as a specific model of static unity formation that possesses considerable explanatory power under conditions of stabilized order but cannot adequately account for the genesis, processuality, and contingency of constituted reality.

The decisive limit of New Realism therefore lies in its ontological presupposition of stability where stability would have to be explained as a processual result.

18. Result and Outlook

(Synthesis and Theoretical Consequences)

The present investigation began with the question of how constituted reality can be understood when different philosophical models not only provide different answers but each bring forth their own forms of world. The point of departure was the observation that classical positions such as those of Kant, Nietzsche, Einstein, and Spinoza do not simply represent competing descriptions of one uniform world but different ways of constituting world.

The aim of the study was not to evaluate these models with regard to their truth but to reconstruct their structural logic and integrate them into a common theoretical framework.

18.1 Synthesis of the Results

(World as the Result of Different Forms of Unity Formation)

The analysis has shown that the positions examined can be understood as different forms of unity formation. Kant stabilizes constituted reality through *a priori* categories, Nietzsche generates it through interpretation and perspective, Einstein discloses it through theoretical models, and Spinoza grounds it in an ontological unity. These differences do not point toward different realities but toward different ways of generating constituted reality.

The systems-theoretical perspective made it possible to reconstruct these models as systems of meaning production. Constituted reality appears within this framework not as a given structure but as the result of operative processes.

On this basis, the central thesis of the study was developed:

Constituted reality appears as ordered because it is apprehended in unities that are generated and stabilized through distinctions.

This thesis makes it possible to understand the plurality of philosophical positions within a common framework without leveling their differences.

18.2 Consequences for Epistemology and Ontology

(From Givenness to Constitution)

The theory of unity formation leads to a fundamental shift in the understanding of knowledge and world. Epistemologically, it becomes clear that knowledge cannot be understood as the representation of a pregiven reality. Rather, it is a process of meaning production in which constituted reality is generated. Truth appears in this context not as correspondence with an independent world but as system-internal coherence.

Ontologically, this perspective leads away from the conception of a fixed, independently given structure of world. World is not what is, but what appears in the process of unity formation.

This shift does not, however, mean that reality is completely negated. It remains as a limiting concept designating the possibility of a world independent of thought without that world being immediately accessible. A position thereby emerges that is neither naively realist nor relativist but places the processual structure of constituted reality at its center.

18.3 The Relation between Stability and Process

(Integration of Static and Dynamic Perspectives)

A central result of the study consists in the distinction between static and dynamic unity formation.

Static models enable stability, order, and orientation by presupposing unities as given. Dynamic models make visible that these unities are results of processes and must be continuously reproduced.

The analysis has shown that both perspectives are necessary. Without static unities, constituted reality would not be manageable; without dynamic processes, it would not be explicable.

Constituted reality arises in the interplay of both forms. It is neither completely fixed nor completely open but the result of an ongoing process in which stability and change are interconnected.

18.4 Unity Formation as a General Theory of World Constitution

(The Systematic Contribution of the Study)

The theory of unity formation constitutes the systematic contribution of the present investigation. It provides a framework within which different philosophical models can be understood as specific forms of world constitution.

The theory is characterized by four central determinations: it does not presuppose unity but explains it; it understands difference as a constitutive operation; it describes understanding and problem as a dynamic structure of meaning; and it determines time as a condition of the production of constituted reality.

It thereby provides an integrated perspective capable of accounting for both the stability and the processuality of constituted reality.

The theory of unity formation understands itself not as a final description of the world but as a model that analyzes the conditions of its appearance.

18.5 Outlook

(Perspectives for Further Research)

The present study opens several perspectives for further investigation.

First, the theory of unity formation could be applied to specific domains, such as scientific knowledge, social systems, or linguistic structures. This would make it possible to investigate how different forms of unity formation operate in concrete contexts.

Second, a more extensive engagement with other philosophical positions not considered within the present study suggests itself. In particular, it could be examined to what extent the theory of unity formation can also be applied to other traditions.

Third, the question arises as to how the perspective developed here can be further differentiated. This concerns in particular the role of time, self-reference, and observation in the constitution of constituted reality.

Finally, the theory of unity formation opens the possibility of rethinking fundamental philosophical concepts. Concepts such as truth, identity, and reality can no longer simply be presupposed as given but must themselves be understood as results of processes.

Mosaic Piece: Reality and Constituted Reality

General Outline:[8]



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[8] A detailed outline is provided on pp. 466-468.

1. Reality and Constituted Reality

1.1 From the Mosaic to a Systematic Theory of the Constitution of Constituted Reality

The present study pursues a unified systematic concern that runs through all its thematic building blocks, experience, understanding, problem, emotion-feeling-intuition, knowing, interior perspective and spirituality, and world constitution through unity formation. These building blocks are not isolated individual theories but different perspectives on a common fundamental question:

Under what conditions does world appear as meaningful, and how is understanding itself possible?

The focus thereby shifts from a theory *about* world to a theory of the conditions under which world appears as world in the medium of meaning. The study therefore understands itself not as an ontology but as an analysis of the conditions of meaning constitution.

In contrast to versions in which these conditions are grasped at the meta-level through the concept of systems of world constitution, a more precise determination is introduced:

World constitution takes place as unity formation.

This shift is not merely terminological but systematic. It takes account of the insight that "systems" are not primary givens but must themselves be understood as results of operative processes. What appears as unity, nexus, or order is not presupposed but brought forth.

Unity formation designates the fundamental operation in which differences are selectively stabilized so that something can appear as something determinate. World appears not as a pregiven totality but as the result of such processes of stabilization.

The guiding perspective of the study can thus be sharpened:

It is not systems that constitute world; rather, unity formation constitutes what can appear as system, object, or nexus.

The individual mosaic stones develop this perspective step by step from different points of view. They do not reconstruct different parts of a finished world but different dimensions of the same constitutive process in which constituted reality arises.

The study thus moves toward a theory in which understanding itself is conceived as a form of unity formation—and in which the question of world is inseparably connected with the question of the operations through which it appears.

1.2 Guiding Difference: Reality and Constituted Reality within the Horizon of Unity Formation

The central systematic axis of the investigation is the difference between reality and constituted reality.

This difference is neither purely terminological nor merely heuristic. It fulfills a precise functional task within the theory of unity formation:

- **Reality** designates the operationally inaccessible limiting concept presupposed by every unity formation without itself being determinable as a unity. Reality is not known; it functions as a formal boundary against totalization and as a marker of the incompletability and irritability of operative processes.
- **Constituted reality** designates the operatively generated nexus of meaning and world that arises in the process of unity formation. Constituted reality is the structured order of stabilized differences in which world appears as ordered and becomes connectable for further operations.

The resulting thesis is:

Constituted reality is unity formation under the transcendental-operative limitation of reality.

Unity formation here designates the fundamental operation in which differences are selectively stabilized so that something can appear as a unity. Every constituted reality is therefore the result of such processes of stabilization—and at the same time remains open to revision in principle.

Reality functions here as a limiting concept that prevents such unity formations from absolutizing themselves without itself being ontologically filled or positively described. It is not the "other" of constituted reality in the sense of a second domain but the limit of its operative integration.

The guiding difference can therefore be formulated precisely:

Constituted reality is what appears as unity. Reality is what eludes this unity formation.

The difference between reality and constituted reality is thus not a difference between two kinds of being but the fundamental structure that first makes unity formation reflexively determinable.

1.3 Methodological Positioning

The study is situated at the intersection of transcendental philosophy, phenomenology, systems theory, and constructive epistemology.

It retains the transcendental question concerning the conditions of possibility but abandons its subject-philosophical answer. The conditions of possibility are located neither in the transcendental subject nor in ontologically fixed unities, but in operations of unity formation through which meaning, identity, and objectivity are brought forth.

Unity formation does not designate an antecedent structure but an analytically reconstructable enactment: differences are selectively stabilized so that unities arise that can appear as objects, concepts, or nexuses.

The methodological approach thereby shifts fundamentally: identity is regarded not as an antecedent unity but as an effect of unity formation; concepts function not as ontological basic instances but as instruments for stabilizing differences; and the "subject" is not a final constituting instance but an operatively generated unity within processes of constituted reality.

Systems theory remains as a frame of reference but is reinterpreted: systems no longer appear as primary units of analysis but as results of recursive processes of unity formation. The unity "system" is itself an effect of operative stabilization and not its point of departure.

The transcendental question remains, but its locus shifts:

> **It is not the subject that constitutes world,**
> **not the system that constitutes world,**
> **but unity formation that generates the conditions of what can appear as subject, system, and world.**

The classical priority of unity and difference is thereby also reversed:

Unity does not ground difference; rather, difference is provisionally stabilized through unity formation.

The study therefore pursues no ultimate foundation and formulates no ontological total theory. Instead, it develops a reflexive analysis of the conditions of unity formation that understands itself as part of the very operations it describes.

The perspective can thus be precisely characterized as:

transcendental-operative in the mode of unity formation.

1.4 Structure of the Study

The investigation unfolds in eight systematic steps:

- **Experience** genetic emergence of meaning
- **Understanding** structural organization of difference and unity formation
- **Problem** epistemological origin and limiting form of non-integration
- **Emotion, Feeling, Intuition** affective foundation and selective mechanism of meaning
- **Knowing** reflexive stabilization and examination of unity formations
- **Interior Perspective: Spirituality** systemic limitation and self-reference of constituted reality
- **World Constitution through Unity Formation** meta-level of operative integration
- **Synthesis** understanding understanding as reflection upon unity formation

The chapters do not build upon one another additively; rather, they progressively radicalize and abstract the initial difference between reality and constituted reality.

With the introduction of the mosaic stone "World Constitution through Unity Formation," the meta-level of the investigation shifts. The systems-theoretical perspective previously employed is not abandoned but rendered more precise. Systems now no longer appear as fundamental units of world constitution but as results of operative processes of unity formation.

The guiding architecture of the study is thereby sharpened:

It is not systems that constitute world; rather, unity formation constitutes what can appear as a system.

The concluding synthesis turns this perspective back upon itself and develops a reflexive determination of understanding as a process of unity formation that reflects upon its own conditions.

1.5 Central Thesis of the Study

The present study advances the following principal thesis:

World appears as meaningful
because differences are operatively stabilized through unity formation.

Constituted reality is the result of this stabilization. It does not consist of pregiven unities but of processes in which differences are selectively fixed and organized as unities.

Unity formation is thereby the fundamental operation of the constitution of constituted reality:

Something appears as determinable only when it is distinguished from something else and simultaneously stabilized as identical.

Reality functions here as a transcendental-operative limiting concept that limits these processes without itself being operationally available or positively determinable. It marks the principled incompletability of every unity formation and prevents its self-absolutization.

The central structure of the study can therefore be formulated as follows:

- **Constituted reality =** **unity formation** (stabilization of difference)
- **Reality =** **limit of unity formation** (non-integrability)

Several systematic consequences follow from this basic structure:

- Constituted reality is neither a representation of an independent reality nor a mere construction, but an operative process of stabilization.
- Unity is not an ontological point of departure but an effect of unity formation.
- Difference is not secondary but the condition of the possibility of unity.
- Truth is the stability of unity formations under continuing pressure from irritation and problems.
- The **Ich** is not a substantial instance but a stabilized unity within processes of constituted reality.

Emotional mechanisms of selection structure the prereflexive level of this unity formation and determine which differences can appear as relevant at all and become stabilized.

A model is thereby developed that avoids realism without denying reality, avoids relativism without absolutizing constituted reality, and avoids subjectivism without negating perspectivity, while nevertheless consistently taking seriously the constructive and processual structure of constituted reality.

The study thus culminates in a theory in which world is understood not as a given order but as an ongoing process of unity formation under conditions of difference and limitation.

2. Mosaic Stone “Experience”

(Experience as the Locus of the Difference between Reality and Constituted Reality)

2.1 Experience as the Point of Departure of the Analysis

The difference between reality and constituted reality is not posited abstractly in this study but developed from the enactment of experience. Experience is the original process in which world appears: not as subsequent reflection but as ongoing meaning formation.

The guiding thesis is:

Constituted reality arises in the process of experience as a structured order of meaning; reality functions as a transcendental-operative limiting assumption that limits this process without itself being part of the operation of meaning.

Experience is therefore neither a representation of an objective structure nor a free projection, but differential meaning formation under conditions of unavailability.

2.2 Reality: Limiting Concept and Differential Pole of Self-Description

Within experience, a “reality in itself” never appears. What appears is always already organized in formations of meaning. Reality is therefore not an object but a limiting concept.

Reality is, negatively determined:

- not describable, not understandable, not conceptually determinable;
- not part of the operation of meaning;
- not a structured order of significance.

It is not known but posited as a boundary marker. More precisely:

It is not “reality itself” that is asserted; rather, the difference between reality and constituted reality is operatively introduced.

Reality functions as a negative differential pole within a systemic self-description: it marks the fact that meaning production cannot be totalized. This avoids duplicating reality as an ontological “something” outside the operation.

2.3 Irritation, Resistance, and Operative Instability

If reality is not operationally accessible, it cannot be described causally. What appears as an “effect” of reality is therefore not an ontically ascertainable influence but a system-internal attribution of difference: the system registers changes that it cannot completely explain from its own resources and marks them as irritation, resistance, or disturbance.

What appears as an “effect” consists above all in changes of state that cannot be completely derived internally, are experienced as irritation or resistance, and are affectively or bodily marked.

Accordingly, **there is no uninterpreted zero point of experience**. Every experience is already perspectival within constituted reality, while reality, as a boundary marker, prevents this perspectivization from ever being completely encompassed.

2.4 Experience as Operative Differentiation

Experience is not an encounter with a finished inventory of objects but a process in which differences are formed, weighted, and rendered connectable. What appears as "world" arises as an order of distinctions: something is marked as relevant, meaningful, fitting, or disruptive.

Experience is therefore already a formation of constituted reality: it provisionally stabilizes patterns of meaning without thereby attaining access to reality "in itself." Reality remains present as a boundary marker insofar as experience always carries within itself a remainder of non-integration: there remains …

There remains something that cannot be completely transformed into operative order and that, precisely for this reason, keeps it open to revision. This logic will later be sharpened in the mosaic stone "Problem."

2.5 Analog and Digital Modes of Experience

Operative meaning formation takes place in two interwoven structural modes.

Analog understanding operates continuously: through gradations, intensities, atmospheres, and bodily resonances. It opens meaning prior to every conceptual fixation.

Digital understanding operates discretely: through identity/non-identity, categorial determination, and symbolic stabilization. Concepts transform continuous differences into distinguishable unities; only at this level do explicit judgments arise.

Both modes are structurally dependent upon one another: digital stabilization presupposes analog differentiation; analog fullness of meaning requires digital fixation in order to become durably connectable. Constituted reality arises through the interplay of both modes.

2.6 Truth as Stability under Pressure from Irritation

If reality is not operationally accessible, truth cannot mean correspondence with reality. Yet truth is not merely internal coherence either. Rather, truth designates the stability of digitally fixed orders of meaning under continuing pressure from irritation:

True is what proves itself under altered configurations of difference and retains its connectivity.

Truth thereby remains entirely within constituted reality but is bound to its transformability. Reality does not function as a standard but as a boundary marker against the idea of a final, closed order.

2.7 Result of the Mosaic Stone “Experience”

The mosaic stone “Experience” shows, in summary:

- Reality is not asserted as an object but introduced as a limiting concept.
- “Effect” is an operative attribution of difference—irritation or resistance—within constituted reality.
- Experience is always already structured interpretation.
- Constituted reality arises as an analogically grounded and digitally stabilized order of meaning.
- Truth is stability under pressure from irritation.

The difference between reality and constituted reality is therefore neither a metaphysical duplication nor a subjectivist construction, but the necessary structure for reflexively analyzing meaning production without ontologizing or emptying it.

3. Mosaic Stone “Understanding”

(The Structural Organization of Meaning)

3.1 Transition: From Genesis to Structure

Having reconstructed the genetic emergence of meaning in the mosaic stone “Experience,” it must now be clarified how this emergence of meaning is structurally organized in such a way that world appears as understandable constituted reality.

Understanding is not an additional instance above experience but the structural explication of what is already implicit in experience: differences are organized in such a way that connectivity arises.

3.2 World as a Field of Possibilities and Unity Formation

Understanding does not begin with an already articulated world. World initially appears as an open field of possibilities: a multiplicity of possible connections of meaning that are selectively actualized only through operative distinctions. This openness is not a “chaos in itself” but the description of a state prior to stabilized differentiation.

Understanding means forming unities from this multiplicity, fixing relations, and establishing nexuses. These unities are not ontologically pregiven but are results of differentiating operations.

The guiding difference is thereby continued:

- **Constituted reality** is the organized nexus of meaning that arises in such processes of unity formation.
- **Reality** remains the limiting concept that cannot be operationally integrated and that prevents this order from being regarded as final.

3.3 Analog Dimension of Experience and Digital Structure of Thought

The structural organization of meaning can be specified through the distinction between two modes.

The **analog dimension of experience** is characterized by continuity, modulation of intensity, and bodily-affective weighting. Relevance and significance arise gradually—as prereflexive markings of what "counts," without discrete unities already having been fixed.

The **digital structure of thought** operates discretely. Continuous differences are transformed into identifiable unities. Concepts, categories, and symbolic forms stabilize what has already been differentiated analogically. Only at this level do explicit judgments, propositional structures, and communicatively testable statements arise.

The two modes are not separate spheres but functional differences within the same operative nexus. Constituted reality arises as an achievement of mediation, not as the result of a single mode.

3.4 Translation, Selection, and Reduction of Complexity

The transition from the analog to the digital is not a lossless representation. Digital stabilization is always selective: it foregrounds particular differences while leaving others in the background. Precisely thereby it reduces complexity and makes stable connectivity possible.

This raises the question: if digital order is selective, why is it not arbitrary?

The answer is that selection does not occur arbitrarily but under the **pressure of plausibility exerted by the experiential dimension**. Digital order must prove itself within the field of experience; otherwise, it loses connectivity.

3.5 Recursive Mediation and Mutual Limitation

There is no hierarchy between the analog and digital dimensions but a recursive coupling.

The analog dimension of experience limits thought through pressure of plausibility: concepts must prove themselves within the experiential field. Conversely, the digital structure of thought structures experience: it shapes expectations, directs attention, and preconfigures perception.

Understanding therefore does not designate a one-way movement "from feeling to concept" but the continuous coupling of both modes: differentiated experience is transformed into stable orders, while these orders in turn structure new ways of experiencing.

3.6 Constituted Reality as an Organized Nexus of Meaning

In this mediation, constituted reality arises as a structured world-order. Constituted reality is not identical with raw experience but is its organized form: relationally connected, digitally fixed, and analogically grounded patterns of difference that stabilize themselves recursively.

Reality remains strictly the transcendental-operative limiting concept: it cannot be integrated, described, or made available as an object. It functions as a boundary marker that keeps visible the incompletability of every order and prevents totalization.

Understanding operates entirely within constituted reality, not beyond it.

3.7 Truth as Mediated Stability

At this level, the concept of truth receives a further specification. Truth is neither correspondence with reality—since reality is not operationally accessible—nor merely internal coherence. Truth designates the stability of an order that is both **analogically plausible**, that is, capable of being borne by experience, and **digitally consistent**, that is, capable of conceptual stabilization and proves itself under conditions of continuing irritation.

True is what maintains the mediation between the experiential dimension and the structure of thought and remains connectable even under expanded configurations of difference.

Truth is thus **dynamic stability under pressure of mediation**.

3.8 Result of the Mosaic Stone "Understanding"

The mosaic stone "Understanding" shows that constituted reality arises not solely from the genesis of experience but only through its structural organization as world.

Understanding is not a superordinate instance but the operative mediation of analog differentiation and digital stabilization.

Constituted reality is the result of stabilized mediation; reality remains the transcendental-operative limiting concept that, as a formal boundary marker, secures the incompletability of operative order.

From this perspective, understanding appears not as the representation of a pregiven world but as the structural condition under which world can become meaningfully experienceable.

4. Mosaic Stone “Problem”

(Problematicity as Epistemic Point of Departure and Limiting Concept)

4.1 Shifting the Beginning: From Experience to Problematization

The preceding chapters have shown that constituted reality arises from the stabilization of experienced differences: experience generates difference; understanding organizes and stabilizes it. Constituted reality appears as an ordered nexus of analogically grounded and digitally mediated relations of meaning.

The mosaic stone “Problem” radicalizes this perspective by asking about the epistemic beginning of the formation of order. This beginning lies not in an already stabilized constituted reality but in problematicity: in differences that cannot be smoothly integrated and thereby compel orientation before reasons, causes, or nexuses of meaning can be determined.

4.2 Experience and Problem: Clarifying the Beginning

Experience remains the genetic locus at which meaning arises.

The problem, by contrast, is the explicit form of those differences that cannot be immediately stabilized.

The logical order is important: the problem does not lie “before” experience in a temporal sense but logically precedes the formation of order. Problem is not an alternative to the experiential beginning but its radicalized limiting form: it designates precisely those differences that come under pressure of stabilization and must be processed.

The epistemic beginning concerns not the emergence of difference but the necessity of order.

Experience remains the locus at which difference arises. Problem designates those differences that come under pressure of stabilization and must be explicitly processed. The epistemic beginning therefore concerns not the emergence of difference but the necessity of order.

4.3 Problem as Axiom: Ultimate Limitation instead of Ultimate Foundation

Problematicity is introduced as an axiom—not as an ontological assertion about an objective external world but as a methodological ultimate limitation of the theory. It marks that operative meaning formation must acknowledge its own non-totalizability.

The axiom is:

There is that which cannot be integrated.

This statement describes no property of reality but prevents constituted reality from being misunderstood as a completely self-grounding totality. The axiom does not replace an ultimate foundation; it prevents one.

This also allows a delicate formulation to be specified: “problematically effective” does not mean the causal influence of a positively determinable real, but the system-internal marking of persistent non-integrability. “Given” here means: not completely available or integrable—not ontologically fixed.

4.4 Reality as Limiting Concept—Problem as Experienced Boundary Marking

In the mosaic stone “Experience,” reality was determined as a transcendental-operative limiting concept. In the context of the problem, this determination receives an epistemic sharpening.

Reality is not structured constituted reality but the boundary marker of the operation of meaning—not an order of meaning, but the marking that meaning formation fails at certain differences or remains precarious.

Crucially, this “efficacy” is not an ontically describable cause but an operative attribution within constituted reality: the system designates as “boundary” what cannot be completely integrated despite attempts at ordering.

A precise distinction can therefore be drawn:

- **Reality** = the formal boundary of operative meaning formation; not operationally accessible and not describable.
- **Problem** = the experienced efficacy of this boundary under pressure of order, that is, the operative manifestation of non-integrability within constituted reality.

4.5 Constituted Reality as a Methodological Response

When what cannot be integrated becomes problematic, constituted reality arises as a methodological achievement of ordering. Constituted reality is not a representation of reality but a produced, provisional, and revision-open order of meaning that must prove itself in dealing with problems.

Causality, conditionality, and meaning are not properties of reality but categories of order within constituted reality. **Order is a response to problem, not a property of being.**

Constituted reality is in this functional sense “secondary” to problematicity: without problem, there would be no occasion for stabilization.

4.6 The Structural Remainder: Incompletability of Order

Every digital stabilization of analog difference is selective—and every selection produces loss. This loss is not a deficiency but a constitutive remainder: differences remain that cannot be completely integrated even after attempts at stabilization.

Problem designates precisely this persistent non-integrability. The openness of constituted reality is thereby systematically secured: constituted reality is continued processing, not completion. Reality remains effective as a limiting concept without ever being positively determinable.

4.7 Truth under Pressure of Problematization

If reality is not operationally accessible, truth can mean neither correspondence with reality nor merely internal coherence. Rather, truth designates the **comparative stability of orders under continuing pressure of problematization and irritation**.

This means that not every order is equally valid. Validity depends upon successful testing—upon whether an order remains connectable when problematicity recurs, intensifies, or assumes new forms.

4.8 Result of the Mosaic Stone "Problem"

The mosaic stone "Problem" radicalizes the architecture developed thus far without abandoning it: experience is the genetic beginning of difference; problem is the explicit limiting form of difference that cannot be stabilized under pressure of order; reality appears not as an object but as an epistemically unavailable boundary marker, whose "efficacy" is an operative attribution of persistent non-integrability; constituted reality arises as a methodological response, namely as a revision-open order that must prove itself; and the structural remainder of every stabilization secures the principled openness of world.

5. Mosaic Stone "Emotion, Feeling, Intuition"

(Constituted Reality as Embodied-Emotional Resonance)

5.1 Transition: From Problem and Pressure of Order to Resonance

The preceding mosaic stones have shown that experience is the genetic locus of difference; understanding organizes this difference; and problem marks persistent non-integrability and generates pressure of order.

Two guiding questions, however, remain open:

How is reality experienced as effective if it is not operationally accessible? And how does difference appear prior to every methodological stabilization?

The answer leads into the dimension of emotion, feeling, and intuition. The focus shifts from the structural organization of meaning to the embodied-affective grounding of meaning formation:

Constituted reality does not first arise in thought but already in the resonance between body and world.

5.2 Reality and Constituted Reality in the Logic of Resonance

Here, too, reality does not appear as a meaningfully structured world or as an object that could be known or conceptually determined.

Rather, reality functions as an epistemically unavailable boundary-reference: as that which is marked as resistance or impulse within meaning formation without itself being an order.

Constituted reality, by contrast, arises in the resonance between body and world. Resonance here does not mean harmonious accord but the embodied-affective structure of response to difference that cannot be completely integrated.

Constituted reality is therefore not a representation of an objective reality but the structured appearance of world in the enactment of emotional, embodied, and later conceptual processes.

5.3 Emotion as a Meaning-Constitutive Process

Emotions are not subsequent evaluations of already finished states of affairs. They are meaning-constitutive processes:

Emotion is the elementary structure of intensity in which difference is marked as significant.

It determines what appears relevant before a conceptual judgment is formed.

The architecture developed thus far thereby receives a deeper foundation: difference does not arise neutrally but is emotionally weighted—and this weighting structures perception itself.

Emotion functions here as a transcendental condition of knowledge because without affective structuring there would be no selectivity, no attention, no prioritization—and thus no formation of constituted reality.

5.4 Feeling as a Perspectivized Relation to World

Feeling is more strongly structured than mere emotion. Whereas emotion marks intensity, feeling already establishes a relational order of world. Feelings connect embodied resonance, situational embeddedness, implicit evaluation, and self-reference.

It follows that constituted reality never appears neutrally but perspectivally—embodied, biographically, and situationally concretized. This perspectivity, however, does not imply arbitrariness but structural limitation through form of life and context.

Constituted reality is emotionally perspectivized from the outset.

5.5 Intuition as Implicit Integration of Wholeness

Intuition designates a further preconceptual mode. It is neither mere intensity nor only relational feeling, but an **implicit apprehension of wholeness**: it enables orientation within the field of possibilities before conceptual stabilization occurs and integrates multiple differences into a provisionally coherent overall configuration.

Important for the conceptual logic is:

Intuition is not access to reality "in itself."

It is an implicit organizational achievement within constituted reality—mediated through emotional resonance—and stands between affective structuring and digital explication.

5.6 The “Two-Level Structure” in Emotional Depth

The distinction between the analog dimension of experience and the digital structure of thought introduced in the mosaic stone “Understanding” acquires greater depth here: this structure is emotionally grounded. The analog dimension is not merely energetic but emotionally structured; digital stabilization fixes a meaning that has previously been formed emotionally and intuitively.

The guiding formulations can therefore be read precisely as follows:

Perception is appearance, not representation; thought is subsequent ordering; language stabilizes meaning that has already arisen.

At no point is reality identified with constituted reality. Constituted reality remains the only operative space of meaning formation.

5.7 De-Substantialization of the I

A further deepening concerns the determination of the **I**. The I is not an antecedent substance behind experience but the personal form of appearance of the resonance process itself: not the origin of meaning formation but the nodal point of embodied-emotional processing of difference. The unity of the I is not presupposed but arises processually in the enactment of resonance and stabilization.

The constitution of constituted reality is thereby de-substantialized: constituted reality is not the product of an autonomous consciousness but the personally concrete enactment of an embodied-emotional relation to world. Reality remains strictly a limiting concept; constituted reality is the processual enactment of this relation to world.

5.8 Transcendental Radicalization of the Difference

By identifying emotions as transcendental conditions of knowledge, the difference between reality and constituted reality is further deepened:

Reality remains what cannot be represented and is not operationally accessible; constituted reality is the emotionally perspectivized world.

Constituted reality is thus already constructive at the prereflexive level—not in the sense of free projection but as embodied, situated structuring. The difference thereby acquires a phenomenological depth:

Constituted reality is always already emotionally formed before it is conceptually stabilized.

5.9 Systematic Condensation

The mosaic stone “Emotion Feeling Intuition” condenses the architecture developed thus far: reality is not immediate appearance but boundary-reference; constituted reality arises in embodied-emotional resonance; emotion functions as the transcendental intensity-structure of

difference; feeling perspectivizes world relationally; intuition preconceptually integrates wholes; and the I is the appearance of this process, not its sovereign origin.

At the same time, one point remains important for the later movement toward normativity and truth: the de-substantialization of the I does not entail a loss of responsibility. The I is not a metaphysical substance but a stabilized locus of attribution; truth arises not from subjective positing but from interpersonal testing under pressure of problematization.

6. Mosaic Stone "Knowing"

(Knowledge as Reflexive Enactment within Constituted Reality)

6.1 Knowledge as an Internal Enactment of the Interior Perspective

In the mosaic stone "Knowing," the difference between reality and constituted reality is not introduced as mere terminology but developed through the enactment of knowledge itself.

Knowledge is not access to objectively and independently existing truths but a processual enactment from the interior perspective. It does not take place outside but within the embodied and situated enactment of world.

This interior perspective is not a subjectivist limitation but the transcendental-operative condition of knowledge as such. Every act of knowing is a perspectivization within an already structured nexus of constituted reality; there is no epistemological external standpoint.

The locus of knowledge therefore lies unequivocally on the level of constituted reality, as a nexus of appearance and interpretation, not as reality "in itself."

Accordingly:

Knowledge is not access to reality, but the reflexive structuring of constituted reality.

6.2 The Difference between Reality and Constituted Reality in the Enactment of Knowing

The architecture developed thus far determines reality as a boundary marker that cannot be completely integrated, while constituted reality has appeared as a relationally constituted order of meaning arising from the interplay of experience, understanding, and emotional resonance. In the context of knowing, this difference is epistemologically sharpened: **only constituted reality is known.**

Reality is not denied but epistemically suspended: it is presupposed as the limit and condition of difference without itself being positively determinable. This suspension concerns only the level of knowledge. Its problematic efficacy, in the sense of a system-internal attribution of non-integrability, remains unaffected: reality remains effective as a boundary marker even though it cannot become an object of knowledge.

The point can therefore be formulated precisely: knowledge does not operate "in the domain of reality" but within constituted reality. Constituted reality is the nexus in which reality appears only as a limiting boundary-reference, not as an identifiable structure.

6.3 Understanding and Knowing as Qualitative Transformation

To avoid redundancy, the difference between understanding and knowing must be clearly drawn:

- **Understanding** operatively organizes differences. It mediates between the analog dimension of experience and the digital structure of thought and enables orientation; it can remain implicit without having to thematize its own structure.
- **Knowing** transforms this implicit organizational achievement into an explicit claim to validity. It makes the order itself the object of examination: whereas understanding integrates difference, knowing reflects upon the conditions of this integration.

Knowing is therefore not merely an intensification of understanding but a qualitative transformation: implicit order of meaning becomes explicit, justifiable, and open to revision.

6.4 Knowledge as the Recognition of Coherence

A new determination is that of knowledge as the **recognition of coherence**. Knowledge does not arise through correspondence with reality but through the fit between experience, meaning, and situational understanding within constituted reality.

“Coherence” does not mean merely subjective agreement but relational coherence in the enactment of world: knowledge occurs when an order of constituted reality proves viable, integrates differences, and remains stable under pressure of problematization.

At the same time, this coherence is not purely cognitive. It is rooted in the embodied-emotional prestructuring of constituted reality. Knowing does not abolish this foundation but brings it into an explicit, testable, and justifiable form: **knowing is the reflexive explication of a constituted reality already structured through resonance.**

6.5 Truth as Reflexively Accountable Stabilization

Truth is defined here not as correspondence with reality but as the **reflexively accountable stabilization of coherence within constituted reality**. Truth is an intensified form of testing: not merely functional viability but methodically examined and justified stability.

This stabilization takes place under deliberate pressure of problematization: knowledge seeks out difference in order to test its own viability. Truth is therefore not a representation but a particularly robust form of the ordering of constituted reality.

6.6 Demarcation from Ontological Realism

In relation to ontological realisms, the position is explicitly sharpened: fields of sense or nexuses of order are not understood as ontological structures of reality but as epistemic models of order within constituted reality. Constituted reality is not a metaphysical blueprint of the world but a nexus of appearance and interpretation.

Reality is not ontologically appropriated. It remains a boundary marker that can never be completely captured; constituted reality remains the sole locus of knowing. Knowledge

therefore does not mean identifying reality but stabilizing orders of constituted reality under reflexive conditions.

6.7 Epistemic Status of Knowing

Whereas "experience" describes the embodied-affective genesis of meaning and "understanding" develops the structural organization of these differences, "knowing" clarifies the epistemic status of the process: knowing is not subsequent representation but a reflexive enactment in which constituted reality proves coherent.

Knowing is the methodically intensified form of what already occurs implicitly in the enactment of world: the continuous, self-critical stabilization of constituted reality under acknowledgment of its principled limitation.

6.8 Result

The mosaic stone "Knowing" provides the epistemological sharpening of the preceding building blocks: reality remains the limiting concept that cannot be positively determined; constituted reality is the processual, embodied-affectively structured nexus of appearance; and knowing is the recognition and methodical securing of coherence within this constituted reality.

The difference between reality and constituted reality is thereby not merely repeated but systematically secured: **knowledge is not access to reality in itself but reflexive enactment within constituted reality, open, limited, and revisable.**

7. Mosaic Stone "Interior Perspective: Spirituality"

(Existential Radicalization of Constituted Reality at the Boundary Marker "Reality")

7.1 Interior Perspective as Structural Point of Departure

In the mosaic stone "Interior Perspective – Spirituality," the difference between reality and constituted reality is not introduced as an ontological opposition but developed as a structural consequence of the interior perspective: human beings never encounter world "immediately," but always perspectivally and mediated through embodiment and culture. What is accessible is therefore exclusively appearing, interpreted, and systemically structured constituted reality.

Reality "in itself," by contrast, remains inaccessible in the Kantian tradition. It is neither known nor described but functions as a limiting concept: as the formal marker that every order of meaning remains incomplete and that irritation remains possible.

The architecture developed thus far is thereby consistently continued:

- **Constituted reality** = actualized, operatively stabilized nexus of meaning within the interior perspective.
- **Reality** = operationally inaccessible boundary marker that, as a source of irritation/difference, prevents the totalization of constituted reality without itself being ontologically filled.

7.2 The Space of Possibilities as a Formal Model of the Formation of Constituted Reality

What is new here is the explicit modeling of the process of constituted reality as a **space of possibilities**: constituted reality does not arise as immediate "givenness" but as the selective actualization of possible interpretations.

The structure can be formulated formally as follows:

Possibility → Selection → Actualization

Constituted reality is not the totality of all possibilities but their operative realization in enactment. The constructive structure of constituted reality is thereby formalized without ontologically replacing reality or introducing it as an object.

Reality remains strictly the limiting concept: it is not "one further possibility" but the boundary marker that keeps visible the incompletability of every actualization.

7.3 Emotion, Intuition, and Faith as Instances of Selection and Validation

Selection within the space of possibilities does not occur purely through understanding. Emotions function as mechanisms of weighting: they mark options as plausible, coherent, or viable. Intuition integrates complex relations prereflexively; faith stabilizes particular options against competing possibilities.

Here, too, the conceptual boundary is important: coherence arises as the convergence of embodied resonance, conceptual order, and situational fit. This convergence is not correspondence with reality but system-internal validation within constituted reality.

7.4 "Personal Reality" as Personally Actualized Constituted Reality

The category "personal reality" used in the text is conceptually risky because it can misleadingly load the limiting concept of "reality" with ontological content. I therefore reformulate it consistently here:

Instead of "personal reality": "personally actualized constituted reality."

What is meant is not an ontological special world but the concretely realized structure of meaning within an individual system of meaning: the result of selective actualization within the space of possibilities.

This personally actualized constituted reality remains entirely located within constituted reality; it is not a "second reality" alongside an ontological world.

"Personal reality" here designates exclusively personally actualized constituted reality—operatively and constructively in the medium of meaning—and not the limiting concept of reality or an ontologically assumed reality.

7.5 Spirituality as Paradigmatic Actualization of Possibility

Within this model, spirituality appears as a specific practice within the space of possibilities. It is neither access to a transcendent reality nor a special constituted reality beyond the world. Spirituality operates within constituted reality as a particular form of actualization of meaning.

It radicalizes the interior perspective by not merely acknowledging the difference between reality and constituted reality epistemologically but weighting it existentially: spirituality is not a necessary stage of the system architecture but a possible form of intensification of the enactment of world.

7.6 Spirituality Does Not Experience Reality but the Limit of Constituted Reality

The decisive point is as follows:

Spirituality does not experience reality as an object, but the limitation of every actualized order of meaning.

Reality remains epistemically suspended and operationally inaccessible. Spiritual enactments likewise provide no access to a "higher level of reality." What is experienced is an intensified sensitivity to the non-integrable within the space of possibilities—that is, an intensification of attention to those differences that constituted reality cannot completely stabilize.

No metaphysical ontology is thereby introduced. The difference between reality and constituted reality remains strictly preserved: **spirituality is the experience of limitation, not the experience of transcendence as an object.**

7.7 Existential Validity and Embodied Testing

Validity is not determined solely through understanding. Constituted reality arises where abstract designs become effective as guides to action within the individual system of meaning. Coherence is not merely cognitive coherence but embodied-existentially tested stability.

Spirituality intensifies this dimension of testing: it is not a new truth but a particular weighting within the space of possibilities that stabilizes existential orientation without transforming the limiting concept of reality into a positive doctrine.

7.8 Safeguarding against Ontologization and Subjectivism

The danger of ontologization is explicitly excluded: spirituality grounds neither an additional level of reality nor a metaphysical world behind the world. Reality remains a limiting concept; constituted reality remains the sole space of meaning, experience, and knowledge.

Subjectivism is likewise avoided: personal actualization remains within relational orders and continues to be subject to pressure from difference and problematization.

Spirituality is therefore not an unassailable private truth but a particular form of system-internal actualization of meaning.

7.9 Result

The mosaic stone integrates the embodied-emotional foundation ("Emotion, Feeling, Intuition"), the epistemological clarification ("Knowing"), and the constructive structure of meaning formation within a formalized model of the space of possibilities.

Conceptually specified, the result is:

- Reality remains a non-integrable, operationally inaccessible boundary marker—neither an object nor a describable dimension.
- Constituted reality arises in the enactment of the interior perspective as a systemically, relationally, and emotionally structured actualization of possibilities.
- Spirituality is not a transcendent special reality but a reflective practice within this process of the formation of constituted reality, in which the boundary marker "reality" becomes existentially palpable as the limitation of actualized order.

8. World Constitution through Unity Formation

(Synthesis – Understanding Understanding)

8.1 Transition: From Systems to Unity Formation

The preceding mosaic stones have progressively disclosed the conditions of the constitution of constituted reality. Experience proves to be the genetic origin of meaning, understanding its structural organization, problem the epistemic impetus and limiting case of stabilization, emotion its affective foundation, and knowing the reflexive examination and consolidation of generated orders. Each of these mosaic stones thereby discloses a distinct dimension of the same fundamental process: the constitution of constituted reality.

At its most general level, however, this fundamental process cannot adequately be grasped through already formed orders but only through analysis of what precedes them. For before something can appear as a nexus, object, structure, or order, it must first be distinguished from something else and stabilized as a unity within this distinction. Precisely therein lies the systematic priority of unity formation.

World constitution takes place as unity formation.

This determination is not merely a terminological shift but follows from a methodological and substantive clarification. It takes account of the insight that stable orders do not stand at the beginning but themselves emerge from processes in which differences are selectively fixed, held together, and rendered connectable. What appears as constituted reality is therefore not the unfolding of already existing unities but the result of operations in which unity is first formed.

Unity formation thus designates the elementary level of the constitution of constituted reality. It refers to the process in which something emerges as something determinate by being simultaneously distinguished from something else and rendered identifiable in itself. Only on

this basis can more complex configurations, relations, and orders arise that can then be experienced as stable nexuses of world.

It is not order that is primordial, but the process of its formation.

The meta-level of the investigation thereby also shifts. The focus is no longer on the description of already stabilized nexuses but on the reconstruction of those operations through which stability first arises. The guiding perspective is therefore:

It is not pregiven unities that constitute reality,
but processes of unity formation that generate
what can appear as unity, nexus, and world.

8.2 Unity Formation as the Fundamental Operation of the Constitution of Constituted Reality

The fundamental thesis is:

Constituted reality arises as differences are stabilized into unities.

Unity is not presupposed but is a result. Difference is not secondary but constitutive.

The architecture developed thus far can therefore be specified as follows:

Experience generates differences; emotion weights these differences; understanding organizes them; knowing stabilizes them reflexively; and unity formation integrates them into world.

Unity arises only where something is distinguished from something else and simultaneously stabilized as identical.

Constituted reality is therefore not an inventory of things but a configuration of stabilized unities.

8.3 Reality and Constituted Reality under the Conditions of Unity Formation

The guiding difference between reality and constituted reality remains in place but is redetermined within the framework of the theory of unity formation. If constituted reality does not consist of pregiven unities but arises only in the process of their production, then reality can no longer be conceived as a second, independently structured order, but only as the limit of this process.

Reality designates the transcendental-operative limiting concept of that which eludes every unity formation. It is neither object nor structure but the marker of the principled incompletability of operative meaning formation. Reality does not appear positively but only

negatively: as that which resists complete integration into unity and thereby limits every stabilization.

Constituted reality, by contrast, is the enactment of unity formation itself. It arises where differences are selectively stabilized and appear as unities. Constituted reality is the order in which something is determined as something, a configuration of stabilized distinctions that presents itself as world and remains connectable for further operations.

The difference can therefore be formulated as follows:

Reality limits unity formation; constituted reality is its enactment.

This relation is not external but constitutive. Unity formation can succeed only by stabilizing differences, while at the same time necessarily remaining related to what eludes this stabilization. The openness of constituted reality is grounded in precisely this tension.

Reality is therefore not the other of constituted reality but its limit. It appears not as a unity but as that which repeatedly irritates unity: as resistance, remainder, and the non-integrable that makes visible the provisional character of every order. Precisely herein lies its systematic function. Reality prevents constituted reality from absolutizing itself without ever itself becoming determinable as part of constituted reality.

8.4 Problem and Unity Formation

Within the theory of unity formation, the mosaic stone “Problem” acquires a more precise systematic function. A problem does not simply designate a lack of knowledge or a mere disturbance within an already finished order. Rather, a situation becomes problematic where unity formation reaches its limit: where differences can no longer readily be integrated, where existing orders become unstable, or where what had previously appeared as a unity loses its self-evidence.

In this sense, the problem is the manifest form of non-integrability. It makes visible that constituted reality does not consist of definitively secured unities but of provisional stabilizations that always remain open to irritation. Precisely herein lies its systematic significance. The problem does not simply destroy order but indicates the limit of a particular order and thereby creates the necessity of renewed unity formation.

Unity formation is therefore to be understood as a response to problem. It begins where differences cannot remain in their mere distinctness but must be organized into a new, viable unity. Without problem there would be no occasion for stabilization; without unity formation, however, no constituted reality could arise. Constituted reality is therefore neither the mere givenness of order nor the mere presence of difference but the result of an ongoing process in which problematic differences are repeatedly transformed into provisionally stable nexuses.

The dynamics of world constitution can therefore be understood as a movement from **problem to unity formation, stabilization, and renewed problematization**. Every stabilization remains selective and finite; precisely for this reason, it can release new differences that may themselves become problematic. Constituted reality is thus not a closed state but a process of

continuing unity formation under pressure from problems. In this movement, order proves not to be the end of the problem but always only its provisional processing.

8.5 Truth as the Stability of Unities

Within the theory of unity formation, the concept of truth can likewise be determined more precisely. Truth designates neither correspondence with reality nor merely the internal coherence of a self-contained nexus. Since reality is not available as a positively accessible object, truth cannot consist in agreement with it. Nor is it sufficient to understand truth solely as internal consistency, since even an internally coherent order can collapse under the pressure of new differences.

Rather, **a unity formation is true insofar as it remains stable under pressure from irritation and problems**. Truth in this sense designates the successful testing of unity in the course of its continued examination. It is not a static property that belongs to an order once and for all but manifests itself in the capacity of a formed unity to remain viable under altered conditions.

A unity proves itself true when it remains connectable, that is, when it enables further operations without collapsing. It must be capable of integrating differences rather than failing because of them, and it must also prove itself under variation, that is, remain stable when perspectives, conditions, or problems change. Truth is therefore neither representation nor mere consistency but **the stability of unities in the process of their testing**.

In this determination, truth itself is integrated into the dynamics of the constitution of constituted reality. It is not an external standard applied to unity formations from outside but the manner in which a unity formation proves itself within constituted reality as robust, connectable, and capable of accommodating difference. Truth is thus **the reflexively secured stability of unity under conditions of continuing irritation**.

8.6 The I as an Effect of Unity

The de-substantialization of the I acquires its precise systematic form within the theory of unity formation. The I is not an antecedent, self-contained unity that precedes the processes of the constitution of constituted reality. Rather, it arises within these processes themselves as a particular form of stabilized unity.

The I is therefore neither the origin nor the final instance of meaning formation but its result. It develops from emotional weightings through which particular differences emerge as relevant, from operative processes of difference-processing in which these relevances are ordered and processed, and from recursive enactments of unity formation in which such orders become condensed and stabilized over time. What appears as the I is thus not a metaphysical core but a generated form of self-reference.

Precisely because the I develops within these processes, it is neither absolute nor immutable as a unity. It possesses stability only insofar as particular self-relations, modes of perception, evaluations, and orientations are continuously reproduced and confirmed. The I is therefore to be understood not as substance but as a processually generated and maintained unity.

In this sense, it can be said: **The I is a particularly stable self-reference within the process of world constitution.** It is that form of unity in which constituted reality not only orders itself but, within this order, simultaneously refers back to itself.

8.7 Unity Formation as the Meta-Level of the Previous Mosaic Stones

The preceding mosaic stones can now be reconstructed within a unified framework:

Experience → emergence of difference; understanding → structural organization; problem → limiting form of non-integration; emotion → affective selection; knowing → reflexive stabilization.

These are not separate levels but moments of an overall process:

Unity formation is the meta-operation that integrates all these processes.

Unity formation thereby not only replaces the systems perspective but explains it, because systems themselves are results of stabilized unity formation.

8.8 Understanding Understanding

The original guiding question of the study—"understanding understanding"—receives its final systematic determination within the theory of unity formation. If constituted reality does not appear as a pregiven order but is brought forth in the process of unity formation, then understanding, too, is not merely a subsequent access to already existing nexuses. Rather, understanding is itself that enactment in which differences are organized into unities, stabilized, and rendered experienceable as meaningful nexuses of world.

The guiding insight can therefore be formulated precisely:

Understanding is unity formation.

Understanding understanding consequently does not consist in adopting an external standpoint above this process but in reflecting upon the operations through which understanding itself brings forth constituted reality. It is directed not only toward the contents of what is understood but toward the process of their constitution.

This means: understanding forms unities; knowing examines these unities; reflection understands this process itself.

In this gradation, the internal architecture of the study is condensed. Understanding is the operative production of unity, knowing the critical examination of its viability, and reflection the return to the conditions of this entire nexus. It thereby becomes visible that constituted reality is not understandable because it already exists as a finished order but because it emerges from processes of understanding and acquires its form within them.

8.9 Result of the Synthesis

The synthesis leads to a fundamental redetermination. World is neither a system of things, nor a representation of reality, nor a mere construct. Rather:

World is the result of operative unity formation under conditions of difference and limitation.

This yields the final condensation:

Constituted reality is stabilized unity formation.
Reality is the limit of this stabilization.
World is the process of their ongoing mediation.

9. Synthesis and Outlook

(Reality as Limiting Concept; Constituted Reality as Operatively Stabilized Order of Meaning)

9.1 Review of the Guiding Question

The present study began from a transcendentally reformulated fundamental question:

Under what conditions does world appear as meaningful, and how is understanding itself possible?

This question was answered not ontologically but through an analysis of operations. The aim was not a theory about world but a theory of the conditions under which world appears as world in the medium of meaning.

At the center stood the guiding difference between reality and constituted reality. Reality was determined as a transcendental-operative limiting concept, constituted reality as an operatively stabilized order of meaning. This difference proved not to be a terminological stipulation but a necessary structure for reflexively analyzing meaning production without ontologically absolutizing it or relativistically emptying it.

9.2 Systematic Integration of the Mosaic Stones

The individual mosaic stones have progressively disclosed different dimensions of the constitution of constituted reality. In their synthesis, they reveal a consistent architecture.

Experience showed the genetic emergence of difference. Constituted reality arose as an analogically grounded and digitally stabilized order of meaning, while reality functioned as the non-integrable boundary marker of operative meaning formation. Understanding reconstructed the structural organization of these differences as mediation between the analog dimension of experience and the digital structure of thought. Problem radicalized the difference epistemologically: reality appeared as the effective boundary of non-stabilizable difference, constituted reality as a methodological response under pressure of order. Emotion, feeling, and intuition deepened the transcendental grounding: difference is never neutral but embodied-affectively weighted, with emotion proving to be a transcendental instance of selection. Knowing specified truth as the reflexively accountable stabilization of coherence within constituted reality. Interior perspective and spirituality formally modeled the formation of constituted reality as the actualization of a space of possibilities under existential weighting. Finally, world constitution through unity formation raised the entire architecture to a more fundamental meta-level: world now appeared as the result of operative unity formation in which differences are selectively stabilized and condensed into orders. Systems were thereby reconstructed no longer as points of departure but as effects of such processes of unity formation.

These steps were not additive building blocks but increasing abstractions and radicalizations of the same basic structure. The difference between reality and constituted reality remained invariant throughout; only the degree of its explication changed.

9.3 Reality as a Formal Boundary Marker

A central result of the study is:

Reality is not an object but a limiting concept.

It is not positively determinable but operatively indispensable. Reality was neither ontologically filled nor epistemically eliminated. Its function consists in marking the non-totalizability of operative meaning formation. It is a source of irritation, a boundary marker of persistent non-integrability, a condition of difference, and a safeguard against self-absolutization.

In this determination, reality is neither a metaphysical world behind the world nor a mere sign of thought. It is a transcendental ultimate limitation. Precisely thereby, constituted reality is prevented from being misunderstood as a closed totality. Reality is no more than a formal boundary marker—but also no less.

9.4 Constituted Reality as Operative Stabilization of Meaning

Constituted reality, by contrast, has consistently been determined as an operatively stabilized order of meaning. It is relationally constituted, embodied-emotionally grounded, perspectivally bound, systemically organized, and transformable under pressure of problematization.

Constituted reality is not a representation of a reality in itself. Nor is it an arbitrary construction. It arises through the interplay of analog differentiation, digital stabilization, affective weighting, and recursive system formation.

Its validity rests not upon correspondence but upon successful testing under pressure from irritation and problematization. Truth has therefore been determined not as representation but as robust stability within open orders.

9.5 De-Substantialization of Subject and World

A decisive shift in the study consisted in the de-substantialization of classical fundamental concepts.

The subject is not a transcendental ultimate instance. It is a point of stabilization within operative processes of meaning. World is not an ontologically given totality. It is an effect of systemic distinctions. Unity is not a presupposition but the result of difference.

The transcendental question is thereby not abandoned but displaced:

It is not a subject that constitutes world; rather, operative difference generates the conditions of what can appear as subject and world.

9.6 Avoiding Realism, Relativism, and Subjectivism

The systematic viability of the approach becomes apparent in a threefold demarcation.

Against naive realism, constituted reality is not the immediate representation of an ontologically fixed inventory of world. Knowledge remains an internal enactment of meaning; reality is not an object but a boundary marker against absolutization.

Against radical relativism, orders of constituted reality remain subject to pressure from testing and problematization; not every order is equally viable or equally connectable.

Against subjectivism, meaning does not arise from free positing but from embodied-emotional and systemic coupling under conditions of limitation; constituted reality is contingent but not arbitrary.

The difference between reality and constituted reality thereby functions as a regulative instrument that prevents totalization without abandoning orientation.

9.7 Transcendental-Operative Status of the Theory

The theory presented here understands itself as transcendental-operative: it asks about conditions of possibility without ontologically hypostatizing them. It provides no ultimate foundation but an ultimate limitation.

It does not describe reality "in itself" but reconstructs how references to reality occur as boundary markings in the stabilization of orders of constituted reality. Its self-reference is not a defect but a consequence: the theory is itself part of the operative production of meaning that it describes. Its validity lies not in absolute ultimate truth but in the reflexive transparency of its own conditions.

9.8 Philosophical Scope and Connectivity

The systemic-transcendental theory of the constitution of constituted reality under affective grounding opens several possibilities for further connection: epistemologically, as a model of dynamic truth beyond correspondence and mere coherence; phenomenologically, through the integration of embodied-emotional grounding as a transcendental condition; systems-theoretically, through the formalization of meaning formation as operative stabilization of difference; existential-philosophically, through the interpretation of spirituality not as access to transcendence or reality as an object but as heightened sensitivity to the limitation of actualized constituted reality; and interdisciplinarily, through the model of a space of possibilities, which permits structural analogies with complexity-theoretical and probabilistic descriptions of the formation of order.

The study thus remains open to further development, particularly with regard to social systems, normative orders, and questions of intersubjective validity.

9.9 Concluding Thesis

The central insight of this investigation can be summarized in a condensed formula:

World appears as meaningful because systems operatively stabilize difference.
Constituted reality is the result of this stabilization.

Reality is the transcendental-operative boundary marker that limits this stabilization without itself being operationally available or positively determinable.

The philosophical point lies not in a new ontology but in the insight that meaning arises only under conditions of limitation.

Reality is not what we can know.
It is what prevents us from taking our constituted reality to be absolute.

Precisely in this methodological self-limitation lies the theoretical coherence, and at the same time the principled openness, of the systemic-transcendental theory of the constitution of constituted reality developed here.

In the end, the guiding difference remains strict: reality is a limiting concept, transcendental-operative, not an object. It is presupposed as an operationally inaccessible boundary marker underlying every production of meaning without itself being positively determinable. Reality is therefore neither describable nor understandable nor conceptually exhaustible, nor is it part of the operation of meaning; it is not known but functions as the marking of a boundary.

At the meta-level, reality is no more than a formal boundary marker—but also no less: a marker of incompletability, a source of irritation, and a safeguard against totalization, without being ontologically filled. The question is not what reality is but how references to reality arise. Constituted reality, by contrast, is a concept of meaning—operative-constructive—not a boundary: it is the operationally accessible nexus of meaning and world that appears as world in the enactment of distinctions, observations, and communications, stabilizes and varies, and proves itself within these operations.

It is always constituted reality that is known and thematized, while reality, as a boundary marker, limits these orders and keeps them open to revision.

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